B.F.W. v. F.P.

2025 BCSC 975 B.F.W. v. F.P.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: B.F.W. v. F.P., 2025 BCSC 975 Date: 20250527 Docket: E4840 Registry: Courtenay Between: B.F.W. Claimant And: F.P. Respondent Before: The Honourable Justice Wolfe Reasons for Judgment Counsel for the Claimant: S. Gabel D. Girard, A/S (June 4, 5 and 7, 2024) Counsel for the Respondent: I. Won Place and Date of Summary Trial: Courtenay, B.C. June 4, 5 and 7, 2024 Further Written Submissions: July 3, 2024 Further Interim Applications: December 13, 2024 and March 12, 2025 Place and Date of Judgment: Courtenay, B.C. May 27, 2025 Table of Contents Introduction.. 4 Issues. 6 Factual background.. 7 The parties and their circumstances. 7 January 2020 incident and ensuing orders. 8 Post-separation circumstances. 11 Procedural history. 14 Analysis. 17 Preliminary issue: suitability for summary trial 17 Issue 1: Parental responsibilities and parenting time. 19 The legal principles. 20 Family violence allegations. 21 Travel within and outside of Canada. 28 Parenting time. 30 The parties' positions. 30 Discussion. 32 Issue 2: Division of family property and debt 38 Legal framework. 39 Would equal division of the equity in the Family Residence be significantly unfair?. 41 Should the Family Residence be listed to determine its value?. 42 Is the contribution from the Mother's parents a family debt?. 46 Would the outcome of a notional equal

division be significantly unfair?. 48 Division of the remaining family property and debt 54 Vehicles. 55 Bank accounts. 56 Pensions. 57 Household effects. 58 Other family debts. 60 Conclusion on division of family property. 61 Issue 3: Child support, special expenses and spousal support 62 The parties' Guidelines incomes for prospective support and s. 7 expenses. 63 Retroactive child support 65 Retroactive s. 7 expenses. 69 Spousal Support 70 The legal framework. 71 Compensatory support 73 Non-compensatory support 76 Quantum and duration of spousal support 80 Issue 4: Divorce. 84 Conclusion and summary of orders. 86 Schedule A.. 99 Introduction [1] The claimant mother, B.F.W. (the "Mother"), applies for summary trial of all issues in this family law proceeding. She and the respondent father, F.P. (the "Father"), were together for over 26 years and were married for more than 23 of them. They have two children together, Z.R.P. ("Z."), who is now 10 years old, and J.F.P. ("J."), who is now 8 years old (collectively, the "Children"). [2] The parties separated on January 4, 2020, after an incident of significant family violence at the former family home in a community on Haida Gwaii, British Columbia (the "Family Residence"). As a result of that incident, there were criminal proceedings, and the British Columbia Provincial Court issued a series of protection orders against the

Father. The Provincial Court prohibited the Father from attending at the Family Residence and imposed no contact conditions as well as constraints on his parenting time. As discussed below, subsequent orders, including orders I made after further interim applications on December 13, 2024 and March 28, 2025, have relaxed some of those conditions while maintaining or imposing others. [3] Since separation, the Children have continued to live with the Mother at the Family Residence. She has been solely responsible for their care. The Children initially had a number of supervised visits with the Father, but because the Father disagrees supervision is necessary, there was a period of more than two years with no contact between the Father and the Children. Since July 2023, the Mother has facilitated approximately weekly phone calls between the Father and the Children, which she supervises. Due to certain behaviours that have persisted into 2025, and the length of time with no in-person contact between the Father and the Children, the Mother maintains the Father's parenting time should, at least initially, be supervised. As of March 2025, both parties continued to reside on Haida Gwaii. The size and remoteness of the communities on Haida Gwaii complicates certain issues between the parties. [4] The Mother seeks orders primarily under the Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c. 25 [FLA], with a

view to resolving all issues between the parties. This encompasses guardianship and parental responsibilities, parenting time, child support and special expenses, as well as division of family property and debt, including the Family Residence and the parties' pensions. [5] Since separation and as late as the beginning of 2025, the Father's words and actions suggest he has struggled to accept the relationship is over. However, at the summary trial, the Father consented to certain relief, including terms respecting guardianship, the Mother's alternative position regarding parental responsibilities, some terms regarding travel, and division of certain property including pensions. The Father agrees he must pay both retroactive and ongoing child support, but disputes the amounts and timeframes, as well as the Mother's request to impute income to him. The Father opposes the Mother's proposals regarding division of the Family Residence and household effects, parenting time and retroactive special expenses. The Father also seeks an order for spousal support. While the Mother's summary trial application did not address spousal support, the Father says since the Mother made submissions on that issue, it is expedient for the Court to address his claim in this proceeding. [6] Similarly, although the Mother did not expressly seek an order for divorce in her notice of application for summary

trial, she did seek that order in her notice of family claim. At the hearing of the summary trial, both parties submitted that if the Court is satisfied a divorce can be granted as part of the summary trial, one should be granted by consent. Both parties also agreed these matters were appropriate for resolution by way of summary trial. [7] To protect the privacy and well-being of the Children, I have initialized the names of the parties in the style of cause, and used initials for the parties and the Children in these reasons. I have also made efforts to anonymize identifying details where possible. Issues [8] As there are a number of issues on which the parties agree, it is possible for me to make consent orders to settle certain elements of this family law claim without addressing their substance in any detail. I do so in the conclusion of these reasons. [9] The disputed issues that require resolution by the Court are as follows: 1) With respect to parental responsibilities and parenting time: i. Who should have decision-making authority with respect to travel with the Children within Canada? ii. What parenting time orders are in the best interests of the Children?

2) With respect to family property and debt: i. Would an equal division of the equity in the Family Residence be significantly unfair? ii. How should the remaining family property and debts, including household chattels, be divided?

3) With respect to support: i. What are the parties' incomes for purposes of prospective support and s. 7 expenses? ii. From which date is the Mother entitled to retroactive child support? iii. What retroactive section 7 expenses must the Father pay? iv. Is the Father entitled to past and / or prospective spousal support?

4) Should the parties be granted a divorce? [10] There is also the preliminary issue of whether this matter is suitable for summary trial, and the issue of costs. Factual background [11] Before addressing the issues, it is helpful to provide a high-level summary of the factual background to this matter, noting where there is dispute. Additional details and facts specific to the individual issues are addressed under my analysis of each issue below. The parties and their circumstances [12] The parties met while attending high school in Ontario. They began living together in a marriage-like relationship in September 1993, while both attended Lakehead University. They married August 24, 1996. It is agreed the parties separated on January 4, 2020, meaning their relationship lasted more than 26 years. Before moving to Haida Gwaii in 2006, the parties moved around a lot while one or more of them attended school in various locations. The rationale for their move to Haida Gwaii is the subject of some dispute. [13] During the course of the relationship, the Mother earned an undergraduate degree, a masters degree and her Ph.D. in biology. She had a number of lab-related jobs at certain points during her studies, but agrees the Father worked more while she was in school. Since 2006, she has worked as a biologist for the federal government with Parks Canada. In 2023, her gross income was

$100,553.59. [14] The Father also earned three degrees during the relationship: two undergraduate degrees and a masters of science in forestry. He has worked a variety of jobs over the years, including as a fine root biologist, an environmental officer, a teaching assistant, a research forester and forestry consultant, in the tourism industry and at a liquor store. Since 2015, the Father has been employed with BC Ferries. He has progressed within that organization, taking on leadership roles with respect to safety and accepting full-time employment in 2023. He also has opportunities to work overtime. In 2023, he earned a gross income of $74,047.66, which included some overtime earnings. [15] In late 2007, the parties purchased the Family Residence on Haida Gwaii for approximately $264,000 (including adjustments). The Family Residence is the parties' largest asset; they are listed on title as joint tenants. The majority of the purchase price was financed through a jointly-held mortgage of $234,600. The parties agree the Mother's parents provided the parties $25,000 to use towards the purchase of the Family Residence. There is a dispute about whether those funds were a loan to be paid back, as the Mother asserts, or a gift to the parties, as the Father alleges. The parties also own two cars, a 2016 Chevy Impala (the "2016 Impala") and a 2018 Chevy Impala (the "2018 Impala"), both

registered solely in the Father's name. Throughout their lengthy marriage, the parties accumulated chattels and household effects, including books, artwork, tools, some jewellery, a canoe and a 2015 Honda Foreman ATV (the "ATV"). There are disputes about the value of these smaller assets and how some of them should be divided. However, the parties agree certain debts and their pensions should be divided equally. [16] The parties had Z. (born January 2015) and J. (born April 2017) relatively late in their relationship. Given the remoteness of Haida Gwaii, the relative availability of medical services, and the status of both pregnancies as "high risk", the Mother travelled to Ontario before the birth of each of Z. and J. so she would have the support of her family and more ready access to medical care. She also took about 13 months' leave with each child. Both parties' families continue to live in Ontario. They have occasionally visited Haida Gwaii, but contact with the extended families was a source of dispute between the parties, as was the Mother's strong attachment to her cultural and religious background. When the parties separated, Z. was not quite five years old and J. was almost two and a half. January 2020 incident and ensuing orders [17] While the parties' accounts differ somewhat in terms of the details, there is no dispute there was an incident at the Family Residence

on January 4, 2020, with the Children present, that led to the police being called and the Father being arrested. It is common ground the parties had been arguing for several days. It is agreed there were further arguments that day which included the Father throwing water on the Mother in the presence of the Children, a further physical altercation between them and the Father's threats to destroy some newly laid floor tile while holding a sledgehammer. When the Father exited the Family Residence, the Mother called the police and was advised to lock the doors and take the Children to a separate part of the Family Residence. [18] The Father admits he turned off the power to the Family Residence from an outbuilding while the Mother and the Children were inside; he restored the power after a few minutes. The Father returned to the house and on finding the doors locked, he admits he smashed the doorknob off a door in an effort to get in, causing damage to the door and frame for which the Mother sought restitution. The police arrived as the Father was attempting to find another way back into the Family Residence. They removed him from the Family Residence and held him until around January 6, 2020. Criminal charges followed and in March 2020, the Father entered into a one-year Recognizance after Allegation, which prohibited the Father from contact with the Mother and from going within

200 metres of her residence, place of employment or anywhere she happened to be. [19] After the January 2020 incident, the Mother also obtained three protection orders from the Provincial Court as follows: a) a January 15, 2020 protection order, under which the Father was to have no direct or indirect contact with the Mother or the Children except for court-related purposes, through counsel and to arrange parenting time, which was to be supervised by a third party approved by the Mother. The Father was also not permitted to attend at, enter or be within five meters of the Family Residence, the Mother's employment or the Children's school; b) a February 23, 2021 protection order made on the same terms; and c) a March 8, 2022 protection order, under which Father was to have no direct or indirect contact with the Mother or the Children except for court-related purposes, through counsel and "as permitted by further court order". There was no express mention of parenting time, supervised or otherwise. In light of the strict constraints on contact, and in absence of another court order respecting parenting time, there was no apparent provision for the Father to exercise parenting time. The Father also remained prohibited from attending at the Family Residence, the Mother's employment and the Children's school. Each of the above protection orders was made without notice to the Father

and, by default, was to expire one year from the date issued. [20] The Provincial Court made a second order on March 8, 2022. That order permitted the parties to communicate with each other only in writing and by email and limited those communications to matters relating to the Children, family law proceedings and any terms of mediation for their family law matters. This second order also did not expressly address parenting time for the Father. [21] During the year the Recognizance after Allegation was in place, the Father applied to the Provincial Court on four separate occasions to set aside the conditions prohibiting him from attending at the Family Residence, with the goal of accessing and being permitted to live at the property. All applications were denied. There is no evidence before me, nor was there any suggestion, that the Father applied to change or vary the restrictions on his parenting time under the protection orders. [22] On July 14, 2022, in lieu of proceeding with the Father's further application to set aside the March 8, 2022 protection order and be permitted to move back onto the property of the Family Residence, the parties consented to a conduct order under s. 222 of the FLA (the "2022 Conduct Order"). It was entered in the Provincial Court on August 15, 2022. The 2022 Conduct Order set aside the March 8, 2022 protection order in its entirety, removing the

existing prohibitions on the Father's contact with the Mother and the Children, and setting new parameters for somewhat increased contact between the parties. Under the 2022 Conduct Order, the parties could communicate, by text or email only, for two specific purposes: a) scheduling parenting time and confirming parenting time supervisors (para. 1); and b) discussing the resolution of their FLA matters including separation and divorce (para. 2). While there is no express term that requires the Father's parenting time to be supervised, the reference to "confirming parenting time supervisors" in paragraph 1 could be read as imposing such a requirement. It appears that is how the Mother interpreted the order. The Father has not applied to clarify or vary that term. [23] The 2022 Conduct Order only permitted in-person communication between the parties by "prior expressed agreement in writing" (para. 3). It also continued to prohibit the Father's attendance within five metres of the Family Residence except with the Mother's prior written approval (para. 4). [24] Approximately a month after the 2022 Conduct Order was made, permitting direct communications between the parties, the Father began making repeated requests to the Mother to reconcile and to permit him to live on the property of the Family Residence. At times, the Father offered payments of money, assistance with the Family

Residence and the Children, or other rewards if the Mother would reconsider; at other times, the Father made threats, including litigation-related threats. The Mother consistently refused, both directly and through counsel. In June 2023, the Father filed an application seeking to set aside the non-attendance provision of the 2022 Conduct Order and seeking permission to live in an outbuilding on the Family Residence property. The Mother opposed the application, but it did not proceed. The Father's requests continued, in various forms, until early 2025. Post-separation circumstances [25] Since the parties' separation in early January 2020, the Children have resided full-time with the Mother. She has provided for their care, food, clothing, activities and support, and has exercised all parental decision-making and responsibilities, since that time. [26] The Father's parenting time since separation has not been consistent. Up until March 2021, the Father had a number of in-person, supervised visits with the Children but contact was irregular. Between March 2021 and July 2023, the Father had no contact with the Children, in-person or otherwise, primarily because the Father did not consider supervision to be necessary. That said, he took no steps to vary the conditions of the protection order that, at least until February 2022, expressly required supervision. After the 2022 Conduct

Order loosened restrictions on direct communications, the Father continued to dispute the Mother's position that supervision was required, but the parties could not agree on supervisors in any event. Since July 2023, the Mother has facilitated approximately weekly phone calls between the Father and the Children, which she supervises. However, the Father has continued to refuse in-person visits with supervisors the Mother suggests and has not provided his own suggestions for supervisors. Instead, he has maintained supervision is not required, or, as part of other requests to reconcile, has suggested the Mother attend in-person visits. The Mother has been clear the relationship is over and she is not open to reconciliation. The Father has not seen the Children in person since March 2021. [27] As noted, the Mother and the Children continue to reside in the Family Residence, and the Mother has paid all expenses associated with the Family Residence, including the mortgage (principal and interest), utilities, insurance, property taxes and the necessary cost of replacing the woodstove. The Mother has also paid off certain family debts. The Father has not contributed towards the Family Residence, or (with one exception discussed below) any joint debts, since separation. He was escorted to the Family Residence by police in January 2020 to retrieve certain clothing and belongings. The

Mother says she has packed up other belongings at his request, but he has not arranged to retrieve them. The Father says he has nowhere to put them. [28] The Father's living situation has been unstable since separation. There was some evidence of a housing crisis on Haida Gwaii, which gets worse during tourist season from late spring through early fall. The Father has variously lived in hotels, in a rented cabin and in a rented trailer on someone's property. He has had to move during tourist season and at times, has lacked basic amenities such as hot water, a place to bathe, sufficient heat and a working toilet. In messages sent to the Mother after the summary trial, and from the Father's more recent conversations with the Children, it appears he continues to live in rented accommodation which he has described as a "shanty". There is evidence the Mother has sent the Father information about potential rentals, but he will not consider housing that involves a shared bathroom or kitchen. The Father has paid all of his rental expenses. [29] The Father has not paid any child support to the Mother since separation, nor has he made any contributions to the Children's special expenses. As a result, for more than five years now, the Mother has had sole financial responsibility for the Children. Neither party has paid the other any spousal support since separation. The Mother does not

seek spousal support from the Father. The Father seeks spousal support from the Mother, including because of his past support of her education and work, and their current differences in income and standards of living. [30] During the relationship, the Mother used the 2018 Impala and the Father used the 2016 Impala. Post-separation, the Mother has continued to use the 2018 Impala and has been responsible for its costs and maintenance, as well as its insurance. However, since it is registered solely in the Father's name, the required annual insurance renewal has created challenges. In 2023, the Mother rented a car for a period of time due to the Father's refusal to sign the paperwork. In 2024, the Father did not cooperate until a few days before the insurance expired, despite a 2023 agreement requiring his future cooperation. In my interim decision of March 28, 2025 (discussed below), I attempted to address the 2025 renewal proactively with a conduct order. Post-separation, the Father has continued to use the 2016 Impala, and has been responsible for its costs and maintenance, as well as its insurance. The parties agree the Father should retain the 2016 Impala and transfer the 2018 Impala to the Mother, but disagree on the value of the vehicles. [31] On multiple occasions, and at least as early as January 2023, the Father has indicated an intention to move away from Haida Gwaii,

including due to his housing situation. He has also repeatedly expressed the view he will be unable to obtain comparable employment if he is forced to move, at least in the shorter term. In his affidavits prepared for the summary trial in June 2024, the Father anticipated that if he decided to leave Haida Gwaii, he would do so by the end of summer 2024. As a result, the Father's parenting time position assumed he would no longer live on Haida Gwaii. However, at the interim applications in December 2024 and March 2025, the evidence confirmed the Father continues to live on Haida Gwaii. The Father deposes he is waiting for the outcome of these proceedings before deciding on next steps. Procedural history [32] The parties initially attempted to resolve these matters by way of mediation or agreement but were unsuccessful. The Mother alleges the Father deliberately delayed resolution of matters between them. [33] The Mother filed a notice of family claim on January 27, 2023; it was amended July 17, 2023. The Father filed his response to family claim and a counterclaim on March 9, 2023. The Mother filed her response to counterclaim on March 17, 2023. The Mother filed the present application for summary trial on March 27, 2024; the Father filed his response May 13, 2024. [34] I heard the summary trial application June 4, 5 and 7, 2024, and reserved judgment. On June 20, 2024, the

Mother submitted a request to make further brief written submissions in respect of a recently published case authority. The Father did not agree further submissions were warranted. I granted the parties leave to file further brief written submissions of a maximum of three pages. Both parties filed further brief written submissions on July 3, 2024; I have considered them and the case authority in reaching this decision. [35] On December 3, 2024, while this decision remained under reserve, the Mother requested a further appearance to seek interim conduct orders under s. 225 of the FLA restraining the Father's communications with her. During the summary trial, the Mother raised the issue of the Father's texts and emails, including his repeated and unwelcome requests to reconcile. On December 13, 2024, I heard the Mother's interim application. The Father represented himself for that hearing. The Mother raised significant concerns about the content of the Father's texts and emails since the summary trial, many of which I found to be outside the scope of communications permitted by the 2022 Conduct Order. The Mother was also concerned about the volume of communications (she had received more than 620 text messages between early June and December 2024), the Father's apparent sense of entitlement to a response on his timelines, and the Father's discussions with the Children about adult

or legal matters. [36] I gave oral reasons for judgment the same day, granting the majority of the relief sought, with some modifications (the "2024 Conduct Order"); the reasons are indexed at 2024 BCSC 2432. Pursuant to s. 194(4) of the FLA, the 2024 Conduct Order replaces paragraph 2 of the 2022 Conduct Order. Under the 2024 Conduct Order, the Father may only communicate with the Mother by text for purposes of arranging dates and times for the Father's calls with the Children, and for any necessary work-related communication if the parties encounter each other while the Father is working at the ferry terminal. The 2024 Conduct Order identifies subjects the Father is not to address directly or indirectly in his texts with the Mother and in his phone calls with the Children. It also imposes standard reciprocal orders to ensure the parties do not involve the Children in their disputes, legal or otherwise, and refrain from negative commentary about each other. I declined to proactively impose a penalty on the Father in the event of a breach, but permitted the Mother to set a hearing on short notice to seek a penalty of $500 per breach if necessary. [37] By memorandum dated January 6, 2025, I advised the parties I considered some of the evidence and submissions from the December 13, 2024 hearing to be relevant to the issues on the summary trial and sought their positions on my

ability to rely on that material for purposes of this decision. Through further communications with the parties in January 2025, including two more memoranda, it became clear another interim hearing would be required. In addition to consideration of the subsequent materials, the Mother also sought to enforce the 2024 Conduct Order, and asked for an interim order transferring ownership of the 2018 Impala to her, in advance of the vehicle's insurance renewal date. The Father admitted he breached the 2024 Conduct Order, but disputed the Mother's tally of breaches and the requested penalty. The Father opposed the order for interim transfer of ownership. Both parties agreed the Court should be permitted to consider the additional evidence and submissions, but differed on their relevance and impact. [38] In advance of the March 12, 2025 hearing of the second interim application, each side provided additional evidence and submissions. I delivered oral reasons for judgment on the second application on March 28, 2025, which are indexed at 2025 BCSC 589. In my second interim decision, I found the Father breached the 2024 Conduct Order in 20 distinct ways on multiple occasions between December 2024 and February 2025. I ordered the Father to pay the Mother $10,000 in penalties ($500 per distinct breach) on a specific payment schedule. I also granted a limited re-opening of the summary

trial so I could consider the factual information and submissions from the December 2024 and March 2025 hearings in rendering this decision. I declined to order the Father to transfer ownership of the 2018 Impala, finding the request to be one more appropriately addressed as part of the summary trial. Instead, I granted a further conduct order requiring the Father to sign and provide the insurance renewal documents by a specific date. I ordered that if the Father failed to comply, that would result in an automatic penalty of $2,500 payable forthwith, without the need for a subsequent application. [39] In both interim applications, I found the Mother entitled to her costs of the applications in any event of the cause, assessed as matters of ordinary difficulty. However, I noted those costs would be addressed as part of this summary trial decision which concludes this family law matter. Analysis [40] The FLA governs matters between the parties in respect of division of family property and debt. With respect to parental responsibilities, parenting time and child support, the parties primarily argued the summary trial application, and consented to certain orders, under the provisions of the FLA. It was not until part-way through the hearing of the summary trial that the parties addressed the possibility of an order for divorce. Given how the hearing proceeded before me, and the

submissions presented, I will deal with the claims for all relief other than divorce and spousal support under the FLA. I note that, in any event, the FLA and the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985 (2nd Supp.), c. 3, now adopt similar approaches in respect of those issues. [41] The request for divorce is governed by Divorce Act. Where a divorce is sought, spousal support is often considered corollary relief under the Divorce Act, which likely explains the Father's reliance on the federal statute. I will address spousal support under the Divorce Act, but in my view, the outcome under the FLA would have been the same. [42] Before turning to substantive issues, I consider suitability for summary trial. Preliminary issue: suitability for summary trial [43] Rule 11-3(15) of the Supreme Court Family Rules [SCFR] permits a summary trial unless the Court is unable, on the whole of the evidence, to find the facts necessary to decide the issues, or the Court considers it unjust to decide the matter summarily. The governing principles were set out in Inspiration Management Ltd. v. McDermid St. Lawrence Ltd. (1989), 36 B.C.L.R. (2d) 202, 1989 CanLII 229 (C.A.). [44] With respect to finding the necessary facts, a conflict in the evidence is not necessarily fatal to a summary trial application, however a judge should not decide issues of fact or law solely on the basis of conflicting affidavits: Cory

v. Cory, 2016 BCCA 409 at para. 10; Morin v. 0865580 B.C. Ltd., 2015 BCCA 502 at para. 56; Greater Vancouver Water District v. Bilfinger Berger AG, 2015 BCSC 485 at paras. 58-60. Where other admissible evidence corroborates or contradicts one side's affidavits, the Court may be able to find the necessary facts despite a conflict in the evidence: Greater Vancouver Water District at paras. 59-60. [45] When assessing if summary disposition would be unjust, the relevant factors include, but are not limited to: the amount involved, the complexity of the matters, urgency, prejudice by reason of delay, the cost of a conventional trial in relation to the amount involved, the course of the proceedings, whether credibility is a critical factor and whether the summary trial will create unnecessary complexity or result in litigation in slices: Gichuru v. Pallai, 2013 BCCA 60 at paras. 30-31. This is not a checklist but provides a good indication of factors that may concern the Court: Ferrer v. 589557 B.C. Ltd., 2020 BCCA 83 at para. 28. [46] The Mother applied for summary trial of all issues in the family law proceeding except for divorce, which was addressed part-way through the hearing. In his written submissions, the Father expressed "some reservation" but ultimately agreed the issues could be resolved by summary trial. However, even if the parties agree, the Court must satisfy itself the matter is suitable for summary trial: Westsea Construction Ltd. v. 0759553 BC Ltd., 2012 BCSC 1799 at para.

93. Suitability for summary trial necessarily depends on the facts and legal issues of each case. [47] Here, the parties agree on certain issues relating to guardianship and parental responsibilities, as well as division of certain property including pensions. They disagree on division of other family property and debts and about the amount and timeframe for child support. The disputed issues were largely argued based on documentary evidence, and there are few contested facts. The parties also disagree about parenting time and spousal support. They have different perspectives about their roles during the relationship and about the interests of the Children and the needs of the parties after separation. The parties submit those issues can be determined, and the necessary facts found, through the affidavits filed by each side. [48] While there are some minor conflicts in the evidence, the major conflict relates to historic allegations of family violence. The Father says the Court is not well-placed to resolve those conflicts on affidavit evidence alone, however, he submits they do not require resolution in order to address the disputed issues. The Mother acknowledges the conflicts, but suggests they are not as significant as they might seem. She also says she is primarily relying on the more recent allegations of family violence and the Court has documentary evidence, largely in

the form of texts and email messages, that can assist in resolving those issues if required. [49] Having considered the matter in light of the evidentiary record as a whole, I find the issues are suitable for summary trial. The factual and legal questions concerning parenting time, child and spousal support, and division of family property and debts are detailed, but not complex. I am satisfied I am able to find the facts necessary to decide those issues on the basis of the affidavits and documents before me. The issues I must decide do not require me to resolve any significant questions of credibility and the conflicts in the evidence do not relate to decision points that would make it unjust to decide the matters summarily. A summary trial will not delay or complicate the proceedings. Instead, it will allow me to address and resolve the family law claim as a whole. The parties have been separated for more than five years. There is a benefit to everyone, including the Children, in having these matters resolved, especially where the legal issues between the parties do not require the expense and further delay that would accompany a full conventional trial. As a result, I exercise my discretion to decide these matters by way of summary trial. Issue 1: Parental responsibilities and parenting time [50] As noted, the Father consented to most of the orders sought by the Mother in

respect of guardianship and parental decision-making. In the conclusion of these reasons, I set out the specific terms of order confirming the parties are joint guardians of the Children under s. 39 of the FLA and will share parental responsibilities for the Children under s. 41 of the FLA based on what is known as a modified Joyce Model. The Father also consented to the Mother having authority to apply for passports for the Children without his input or cooperation. The terms of that order are also set out in my conclusion below. [51] The only dispute between the parties with respect to parental decision-making authority concerns travel with the Children. The Father consents to an order allowing the Mother to travel with the Children outside of Canada, including a term requiring that he sign a travel authorization when requested and not unreasonably withhold that authorization. The Father does not consent to the Mother travelling with the Children anywhere within Canada without his permission or agreement. The Father's concern, as expressed, is that he should at least be informed of where and when the Children are travelling. He does not suggest the Mother must have his permission or consent to travel within Canada. [52] The Father also consents to an order that the Children are to reside exclusively with the Mother. While the parties' dispute over parenting time narrowed

somewhat at the hearing of the summary trial, they continue to disagree about whether the Father's time should be supervised, and if so, for what period. Parenting time is the principal issue that engages the Mother's allegations of family violence. The legal principles [53] Where the orders sought relate to guardianship, parenting arrangements or contact, s. 37(1) of the FLA requires that I consider only the best interests of the Children. All of the Children's needs and circumstances must be considered, including the following factors set out in s. 37(2) of the FLA: (a) the child's health and emotional well-being; (b) the child's views, unless it would be inappropriate to consider them; (c) the nature and strength of the relationships between the child and significant persons in the child's life; (d) the history of the child's care; (e) the child's need for stability, given the child's age and stage of development; (f) the ability of each person who is a guardian or seeks guardianship of the child, or who has or seeks parental responsibilities, parenting time or contact with the child, to exercise the person's responsibilities; (g) the impact of any family violence on the child's safety, security or well-being, whether the family violence is directed toward the child or another family member; (h) whether the actions of a person responsible for family violence indicate that

the person may be impaired in the person's ability to care for the child and meet the child's needs; (i) the appropriateness of an arrangement that would require the child's guardians to cooperate on issues affecting the child, including whether requiring cooperation would increase any risks to the safety, security or well-being of the child or other family members; (j) any civil or criminal proceeding relevant to the child's safety, security or well-being. [54] To be in a child's best interests, an order must protect, to the greatest extent possible, the child's physical, psychological and emotional safety, security and well-being: FLA, s. 37(3). A person's conduct may only be considered by the Court if it substantially affects a factor set out in s. 37(2) and then only to the extent that it affects that factor: FLA, s. 37(4). [55] Section 37(2)(g) of the FLA specifically requires the Court to consider family violence when considering the best interests of a child. Given the circumstances of this case, I will address the allegations of family violence first. Family violence allegations [56] The Mother alleged family violence in her evidence and submissions, both at summary trial and in the two subsequent interim applications. Under s. 1 of the FLA, "family violence" is defined broadly: "family violence" includes, with or without an intent to harm a family member, (a) physical

abuse of a family member, including forced confinement or deprivation of the necessities of life, but not including the use of reasonable force to protect oneself or others from harm, (b) sexual abuse of a family member, (c) attempts to physically or sexually abuse a family member, (d) psychological or emotional abuse of a family member, including (i) intimidation, harassment, coercion or threats, including threats respecting other persons, pets or property, (ii) unreasonable restrictions on, or prevention of, a family member's financial or personal autonomy, (iii) stalking or following of the family member, and (iv) intentional damage to property, and (e) in the case of a child, direct or indirect exposure to family violence; [57] To assess family violence in relation to the best interests of a child, s. 38 of the FLA requires a court to consider all of the following: (a) the nature and seriousness of the family violence; (b) how recently the family violence occurred; (c) the frequency of the family violence; (d) whether any psychological or emotional abuse constitutes, or is evidence of, a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour directed at a family member; (e) whether the family violence was directed toward the child; (f) whether the child was exposed to family violence that was not directed toward the child; (g) the harm to the child's physical, psychological and

emotional safety, security and well-being as a result of the family violence; (h) any steps the person responsible for the family violence has taken to prevent further family violence from occurring; (i) any other relevant matter. [58] There is no suggestion of sexual abuse in this matter but there are allegations of physical abuse. Many of those allegations are dated and occurred before the Children were born, but there are some allegations of physical abuse in relation to the January 4, 2020 incident. However, the majority of the allegations of family violence, including the most recent ones on which the Mother primarily relies, relate to psychological or emotional abuse, including intimidation, harassment, coercion, threats, and intentional damage to property. [59] The Mother characterized the Father's actions as a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour. While primarily directed at the Mother, she says the Children have also been directly and indirectly exposed to family violence in a manner that undermines their psychological and emotional safety, security and well-being. She says the Children have witnessed the Father's mistreatment of her, and the Father has both made express threats to inform and involve the Children in the parties' disputes and, since contact resumed in July 2023, has brought them into the conflict through the content of some of his weekly

calls. [60] The Mother deposes to what she considers significant emotional abuse prior to separation in January 2020, some of which is corroborated through documentary evidence. For example, as noted, due to the high-risk nature of her pregnancy, the Mother travelled to Ontario with Z. before the birth of J. and made arrangements for the Father to follow closer to the birth. In Facebook messages between the parties while the Father was travelling a week before J.'s birth, the Father berates the Mother, repeatedly swearing at her and blaming her for all the problems he encounters on his travels. When she offers to find alternate accommodations and genuinely apologizes, the Father responds "Sorry is in the dictionary, somewhere between shit and syphilis." The Father then tells the Mother not to ask him to "waste money" on travelling, and insults the Mother's church calling it satanic and saying he no longer wants Z. to attend. These are the Father's own, unfiltered words to his health-compromised wife, sent while travelling to be present for the birth of his second child. [61] The Mother deposes the Father refused the allow the Children to be baptized and barred her and the Children from attending church. She says the Father also imposed restrictions on interactions with both sets of grandparents over the years, furthering their isolation. The Father does not specifically deny

this. The Mother deposes to frequent arguments in which the Father accuses the Mother of being lazy and not taking proper care of him, including in front of the Children. She provides specifics of instances when the Father "called in sick" for childcare duties or gave the Mother "notice" to find alternate childcare because he would no longer be caring for the Children while she was at work. Some of these exchanges are captured in electronic or physical messages. [62] The Mother also details an incident in June 2019, about six months prior to separation, where the Father berated and insulted her, and as part of a further argument about childcare, forbid her from seeking the help of her parents. When she responded, the Mother says, in the presence of Z., the Father ordered her to pack up the kids, get out of the house and go live in a hotel. The Mother says this made Z. cry so she took Z. to get J. up from his nap. She then heard the Father banging around in the house, and returned to find him threatening to destroy a handmade photo collage given to her by her mother. A few days later, the Mother says she returned home after work and the Father yelled at her for having earlier disturbed his nap with a phone call. The Mother says the Father instructed her to look in three rooms in the house; when she did, she found the Father had deliberately created messes for her to clean up

(for example, shampoo and conditioner all over the bathroom floor). She says he stated he hoped she had "learned [her] lesson". She deposes to further erratic behaviour by the Father in August and September 2019, including an incident where he threw the family's groceries on the lawn after an argument. [63] The Mother deposes to further arguments in the 2019 holiday period, including an argument about the Mother's parents visiting which ended with the Father brandishing an axe and threatening to smash the Family Residence apart. On January 3, 2020, the morning before separation, the Mother details a further argument because she failed to keep Z. quiet enough in the morning. After the Mother left in haste for work, forgetting to give Z. a hug goodbye, the Father sent Facebook messages berating the Mother because he had to deal with Z.'s crying. Among other things, the Father writes "0810 still crying, when should I destroy her little world and say Mama does not care?" The Mother says on a further phone call that day, the Father threatened to "wreck something". The documents show the Father's subsequent message stating he would no longer call or accept calls from the Mother's workplace and her response of "Please don't wreck anything. You're scaring me". The parties separated the following day. I have set out above the pertinent details about those events and need not repeat

them. [64] The Mother also says the 2022 Conduct Order, which permitted the Father to contact her directly again, opened the door to further emotional abuse which is documented in the emails and voluminous text messages before the Court. I have reviewed all those communications and will not summarize them in detail. Consistent with my December 13, 2024 conclusions, the messages show a continuing pattern of the Father: badgering, threatening and entreating the Mother to reconcile or at least allow him to move back onto the Family Residence property; offering bribes and gifts, including of money and time, to achieve his ends; demanding the Mother answer his questions; and refusing to accept both the Mother's requests that he cease and her decisions not to engage or entertain his wishes. [65] The messages also show the Father has repeatedly threatened to involve the Children in the dispute. For example, he suggests if the Mother will not assist or show "mercy" in relation to his housing, he will have to tell the Children he is leaving Haida Gwaii, the implication being it is the Mother's fault. In another example, he asks what he should tell the Children about how they have been "withheld" from him for multiple years. In the days before the summary trial, the Father repeatedly asked the Mother to consider settling rather than proceeding with the summary trial, promising money and

vague options, but only if she would meet or speak with him directly. When she would not engage, the Father stated "Ok, give more $ to lawyers then. I will explain to the children when they are older where the fun, and their post secondary education went." [66] The Father's messages contain religious and suggestive language, unwelcome terms of endearment for the Mother, and express threats regarding litigation. He uses more subtle coercion as well, asking the Mother if she wishes the Children to have a father in their lives and if she cares about his mental health and well-being. In the weeks leading up to the application where I granted the 2024 Conduct Order, the Father's communications increased in number and severity, progressing to the point where he threatened to call the police for a "wellness check" when the Mother did not respond quickly enough. [67] As noted, the Father admits certain details regarding the January 4, 2020 incident. He admits that in the presence of the Children, he threw a glass of water on the Mother in an angry response to their argument. He admits he threatened to smash the new tile floor while holding a sledgehammer, but says he did not carry through. He admits he deliberately cut the power to the Family Residence with the Children inside, but says he turned it back on quickly. He also admits that, in his anger at not being able to get back into

the home, he smashed the doorknob off a door. While the Father says he "strongly regrets" the incident and has done a lot of work to better himself and ensure that behaviour is never repeated, the Father does not acknowledge or appear to understand that this was family violence. Instead, the Father's evidence attempts to minimize, and to a certain extent, justify his behaviour that night. For example, he deposes he was not getting a lot of sleep at that time due to juggling his shift work schedule and his childcare responsibilities when the Mother was at work. He points to the fact that it was early January and very cold, and he was not wearing appropriate clothing when he exited the Family Residence, to explain his anger when he found the doors locked on his return. [68] In respect of the other allegations of family violence, in three short paragraphs in his 3rd Affidavit, made May 8, 2024, the Father offers a blanket statement denying that "the majority of the [Mother's] allegations" "happened as she describes or at all". He also provides a qualified admission, asserting both parties "engaged in physical violence and other forms of mutual abuse" during the relationship. He deposes the Mother pushed, scratched, threatened him with a knife and choked him "at various points in time". The Father provides no other details of these alleged incidents. The Father did not attempt to

respond to or explain the evidence of his communications to the Mother, both before and after separation, in which he variously insults her (including her culture and religion), attempts to cajole or badger her into agreement, and alternates between offering bribes and threatening litigation and to involve or inform the Children in the parties' disputes. [69] In my view, it is not necessary to decide the veracity of all the historic allegations of family violence, including those that pre-date the Children. As I am considering the allegations in the context of determining parenting issues, my focus is properly on how the allegations, particularly the more recent ones, impact the best interests of the Children: N.D.T. v. T.F.T., 2016 BCSC 134 at para.

103. I accept it is often not possible in family law cases, nor is it necessary, for the Court to make definitive factual findings on all family violence allegations before making orders for parenting arrangements. Rather, s. 37(4) of the FLA contemplates that to protect and promote a child's physical, psychological and emotional safety, security and well-being to the greatest possible extent, a Court may focus on evidence of real and substantial risks to those interests, rather than attempting to reach specific conclusions about past events: N.D.T. at para 103. [70] On review of the evidentiary record as a whole, I find there is independent documentary evidence of communications from the Father, both before and after separation, which, because of their content, context and frequency, constitute emotional abuse and family violence, including threats, intimidation and coercion: see, for example, K.W. v. L.H., 2018 BCCA 204 at paras. 122-123, leave to appeal to SCC ref'd, [2018] S.C.C.A. No. 340; K.S.P. v. J.T.P., 2023 BCSC 1188 at para. 402; M.S.G. v. I.K.G., 2024 BCSC 651 at paras. 19-22, 40-43. I reached the same conclusion at para. 14 of my decision from December 13, 2024. In many cases, the documentary evidence supports the Mother's detailed allegations of specific instances of family violence. Her evidence in this regard stands in sharp contrast to the Father's vague and

unparticularized allegations of "mutual abuse", which I do not find credible. [71] It is not necessary to conclude each of the incidents described by the Mother happened exactly as she asserts. When coupled with the unchallenged documentary evidence of the parties' communications, I am satisfied there is a pattern of psychological and emotional abuse, and coercive and controlling behaviour by the Father. Based on the additional evidence provided in advance of the December 2024 and March 2025 hearings, I am also satisfied this pattern has continued post-summary trial, including into early 2025. [72] I recognize there is little direct evidence of the impact of this family violence on the Children. There are no reports on the views of the Children or the impacts of separation. However, there is evidence of the Children being exposed to volatile arguments between their parents, and no dispute the Children were present during the significant incident of family violence on January 4, 2020. There is also evidence from the Mother, which the Father did not dispute, that in his weekly phone calls with the Children, he has made direct statements suggesting the Mother is to blame for various things, including his living conditions and his lack of in-person visits. In fact, in his Affidavit #4, made February 21, 2025, in preparation for the March 12, 2025 hearing, the Father admitted he

breached the terms of the 2024 Conduct Order that restrict the subject of his communications with the Children. The Mother deposes that, on occasion, the Father's comments during the weekly calls have prompted Z. to question her about the parties' disputes. [73] As was the case in K.L.M. v. J.R.H., 2024 BCSC 640, I accept the Children will have been affected by the Father's communications. To her credit, the Mother continues to facilitate weekly calls with the Children to ensure they have a relationship with the Father. However, despite evidence that the Mother does her best to shield the Children from the impacts of the Father's communications, I find it would be impossible for her to completely isolate them from the negative effects of the parties' communications, whether or not the Children are directly involved. I also accept that, as a result of the Father's continued barrage of messages and refusal to respect the Mother's boundaries, it is likely the Mother has suffered emotionally: K.L.M. at para. 36. [74] Accordingly, I find there is evidence of family violence on the part of the Father that creates a real and substantial risk to the Children's emotional and psychological safety and well-being. As set out below, this history of the Father's coercive and controlling behaviour, and the risks it creates, both inform my view about what parenting time orders are in the best

interests of the Children. Travel within and outside of Canada [75] As noted above, since separation, the Mother has exercised all parental decision-making and responsibilities in respect of the Children. Both parties' parenting time proposals contemplate the Children will continue to spend the vast majority of their time with the Mother. This is not a case where either side is seeking anything approaching shared parenting. However, the parties consented to an order to share parental responsibilities under s. 41 of the FLA on a modified Joyce Model. This will necessarily require more collaboration and communication on significant decisions affecting the Children than the parties have engaged in since separation. I have considered the travel orders sought by the parties in the context of this soon-to-be new reality. [76] The Mother seeks orders that she be permitted to travel within and outside of Canada with the Children. For travel outside of Canada, the Mother proposes the Father sign a travel authorization within 14 days of being asked and not unreasonably withhold such authorization. Through the travel authorization, the Father will receive certain basic information about where the Children are travelling and for how long. The Father consents to that order. For travel within Canada, the Mother proposes she have authority to travel anywhere with the Children without the

permission or agreement of the Father. The Father does not agree to that order because, in contrast to international travel, he will not have any information about where the Children are and when they will return. The Father does not propose the Mother obtain his permission; his request is that he be reasonably informed of the Children's travel details. [77] In my view, in circumstances where the parties remain joint guardians and have agreed to share parental responsibilities, it is reasonable for the Father to receive certain basic information regarding travel the Mother takes with the Children, whether within Canada or internationally. The parties have consented to discussing matters and decisions of a significant nature with each other. Not all trips within Canada will rise to the level of a "significant" decision. However, given the remote location where the parties live, and the lack of any other immediate family in the vicinity, if the Mother leaves Haida Gwaii or its surrounding areas with the Children, it is reasonable for the Father to receive basic travel information, including in the event something happens on the trip. To the extent any such travel might require adjustments to the Father's parenting time (discussed below), it is likely that at least some basic information (such as dates the Children will be away) would have to be shared regardless. [78]

Accordingly, I find it appropriate to require the Mother to provide the Father with basic information about any travel she takes with the Children, within Canada or internationally. By basic information, I mean the Father must be advised of the general location to which the Children are travelling (i.e. the lower Mainland) and the expected dates of travel (i.e. departure date and return date). This information is to be provided to the Father in advance of the departure date. To be clear, the Mother does not require the Father's permission or agreement to travel with the Children within Canada. The Father is only entitled to information. For international travel, consistent with the Father's consent, he is to sign a travel authorization when requested and is not to unreasonably withhold his consent. The specific terms of my orders regarding travel, which differ in both cases from those sought in the Mother's notice of application, are set out in the conclusion of these reasons. Parenting time The parties' positions [79] The Mother seeks an order that the Children continue to reside exclusively with her and the Father consents. I agree that order is appropriate and it is among the orders set out in the conclusion of these reasons. [80] In terms of parenting time, in her notice of application, the Mother's primary position was that the Father should have supervised parenting from

time to time as agreed between the parties, on terms she alone would set. Her alternative position was that there should be an initial period of supervision with a gradual loosening of restrictions once trust had been built. As the Father noted, it was unclear how the Mother's proposed trust standard was to be measured or determined. [81] By the hearing of the summary trial, the Mother's position shifted somewhat. She now submits that if the Father does not leave Haida Gwaii, he should have a weekly, three-hour in-person visit with a supervisor the parties agree on. If the parties cannot agree, the Mother says she should choose the supervisor. The Mother also proposes a review of parenting time at six months. The Mother notes the Father has not had regular contact with the Children since early January 2020 and caring for Z. (now 10) and J. (now 8) is quite different than it was five years ago. In relation to her request for at least initial supervision, the Mother says the Father's communications both before and after the summary trial demonstrate a continuing risk of the Father involving the Children in adult or legal matters in a way that may be harmful. As late as February 2025, the content of the Father's communications was still raising concerns. In all the circumstances, the Mother says the Father's parenting time should be rebuilt carefully and incrementally. [82] The

Father's parenting time proposal at the summary trial assumed he would likely leave Haida Gwaii by the end of summer 2024. As of March 2025, despite continuing to live on Haida Gwaii, the Father maintained there is a realistic possibility he will relocate. As a result, he continues to seek the same orders as at summary trial. In that regard, the Father proposes that until he relocates from Haida Gwaii, he should have at least one, unsupervised, in-person visit per week, of at least three hours' duration, either at his accommodations or in a public location. If he opts to remain permanently on Haida Gwaii, he proposes the parties use best efforts to agree on a parenting time schedule, with either party at liberty to apply to the Court if required. However, in anticipation of his departure, the Father also seeks an order that once he leaves Haida Gwaii, he will have weekly phone calls with the Children on a schedule agreed between the parties, and one week of in-person parenting time, on Haida Gwaii (or wherever the Children reside), at his new home, or at another location to be agreed. [83] If the Court concludes supervision is appropriate, the Father says it should be for a limited time only, and the parties should either agree on the supervisor or use a previously-agreed supervisor, with the Father at liberty to choose. In oral submissions, the Father suggested the supervisor

could be from either the Ministry of Children and Family Development ("MCFD") or Haida Child and Family Services ("HCFS") as each provided some supervision before March 2021. However, on further questioning by the Court, the Father admitted he had made no inquiries of either organization to determine their capacity to assist with supervision. Discussion [84] To begin, it would be premature to address the Father's request for an order for parenting time in the event he moves away from Haida Gwaii. As the Mother noted, since at least early 2023, the Father has indicated, or perhaps more accurately threatened, that his housing situation would require him to leave Haida Gwaii. However, as of at least March 2025, there is no evidence he has taken any concrete steps towards that end, nor that he has any timeline for doing so. There was no evidence he had researched or applied for employment elsewhere, and no evidence of attempts to secure housing in another location. [85] I accept the Father's evidence from March 2025 that he continues to entertain the possibility of relocating and that receipt and consideration of this decision may inform his thinking. I also accept that family law cases often necessitate future-looking orders. However, in the current, speculative circumstances, there would be no utility in making an order for future parenting time based on a situation that may or

may not come to pass. It is not possible to determine what would be in the best interests of the Children without knowing when and if the Father will relocate, and if so, to where. For example, the relevant considerations may be different if he moves to Ontario versus Vancouver Island or mainland British Columbia. Similarly, a move three or four months after this decision may raise different considerations than a move five years from now, after the Father has exercised parenting time in the interim. In my view, any change to the Father's parenting time as a result of a relocation off Haida Gwaii should be addressed if and when that day comes, in light of the actual circumstances any such move presents. [86] That leaves the question of the appropriate parenting time order while the Father is on Haida Gwaii. At the hearing of the summary trial, the parties were not that far apart. As noted, this is not a situation where one party seeks 50-50 shared parenting time and the other is resisting all but nominal time. Instead, both parties agree the Father should have one in-person visit per week for at least several hours. I recognize the Father sought "at least one" such visit, but in her oral submissions, the Mother appeared to accept the Father's time would likely expand in future. The core of the parties' dispute is whether supervision is required at all, and if so, for how long

and how the supervisor should be selected. [87] At its simplest, the Mother says the history of family violence, including the Father's inability to refrain from inappropriate communications with her and during his weekly calls with the Children, provides a sufficient evidentiary basis for imposing a further period of supervision. She says the Father has demonstrated a pattern of subtle and not-so-subtle harm, as well as pressuring others to do as he wishes. She says there continues to be a real risk that, if not supervised, the Father will attempt to recruit the Children against her or otherwise involve them in adult matters. [88] The Mother says this is not a historical or speculative risk. There is significant evidence of inappropriate communications from about a month after the 2022 Conduct Order was made up to the point of the summary trial, including explicit threats six weeks before the summary trial to tell the Children their Mother is (among other things) "merciless", "heartless", "cruel" and "inhumane". However, the Mother says more relevant are the Father's communications after the summary trial, and then again after the 2024 Conduct Order. At that point, the Father was aware the Mother had records of his communications, yet he still made express requests to reconcile, offered bribes if the Mother would reconsider, and threatened both to involve the Children in the

parties' disputes and to seek legal remedies against her. In his calls with the Children into at least the early part of 2025, which he knows the Mother supervises, the Father again raised issues such as his housing situation and the fact that his calls are monitored, despite court-ordered restrictions on the content of his communications. [89] In addition, the Mother says the evidence since separation establishes the Father's true focus is not on his relationship with the Children, but rather his preoccupation with reconciling or at least seeing the Mother. The Mother notes the Father repeatedly refused in-person visits with the Children because they were not on his terms. For example, he refused multiple offers for in-person visits in 2023 due to disagreements about the proposed supervisor. In 2024, the week before the summary trial, the Father proposed a dinner with the Mother and another couple or two. The Mother responded that the Father was welcome to take the kids for dinner with any of the people the Father had suggested, but advised she would not join. The Father declined the chance to see the Children in person, with "supervisors" he proposed, stating the dinner was only on offer if Mother was present. To the extent the Father suggests "supervision" is the problem, the Father did not take concrete steps to vary the terms of the protection orders that required

supervision until at least February 2022. He also did not apply for an order clarifying his belief that the 2022 Conduct Order did not require supervision. [90] The Mother recognizes that long-term supervision of parenting time is only rarely ordered, but says it is warranted on these facts, at least on an initial basis. She relies on Maher v. Maher, 2018 BCSC 275, as an example of a case where the Court ordered supervised parenting time, including because of family violence and the father's refusal to accept parenting time opportunities that did not align with his views. She also cited Jirh v. Jirh, 2014 BCSC 1973 where the Court concluded that, after a period of minimal contact between the father and the child, and given concerns about previous mistreatment, it was appropriate to order supervised parenting. The Court found this would allow for a gradual building of the parent-child relationship and permit the father to demonstrate his commitment to the child. [91] The Father says there is no need for supervision of his parenting time as he poses no threat to the Children. Relying on F.K. v. M.K., 2010 BCSC 563, the Father characterizes supervision as an intrusive measure that is "just one small step away" from termination of the parent-child relationship (F.K. at para. 147). In affidavits prepared for the summary trial, he admits he found it very difficult to accept the idea

that the Children needed protection from him, and that his parenting time should remain supervised so long after separation. [92] At summary trial, the Father insisted the Mother's concerns were largely speculative, falling well short of the evidence of exceptional circumstances that is necessary to justify an order for supervised parenting time. For example, to the extent there were concerns about content of some of his communications with the Children, the Father suggested it would be more appropriate and less intrusive to grant a conduct order prohibiting him from discussing such matters or disparaging the Mother. He also relied on his compliance with the terms of his release and the protection orders, as well as his consent to the 2022 Conduct Order. [93] Since the summary trial, however, I heard two interim applications, both of which focused on continuing problems with the Father's communications to the Mother and, to a lesser extent, the Children themselves. On the first application, the evidence before me confirmed the Father had not complied with what ought to be common sense requirements for respectful communications with an ex-spouse around parenting time. In addition, I found the Father engaged in communications with the Children that were inappropriate. To address this problematic behaviour, I granted the less intrusive measure he had suggested at the summary

trial, imposing the 2024 Conduct Order. In addition to parameters for permitted communications, the 2024 Conduct Order expressly spelled out topics that were not to be raised. The Father personally provided the Court his assurances that he understood his behaviour had been inappropriate and that it would cease. [94] Despite those assurances, the Father did not change his behaviour. This prompted the Mother's application to enforce the 2024 Conduct Order. At that application, the Father admitted to knowingly breaching the 2024 Conduct Order. He admitted that despite representations to the Court that he would stop sending unwelcome messages to the Mother, he failed to do as he had promised. Some of his messages included express criticisms and flaunting of the 2024 Conduct Order. There can be no dispute the Father's actions in that regard were deliberate. As I found in my reasons of March 28, 2025, his actions were designed at least in part to test if the Mother would pursue enforcement. This is an extension of his coercive pattern. More critical to the question of parenting time, I found the Father continued to raise inappropriate content in some of his calls with the Children, a fact which he also admitted. While there was some evidence the Father started to modify his behaviour in February 2025, perhaps after consultation with his counsel, the concerning messages still did not

cease entirely. [95] I have considered the oft-cited principles from paras. 145-150 of the decision in F.K., which, among other things, set out factors commonly considered by the Courts when assessing if supervision is required. I accept this case is factually different in some respects from F.K. and Jirh. While there was a lengthy period of no contact between the Father and the Children from March 2021 to June 2023, since July 2023, the Mother has facilitated more regular contact through weekly calls between the Father and the Children. Frankly, it is the Mother's commitment that has ensured the Children have a continuing relationship with their Father, despite all the challenges it has created for her. [96] However, there has been no in-person contact since March 2021, primarily because the Father has resisted both the suggestion he requires supervision and all supervisors proposed by the Mother. As noted, he has also refused to accept opportunities to spend time with the Children unless the Mother also attends. Given his accusations that the Mother has "withheld" the Children from him, as in Maher, I find it concerning the Father has not availed himself of every opportunity to spend time with the Children, even if it meant agreeing to supervised visits on a without prejudice basis. It would have at least given the Father a chance to start rebuilding an in-person relationship

and to demonstrate his ability to parent in-person. [97] As it currently stands, the Father has not seen the Children in-person, or spent any extended periods with them where he is responsible for their care, in more than four years. I accept that purely as a result of the passage of time, Z. and J. are very different than they were when the Father was last responsible for their care. In my view, as in Jirh, it would not be appropriate to jump immediately from no in-person contact to a three-hour, unsupervised visit (see Jirh at para. 37). While the Father has a relationship with the Children, and I accept has demonstrated some commitment to maintaining that relationship through the weekly calls, I do not consider it could fairly be described as a parenting relationship at this point. [98] In addition, as set out above, I have concluded there is a history of family violence that poses a real and substantial risk to the psychological and emotional safety, security and well-being of the Children. In saying this, I do not doubt the Father loves and misses his Children; his communications make clear that he does and that he looks forward to spending time with them. However, the history of long-term harmful behaviour, including through his communications with the Mother and the Children, also demonstrates he lacks the ability to make appropriate choices about what should be

discussed with the Children and about how to respect the clear boundaries the Mother has set for her interactions with him. These are not speculative risks; the evidence confirms that as late as early 2025, the Father still could not govern himself appropriately with the Children and continued to send unwelcome and harassing messages to the Mother. [99] Given these conclusions, I find that to manage the identified risks and to facilitate the best and safest relationship between the Father and the Children, an incremental approach to parenting time, including an initial period of supervision, is warranted. [100] I consider a reasonable starting place to be an order that, for an initial period of three months, the Father will have one supervised, in-person visit with the Children each week of not less than two hours on dates to be agreed. That in-person visit may be supplemented by one additional electronic communication per week if the parties' and Children's schedules allow. After the initial three-month period, the Father's parenting time will be increased so that, for the next three-month period, each weekly in-person visit will be not less than three hours and every second in-person visit will be unsupervised. Electronic communications may also continue. [101] For the first six months, the parties are to use best efforts to agree on the location, duration and the supervisor

(when required by the order). If the parties are unable to agree on one or more of those elements, the Mother is entitled to choose. Electronic communications will be supervised by the Mother or another person of her choosing. Either party will be at liberty to apply to vary this parenting time arrangement after the first three-month period has passed, and a court-ordered review of the parenting time arrangement is to be set no earlier than six months after the date of this order. The parties are at liberty to adjust the parenting time arrangements at any time by agreement in writing. The specific terms of my parenting time order, which also address adjustments if the Mother is travelling with the Children, are set out in the concluding section of these reasons. [102] In light of the orders I am making regarding parental responsibilities and parenting time, it is necessary to adjust the 2024 Conduct order in respect of the parameters of communication permitted between the parties. The necessary adjustments are also set out in the concluding section of these reasons. Issue 2: Division of family property and debt [103] The parties have family property and family debt that must be divided. The Family Residence is the largest family asset; the parties disagree on how it should be dealt with. The parties also have three vehicles, household effects and certain financial assets. The

parties agree on how the vehicles should be divided, but not on their values. They have largely addressed the former joint accounts and have agreed to divide their pensions, but they disagree on how to divide the household effects. The mortgage is the largest family debt to be addressed. As noted, there is a dispute about whether the $25,000 contribution from the Mother's parents is a family debt. Other debts include a line of credit, a pension plan deficiency from the Mother's parental leaves, the Father's income tax arrears and Medical Services Plan ("MSP") premiums, all of which have been paid off but require reconciliation. [104] Since the equity in the Family Residence represents the bulk of the value of the family property, I will address issues related to the Family Residence first, including whether the presumptions of equal division and valuation as of the date of trial should apply in this case. I will then address division of the remaining family assets and the question of the appropriate equalization payment. Throughout, I will indicate where matters are agreed, such that orders are made by consent. Legal framework [105] The applicable legal framework for division of family property and debt is well-settled. Part 5 of the FLA governs property division in family law matters. The starting point is the presumption under s. 81 of the FLA that, unless an agreement or

order otherwise provides, spouses are entitled to an equal interest in all family property, regardless of their respective use or contribution, and are equally responsible for family debt. [106] Section 84 of the FLA broadly defines "family property" to include all real or personal property owned by at least one spouse on the date of separation or in which at least one spouse has a beneficial interest, that is not excluded property under s.

85. Section 86 defines family debt to include all financial obligations incurred by a spouse during the relationship, as well as after separation, if incurred for purposes of maintaining family property. [107] Section 85(1) of the FLA specifies categories of property excluded from family property. A party claiming that property is excluded property bears the onus of proving that claim on a balance of probabilities (FLA, s. 85(2)), and on the basis of clear and cogent evidence albeit without the need for mathematical certainty: Shih v. Shih, 2017 BCCA 37 at paras. 41-44. The amount by which the value of excluded property has increased since the later of when the relationship began or the excluded property was acquired is considered family property: FLA, s. 84(2)(g). [108] Under s. 87 of the FLA, the value of family property is presumptively based on its fair market value and determined as of the date of the hearing, unless there is an agreement dividing family property and debt or the Court orders otherwise. There is no agreement in this case, but the Mother seeks an order that the Family Residence be valued as of the date of separation. Since a departure from the presumptive date for valuation is effectively a reapportionment or unequal division (because it deprives the other spouse of post-separation increases in value), it requires a finding of significant unfairness: Kumagai

v. Campbell Estate, 2018 BCCA 24 at para. 76; Banh v. Chrysler, 2022 BCCA 74 at para. 26. [109] Section 95(1) of the FLA permits the Court to order an unequal division of family property or debt or both if the Court finds an equal division would be "significantly unfair", having regard to one or more of the factors set out in s. 95(2). For purposes of this case, the relevant factors under s. 95(2) include: (a) the duration of the relationship between the spouses; [ ] (f) whether a spouse, after the date of separation, caused a significant decrease or increase in the value of family property or family debt beyond market trends; [ ] (i) any other factor, other than the consideration referred to in subsection (3), that may lead to significant unfairness. [110] The jurisprudence confirms there is a high bar to establish the kind of significant unfairness that warrants a departure from the presumptive equal division of family property. In Singh v. Singh, 2020 BCCA 21 [Singh], the British Columbia Court of Appeal referred with approval to its earlier decision in Jaszczewska v. Kostanski, 2016 BCCA 286, before concisely summarizing the applicable principles as follows: [134] it is clear that the Legislature intended the general rule of equal division to prevail unless persuasive reasons can be shown for a different result: Jaszczewska at para.

41. Reapportionment will require something objectively unjust, unreasonable, or unfair in some important or substantial sense. This is in contrast to the previous legislation where courts had discretion under s. 65 to reapportion property or debt where it would be simply "unfair" not to do so. The threshold for "significant unfairness" is high. There must be a real sense of injustice that would permeate the result if the court did not deviate from the presumptive equal division. [111] The Court of Appeal has also confirmed that when faced with a claim for unequal division of family property, the proper analytical approach is to first consider the outcome of a notional equal division of family property, and then decide if that equal division would be unfair, given the factors in s. 95(2): Healey v. Healey, 2024 BCCA 68 at para. 69. [112] Section 97 of the FLA permits the Court to make determinations and grant orders as required to give effect to a division of family property or family debt under Part 5 or Part 6 of the FLA. Relevant to this case, under s. 97(2)(b), the Court may require that title to a specific property granted to a spouse be transferred to, held in trust for, or vested in the spouse absolutely, for life, or for a term of years. Further, s. 97(1)(b) grants the Court authority, subject to certain exceptions, to "make any order that is necessary, reasonable or

ancillary to give effect" to a division of family property or family debt. Would equal division of the equity in the Family Residence be significantly unfair? [113] The parties agree the equity in the Family Residence must be divided in some fashion but that is where their agreement stops. Despite having obtained joint appraisals for the value of the Family Residence at separation (January 4, 2020) and as of November 16, 2023, the parties continue to disagree on how the Family Residence should be valued, which date should be used and whether there is an outstanding loan that requires repayment in addition to the mortgage. [114] The Mother wishes to buy out the Father's interest in the Family Residence, but says an equal division as of the date of the hearing would be significantly unfair. She says, post-separation, she has caused an increase in the value of the Family Residence beyond market forces and has been solely responsible for all its associated financial obligations, including maintenance and preservation. The Mother recognizes she has had exclusive use of the Family Residence but says the Father's delay and unwillingness to move the property issues forward meant she also could not access her equity. In addition, the Father has not provided any post-separation support or contributions for the Children. In the circumstances, she relies on the joint appraisals and asks

the Court to either use the date of separation values, or if the more recent values are used, asks that she be given credit for her sole post-separation payment of expenses. She maintains the $25,000 contribution from her parents was a loan that should be divided equally. [115] The Father says the Family Residence should be divided equally based on current values, but he does not agree to using the values from the joint appraisals. He cites concerns about uncertainty and reliability arising from the unique housing market on Haida Gwaii. Instead, he proposes to expose the Family Residence to the open market for six months, during which time it would be open to the Mother to match all bona fide offers. If she cannot, he says the Family Residence should be sold pursuant to the unmatched offer. At the end of six months, if the Family Residence has not been sold, he proposes the Mother buy out his interest at the greater of the highest bona fide offer or the most recent appraised value of $550,000, with the proceeds to be divided as the Court determines appropriate. [116] If the Court prefers to rely on the joint appraisals, the Father says an equal division based on current values is necessary to preserve his entitlement to the post-separation increase in value. If the Court finds equal division would be significantly unfair, the Father says the Mother should either receive credit

for payments that were necessary for maintenance (i.e. home insurance and property taxes) or for half the mortgage payments, but not both. In all scenarios, the Father says the contribution from the Mother's parents was a gift to both parties, not a loan, and therefore is not a family debt to be repaid. Should the Family Residence be listed to determine its value? [117] On December 12, 2023, the parties obtained joint appraisals of the Family Residence showing both the historical value at separation and the "current value" as of November 16, 2023. As part of earlier efforts to move the property issues forward, the Mother obtained previous appraisals on her own in August 2021 and again in June 2023; the Father refused to cooperate in joint appraisals between January 2020 and November 2023. The Mother does not rely on the earlier appraisals, but all three were in evidence on the summary trial. She says the joint appraisals are the best evidence of the values and the Court should rely on them. [118] The jointly appraised values for the Family Residence are $400,000 as of January 4, 2020 and $550,000 as of November 16, 2023. The joint appraisals both note there is "greater uncertainty to the value conclusion as the subject property is situated in a very small market area with [more] limited market evidence than would be the case in a larger market area with more market evidence".

Despite this caution, both the historical appraisal and the November 2023 appraisal were based on direct comparisons with comparable sales or properties (five for the historical appraisal; four for the more recent one). The historical appraisal notes that in 2020, most sales on Haida Gwaii were private sales. By 2023, there appear to be more sales by real estate agents. Presumably in the event the parties wish to proceed with a public sale, the appraisers provided an estimate that, in November 2023, a "reasonable exposure time" for the Family Residence would be between 28 to 220 days, based on how long the comparable properties were listed before sale. [119] The Father submits that, given the remoteness of Haida Gwaii and its limited real estate market (facts recognized in all the appraisals), the joint appraisals do not provide reliable evidence of the "fair market value" of the Family Residence. As evidenced through his communications with the Mother, the Father maintains the Family Residence is worth much more than $550,000, relying in part on an email exchange he had with a real estate agent in September 2023. While that email was appended to one of his affidavits, I decline to give it any weight. It is clearly opinion evidence, but was expressly not offered as expert evidence. It lacks a sufficient explanation of the basis for the opinion, including what information the

Father provided. Unlike with the joint appraisers, there is no suggestion the real estate agent has ever been to the Family Residence. Further, R. 13-3(2) of the SCFR requires that expert opinion evidence on a financial issue must be jointly obtained unless the court otherwise orders or the parties agree. In the absence of agreement or a court order, neither of which exist here, a party cannot offer independently obtained expert evidence of financial issues such as valuation: Hilborn v. Wright, 2014 BCCA 92 at paras. 48-49. [120] Based on the above-noted concerns, the Father says the Court should adopt a modified version of the approach taken in Watson v. Strong, 2014 BCSC 754, an estates case. There, to settle a dispute about the value of the property at issue, the Court ordered the property to be publicly listed for sale by the executor. All bona fide offers were to be presented to both parties and the one respondent was permitted to make an offer, including at the application for court approval of the sale. The Father says a similar approach involving bids was used in Chapman v. Chapman, 2020 BCSC 1029, rev'd in part on other grounds 2024 BCCA 372, to resolve disputed claims of asset values where appraisals were not available or not relied on. Consistent with those approaches, the Father proposes the Family Residence be listed for six months (given the "reasonable exposure

time" estimates), with the Mother able to "bid" by offering to match any bona fide offers to prevent a sale. After six months, he proposes the Mother buy out his interest at the higher of the most recent appraised value or the highest bona fide offer she was willing to match. [121] I am not persuaded the Father's proposal to expose the Family Residence to the open market is appropriate or necessary in this case. The parties obtained joint appraisals from accredited appraisers who were retained to provide expert opinion evidence of the value of the Family Residence as of two dates. Given the requirements of R. 13-3(2), this is common practice in family law cases and the courts usually accept joint appraisals as the "best evidence" of value, provided they are completed in close enough proximity to the date of the hearing. As the joint appraisals were not received until mid-December 2023, the summary trial could not be scheduled until 2024. It did not proceed in April 2024 due to an error in the office of the Mother's counsel, but was heard in early June 2024. The Court must take a practical approach when considering the timing for appraisals; it would be unreasonable to expect parties to incur the cost of updating an appraisal every time a court hearing does not proceed as anticipated. On these facts, I do not consider the delay to render the joint appraisals out of date. [122]

The appraisal reports themselves include express recognition of the appraisers' duty, under R. 13-2 of the SCFR, to assist the Court and not to be advocates for either party. I reject the notion that the caution about the certainty of the value conclusion is a basis not to rely on the joint appraisals. Instead, I anticipate it is a necessary, and frankly responsible, caution any time an appraisal is done for property in a remote location with a limited real estate market that creates unique selling conditions. There is no expectation that an appraisal will be perfect. By its nature, it is an estimate of value at a particular point in time. [123] Both Watson and Chapman are distinguishable and do not assist the Father. Watson involved an acrimonious estates dispute in which the Court had already issued an order for sale of the property in issue, but the executor was thwarted in moving ahead by the refusal of his respondent siblings to vacate the property. The property was not owned by any of the parties personally. Instead, it was the principal asset of their deceased parent's estate which had to be sold to permit distribution of that estate. All parties agreed the property should be sold, and there was even substantial agreement with the terms of order the Court crafted to facilitate vacant possession and court-approved sale on a particular timeline. There is no indication the

executor or any other party had obtained an appraisal, nor was the decision to publicly list the property motivated by concerns about the value of the property. The decision has not been followed in any family law case. [124] Although Chapman was a family law case, the circumstances were very different. The parties had amassed an extraordinary number of chattels, including vintage cars, documented artwork, numerous vessels, several properties (none of which was the family home) and other household items so voluminous they filled three different storage areas. For some items of family property, there were competing appraisals; for others, no appraisals were available. To address the parties' inability to agree on division of that property, the Court fashioned a "sealed bid" process under which the parties were to submit sealed bids on each category of family property to their counsel. The process was designed to encourage each party to bid based on the amount at which they valued the specific items; it did not involve any exposure to the "open market" for purposes of determining valuation. There is no comparison to the Father's proposal here. [125] Finally, I agree with the Mother that a process under which the Family Residence would be exposed to the open market for six months would likely have a negative impact on the Children's wellbeing. The Family Residence has been their

home since birth. Since separation, the Mother has been solely responsible for their care as well as for the maintenance and preservation of the Family Residence. Preparing a home for listing can be a stressful and costly endeavour; maintaining a home in showable condition for six months, particularly as the parent with primary care of the Children, could not help but impose an additional burden on the Mother. When the Court already has access to expert opinion evidence of valuation in the form of the joint appraisals, the cost of that additional burden is not justified. I find the joint appraisals to be reliable evidence of the value of the Family Residence. Is the contribution from the Mother's parents a family debt? [126] The parties agree the Mother's parents provided $25,000 toward the purchase of the Family Residence, but disagree on the nature of that contribution. The Mother says it was a loan her parents expect will be paid back, so it constitutes a family debt to be shared. The Father says it was a gift given to both of them, with no expectation it would be paid back, and is therefore not a family debt. [127] In Chang v. Xia, 2015 BCSC 1994, Justice Fleming noted that, at common law, "when a parent transfers funds gratuitously to an adult child, it is presumed the child holds the funds on a resulting trust", and is obliged to repay them (at para. 54). To defeat the presumption, the recipient bears the burden to provide sufficient evidence that the parent actually intended the transaction to be a gift: Chang at para. 54; M.L. v. R.H., 2022 BCSC 1580 at para.

159. To ascertain a parent's intention, the Court must weigh all the evidence and may consider factors such as: 1) whether there are any contemporaneous documents expressly indicating a loan or a gift; 2) whether the manner for repayment is specified; 3) whether there is security held by the parent; 4) whether there are advances to one child and not others; 5) whether there has been any demand for repayment; 6) whether there has been any partial repayment; and 7) whether there was any expectation, or likelihood, of repayment. See Chang at para. 55; see also M.L. at para. 158, citing Locke v. Locke, 2000 BCSC 1300 at para. 20. [128] There are only two contemporaneous documents that address the contribution from the Mother's parents. In her Affidavit #4, made May 21, 2024, the Mother attaches as an exhibit contemporaneous documents relating to the purchase of the Family Residence in fall 2007. One of those documents is an email the Mother sent to a senior banking official at Scotiabank in Prince Rupert in the context of negotiating the mortgage for the Family Residence. In that November 14, 2007 email, the subject of which is "down payment info", the Mother writes in relevant part: I spoke with my parents, and they will be loaning me $25,000 towards a down payment. They bank with Scotiabank as well (Sarnia, ON, Indian Rd. branch). When the time comes, I'm sure there's a way for

them to wire the money into my account. [Emphasis added.] [129] In the same exhibit, there is another email chain between the Mother and the banking official in which the Mother writes the previous day: "Once I get a hold of my father to solidify financing from his end, I will pass on how much of a down payment will be made on the house - hopefully that will be later today or tomorrow" (emphasis added). The November 14, 2007 email is the promised follow-up email. [130] There are no other documents such as promissory notes or communications directly between the Mother and her parents. For example, there is nothing stating the funds must be repaid, setting terms of repayment or subsequently requesting repayment. The parties agree no funds were repaid during the relationship; the Mother does not suggest she has repaid any portion since separation. The Mother deposes the funds were a loan and her parents still expect it to be repaid after the mortgage is paid off. She lists the contribution as a debt in her Form F8 Financial Statement. There is no affidavit or other evidence from the Mother's parents. Her counsel explained that it would not have been contemporaneous, so, in the context of a summary trial, it was not pursued. [131] The Father deposes that while he recalls the contribution from the Mother's parents, he recalls it being "a gift to the two of us". He says the Mother's

parents never told him they expected to be repaid and confirms the parties did not make any payments. He also says his own parents made similar contributions without expectation of repayment. The Mother disputes these assertions. [132] The Father bears the burden of proving the contribution was intended to be a gift. I am not persuaded the Father's recollections about the nature of the contribution, or his assertions about the parties' subsequent conduct, constitute evidence of donative intent sufficient to rebut the presumption of resulting trust. The Mother says the expectation was that the funds would be repaid after the parties paid off their mortgage; this would explain the lack of any payments to date. The assertion of similar "gifts" from the Father's own family has no bearing on what the Mother's parents intended. [133] Further, in the two emails that are contemporaneous with the purchase of the Family Residence, the Mother describes the contribution as a loan in one case, and as "financing" in the other. At the time those emails were written, I see no reason for the Mother to characterize the contribution as something requiring repayment if it did not. Accordingly, I conclude the presumption has not been rebutted and I find the $25,000 was a loan from the Mother's parents. As it has not been repaid, it is a family debt related to the Family Residence for which the

parties are presumptively equally responsible. Would the outcome of a notional equal division be significantly unfair? [134] I have settled that the joint appraisals provide reliable evidence of valuation and determined there is a family debt in the form of the $25,000 loan from the Mother's parents. I can now consider if a notional equal division of the equity in the Family Residence would be significantly unfair, with reference to the factors under s. 95(2) of the FLA. [135] There is no dispute the mortgage on the Family Residence is a family debt, and equally no dispute the Father has not contributed to the mortgage payments at all since separation. The most recent evidence provided at the summary trial showed a mortgage balance of $60,996.02 as of March 11, 2024. Using the most recent appraised value of $550,000, and subtracting both the mortgage balance and the $25,000 loan, that results in equity of $464,003.98. If that amount is divided equally, each party would notionally be entitled to $232,001.99. [136] The Father says given the strong presumption that each spouse is entitled to share equally in any post-separation increase in the value of family property, regardless of post-separation contributions (see, for example, Jaszczewska), an equal division is not a significantly unfair outcome. While he admits he has not made any post-separation contributions to the Family

Residence, he says post-separation contributions alone are not a basis for ordering unequal division. He says there is nothing exceptional about this matter that would justify departing from the presumption of equal division, and the Mother's claims respecting delay and refusals to cooperate are not borne out. [137] The Mother says an equal division would be significantly unfair in the circumstances of this case. The Mother recognizes, and I accept, that the long duration of the parties' marriage is a factor that weighs in favour of equal division. However, she says other factors under s. 95(2) of the FLA weigh in favour of unequal division, notably, the increase in value she caused beyond market forces, and relevant catch-all factors (under s. 95(2)(i) of the FLA), such as her sole care of the Children, payment of post-separation expenses without any financial support from the Father and his refusal to move toward resolution. Relying on Singh v. Chandi, 2024 BCSC 771 [Chandi], the Mother's primary position is that the Court should use the date of separation value and mortgage balance to divide the Family Residence. Alternatively, if current values are used, she says she should be credited for her post-separation contributions and efforts: Hunt v. Hunt, 2024 BCSC 1048. [138] At the date of separation, the Family Residence was valued at $400,000 and the mortgage balance was

$125,606.75. The equity (taking into account the $25,000 loan) was therefore $249,393.25. An equal division of the equity at separation would have resulted in each party receiving $124,696.62. Since separation, the value of the property itself has increased by $150,000, but as a result of the Mother's sole efforts to pay down the mortgage (both principal and ever-accumulating interest), the equity in the home has increased by $214,610.73. While this represents a mathematical difference of $64,610.73, the Mother has actually paid $82,675.38 on the mortgage since separation. I accept there has been an increase in the value of the Family Residence beyond market forces that weighs in favour of unequal division: Chandi at paras. 103-109, citing Mao v. Rao, 2021 BCSC 2073 at paras. 208-209, 213-215. [139] Section 95(2)(i) of the FLA provides the Court may consider "any other factor" that may lead to significant unfairness, but the provision is interpreted as limited to factors that relate to the economic characteristics of the spousal relationship: Singh at paras. 138-139. In C.K.M. v. H.R.M., 2021 BCSC 1297, the father had been solely responsible for caring for the child for more than a year, and the mother had been unable to provide any child support or other financial contributions. As that situation was unlikely to change, the Court held the fact of the respondent's role as sole

caregiver and financial support for the child was relevant to the consideration of significant unfairness and favoured unequal division. [140] Here, the Mother has been solely responsible for the care of the Children for what is now more than five years since separation. In addition to their physical and emotional needs, she has been their sole source of financial support, as the Father has not made any financial contributions. While I address child support and special expenses below, as noted above in the section on parenting, the Father consents to an order that the Children will reside exclusively with the Mother and does not seek anything approaching shared parenting. The needs of the Mother as the primary caregiver for the Children, both for the last five years and for the foreseeable future, are relevant considerations and weigh in favour of unequal division: C.K.M. at para. 62, citing H.C. v. H.P.C., 2014 BCSC 1775 at para. 67. [141] The Mother's claim in respect of her sole post-separation financial contributions is more nuanced than in most other cases. Rather than simply pointing to the fact that she alone was responsible for preservation, maintenance and all other financial obligations in relation to the Family Residence post-separation, the Mother says the Father's unwillingness to cooperate, and continued insistence on reconciliation, has delayed the resolution of

the matter, making it more expensive than it ought to have been. For example, she deposes the Father refused to engage in August 2022 with her proposals respecting property division. Communications in evidence show that his response was instead to suggest the Mother consider reconciliation or at least allowing him to return to the property. She also points to difficulties in obtaining his agreement to a joint appraisal, which ultimately delayed the ability to set the matter for summary trial, extending the period for which she has remained solely responsible for payment of expenses for the Family Residence. While the Father submits he responded in a timely fashion once served with court documents, I rely on my previous decisions canvassing the Father's voluminous communications to conclude he did delay efforts to resolve these matters, including through his refusal up until early 2025 to accept the relationship was over. [142] With respect to the value of post-separation expenses, the Mother says she alone paid $82,675.38 in mortgage payments (principal and interest). She submits this includes additional mortgage interest she could have avoided if the Father had been willing to discuss renewing the mortgage for a longer-term. Since he was not, the Mother says she has been forced to accept auto-renewed six-month mortgage terms at ever-increasing interest rates. While there is no

evidence to contradict the amount the Mother has paid overall for the mortgage, I agree with the Father there is no evidence of the rates that could potentially have been secured, nor is there evidence of the Mother raising this specific issue with the Father and him rejecting it. I do not accept the Mother's submission on this point. [143] With respect to other post-separation expenses related to maintenance and preservation, the Mother provided evidence she has paid: $19,424.61 for property insurance between separation and March 2024; $5,431.71 for property taxes from 2020 to 2023; $4,655.84 to replace the previous woodstove which was unsafe to continuing using; and $1,627.04 for mandatory garbage collection fees and a required propane tank rental. [144] The Father recognizes there is some support in the caselaw for unequal division based on carrying costs such as insurance and taxes, but says mortgage payments ought not to be included: Rudyak v. Bekturova, 2017 BCSC 2223, aff'd 2018 BCCA 414 at paras. 66-68. He also cites Storey v. Terry, 2020 BCCA 30, where the Court of Appeal dismissed arguments that the trial judge erred by ordering equal division despite the appellant having paid all post-separation expenses. The Court in Storey noted that a request to equally divide post-separation expenses does not account for the benefit that party received by living in the family

home (at para. 31). Finally, the Father relies on Jean Louis v. Jean Louis, 2020 BCCA 220, leave to appeal to SCC ref'd, [2021] S.C.C.A. No. 513, in which the Court of Appeal confirmed one party's sole occupancy of the family residence can be a basis on which to discount a request for unequal division, without any formal claim for occupational rent (at para. 38). The Father notes that although the Mother paid the post-separation expenses for the Family Residence, she had the benefit of living there. In contrast, he incurred rent costs of $43,650, including because he could not access his equity. [145] I have reviewed the authorities cited by both counsel in relation to these issues, as well as some additional authorities referred to in those cases or in family law texts canvassing unequal division. While informative, each case necessarily turns on its facts. None of the cases I was referred to are so aligned with the present facts as to be determinative. [146] I accept the threshold for a finding of significant unfairness is high and that the FLA represented a conscious shift away from regular consideration of each party's relative contributions to family property. However, the FLA does not abolish unequal contributions as a potentially relevant factor; it confirms the circumstances in which they are relevant are "much constrained": Jaszczewska at para. 44. [147] Based on my

foregoing analysis, I am satisfied that each of the factors relied on by the Mother support the conclusion that an equal division of the Family Residence as of the date of the summary trial would be significantly unfair, as that term is understood in the jurisprudence, and those factors are not outweighed by the length of the parties' relationship. Having reached that conclusion, I must decide how the equity should be divided. [148] In my view, it would not be appropriate to remedy the significant unfairness by using the value and mortgage balance as of the date of separation. That would allocate the entire benefit of the post-separation increase in value to the Mother when I accept that at least some of the increase in value is as a result of market forces rather than the Mother's efforts. This is not a situation like Chandi where the property was purchased and owned by one party before a short marriage, and then again solely maintained post-separation by the original purchasing party for a period longer than the marriage itself. I accept that, in this case, for 12 years, the parties worked together to build equity in the Family Residence and to pay its associated expenses and debts. I find the Father should be entitled to some of the post-separation increase in value based on those previous efforts. [149] That said, I find that post-separation, the Mother has

disproportionately borne all family burdens, including providing all care and support for the Children, as well as solely shouldering the financial obligations of the Family Residence. She has done this without any support or contribution from the Father for what is now more than five years, when the Father's own evidence is that he had funds to contribute. Further, the Father's refusal to accept the end of the relationship created obstacles to a timely resolution of these issues. [150] In the circumstances, it would be significantly unfair for the Father to benefit from both the Mother's sole efforts to preserve and maintain the Family Residence, and the increase in value she caused beyond market forces, when he deliberately chose not to make contributions of any kind over this time period, despite being capable of doing so. I find it is appropriate to order the Father to pay one half of all debt payments for the Family Residence made by the Mother since separation, including the above-noted carrying costs and mortgage payments. While the Mother has enjoyed exclusive occupation of the Family Residence since separation, this is not a case where the Mother realized any additional benefit from the property (such as rental income) that could be shared with the Father to offset his loss of use and his rent costs. Accordingly, I consider it appropriate to order the Mother to pay one

half of the Father's rental expenses to off-set the costs he incurred. [151] The Mother's evidence is that she intends to buy out the Father's interest in the Family Residence. Since there is additional family property and debt to consider, I will address the overall amount of the equalization payment below. However, as a result of the above conclusions, I order the Father, within 45 days of the date of this decision, to transfer his interest in the Family Residence to the Mother. I also order the parties to share the cost of the transfer of the Family Residence equally. [152] At paragraph 23 of her notice of application, the Mother sought alternative relief in the event the Court ordered sale of the Family Residence. She asked that any sale be delayed and she be permitted to relocate with the Children. Given the orders I am making, I dismiss that alternative relief. To the extent the Mother wishes to relocate with the Children in the future, she will need to follow the established process for notifying the Father and, if required, applying to the Court. [153] On a final note in regard to the Family Residence, both parties consented to cancel the certificates of pending litigation ("CPLs") they have each filed against the Family Residence. I will grant this order by consent, but the parties did not make submissions on the timeframe within which this step is to be taken. Given

the other orders I am making respecting the Family Residence, I order the parties to use best efforts to remove the CPLs in a timely manner, and in any event, not later than 45 days from the date of this decision. My specific terms of order respecting the Family Residence are set out in the concluding section of these reasons. Division of the remaining family property and debt [154] While there is agreement about many of the remaining property division issues, certain discrete matters require determination before the amount of the equalization payment can be set. I will address each in turn. Vehicles [155] The parties own three vehicles: the 2018 Impala, the 2016 Impala and the ATV. The two cars are registered solely in the Father's name, but during the relationship, and certainly post-separation, the Mother has primarily used the 2018 Impala and the Father has primarily used the 2016 Impala. The Father consents to an order requiring him to transfer ownership of the 2018 Impala to the Mother, but the parties disagree on the value of the cars. The Father also consents to an order allowing the Mother to retain the ATV, but disagrees with her valuation. In the conclusion of these reasons, I make orders regarding transfer and ownership of the 2018 Impala and the ATV by consent. For clarity, I also order that the Father retain the 2016 Impala. [156] With respect to valuation, the

Mother provided the Canadian Red Book values as of January 2020, which valued the 2016 Impala at $19,172 and the 2018 Impala at $25,607. In her Form F8, made June 8, 2023, the Mother provided more updated values of $14,523 for the 2016 Impala and $19,416 for the 2018 Impala, based on the Canadian Black Book average total wholesale value, as provided by the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia. There were no further updates to the estimated values as of the date of summary trial. The Mother also provided a Blue Book value for the ATV of $3,950 (assuming average condition), but the date for that value is not clear. In her Form F8, the Mother valued the ATV at $4,800 based on the Canadian Blue Book motorcycle trader average retail value. [157] The Father urges different values for all three vehicles, but did not provide any independent or corroborative evidence to support his values. Instead, in his Affidavit #3, made May 8, 2024, the Father says that based "on his personal knowledge of the condition of the items and the price [the parties] paid to obtain them", the 2016 Impala should be valued at $14,000, the 2018 Impala should be valued at $24,000 and the ATV should be valued at its purchase price of $5,000. In his Form F8 Financial Statement, made June 5, 2023, the Father estimated different values for the cars: $17,000 for the 2016 Impala and $27,000 for the 2018

Impala. [158] I prefer the Mother's evidence of the values for the cars and the ATV, given that it is based on independent and commonly used valuation for such assets. I am not satisfied the Father has any particular knowledge of how to value cars or ATVs, and at least in relation to 2018 Impala and the ATV, I am not satisfied the Father has current knowledge of their condition, as they have been in the Mother's exclusive possession since January 4, 2020. Since each party has had use of their "own" car since separation, and as the Mother has had the use of the ATV, I consider it appropriate to use the updated values from the Mother's Form F8. While not current to the date of trial, those values represent the best available evidence. Accordingly, for purposes of the equalization payment, I find the vehicle values to be as follows: $14,523 for the 2016 Impala; $19,416 for the 2018 Impala; and $4,800 for the ATV. Bank accounts [159] At separation, the parties had a joint savings account and a joint chequing account. The Mother deposes the sole purpose of the joint savings account was for monetary gifts the Children received through the years; it had a balance of $7,070.76 at separation. The Mother says she transferred the funds to an RESP for the Children in 2020, and has been making additional contributions to that RESP since January 2021. The Mother's Form F8 confirms the

existence of RESP accounts for the Children acquired after separation. In the spreadsheets the Mother's counsel provided at summary trial, the joint savings account was treated as if it had already been equally divided between the parties. This was presumably on the theory that the funds had been preserved for the Children's future educational costs, which benefits both parties equally. While the Father's Scott Schedule suggested the joint savings account should be viewed as the Mother's asset, the Father did not dispute the Mother's characterization of those funds, or offer any evidence to the contrary. I prefer the Mother's evidence and will treat the balance of the joint savings account as having already been "divided", as it has been placed in an investment for the Children's future, and did not benefit the Mother directly. [160] With respect to the joint chequing account, the Mother deposes it was the parties' operating account, into which each party's pay was deposited, and from which debts, such as the mortgage, utilities and credit card balances, were paid. The Mother provided bank statements showing a balance of $15,045.52 on the date of separation. Those same bank statements demonstrate that in the weeks following separation, the Father withdrew more than $11,000 through ATM withdrawals and credit card advances. The Mother eventually froze the account, and opened her

own account in early February 2020. She arranged to have her pay deposited into the new account and also switched the mortgage and insurance payments to her new account. The Father's pay continued to be deposited to the joint chequing account until late February 2020. [161] The Mother deposes that in January and February 2020, she used the funds deposited as the Father's wages to pay down the credit card debt he had just incurred and also to pay the Father's outstanding income tax arrears (this is a shared debt and is addressed further below). There is no "forensic accounting" of the joint chequing account. The Mother's evidence is that, after all was said and done, each party received about half of the value of that account. This "equal division" was reflected in her counsel's spreadsheet as having already occurred, such that no further reconciliation is required. The Father's Scott Schedule appears to reflect agreement that he received a benefit from the joint chequing account. He did not offer any independent evidence with respect to those funds. Again, I accept the Mother's evidence and will treat the joint chequing account as already having been divided equally between the parties. To the extent it has not already been done, the two joint accounts should formally be closed. [162] Apart from pensions (addressed below), there was no evidence the parties had joint investments

or other financial assets, such as RRSPs, that require division. Pensions [163] The Mother has a pension under the Federal Public Service Pension Plan. The Father has a pension from BC Ferries. The parties agree the pension benefits that each accrued in their respective pensions between 1992 and January 4, 2020 are family property and should be divided equally. They also agree any benefits either has accrued after January 4, 2020 are not family property and are not subject to division. The Father consented to the forms of order proposed by the Mother to address entitlement to and division of their respective pension benefits. The terms of those specific consent orders are set out in the conclusion of these reasons. Household effects [164] The Mother has had exclusive possession of the Family Residence and most household effects since separation. As noted, in early January 2020, following his release, police escorted the Father to the property to retrieve certain personal belongings and clothing. However, the Father says many of his personal effects remain in the Family Residence and the parties accumulated a lot of shared items during the relationship. The Mother deposes she packaged up boxes of the Father's belongings (including his degrees, his Haida clan vest, clothing, footwear, outdoor gear, documents and other personal effects) but he did not arrange to obtain them. The

Father says he did not have anywhere to store those items. [165] In her notice of application, the Mother sought an order that she return the Father's clothing, clan vest, university degrees and other items of her choosing, and then retain the remainder of the household effects. At summary trial, her counsel's spreadsheets proposed the Court accept the Mother's Form F8 estimates of the value for the household effects (approximately $9,000, based largely on online research of the value for similar items) and divide that value equally for purposes of the equalization payment. [166] In his Form F8, the Father estimated vastly different values for the household items (totalling $491,000), without any specific descriptions or evidence to substantiate those figures. For example, he estimated the parties' art collection and book collection to each be worth $150,000. The Mother disputes the parties' effects have that much value. In oral submissions, the Father's counsel admitted the Father's estimated values for the items were "difficult to square" with their descriptions, but suggested they might reflect more than just their monetary value, especially given the length of the relationship. The Father initially sought an order that the parties divide the household effects by agreement, with either party at liberty to make a further court application if agreement could not be reached.

Given the parties' poor track record of resolving matters by agreement, and recognizing that the Father had not been to the Family Residence since January 2020, I asked counsel to see if a practical solution could be reached. [167] By the conclusion of the summary trial hearing, both parties submitted the best approach would likely be to require the parties to exchange lists of the most critical items each wished to retain, with liberty to apply to Court if agreement cannot be reached. The Father maintained the presumption of equal division of family property should apply to household items. The Mother suggested the Father should first retrieve the items she previously packaged for him and any further exchange of lists should wait until after the Father either sorts out his housing situation (based on the division of other family property) or leaves Haida Gwaii. She was adamantly opposed to the Father attending the Family Residence, including because it has changed a lot since separation and the Father has no right to see things she has acquired or changed in that time. Both parties agreed they wished to avoid the division of household items creating further conflict. [168] In the circumstances, I do not consider it appropriate to order the division sought by the Mother. While I anticipate her proposal was an effort to achieve a so-called "clean break" with respect to household

items, I accept there may be items with particular personal significance to the Father that he would like to at least request be returned. Accordingly, I will not attempt to estimate a value of the household items for purposes of the equalization payment. Instead, I will order the Father to arrange to retrieve the belongings the Mother previously packed up for him within 30 days of these reasons. He is responsible for storage of those items. Within 30 days of the items being retrieved, the parties will then, through counsel, exchange lists of the remaining critical items each wishes to retain and use best efforts to agree on how to divide the household items. The Father is not permitted to attend the Family Residence and the Mother is not required to interact directly with him on these issues unless she so chooses. [169] While the parties are at liberty to return to Court if agreement cannot be reached, I urge each of the Mother and Father to approach this issue from an arm's length perspective and with an eye to their continuing physically separate futures. A lot has changed in more than five years. In any household, let alone one with children, it is common for some items to have fared poorly or not survived with the passage of time. It is in everyone's interests, including those of the Children, to have these matters resolved as expeditiously and economically as possible,

and not to allow the little details to stand in the way. Other family debts [170] There are four other debts incurred during the relationship which the parties agree are family debts that should be shared equally. As all four were paid off after separation, it is simply a matter of confirming the value to be reconciled as part of the equalization. [171] First, the Mother incurred a pension plan deficiency as a result of the federal government failing to deduct pension plan contributions during both of her parental leaves with the Children. On the evidence provided, I find there was a family debt of $11,374.88 as of the date of separation. This debt was repaid through deductions from the Mother's paycheque from early 2020 to late 2023. [172] Second, the parties opened a line of credit in 2019 in order to purchase the 2018 Impala. I find the balance owing as of the date of separation was a family debt of $4,279.04, which the Mother paid off by the end of June 2020. [173] Third, as a result of a pay system error within the federal government, in 2017, the Mother's employer stopped deducting MSP premiums, initially resulting in a debt of $2,700 that was outstanding as of the date of separation. The Mother deposes that in April 2024, she was advised the debt had been reduced to $1,500. That amount was subsequently deducted from the Mother's 2023 income tax return. I find the amount

of the family debt to be $1,500. [174] Finally, the Respondent deposes he did not pay his income taxes for the period of 2016 to 2019 due to his political beliefs. As of separation, I find there was a family debt of $3,131.29 as a result of his outstanding arrears. Although the Father was not aware at the time, I accept the Mother paid off this debt from the joint chequing account after separation, using funds from the Father's pay cheques that were still being deposited. [175] I find all four of these debts should be divided equally between the parties, and reconciled based on whose funds were used to pay them. They are included in the calculation of the equalization payment. Conclusion on division of family property [176] Both parties agree an equalization payment will be necessary to equalize the division of family property and debt, including to permit the Mother to purchase the Father's interest in the Family Residence. [177] Attached to these reasons as Schedule A is a table calculating the required equalization payment. The figures in Schedule A are based on my findings above regarding the appropriate division of family property and debt, including unequal division of the Family Residence. Only those items of family property that still require division and equalization have been included. [178] Based on my conclusions and the calculations in Schedule A, I order the

Mother to pay the Father a total equalization payment of $193,189.24 to effect division of all family property and debt, including the Family Residence. For clarity, this figure does not include any amounts owing between the parties for child support, spousal support or s. 7 expenses, which are addressed separately below. [179] In my view, it is appropriate to allow the Mother some time to organize her affairs and obtain the necessary financing to purchase the Father's interest. I therefore order the Mother to pay the equalization payment on the following schedule: a) $50,000 within 45 days of the date of these reasons (to correspond to the Father's transfer of his interest in the Family Residence); and b) the balance of $143,189.24 within four months of the date of these reasons. The parties may adjust the ultimate deadline by agreement; in the absence of agreement, the Mother has leave to reappear before me to request adjustment of the deadline. Issue 3: Child support, special expenses and spousal support [180] There are no agreements or previous court orders of respecting child support, special expenses or spousal support, nor has any support been paid by either party to the other. As a result, the support issues in this matter come before the Court on a first instance basis. [181] There is common ground between the parties respecting certain prospective support issues. The

Father agrees he must pay prospective child support based on his income under the Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175 [Guidelines]. The parties also agree they should share the Children's s. 7 special or extraordinary expenses in proportion to their Guidelines incomes. Recognizing that child support should be commensurate to a parent's income, and should reflect changes in that income, the parties also agree that child support and the proportion of s. 7 expense contributions should be reviewed and adjusted annually. To this end, the parties consent to an order requiring them to exchange financial information in May each year, with a view to making necessary adjustments each June, based on the previous year's income. As I have modified the language of the orders granted in the concluding section of these reasons, I have not framed those orders as being by consent, but I recognize there was agreement in principle. [182] It is necessary for the Court to make a finding regarding the parties' Guidelines incomes for purposes of prospective support and proportionate sharing of s. 7 expenses. I must also deal with the Mother's request to impute a minimum level of income to the Father for purposes of future child support adjustments. There are disputes between the parties respecting the Mother's entitlement to retroactive child support and retroactive s. 7 expenses, as well as

the Father's claim for past and prospective spousal support. I will deal with each in turn. The parties' Guidelines incomes for prospective support and s. 7 expenses [183] The parties each filed their Form F8s in June 2023 and referenced income information from 2022 (the Mother provided her 2022 income tax return; the Father only provided his 2022 T4). The parties did not update their Form F8s before the summary trial. However, in subsequent affidavits, each party provided their T4 slips for 2023. They agree that is the most recent income information before the Court and should be used for purposes of determining prospective support and proportionate sharing of s. 7 expenses. Given when I heard the application for summary trial, I find June 1, 2024 to be the starting date for prospective support and s. 7 expenses. I consider claims in relation to support or expenses prior to June 1, 2024 to be retroactive claims. [184] Based on the income evidence before me, I find the Mother's 2023 Guidelines income, for purposes of support obligations beginning June 1, 2024, to be $99,892 (reflecting her T4 income of $100,553.59 less union dues of $661.70). I find the Father's 2023 Guidelines income, for purposes of support obligations beginning June 1, 2024, to be $72,296 (reflecting his combined income of $74,047.66 ($58,866.85 + $15,180.81) less union dues of $1,121.73 ($853.85 +

$267.88)). I note that neither party suggested their Guidelines income should be calculated differently for purposes of child support compared to spousal support. Accordingly, I find these Guidelines incomes applicable to both types of support claims. [185] Using the Guidelines incomes as found above, and relying on the DivorceMate calculations provided by the Father at the hearing of the summary trial, I order the Father to pay prospective child support to the Mother for the Children, in the amount of $1,131 per month, commencing June 1, 2024, and on the first of every month thereafter, until further agreement of the parties or order of the Court. I note that given the annual review process to which the parties agreed and which I am ordering, after an exchange of financial information, the child support payable by the Father may be adjusted effective June 1, 2025, based on the parties' 2024 Guidelines incomes. [186] As noted, the parties agree they should share s. 7 expenses in proportion to their incomes. If based solely on the parties' Guidelines incomes above, the proportionate sharing for s. 7 expenses beginning June 1, 2024 would result in the Mother paying 58% of such expenses and the Father paying 42%. However, as noted in M.A.T. v. K.P.T., 2017 BCSC 1603 at para. 196, while spousal support is not included as income for purposes of basic child support, it is included as

income in relation to s. 7 expenses. Accordingly, if I determine the Father is entitled to spousal support, that will impact the parties' proportionate share of s. 7 expenses. For example, if I accept the Father's claim for spousal support at the mid-range, the proportionate share of s. 7 expenses is 53% payable by the Mother, and 47% payable by the Father. If spousal support is ordered at the low end of the range, the Mother's share would be 54% and the Father's would be 46%. Accordingly, I will return to the prospective proportionate share after addressing spousal support below. [187] The Mother also seeks an order proactively imputing a minimum income to the Father of $65,000 for future child support adjustments, with the caveat that if his income exceeds $65,000, the parties will use the Father's actual income instead. The Mother explained her request was prompted by the Father's statements that he intended to quit his job and relocate off Haida Gwaii. She wishes to protect against the Father voluntarily reducing his income to claim he cannot pay child support. [188] While the Court has discretion under s. 19 of the Guidelines to impute income where the Court considers it appropriate, I do not consider this to be such a circumstance. Just as I concluded it would be premature to grant the Father a parenting time order at this stage based on a possible future relocation off

Haida Gwaii, it would likewise be premature to impute a minimum level of income to the Father for child support adjustment purposes. Even if the Father does relocate, it is speculative to assume a move will necessarily result in a reduction of his income. The potential income impacts of such a change should only be addressed if and when they come to pass, based on the actual circumstances. It will, of course, be open to either party to seek the assistance of the Court in relation to matters they are unable to resolve between themselves. I decline to grant the imputation order sought by the Mother. Retroactive child support [189] The Mother seeks an order for retroactive child support. The Father accepts that, as he has not paid any child support since separation, the Mother is entitled to some amount of retroactive support. The only disagreement between the parties is the date from which such support should be payable. The leading cases on retroactive support, including the date of retroactivity, are D.B.S. v. S.R.G., 2006 SCC 37 and Michel v. Graydon, 2020 SCC 24. [190] Consistent with D.B.S. at paras. 118-125, the Father says the general rule is that retroactive child support should be payable from the date of "effective notice". There is no dispute the Mother provided effective notice on August 30, 2022, when she raised the Father's obligation to pay child support in an

email. The Father says retroactive support should therefore be payable from September 1, 2022. Based on the Father's Guidelines incomes for 2022 ($64,417) and 2023 ($72,926), the amount of retroactive support payable from September 1, 2022 to May 31, 2024 would be $23,227, calculated as follows: Year (months) Father's Guidelines income Monthly support payable for 2 kids Total 2022 (4 months) $64,417 $1,000 $4,000 2023 (12 months) $72,296 $1,131 $13,572 2024 (5 months - Jan to May) $72,296 $1,131 $5,655 Total: $23,227 [191] The Mother says the Father should pay retroactive child support from the date of separation on January 4, 2020. She says the Father cannot reasonably believe he was meeting his child support obligations after separation given he has not paid anything. Further, the Mother says she was unable to raise the issue of child support earlier due to the protection orders that restricted the parties' communications. As soon as the 2022 Conduct Order reopened the lines of communication, she raised the issue. She says the Children ought not to be penalized in these circumstances. [192] The Mother also says the Father engaged in "blameworthy conduct", as that term is described at paras. 115-116 of Michel (per Justice Martin and Chief Justice Wagner concurring), including through failures to disclose financial information and his repeated offers to provide financial support to the Children and the Mother as long as the Mother agreed to his terms (i.e., reconcile or grant permission for him to move back onto the Family Residence property). She says that blameworthy conduct makes the date of effective notice irrelevant: Michel at para.

119. Using the Father's Guidelines incomes for 2020 ($43,440), 2021 ($58,307), 2022 ($64,417) and 2023 ($72,296), the amount of retroactive support payable from January 4, 2020 to May 31, 2024 would be $50,307, calculated as follows: Year (months) Father's Guidelines income Monthly support payable for 2 kids Total 2020 (12 months) $43,440 $685 $8,220 2021 (12 months) $58,307 $905 $10,860 2022 (12 months) $64,417 $1,000 $12,000 2023 (12 months) $72,296 $1,131 $13,572 2024 (5 months - Jan to May) $72,296 $1,131 $5,655 Total: $50,307 [193] To determine if an award of retroactive support is appropriate, the Court considers the four D.B.S. factors: any reasonable excuse for delay in seeking support, the conduct of the payor parent, the circumstances of the children and the potential hardship occasioned by a retroactive award (D.B.S. at paras. 94-116). Having regard to those factors, and in light of the parties' agreement that the Mother is entitled to some retroactive support, I conclude a retroactive support award is appropriate in this case. [194] However, I recognize that at para. 82 of D.B.S., the majority held that where the Court makes an order to enforce child support obligations predating any order requiring child support to be paid, the Court is "not making a retroactive order in the true sense", but rather "enforcing an obligation that existed at the relevant time." As the

Mother noted, where no child support has been paid, it is unreasonable for a parent such as the Father to believe he was meeting his obligations to the Children: D.B.S. at para. 80. [195] With respect to determining the date from which a retroactive award should be payable, in Buchanan v. Wight, 2023 BCSC 1794, Justice Mayer (as he then was) summarized the possible options: [22] Once a court has established that a retroactive award is due, the court must determine the date to which the award should be retroactive. The choices include: the date when an application is heard; the date when formal notice was given (that is, the date on which an application for a retroactive award was filed and served); the date when effective notice of an intention to seek a retroactive award is given; and the date when the amount of child support should have increased. As a general rule, the date of effective notice is the default option: D.B.S. v. S.R.G., 2006 SCC 37, at paras. 119-121. [23] In most cases, it is inappropriate to make an award retroactive to a date which is more than three years before formal notice is given to the payor parent: D.B.S. at para. 123. [ ] [25] The default option of effective notice can be overridden, and an earlier date applied, when a payor parent has engaged in blameworthy conduct because the parent could not have reasonably believed that they were meeting their

support obligations. Blameworthy conduct includes withholding information and failing to disclose a material change in circumstances, such as an increase in income, which would alter the amount of child support payable: D.B.S. at para. 124. [Emphasis added.] [196] While I accept that the date of effective notice is the default date of retroactivity, in my view, it would be unreasonable for the Father to believe he was meeting his support obligations to the Children when he has not paid any support since separation. The Children had a right to be supported by the Father, in an amount commensurate with his income, from the date of separation. Since neither the Children nor the Mother (as the recipient parent) can waive the Children's right to support, delay in enforcing the right to support is generally irrelevant: Boyko v. Fitzgerald, 2022 BCSC 614 at para. 84, citing D.B.S. at para.

38. This is also not a situation where the Father paid child support of a certain amount in a manner that would trigger the need to balance his interest in certainty against the need for fairness to the Children and for flexibility. As the majority stated at para. 80 of D.B.S., in these circumstances, the non-custodial parent's interest in certainty is generally not very compelling. [197] In each of D.B.S., Michel and Colucci v. Colucci, 2021 SCC 24, the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that blameworthy conduct is not limited to "egregious cases of deception or intentional evasion", but "may also extend to cases of mere passivity" (Colucci at para. 41). Courts now take an expansive view of what constitutes "blameworthy conduct" and the threshold is low (D.B.S. at para. 106). Failure to provide necessary financial information and failure to disclose an increase in income (D.B.S. at para. 124; Michel at para. 116; Colucci at paras. 40-42) both qualify as blameworthy. In fact, D.B.S. defined blameworthy conduct as "anything that privileges the payor parent's own interests over [their] children's right to an appropriate amount of support" (D.B.S. at para. 106). A finding of blameworthy conduct not only weighs in favour of an award of retroactive support, it may also serve to expand the temporal scope of the retroactive award (Michel at para. 119). [198] In my view, the Father's

conduct can be considered "blameworthy" in several respects. First, having not paid any support since separation, the Father could not reasonably have believed he was meeting his obligations. Second, when the Mother gave effective notice in August 2022, the Father refused to provide the financial information she requested, ostensibly on the basis that his counsel advised against providing it. A payor parent cannot use their "informational advantage" to avoid their support obligations: Michel at para.

116. Third, I agree with the Mother that repeatedly offering financial support, to which the Children were entitled, but only if the Mother agreed to the Father's terms, is behaviour that privileged the Father's interests over his Children's rights to appropriate support. [199] Accordingly, I exercise my discretion to depart from the presumptive date of retroactivity, and instead order retroactive support back to January 4, 2020. This takes the period of the retroactive award back three years and less than a month from the date of formal notice on January 27, 2023, when the Mother filed the notice of family claim. The slight extension of the three-year period is warranted by the Father's conduct, and the reality that, on these facts, this is not a true retroactive award. Rather it is an award that enforces, for the first time, the Father's support obligations as they existed at the date of separation. [200] I therefore order the Father to pay the Mother $50,307 in retroactive child support for the period of January 4, 2020 to May 31, 2024. Retroactive s. 7 expenses [201] As noted, the Father accepts he has not paid any s. 7 expenses for the Children since separation. The Mother seeks an order that the Father pay his proportionate share of retroactive s. 7 expenses. She has provided receipts for childcare expenses incurred in 2020, 2021 and 2022, and receipts and estimates for

certain extra-curricular expenses incurred from 2022 forward. [202] The Father accepts that s. 7(1)(a) of the Guidelines expressly contemplates that where childcare expenses are incurred to permit the parent with the majority of parenting time to work, they are legitimate "special expenses". However, the Father disputes that costs incurred for ordinary extra-curricular expenses, such as recreational sports or activities, qualify as "extraordinary expenses" under s. 7(1)(f) of the Guidelines. [203] I agree with the Father that ordinary recreational activities, such as dance and swimming lessons, and sports, are not generally compensable under s. 7 of the Guidelines unless the participation of the particular child goes beyond that of the 'average child': Clarke v. Clarke, 2014 BCSC 824 at paras. 47-58. The basic amounts of child support are designed to cover all the "ordinary" costs of raising a child, including many educational and recreational expenses. The Mother did not suggest either Z. or J. has participated in extra-curricular activities at a level that exceeds that of ordinary children. Those expenses are not compensable. [204] Accordingly, in relation to the Mother's claim for retroactive s. 7 expenses, I find the Father must pay his proportionate share of childcare expenses incurred by the Mother from 2020 to 2022. Those expenses total $21,532.50. The Court has

discretion under s. 7 to divide the parties' obligations to pay other than strictly in proportion to their incomes. Rather than attempting to determine the Father's proportionate share of the specific childcare expenses incurred in each year, I have considered the average of the Father's proportionate income share over those three years, assuming an entitlement to spousal support. On that basis, I order the Father to pay the Mother 41.5% of the childcare expenses, for a total of $8,935.99. Spousal Support [205] The Father asks the Court to determine his spousal support claim as part of the summary trial. He acknowledges the Mother did not seek orders respecting spousal support, but notes she did address his claim in the body of her notice of application. There is no dispute he did not file a cross-application. Instead, the Father says it is in everyone's interest to have the Court resolve all matters between the parties at the same time. The Mother provided evidence and made submissions in respect of the Father's claim. In the circumstances, I agree it is appropriate to decide the Father's spousal support claim as part of this matter. [206] As noted above, since the parties seek a divorce, it is appropriate to address the Father's claim for spousal support as a request for corollary relief under the Divorce Act: Domirti v. Domirti, 2010 BCCA 472 at para. 7; K.R. v. J.R., 2022 BCSC 1856 at para. 345; L.A.M. v. F.B.M., 2022 BCSC 2187 at para. 9; and F.N. v. R.P., 2024 BCSC 118 at para.

209. However, in my view, the outcome would have been the same under the FLA as the applicable principles are largely analogous: Zilic v. Zilic, 2021 BCCA 107 at para.

21. The legal framework [207] There is no right to spousal support. As a result, the threshold question is whether the Father is entitled to spousal support. In determining entitlement, the Court must bear in mind the objectives of spousal support set out at s. 15.2(6) of the Divorce Act: (6) An order made under subsection (1) or an interim order under subsection (2) that provides for the support of a spouse should a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown; b) apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and above any obligation for the support of any child of the marriage; c) relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage; and d) in so far as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time. [208] Section 15.2(4) of the Divorce Act requires the Court to also consider the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse, including: a) the length of time the spouses cohabitated; b) the functions performed by each spouse during cohabitation; and c) any order, agreement or arrangement relating to support of either spouse. [209] Section 15.2(5) of the Divorce Act prohibits the Court from taking into consideration any misconduct of a spouse

in relation to the marriage when determining entitlement to spousal support and in making an award of spousal support. This means my conclusions above with respect to family violence are not relevant to the analysis. [210] In Tai v. Wu, 2024 BCSC 1279, Justice Lamb summarized the overarching theory of spousal support as follows: [28] The Supreme Court of Canada has identified that the purpose of spousal support "is to relieve economic hardship that results from 'marriage or its breakdown'": Moge v. Moge, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813 at 848, 1992 CanLII 25 (emphasis in original). Marital partners "should expect and are entitled to share [the] financial benefits" that are generated from the marriage: Moge at 849. Those financial benefits can be equally distributed in many ways, including through spousal support and through division of assets: Moge at 849. The court must consider "the respective advantages and disadvantages of the spouses as a result of their roles in the marriage": Moge at 849. [211] There are three possible grounds for entitlement to spousal support: compensatory support, non-compensatory or needs-based support and contractual support. Contractual support is not at issue here. [212] Justice Fleming set out the principles animating compensatory support in Jordan v. Jordan, 2022 BCSC 1564: [132] Compensatory support is intended to provide redress for an economic disadvantage arising from the marriage or its breakdown (such as diminished earning capacity and lost career opportunities from taking on childcare responsibilities) or the conferral of an economic advantage upon the other spouse (such as enhanced earning capacity through career development): Chutter v. Chutter, 2008 BCCA 507 at para.

39. Either an economic disadvantage or an economic advantage may provide a basis for an award of compensatory spousal support. Both are not required. [213] In contrast, as described at para. 208 of F.N.: Non-compensatory support is grounded in the "social obligation model" of marriage. It embraces the idea that, upon the dissolution of a marriage, the primary burden of meeting the needs of the disadvantaged spouse falls on his or her former partner, rather than the state: Chutter at para. 54. [214] In other words, need alone may be sufficient to establish entitlement to spousal support. However, the concept of "need" for spousal support purposes goes beyond the basic necessities of life and varies with the circumstances of the parties: Chutter v. Chutter, 2008 BCCA 507 at para. 55, leave to appeal to SCC ref'd, [2009] S.C.C.A. No.

41. Self-sufficiency is likewise a variable concept. As Fleming J. noted at para. 133 of Jordan, "[i]n longer marriages, both need and self-sufficiency are measured against the marital standard of living or the payor's post-separation standard of living: Chutter at para. 59; Hodgkinson v. Hodgkinson, 2006 BCCA 158 at paras. 68-69." [215] While non-compensatory support does not guarantee either spouse the same standard of living they had before separation, generally speaking, the longer the relationship and the greater the economic union between the parties, the "greater will be the presumptive claim to equal standards of living upon its dissolution": Moge v. Moge, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813 at 870, 1992 CanLII 25. [216] The Father says he is entitled to spousal support on both compensatory and non-compensatory grounds. I will consider each in turn. Compensatory support [217] The Father claims compensatory support based on two things: first, his role in supporting the Mother financially at certain points of their relationship, and second, what he characterizes as the parties' decision that he would scale back his employment to assume a greater share of the childcare responsibilities while the Mother worked. In other words, the Father claims he suffered an economic disadvantage, and conferred an economic advantage on the Mother, by assuming primary responsibility for the Children. [218]

With respect to the Father's first basis, the Mother says the parties supported each other at various times during their schooling, and they each earned three degrees while together. She says the parties moved to Haida Gwaii because it held more opportunities for the Father's career in forestry. She says she did not accept several career opportunities in other locations because they did not provide sufficient employment possibilities for the Father. [219] In terms of the Father's second basis, the Mother notes the parties did not have the Children until more than 20 years into their relationship, so any potential economic advantage or disadvantage associated with childcare would be of short duration compared to the overall length of the marriage. While the Mother acknowledges the Father scaled back his employment when she returned to work after her maternity leave with Z., she says the Father was not the primary caregiver. Instead, the parties largely shared childcare responsibilities, while juggling their respective work schedules. She says if their schedules overlapped, she was the one who stayed home or changed her hours to provide care. She says she was also the primary caregiver for both Children during the 13 months or so of leave she had with J. Given the ages of the Children at separation and her various leaves, the Mother says, at most, there was a period of about two

to three years when the Father could attempt to claim primary responsibility. In the context of the parties' lengthy relationship, even if it this were true, the Mother says it does not entitle the Father to compensatory support. [220] On the evidence before me, I am not satisfied the Father missed career opportunities or the Mother's career was enhanced as a result of the role the Father played during the relationship. I am likewise not satisfied the Father has suffered economic hardship as a result of the breakdown in the marriage. [221] I agree with the Mother this case is somewhat unique in that the parties had a very lengthy relationship before the Children were born. It was really only in the last five years of the relationship that the parties had to contend with juggling their careers and being parents. Prior to that time, the evidence shows both parties pursued multiple post-secondary degrees. While there were certain periods where the Father worked while the Mother attended school, at other times, both parties worked while going to school, or worked between educational programs. The Mother also worked full-time while the Father completed his masters program, did occasional consulting, and worked a number of part-time jobs. For many years, both parties worked equally. Rather than establishing the Father made all the sacrifices, as the Father asserted, the evidence

shows each party made choices to forego opportunities in the interests of building their life together. This is neither unusual nor something that warrants compensation. [222] I accept that when the Children were born, things changed. After such a long period together just as a couple, becoming parents likely felt disruptive and potentially overwhelming. Again, this is not unusual. I am not persuaded the Father was the primary caregiver for the Children in the way he alleges. Rather, I am satisfied both parties shared responsibility for raising the Children. Once the Mother returned to work after Z. was born, and again after J. was born, I accept the Father took the "day shift" and the Mother had the "evening shift". This does not amount to one parent taking on a greater proportion of the parenting responsibilities. Instead, it reflects the reality of many working parents, who share the load, but often struggle with being tired and stressed by competing demands. [223] Further, the Father admits the Mother was the primary caregiver for the Children during her various periods of leave. While he suggests different dates for her leaves, I accept the Mother's evidence that she was off work from October 2014 to January 2016, and again from February 2017 to April 2018. During the almost two-and-a-half years of leave after Z. was born, I find the Mother was primarily responsible for

the Children. I am satisfied that in the other two-and-a-half years, viewed globally, the parties shared parenting responsibilities. [224] I have no doubt that at specific points, one or the other parent carried more of the household and childcare responsibilities. This kind of ebb and flow is normal. I am not satisfied the balance was always tipped in favour of the Mother working, with the Father's work being neglected. In fact, the Father admits in his 3rd Affidavit, made May 8, 2024, that he had his "own work schedule and obligations to meet" and that it would have been "difficult to maintain [his] employment and take absolute responsibility for the children for multiple days at a time" (emphasis added). This statement is not consistent with a claim that he was the Children's primary caregiver. Nor does the Father suggest there were other career opportunities he was prevented from pursuing. I am also not satisfied any career advancement by the Mother can be attributed to the Father's role in the family. The Mother clearly shared in the child and household responsibilities. In fact, at times, the Mother stretched her workplace flexibilities to a significant extent, and even took time off, to facilitate the Father's ability to work. [225] Post-separation, there is no evidence the Father has suffered any economic hardship from the breakdown of the marriage, in the sense of past

or present family-related responsibilities hindering his career in a significant way (I will address the Father's housing situation below when dealing with non-compensatory support). The Father began working at BC Ferries the year Z. was born and continues with that employer to this day. He appears satisfied with his work, resisting the Mother's suggestion that there are better employment prospects for him. The Mother has had sole parental and financial responsibility for the Children for more than five years, and has navigated all childcare responsibilities and her own employment without financial or other assistance from the Father. In contrast, the Father has not been burdened with family responsibilities and his career appears to have benefitted. He has progressed to full-time employment, has assumed a leadership role with respect to safety, and has been entrusted with certain supervisory responsibilities. By his own messages to the Mother, his "job is good" and the "money is there"; he has "doubled [his] wage" and "climbed the ladder". [226] I find the Father has not established a claim for spousal support on a compensatory basis. Non-compensatory support [227] The Father says he is entitled to non-compensatory support to narrow the gap between the parties and ensure an equitable sharing of the economic consequences of the marriage. In this regard, he points to the income

disparity between the parties post-separation, the instability of his housing situation and the fact that he has had to rent accommodations that are considerably less than ideal while his equity remains tied up in the Family Residence. He says, post-separation, he has maintained full-time employment and increased his income each year, demonstrating reasonable efforts to achieve self-sufficiency. The Father says there is no merit to the suggestion he is intentionally underemployed or should be imputed a higher level of income based on a career trajectory he chose not to pursue well before the parties separated. [228] The Mother acknowledges there is a post-separation "gap" between the parties in respect of their accommodations, but says that is primarily due to the housing shortage on Haida Gwaii, rather than any lack of financial capacity on the Father's part. She points to his repeated offers of money and other "gifts" if the Mother will agree to his terms, as well as his accumulation of more than $21,000 in post-separation savings. In contrast, given her responsibilities for the Children and the Family Residence, she says she is not in a position to save money. While she agrees there is an income disparity between the parties, the Mother says that alone is not sufficient to establish entitlement, and the Father has not otherwise demonstrated the lack of means or kind of need

that non-compensatory spousal support is designed to address. [229] To the extent the income disparity is relevant, the Mother says the Father could be earning significantly more (and thus narrowing any gap) if he put his education to use. She provided some evidence of forestry and tourism-related job postings for which she submits the Father either is, or could in a few years become, qualified. Finally, the Mother says when the family property is divided, particularly the Family Residence and the parties' pensions, that will be enough to ensure both parties share the "financial benefits" of the marriage. [230] There is no question that a disparity in income alone is not sufficient to establish entitlement to spousal support, nor is there any presumption that a party is entitled to the same standard of living the parties enjoyed before separation: Lee v. Lee, 2014 BCCA 383 at paras. 60-61, 65. That said, the jurisprudence is also clear that "need" is not simply a question of whether the spouse seeking support can meet their stated expenses or has achieved a level of income at or above subsistence. Rather, what is required is a broader comparison of the parties' standards of living before and after separation: Chutter at paras. 55-59. The Court must also consider the length of the marriage and the degree to which the parties' finances were intertwined during the relationship,

resulting in shared economic benefits. [231] In this case, I accept that the long duration of the parties' marriage and the degree of their economic interdependence suggest at least some eligibility for non-compensatory support. The parties were together for more than 26 years; there is at least some evidence of joint accounts and shared finances. I also accept there is an ongoing income disparity between the parties, although the extent of the difference appears variable. Both parties are steadily employed. The Mother currently earns around $100,000 a year; the Father's income has been increasing to the point that in 2023, he earned approximately $73,000 (including overtime). The disparity between their incomes is considerably less than in many of the cases to which I was referred. [232] The bigger challenge is the lack of evidence about the marital standard of living. I do not have evidence of the parties' shared financial situation or earnings prior to separation, nor of their spending habits or what they were able to afford or enjoy when together. There is some evidence of renovations to the Family Residence, most of which appear to have been undertaken by the parties themselves. I also do not know the extent to which the parties' remote location on Haida Gwaii impacted their lifestyle. [233] Post-separation, I accept there are physical differences in the parties' living

conditions. The Mother continues to live in the Family Residence. The Father has, at various times, lived in a hotel, a trailer and a cabin. As set out above, those accommodations have sometimes lacked basic amenities. The Father has had to relocate multiple times, resulting in instability and an inability to retrieve and store his personal belongings. However, this state of affairs is not unique to the Father, nor is there evidence it stems from a lack of financial capacity. There is evidence of a housing crisis on Haida Gwaii, which is exacerbated by the prioritization of available housing for tourists during the tourist season. [234] The Mother has sent the Father alternative housing options of seemingly better quality, but the Father refuses to consider anything that is not a fully self-contained unit. I accept that, compared to the Family Residence, a rental unit with a shared kitchen or bathroom would not be comparable. However, in a tight housing market, this means the Father has chosen to prioritize personal space over basic comforts. The Father asserted in oral submissions that if he had had access to his equity from the Family Residence, he could have potentially made a down payment on new and better accommodations, but he advanced no evidence to substantiate that claim. Apart from this obvious difference in accommodations, there is very little other evidence about

the parties' post-separation standards of living. [235] The parties' Form F8s were not updated for the summary trial. As a result, their evidence of expenses compared to income was a year old as of the summary trial hearing. The Mother submits that because the Father has only been responsible for himself post-separation, he has been able to save funds, where her obligations have not allowed her to do so. However, I note the Mother has been able to pay down the mortgage to a significant extent. Neither party provided evidence they incurred debts post-separation in order to finance their needs or standard of living. Neither suggested they had foregone specific opportunities, such as trips or activities, as a result of their post-separation financial status. Nor is there evidence that either party has significantly enhanced their standard of living post-separation, for example, by purchasing a new vehicle. Other than the housing situation, which largely does not appear financial in nature, I am hesitant to draw any more specific conclusions about the parties' comparative standards of living based on the limited evidence provided. [236] I reject the Mother's assertions that the Father should be imputed income due to intentional underemployment. The Father commenced work with BC Ferries five years prior to separation. Although it was shift work, it was stable employment which

offered the Father an opportunity for a pension as well as overtime, and provided the family some flexibility to juggle childcare. Separation was a destabilizing event on both sides. In the circumstances, it was not unreasonable for the Father to continue with his existing employment. Further, given that the Father was 47 at separation and considerable time had passed since he had worked in the forestry or tourism sectors, I find it was not unreasonable for the Father to maintain his career with BC Ferries. He has progressed in that role and increased his income each year. The Father's obligation is to make reasonable efforts to achieve self-sufficiency within a reasonable time. He is not obliged to take up particular employment, including by reverting to a previous career trajectory, as long as his efforts to contribute to his own support have been sufficient in all the circumstances: Jendruck v. Jendruck, 2014 BCCA 320 at para.

16. I find they have been. [237] In addition, given my decision above with respect to the division of family property and debts, the Father will, through an equalization payment, receive what I have determined is his appropriate net share of his equity in the Family Residence and his interest in the other family assets, as set-off against his share of the family debts. The Father is also entitled to an equal share of the portion of the Mother's pension that is family property. Although I do not have evidence of the value of that pension, given the length of the Mother's employment with the federal government, it is reasonable to assume it will not be an insignificant benefit for the Father. The resolution of the family property issues will improve the Father's means. [238] Both parties have established careers. Neither party's income appears to have been negatively affected as a result of the breakdown of the marriage; in fact, the Father's income has increased post-separation. However, there is some degree of income disparity between the parties and some evidence that, at least in respect of his accommodations, the Father's standard of living has suffered post-separation. In my view, that decline is largely a function of the housing crisis on Haida Gwaii, but I accept that the Father's inability to access his equity in the Family Residence for the last five years likely

contributed in some way. On consideration of the whole of the evidence, in light of the objectives of spousal support, I find the Father has established an entitlement to spousal support on non-compensatory grounds. Quantum and duration of spousal support [239] The Father seeks prospective spousal support payable at the mid-range on an indefinite basis, as well as an award of retroactive support from April 1, 2023. He says the filing of his counterclaim on March 9, 2023 constituted "effective notice". In his written submissions, the Father suggested retroactive support should be payable from the date of separation, but in oral submissions, he conceded April 1, 2023 is the more appropriate date. The Mother says that if the Father is entitled to support, it should be for a limited duration payable at the low end of the range. She suggested four years from the date of separation based on the timeframe it would likely take for the Father to retrain for a career in forestry. She says no retroactive award should be made, but if the Court decides otherwise, then April 1, 2023 is the appropriate date. [240] As was the case with child support, based on when I heard the summary trial, I consider June 1, 2024 to be the start date for an award of prospective support. [241] There is no dispute the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines [SSAG] provide useful guidance when establishing the

appropriate range and duration of spousal support at the time of an initial application: Nicholl v. Nicholl, 2020 BCCA 173 at para. 42; Yemchuk v. Yemchuk, 2005 BCCA 406 at paras. 60-66. Based on the parties' 2023 incomes of $99,892 for the Mother and $72,926 for the Father, the SSAG recommend a "custodial payor" spousal support amount of $555 at the low end, $648 at the mid range and $740 at the high end. Further, given the 26.5-year duration of the parties' relationship and the Father's age at separation, the SSAG recommend spousal support should continue for an indefinite duration, subject to variation and possibly review. [242] However, the SSAG are, by their nature, advisory. Their goal is to bring "more certainty and predictability to the determination of spousal support": Yemchuk at para.

62. They do not displace the discretion of the Court to craft spousal support awards that are responsive to the objectives of spousal support, decided authorities, and the particular circumstances at hand: Yemchuk at para. 64; Lan v. Buchanan, 2024 BCSC 302 at paras. 396-398; Tai at paras. 55-61. If the Court determines a departure from the SSAG is appropriate in a given case, an explanation is required: Kerr v. Barnow, 2009 BCCA 111 at para. 84, rev'd in part on other grounds 2011 SCC 10; Lightle v. Kotar, 2014 BCCA 69 at paras. 62-63, leave to appeal to SCC ref'd, [2014] S.C.C.A. No. 176. [243] I find there are special circumstances in this case that justify a departure from the recommended indefinite duration of a spousal support award. Instead, I consider it appropriate to order spousal support at the low end of the range, and to set the duration of spousal support at seven years from the date of separation. There are several reasons. [244] The Father's entitlement is based solely on non-compensatory grounds and his claim is not strong. While there is a modest income disparity and some evidence of a decline in the Father's standard of living post-separation due to his accommodations, the Father's income has been on an upward trend and the accommodation issues are largely attributable to factors other than his financial capacity. Further, the division of the family assets

pursuant to this proceeding will improve the Father's means, narrowing the gap between the parties. The justification for spousal support is to provide him with transitional support while he works towards greater self-sufficiency. His needs in this regard were more significant immediately after separation, when the income disparity was greater. They have decreased in the last several years with the increase in his income and his acceptance of full-time employment in 2023; they will decrease again on receipt of his share of the family property. In all of the circumstances, I consider an award of seven years of support to strike the appropriate balance by providing a sufficient transitional period, while refraining from imposing an indefinite burden on the Mother largely due to her higher earning capacity: Lee at para. 65; Tai at para.

60. Further, there is precedent for departing from the SSAG recommendation for indefinite duration where entitlement is based only on non-compensatory grounds: Lan at para. 398; Tai at para. 56. [245] With respect to the Father's retroactive claim, the parties agree the principles from D.B.S. also apply to claims for retroactive spousal support: Kerr v. Baranow, 2011 SCC 10 at paras. 206-208 [Kerr SCC]. While concerns about notice, delay and misconduct "carry more weight in relation to claims for spousal support" because there is no presumptive right to spousal support (Kerr SCC at para. 208), if the Court decides a retroactive award is appropriate, the general rule is that support is payable from the date of "effective notice". [246] The Father did not raise the issue of spousal support until he filed his counterclaim on March 9, 2023. The date of effective and formal notice are therefore the same. The Father did not directly address why he did not advance his claim at an earlier date, but deposes that until the notice of family claim was filed in late January 2023, he had hoped the parties would reconcile. I am satisfied there is some explanation for the delay in advancing the claim for spousal support. The parties did not make detailed submissions on the other D.B.S. factors in relation to the retroactive spousal support claim. I am conscious this is not a case where one

party is seeking to vary a previous spousal support order, but rather an initial application for support, including for a period prior to the making of any order. In the circumstances, I am satisfied it is appropriate to award the Father retroactive spousal support from April 1, 2023 to May 31, 2024. [247] As a result, the Mother must pay the Father retroactive spousal support from April 1, 2023 to May 31, 2024 in the amount of $7,770. Beginning June 1, 2024, the Mother must pay the Father $555 per month on the first of each month until May 31, 2025. Starting June 1, 2025, the amount of monthly spousal support payable by the Mother will be adjusted to reflect the low "custodial parent" SSAG amount based on each party's 2024 income. Spousal support will be adjusted effective June 1 of each subsequent year in the same manner (i.e., based on each party's income from the previous year) with the final adjustment being made effective June 1, 2027 and the Mother's obligation to pay spousal support ceasing after the final support payment is made December 1, 2027. [248] My award of spousal support for the Father impacts the parties' incomes for purposes of determining their proportionate shares of s. 7 expenses. Beginning June 1, 2024, the Mother's proportionate share of s. 7 expenses will be 54% and the Father's proportionate share will be 46%. Until spousal support terminates after

the final payment on December 1, 2027, the calculation of the parties' incomes for purposes of determining their proportionate share of s. 7 expenses must include spousal support. Issue 4: Divorce [249] The Mother sought an order for divorce in her notice of family claim but not in her notice of application for summary trial. At the hearing of the summary trial, the Mother advised she did not include a request for divorce as part of the summary trial application because she was uncertain if the Court could grant an order for divorce in the same application as the one seeking to establish formal arrangements for both child support and parenting time. Despite this uncertainty, both parties made submissions during the summary trial hearing in support of an order for divorce by consent. At that point, the Registrar's certificate of pleadings had not yet been issued. Based on the parties' request for a divorce, their submissions at the hearing and my review of the underlying pleadings, I requested the certificate of pleadings to be issued. It was issued May 8, 2025. Accordingly, and consistent with the approach taken in C.C.R. v. T.A.R., 2014 BCSC 620 at para. 57, I consider the request for a divorce to be properly before me. [250] The Mother seeks an order for divorce on grounds that the parties have lived separate and apart since January 4, 2020 and there is no prospect of

reconciliation. In his response to family claim, filed March 9, 2023, the Father opposed the request for a divorce but did not provide any explanation for why. By the time the summary trial application was heard in June 2024, the Father had changed his position and no longer opposed an order for divorce. In both his oral and written submissions at the summary trial, the Father took the position that an order for divorce should be made and could be made by consent. [251] Under s. 8(1) of the Divorce Act, the Court has discretion to grant a divorce, on the application of one or both spouses, on the ground that there has been a breakdown of their marriage. A breakdown in marriage is established if one of the two factors in s. 8(2) is established. In the present case, I am satisfied a breakdown in the marriage has been established under s. 8(2)(a) of the Divorce Act. It is common ground the parties have lived separate and apart since January 4, 2020, and were living separately when the summary trial began in June 2024. [252] Before granting a divorce on grounds that the parties have lived separate and apart for at least a year, the Divorce Act requires the Court to be satisfied that: a) there is no possibility of reconciliation between the spouses (s. 10(1)); b) there has been no collusion in relation to the application for divorce (s. 11(1)(a) and (4)); and c) reasonable

arrangements have been made for the support of any children of the marriage having regard to the Guidelines (s. 11(1)(b)). The Court also has inherent discretion to postpone granting a divorce if it is established that granting a divorce would prejudice the rights of one of the parties, and there is no compelling or urgent need for the divorce that can override the prejudice: Cooper v. Cooper, 2021 BCSC 2042 at para. 7. [253] On the evidence before me, I am satisfied there is no possibility of reconciliation between the parties. While the Father has requested reconciliation on multiple occasions, the Mother has consistently confirmed the relationship is over and she has no interest in reconciling. There is no evidence of collusion in relation to the parties' current request for an order for divorce. The order is sought by consent; neither party asserted any prejudice from an order granting a divorce. [254] The only remaining question is whether "reasonable arrangements" have been made for the support of the Children, as required by s. 11(1)(b) of the Divorce Act. As noted, during the hearing of the summary trial, the Mother expressed some concern about whether an order for divorce could be sought as part of the same proceeding in which orders for parenting time and child support are being sought. [255] In Kaila v. Kaila, 2024 BCSC 2399, Justice Veenstra considered whether

questions of potentially outstanding corollary relief preclude an order for divorce. After canvassing several authorities, including the Court of Appeal's decision in Gill v. Benipal, 2022 BCCA 49, Veenstra J. concluded that where the statutory requirements for a divorce are otherwise met, parties should be able to obtain an order of divorce "even if some matters of collateral relief cannot yet be determined": Kaila at para. 64. [256] The duty to ensure that "reasonable arrangements" have been made for any children is a statutory requirement. However, I agree with the Father that a plain reading of s. 11(1)(b) of the Divorce Act and the jurisprudence in this area makes clear that the focus is on "reasonable arrangements" for child support with reference to the Guidelines. In Kaila, Veenstra J. confirmed that such arrangements are "generally established either by way of a court order or by way of an agreement between the parties" (at para. 65). [257] As set out above, in this proceeding, I have determined all of the parties' claims for corollary relief, including for child support. I am granting orders in respect of each of those claims. I am satisfied the child support orders I am making constitute "reasonable arrangements" for the support of the Children, as measured against the Guidelines, such that the test under s. 11(1)(b) of the Divorce Act is met. There is no prohibition against the order that makes reasonable arrangements for child support being granted as part of the same application in which the divorce is sought: Kaila at para.

76. Accordingly, I exercise my discretion to grant the parties an order for divorce. The specific form of order is set out below. Conclusion and summary of orders [258] In conclusion, I make the following orders based on my findings above, and in consideration of the evidence and submissions provided during the summary trial itself and on the two subsequent interim applications. As noted, the list of orders below includes orders that were consented to even where I have not expressly addressed those matters in my reasons above. For clarity, those terms of order are indicated as being "by consent". I have also reverted to using "Claimant" and "Respondent" in the following paragraphs to facilitate drafting of the final order. All references to paragraph numbers are to paragraphs in Part 1 of the Mother's notice of application for summary trial, filed March 27, 2024 (the "notice of application"). Lastly, I have maintained the sequence of orders sought in the notice of application, rather than following the sequencing of issues addressed in this decision. [259] With respect to guardianship and parental responsibilities, I grant the relief sought at paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 of Part 1 of the notice of application and make the following orders under Part 4 of the FLA: a) By consent, pursuant to s. 39(1) of the FLA, the parties are joint guardians of the Children. b) By consent, pursuant

to s. 41 of the FLA, the parties will share parental responsibilities for the Children based on a modified Joyce Model as follows: i. Each guardian will have the obligation to advise the other guardian of any matters of a significant nature affecting the Children; ii. Each guardian will have the obligation to discuss with the other guardian any significant decisions that have to be made concerning the Children, including significant decisions about the health (except emergency decisions), education, religious instruction and general welfare of the Children; iii. The guardians will have the obligation to discuss significant decisions with each other and the obligation to try to reach agreement on those decisions; iv. In the event that the guardians cannot reach agreement on a significant decision despite their best efforts, the Claimant will be entitled to make those decisions and the Respondent will have the right to apply for directions, under s. 49 of the FLA, respecting any decision that he considers contrary to the best interests of the Children; and v. Each guardian will have the right to obtain information concerning the Children directly from third parties, including but not limited to teachers, counsellors, medical professionals and third-party caregivers. c) By consent, the Claimant will have the authority to apply for passports for the Children without the input or

cooperation of the Respondent. [260] Having granted the alternative relief respecting parental responsibilities, I dismiss the relief sought at paragraph 2 of Part 1 of the notice of application. [261] With respect to travel with the Children, and the relief sought at paragraphs 5 and 6 of Part 1 of the notice of application, the Respondent consented to the relief sought at paragraph 6, but not that sought at paragraph 5. As set out above, I accept it is reasonable for the Respondent to be provided with certain information concerning the Children's travel. I therefore grant the relief sought at paragraphs 5 and 6 in part, and make the following orders under Part 4 of the FLA: a) The Claimant is permitted to travel with the Children anywhere within Canada without the permission or agreement of the Respondent, provided that at least five (5) days before the day of departure, the Claimant is to advise the Respondent of the general location(s) to which the Children will be travelling and their expected dates of travel. b) The Claimant is permitted to travel with the Children outside of Canada, provided that at least 30 days before the day of departure, the Claimant is to advise the Respondent of the general location(s) to which the Children will be travelling and their expected dates of travel. The Respondent will sign any required travel authorization within 14 days of being asked

to do so by the Claimant, and the Respondent will not withhold travel authorization unreasonably. [262] I have made substantive adjustments to the requirements of the above two orders that differ from what was sought in the notice of application. It is therefore not accurate to consider the second term of order to have been made by consent. I acknowledge the Respondent was not opposed. [263] With respect to parenting time, and the relief sought at paragraphs 7 to 9 of Part 1 of the notice of application, I grant the order sought at paragraph 7 in full, grant the order sought at paragraph 9 in part, and make the following orders under Part 4 of the FLA: a) By consent, the Children will continue to reside exclusively with the Claimant. b) The Respondent will initially have supervised parenting time with the Children for a period of not less than three months from the date of this order. In the initial three-month period, the Respondent is to have one in-person visit per week with the Children, for a duration of not less than two hours, on dates to be agreed between the parties from time to time. The Respondent may supplement the in-person visit with one electronic communication with the Children per week if the Children's and parties' schedules permit, on dates and for durations to be agreed between the parties from time to time (the "initial arrangement"). c) After a period of

at least three months of the Respondent exercising regular, supervised parenting time under the initial arrangement, the Respondent's parenting time will be adjusted so that in-person visits are increased to not less than three hours on dates to be agreed between the parties, and every second in-person visit is unsupervised; electronic communications may also continue as above (the "modified arrangement"). The modified arrangement will continue for a further three months from the date of adjustment, to allow the parties to monitor the Respondent's parenting time and assess the Children's best interests. d) During the period of both the initial arrangement and the modified arrangement: i. For in-person parenting time, the parties are to make best efforts to agree on the supervisor (if required under this order), location and duration of the visit prior to any parenting time sessions. If the parties are unable to agree on any of the supervisor, location or duration, the Claimant is entitled to choose the supervisor, location and / or duration. ii. Parenting time that occurs via electronic communications is to be supervised by the Claimant or by another person chosen by the Claimant. e) If the Claimant intends to travel with the Children during the period of the initial arrangement or the modified arrangement in a way that will not allow the Respondent to exercise his weekly

parenting time, the Claimant must offer the Respondent options to make-up his missed parenting time within a reasonable period before or after the Children's travel. This may result in a temporary increase in the amount of the Respondent's parenting time in a particular week. The parties are to use best efforts to resolve issues of make-up parenting time between themselves, with either party at liberty to apply to the Court for directions in the event agreement cannot be reached. f) Either party is at liberty to apply to vary the parenting time arrangement, including the terms of the modified arrangement, at any time after the three-month period of the initial arrangement has passed. g) A court-ordered review of the parenting time arrangement is to be set no earlier than six months after the date of this order to determine whether supervision of the Respondent's parenting time continues to be necessary and if the best interests of the Children warrant a further increase in the Respondent's parenting time. The parties may agree not to proceed with the court-ordered review if the parties are able to agree on a parenting time arrangement that eliminates the requirement for any supervision during the Respondent's parenting time. In that case, the parties are to advise me, via Supreme Court Scheduling, of the terms of the parenting time arrangement they have reached. h) The parties

are at liberty to adjust the parenting time arrangements by agreement in writing at any time. [264] Having granted the alternative relief respecting parenting time, I dismiss the relief sought at paragraph 8 of Part 1 of the notice of application. [265] In light of the orders I have made regarding parental responsibilities and parenting time, I vary paragraph 1(a) of the 2024 Conduct Order by replacing it with the following: a) "By way of text message or email, but only for the purposes of arranging parenting time or discussing matters of shared parental responsibilities, as required by the Court's order of May 27, 2025, and" In all other respects, the 2024 Conduct Order remains in force. [266] With respect to child support and special expenses, and the relief sought at paragraphs 10 to 15 of Part 1 of the notice of application, I grant the relief sought at paragraphs 10 to 14 in part, and make the following orders under Part 7 of the FLA: a) The Claimant is found to be a resident of British Columbia and is found have an annual income for 2023 of $99,892 for purposes of both child support under the Guidelines and spousal support under the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines. b) The Respondent is found to be a resident of British Columbia and is found to have an annual income for 2023 of $72,296 for purposes of both child support under the Guidelines and spousal support under

the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines. c) The Respondent will pay to the Claimant the sum of $1,131 per month for the support of Z. and J., commencing on June 1, 2024 and continuing on the first day of each and every month thereafter, for as long as Z. and J. are eligible for support under the FLA or until further agreement of the parties or order of the Court. d) For as long as Z. and J. are eligible for support under the FLA, the parties will share the special or extraordinary expenses set out in s. 7(1) of the Guidelines for Z. and J. in proportion to their incomes. Commencing June 1, 2024, the parties' respective proportional shares are 54% for the Claimant and 46% for the Respondent. e) For as long as Z. and J. are eligible for support under the FLA, the parties will exchange copies of their income tax returns by May 31 each year, and will adjust the amount of child support and the proportionate sharing of special or extraordinary expenses accordingly, with such changes to take effect on June 1 of each year, based on the previous year's income. f) The Respondent must pay the Claimant retroactive child support for the period January 4, 2020 to May 31, 2024 fixed in the amount of $50,307. g) The Respondent must pay the Claimant his proportionate share of retroactive special expenses for childcare fixed in the amount of $8,935.99. [267] Given my orders respecting the

parties' incomes, and the requirement for an annual review and adjustment of child support and s. 7 expense obligations, I dismiss the relief sought at paragraph 15 of Part 1 of the notice of application. [268] With respect to the Respondent's request for spousal support, I make the following orders under the Divorce Act: a) Pursuant to the Divorce Act, the Mother will pay the Father retroactive spousal support from April 1, 2023 to May 31, 2024 fixed in the amount of $7,770. b) Pursuant to the Divorce Act, commencing on June 1, 2024 and ending on December 31, 2027, the Mother will pay the Father ongoing spousal support on the first day of each month at the low end of the range under the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, based on the parties' incomes for the previous year. For clarity, from June 1, 2024 to May 31, 2025, the Mother will pay the Father spousal support of $555 per month. The amount of spousal support will be varied effective June 1, 2025, and on June 1 in each subsequent year, based on the parties' incomes from the previous year, until support terminates on December 31, 2027. [269] With respect to the Family Residence, and the relief sought at paragraphs 16 to 19 of Part 1 of the notice of application, I grant the order sought at paragraphs 16 to 18 in full, grant the orders sought at paragraph 19 in part, and make the following orders under Part 5 of the

FLA: a) By consent, both parties will cancel the certificates of pending litigation each has registered against title to the Family Residence. b) The parties must use best efforts to cancel the certificates of pending litigation in a timely manner and, in any event, no later than 45 days from the date of this order. c) Within 45 days of the date of this order, the Respondent will transfer his interest in the Family Residence (the civic address and legal description of which are to be inserted into the final form of order) to the Claimant, after which the Claimant will have exclusive ownership of the Family Residence. d) The parties will share the cost of the transfer of the Family Residence equally. e) Pursuant to s. 95 of the FLA, the equity in the Family Residence will be divided unequally in favour of the Claimant as follows: i. The Family Residence will be valued using the appraised value and mortgage balance as of the date of the summary trial; and ii. The Claimant will pay the Respondent an equalization payment as set out below that, in respect of the Family Residence, accounts for: (1) payment by the Respondent of one-half of all post-separation expenses and debts paid by the Claimant for the Family Residence, including mortgage payments and identified carrying costs, up to the date of the summary trial; and (2) payment by the Claimant of one-half of the Respondent's

post-separation rental expenses up to the date of the summary trial. [270] Given my orders respecting disposition of the Family Residence, I dismiss the relief sought at paragraph 23 of Part 1 of the notice of application. [271] With respect to the division of family property and debts, and the relief sought at paragraphs 19 to 22 of Part 1 of the notice of application, I grant the relief sought at paragraph 19 in part, grant the relief sought at paragraphs 20, 21 and 22 in full, and make the following orders under Part 5 of the FLA: a) By consent, within 30 days of the date of this order, the Respondent will take all steps necessary to transfer the ownership of the 2018 Chevrolet Impala from his name solely to the Claimant's name. b) The Respondent will retain the 2016 Chevrolet Impala as his property. c) By consent, the Claimant will retain the 2015 Honda Foreman 500 ATV. d) Within 30 days of the date of this order, the Respondent will arrange to retrieve from the Family Residence the personal belongings the Claimant previously packed up for him. For clarity, the Respondent is not to attend the Family Residence personally to retrieve the items and the Respondent is responsible for their storage and safekeeping. e) Within 30 days of the Respondent having retrieved the items previously gathered, the parties will, through counsel, exchange lists of the remaining critical items

of family property each wishes to retain and will use best efforts to agree on how to divide the household items. The Respondent is not permitted to attend the Family Residence for purposes of dividing household items and the Claimant is not required to interact directly with the Respondent on these issues unless she so chooses. The parties are at liberty to apply to Court for further directions on the distribution of any items that cannot be agreed. f) By consent, to the extent either party has outstanding debts in their own name that are not family debts, that party will be responsible for paying such outstanding debts. [272] To give effect to the orders I am making respecting division of family property and debts, including the unequal division of the Family Residence, I order the Claimant to pay the Respondent a net equalization payment in the amount of $193,189.24. The Claimant is to pay that amount on the following schedule: $50,000 within 45 days of the date of this order and the balance of $143,189.24 within four months of the date of this order. The ultimate deadline may be adjusted by agreement between the parties. In the event the parties are unable to agree, the Claimant has leave to reappear before me to address the issue. [273] With respect to the parties' respective pensions, I grant in full the relief sought at paragraphs 24 to 31 of Part 1 of the notice of

application and make the following orders under Part 6 of the FLA: a) By consent, the benefits accrued to the Claimant under the Federal Public Service Pension Plan (the "Claimant's Plan") between 1992 and January 4, 2020 (the "Claimant's Pension") are family property. b) By consent, the Claimant's Pension will be divided evenly between the parties. c) By consent, any benefits accrued to the Claimant under the Claimant's Plan after January 4, 2020 are the Claimant's sole property. d) By consent, the Respondent's share of the Claimant's Pension will be satisfied by the transfer of an amount from the Claimant's Plan to the credit of the Respondent in accordance with the federal Pension Benefits Division Act and the Pension Benefits Division Regulations. e) By consent, the benefits accrued to the Respondent under the BC Public Service Pension Plan (the "Respondent's Plan") between 1992 and January 4, 2020 (the "Respondent's Pension") are family property. f) By consent, the Respondent's Pension will be divided evenly between the parties. g) By consent, any benefits accrued to the Respondent under the Respondent's Plan after January 4, 2020 are the Respondent's sole property. h) By consent, the Claimant's share of the Respondent's Pension will be satisfied by the transfer of an amount from the Respondent's Plan to the credit of the Claimant in accordance with the federal Pension

Benefits Division Act and the Pension Benefits Division Regulations. [274] Finally, with respect to the parties' request for an order for divorce by consent, I make the following order: a) Subject to s. 12 of the Divorce Act, the Claimant, B.F.W., and the Respondent, F.P., who were married at Sarnia, Ontario, on August 24, 1996, are divorced from each other, the divorce to take effect on the 31st day after the date of this order. [275] The parties are permitted to draft the order for divorce as a separate order from the other terms of order set out above if they wish to do so. [276] I turn finally to the issue of costs. At paragraphs 32 and 33 of Part 1 of the notice of application, the Claimant sought orders for costs and special costs respectively. The Respondent submitted there was no basis for special costs. [277] As I noted in my decision of March 28, 2025 on the second interim application, special costs are an extraordinary, discretionary remedy. They are punitive rather than compensatory, and are awarded when a court seeks to disassociate itself from conduct it considers reprehensible and "deserving of reproof and rebuke": Smithies Holdings Inc. v. RCV Holdings Ltd., 2017 BCCA 177 at paras. 56-57, citing Garcia v. Crestbrook Forest Industries Ltd. (1994), 9 B.C.L.R. (3d) 242 at para. 17, 1994 CanLII 2570 (C.A.). The threshold to establish that an award of special costs

is warranted is a high one. [278] I found the Respondent to have engaged in some concerning behaviour as regards his communications to the Claimant, including in the period after the summary trial was heard. However, in my view, that behaviour was addressed first through the imposition of the 2024 Conduct Orders, and then through the imposition of penalties for non-compliance with those orders. I do not find the Respondent's conduct leading up to or during the summary trial to meet the necessary threshold to warrant an order for special costs. I dismiss the relief sought at paragraph 33 of Part 1 of the notice of application. [279] Turning then to regular costs, in both interim decisions on December 13, 2024 and March 28, 2025, I awarded the Claimant costs of those applications, as matters of ordinary difficulty, in any event of the cause. Pursuant to R. 16-1(10) of the SCFR, those interim costs are payable on conclusion of the family law case. Given the comprehensive nature of this summary trial application, this decision marks the conclusion of this family law case. As a result, the Respondent is now liable to pay the Claimant her costs of the two interim applications as previously ordered. [280] In relation to the summary trial, I find the Claimant has been substantially successful, as that term is used in the jurisprudence. While I appreciate that many of the orders

requested by the Claimant were consented to, on the issues in dispute between the parties, and in relation to which the majority of time was spent during the summary trial (including parenting time, retroactive child support and s. 7 expenses, and division of the Family Residence), I consider the Claimant to have achieved substantial success. The Claimant is therefore presumptively entitled to an order for her regular costs of the summary trial, as sought at paragraph 32 of Part 1 of the notice of application, and I so order. [281] I further order that any costs payable to the Claimant for the summary trial and the two interim applications may be deducted from the equalization payment I have ordered the Claimant to pay the Respondent. [282] Despite the above costs order, if either party wishes to make further submissions on costs, they may do so in writing. The parties' submissions are not to exceed five pages in length and should be exchanged according to a schedule agreed between counsel, with the first submission to be filed with the Supreme Court Registry within 30 days of the release of these reasons. If further costs submissions will be made, the parties are requested to inform Supreme Court Scheduling as soon as possible of that intention, and in any event, not later than 14 days after the release of these reasons, setting out the agreed schedule for the exchange of costs submissions. "K. Wolfe J." Schedule A