Bridger v. Bridger & Others

2005 BCSC 269 Bridger v. Bridger and Others

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: Bridger v. Bridger & Others 2005 BCSC 269 Date: 20050228 Docket: 35228 Registry: Kamloops Between: Julia Victoria Bridger also known as Julie Vicki Bridger Plaintiff And Warron Hastings Bridger also known as Warren Hastings Bridger also known as Warren Bridger Executor of the Will of Jack Edgar Bridger, Deceased, Cathy Jones, Cherry Mahon and Lauri Martin Defendants Before: The Honourable Mr. Justice Rogers Reasons for Judgment Counsel for the plaintiff: F.R. Scordo L. An, Articled Student Counsel for the defendants: R. Buddenhagen Date and Place of Trial: February 14 - 18, 2005 Kamloops, B.C. Introduction [1] Jack and Julia Bridger were married for 38 years. It was a second marriage for both. When Mr. Bridger died his will left his $311,000 estate to his three daughters from his first marriage. The will gave Mrs. Bridger a car that had long since been sold. Mrs. Bridger got nothing from the estate. Mrs. Bridger has sued the estate for a share pursuant to the Wills Variation Act. The daughters resist her claim. [2] The estate has counter-claimed against Mrs. Bridger. The estate alleges that a power of attorney Mr. Bridger gave his wife was void ab initio owing to Mr. Bridger's incapacity when he made it. The estate says that Mrs. Bridger used that power of attorney to convert certain assets to cash and that she must account to

the estate for her dissipation of that cash. The Facts [3] Mrs. Bridger was born in June 1926. She is now 78 years old. Although it is clear that Mrs. Bridger does not hear very well, I heard no evidence that her health is bad. Mrs. Bridger's first marriage produced three sons: Larry born in 1945, Marcel born in 1946, and Leonard born in 1949. Sometime before 1960 Mrs. Bridger separated from her first husband. [4] In 1960 or 1961 Mrs. Bridger bought a house on Munro Street in Kamloops. She paid the vendor an agreed sum of money over time. Eventually Mrs. Bridger paid the vendor off and in April 1966 the vendor actually transferred the property to Mrs. Bridger. At the same time Mrs. Bridger assumed the mortgage on the property. Mrs. Bridger rented out a portion of the Munro Street house and used that rent together with her waitress wages to pay first the vendor and then the mortgage. [5] In March 1965 Mrs. Bridger bought a duplex on Redwood Crescent in Kamloops. She borrowed the down payment and assumed the existing mortgage. Mrs. Bridger rented out both of the duplex's suites. She used the rent money to pay the loan and mortgage and the property's expenses. She registered the Redwood property in her name alone. [6] Mr. Bridger was born in April 1937. He was a mechanic and a welder by trade. His career took him around the countryside as he worked on various construction

projects. Mr. Bridger's first marriage produced three daughters: Sherry Mahon born in 1953, Lauri Martin born in 1955, and Cathy Jones born in 1958. [7] Mrs. Bridger met Mr. Bridger in 1964. They married in June 1965. At that time Mrs. Bridger was in the process of purchasing the Munro Street house and the Redwood Crescent duplex. Mr. Bridger then owned his trade tools and personal effects. He owned no real property. The couple lived together in part of the Munro Street house. Mrs. Bridger continued to rent out the other part and to use the rent income to pay the mortgage and other expenses associated with the house. The Munro Street house was registered in Mrs. Bridger's name. That property became, to use Family Relations Act vernacular, the matrimonial home. [8] In or around 1969 Mr. and Mrs. Bridger moved to Fort McMurray where Mr. Bridger had a job. Mrs. Bridger rented out both portions of the Munro Street house while the couple lived away from Kamloops. Mrs. Bridger did not work in Fort McMurray. They stayed in Alberta for about a year, and then they returned to Kamloops. [9] When they arrived back in Kamloops in 1970 or 1971 the Munro Street house was still rented out top and bottom. They bought and lived in a mobile home. They each contributed some money to buy the mobile home. [10] In July 1979 Mr. and Mrs. Bridger each contributed $10,000 to buy another duplex, this

one located on Bentley Place in Kamloops. They registered the Bentley property in their names jointly. They opened a joint bank account and deposited into it the rental income from Bentley Place. They paid Bentley Place's mortgage and expenses from that account. [11] Sometime in 1980 or 1981 the couple sold the mobile home. Mr. Bridger took all the proceeds of that sale. They then moved back into one of the suites in the Munro Street house. The other suite continued to be rented to tenants. [12] In March 1980 Mrs. Bridger transferred a half interest as joint tenant in the Redwood duplex to Mr. Bridger. They began to deposit all rents into their joint account and to pay all expenses from it as well. They used any left-over money in that account to pay their own household expenses. [13] In the summer of 1980 Mrs. Bridger discovered that Mr. Bridger had a romantic relationship with another lady. Mr. and Mrs. Bridger's marriage went through a rough patch following that revelation. [14] In January 1981 the Munro Street house was still in Mrs. Bridger's name alone. The Redwood and Bentley duplexes were jointly held by Mr. and Mrs. Bridger. On January 13, 1981 Mrs. Bridger decided to sever the joint tenancy in the duplexes. She visited a lawyer and transferred her half interest in those properties to herself. From that point forward the Redwood and the Bentley duplexes were held by

Mr. and Mrs. Bridger as tenants in common. [15] On February 24, 1981 Mr. Bridger made his will. Mr. Bridger's instructions to the lawyer who drafted the will were that Mrs. Bridger had her own assets, her own home, and her own revenue producing property. Mr. Bridger's will gave a car to Mrs. Bridger and the rest of his estate in equal shares to his three daughters. [16] On February 26, 1981 Mrs. Bridger visited a different lawyer to make her own will. She instructed the lawyer to write the will so that all her estate would go to her three sons in equal shares. She told the lawyer to include in the will her reasons for not leaving anything to Mr. Bridger. Those reasons were that this was a second marriage for both, each had their own children and had separate assets, and their mutual wish that one not should not benefit from the estate of the other. [17] Despite the rocky time in the early 1980's Mr. and Mrs. Bridger's marriage survived. They never did separate. [18] Mr. and Mrs. Bridger always kept their personal finances quite separate from one another. The only mingling that went on was the revenue from the rental suites that went into the joint account and the rental expenses and household expenses that were paid from that joint account. Otherwise, the pair managed their own money. Mrs. Bridger had a personal account into which she deposited her wages when she worked and her

pension cheques after she retired. Mrs. Bridger did not say that she shared information relating to her own accounts with her husband, and I conclude that she made a deliberate choice to not tell him where her accounts were or how much money was in them. [19] I find that Mr. Bridger kept his own accounts as well. He kept those accounts secret from Mrs. Bridger. Mrs. Bridger said a number of times during the trial that she simply did not know what accounts or investments Mr. Bridger had, what banks held those accounts, or how much money was in them. I accept that evidence. I conclude that Mrs. Bridger did not know about Mr. Bridger's financial affairs because Mr. Bridger did not want her to know. I find that Mr. Bridger was determined to manage his own financial affairs and did not want his wife to have any knowledge, much less any control, over them. [20] As the 1990's wore on Mr. Bridger began to behave oddly. He retired from his work around 1990, but continued to insist that he had jobs to go to. There were, in fact, no jobs for him. Mr. Bridger's speech was always profane and his temper quick, but as the years passed these characteristics become more pronounced, troublesome, and eventually problematic. Mr. Bridger's memory and orientation to place and time deteriorated. In the summer of 1994, Mr. Bridger's behaviour was sufficiently abnormal that he was referred to Dr.

Feldman who was a neurologist at the UBC Hospital in Vancouver. Mrs. Bridger accompanied her husband to Vancouver for that assessment. Dr. Feldman diagnosed Mr. Bridger with early dementia. This was an unusual case - Mr. Bridger was only 67, which is relatively young for the onset of dementia. [21] Mr. Bridger and Mrs. Bridger returned to Kamloops and continued to live in the Munro Street house. Life became increasing difficult for her. The doctor prescribed pills for Mr. Bridger, and the medication somewhat calmed his disruptive behaviour. But, of course, the medication only controlled his agitation - it could not restore his mental capacity. [22] Each of Mr. Bridger's three daughters Ms. Mahon, Ms. Martin, and Ms. Jones and Mr. Bridger's brother Warren Bridger noticed progressive deterioration of Mr. Bridger's mental state commencing in the early 1990's. I accept Ms. Mahon and Ms. Jones' evidence that in 1992 Mr. Bridger was befuddled and confused when the family gave him a simple task with a shovel. This was at a lakeside cottage. The evidence was clear that in his younger days Mr. Bridger was a well motivated hard working fellow. He was skilled with tools and, as a welder and mechanic, I have to conclude that he was adept at manual labour. Yet, in 1992 at the lake a simple shovelling task stumped him. This was entirely out of the norm for Mr. Bridger and it evidenced a

significant change in his ability to cope with life. [23] Other examples of such evidence are: a) In 1995 Mr. Bridger attended his younger brother's wedding, but was confused and upset by the proceedings. Ms. Mahon testified and I accept that his memory was so poor that he could long grasp that this was his brother's wedding. b) Ms. Martin testified and I accept that when her father came to visit her family in Kimberly in 1995, she had to orient him in her house and repeatedly show him where the bathroom was. He was confused and concerned by a simple flight of stairs between floors in the house. c) Ms. Mahon and Ms. Jones testified that around 1994 - 1996, their father became increasingly withdrawn and isolated. He did not initiate conversations, and when drawn into a conversation he would respond with one or two word answers. d) In 1995 Ms. Jones noticed that her father was quite unable to understand the rules and object of a card game she and Mrs. Bridger were playing. When Mr. Bridger joined the game he did not know what the cards were, and the two ladies had to basically play along in a make-believe game to ensure that he got the impression that he had won. e) During 1994 - 1996 Ms. Mahon and Ms. Jones said that their father was unable to recognize his daughters, and would ask which the one before him was. Then he would recover, saying words to the effect of "Oh I knew

that". f) During that same period Ms. Jones and Ms. Mahon's husband took Mr. Bridger to a restaurant where they had coffee. Ms. Jones testified that Mr. Bridger was quite unconcerned with how much the bill was, that he appeared to not look at the money he handed over at the till or how much he got back in change. This exchange would, by itself, be inconsequential. However, the evidence was clear that Mr. Bridger had always been extremely conscious of the cost and value of things. He would go to grocery stores and obsess over the cost of produce, even to the point of cutting potatoes open to ensure they were not hollow and thus a poor value. He would take his own calculator to a gas station to ensure that he paid the exactly correct sum for the volume of fuel he purchased. His apparent lack of concern at the restaurant was a marked departure from his earlier cost-consciousness. g) Warren Bridger testified that in 1994 or 1995 he took his brother on a shopping trip. They were looking to buy some hardware and plumbing supplies. Mr. Bridger brought along a chunk of malfunctioning plumbing that needed to be replaced. Mr. Bridger wandered away from Warren in the shopping mall. By the time Warren caught up to him he was in a jewellery store and was asking a bewildered clerk to replace the broken plumbing. Warren had to make his apologies to the clerk and steer his brother toward an

actual hardware store. Given Mr. Bridger's career as a mechanic and welder the fact that he would look for plumbing fixtures at a jewellery store suggests that he suffered from extreme mental confusion. [24] Sometime in 1996 Mrs. Bridger had a conversation with an acquaintance who told her about something called a power of attorney. Mrs. Bridger thought it would be a good idea to have a power of attorney from Mr. Bridger. She telephoned a lawyer in Kamloops and instructed the lawyer to prepare one. The lawyer noted that she told him on the telephone the reason a power of attorney was necessary was because "the family was concerned about his failing health". [25] On April 29, 1996 Mr. and Mrs. Bridger visited the lawyer's office. The lawyer testified that he explained to Mr. Bridger the nature and consequence of the power of attorney. He told Mr. Bridger that the power of attorney was enduring, which is to say it would survive mental infirmity, and that with respect to real estate it would continue to be in effect for more than three years. The lawyer testified that he asked Mr. Bridger if he understood all that and Mr. Bridger indicated yes. The lawyer did not ask what aspect of Mr. Bridger's health was failing. Mrs. Bridger did not describe what it was about Mr. Bridger's health that was failing. Mrs. Bridger did not volunteer that Mr. Bridger had been diagnosed with dementia

approximately two years earlier. The lawyer did not ask Mr. Bridger to paraphrase his understanding of the power of attorney. The only indication that Mr. Bridger appreciated the legal effect of what he was doing was that he answered yes when the lawyer prompted him to do so. [26] The lawyer charged $125 for the power of attorney. Mrs. Bridger took out a cheque book and made out a cheque for that sum. This was Mr. Bridger's cheque book, and it was a cheque drawn on Mr. Bridger's personal account. She gave the cheque to Mr. Bridger and he signed it. In cross-examination Mrs. Bridger was asked why she wrote that cheque instead of giving it to Mr. Bridger to make out. Her answer was "I didn't think of it". [27] Mrs. Bridger asserted that she did not think that her husband was mentally incompetent in the years between 1994 and 1996. She testified that he had always been gruff and difficult to deal with, and that his behaviour during this period was simply more of the same. She did not notice anything particularly odd about Mr. Bridger's mental function, and thought that he was able to understand the nature and consequence of the power of attorney when he signed it. [28] As 1996 passed into 1997 and 1998, Mr. Bridger became more and more difficult for Mrs. Bridger to handle at home. Although she struggled mightily and bore a greater burden than many would shoulder, finally in

January 1999 it was all too much for her. She arranged for Mr. Bridger to go into an extended care home. He died there on April 27, 2003. [29] Given her age and circumstances Mrs. Bridger found managing tenants and rental property too demanding. She sold both duplexes in September 1999. The net proceeds of those sales were $142,344.36 from Redwood and $124,849.49 from Bentley. Ms. Bridger opened a joint bank account in her and her husband's names and deposited those proceeds. In so doing, Mrs. Bridger converted what had been a tenancy in common into a joint tenancy. Her action unilaterally imposed survivorship rights where none had existed before. [30] Mrs. Bridger's income for 1999 and Mr. Bridger's 2000 income included $28,469.11 each in taxable capital gains resulting from the sale of the duplexes. Mrs. Bridger testified that the income tax on those gains was paid out of the joint account holding the net proceeds of the sale of the rental properties. There was no evidence that either tax bill is outstanding, so I accept that Mrs. Bridger used either the sale proceeds or money from some other source to pay the capital gains tax. That cannot have been a huge tax bill - the taxable gain totalled only $57,000 or so, and the Bridger's marginal rate was at the low end of the scale. I will (somewhat arbitrarily) fix the amount paid in taxes out of the sale proceeds at 25% of the

capital gain, or $14,250. [31] The Munro Street house was always in Mrs. Bridger's name alone. In October 2004 Mrs. Bridger sold the house. She received the net proceeds of $153,264.04 and deposited them to her bank account. [32] Between 1999 and 2004 Mrs. Bridger gave a series of gifts to her sons and grandchildren. These were gifts of cash, and they totalled something on the order of $130,000 to $140,000. She has invested some money in term certificates and has other money in bank accounts. [33] As noted earlier, before 1999 Mr. and Mrs. Bridger lived frugal lives, and this included frugality in relation to their children. The Bridger daughters testified that their father was most disinclined to give them money. There was no evidence that Mrs. Bridger was any less parsimonious with her children than Mr. Bridger was with his - at least that was so before she sold the duplexes. I find that while they lived together Mr. and Mrs. Bridger expected that their children would sink or swim on their own financial merits, and that any money they expected to distribute to their respective children would go by their wills, not by gifts made inter vivos. [34] When he died Mr. Bridger's estate had $311,281.62, all in cash and all in bank accounts or investments. Mr. Bridger had long since sold the car he bequeathed to Mrs. Bridger. The estate was reduced by funeral expenses and will be

further reduced by however much income tax will be levied against those investments and by estate administration expenses. On the other hand, the estate's money has remained invested and so, presumably, some interest income has accrued to the estate as well. All of which is to say that the evidence at trial was not adequate for me to find precisely how much the estate is worth. I can say that that the estate is probably worth approximately $300,000. [35] As noted earlier, Mrs. Bridger is in good health. Her needs are modest. Her pension income is just adequate to meet those needs. Any income she might have in addition would go to provide her some luxuries. It has to be said, though, that given her very frugal lifestyle I doubt that she would indulge herself even if she had the means to do so. [36] I was well-impressed by Mr. Bridger's daughters. All three are comfortably settled in their adult lives. They are married and are together with their husbands. They have children who are either grown or are in their teens. Each woman candidly testified that it would work no hardship on her or her family if she did not get a share of her father's estate. I have no impression that the daughters are grasping or that they are jealous of Mrs. Bridger's finances. They simply wish to ensure that their father's estate is properly gathered in and reasonably distributed. Discussion Validity of

Power of Attorney [37] The estate challenges the validity of the power of attorney that Mr. Bridger gave to his wife in April 1996. The estate says that Mr. Bridger was not sufficiently competent to give the power. This begs the question: What level of competence is necessary to give a valid power of attorney? In Egli (Committee of) v. Egli 2004 BCSC 529, 28 B.C.L.R. (4th) 375, where Hans Egli gave his power of attorney to David Egli, Garson J. articulated the test thus: 28 In this case, therefore, it was necessary for Hans Egli to understand that David Egli would complete authority over his affairs, that David Egli would have authority to do anything the donor could have done, that the authority would continue if Hans Egli became incapable, and that in the event of incapacity the appointment would be irrevocable. [38] The evidence at trial was uniformly to the effect that Mr. Bridger was very tight and very private about his money. He did not let his daughters or his wife of many years know where his money was or how much he had. Mrs. Bridger testified that her husband kept her completely ignorant of his financial affairs. Mr. Bridger's brother testified that Mr. Bridger was unusually concerned about the cost and value of consumer items. The daughters testified that when they visited, their dad and step-mother's conversation would always concentrate on how much things cost and

how poor they were. [39] Mrs. Bridger did not give any evidence to the effect that prior to April 1996 her husband decided to open up and to share his financial life with her. She testified to no epiphany, reconciliation, gradual process or landmark event that resulted in Mr. Bridger changing his stripes and becoming content to have his wife to take his bank book in her hand and write out a cheque on his account. She gave no evidence that at a time when his mental competence was not in question, i.e: before the summer of 1994, her husband was happy for her to write cheque on his account. [40] If Mr. Bridger was mentally competent when he was in the lawyer's office that day, then he must have undergone a very significant change of attitude for him to meekly sit by while Mrs. Bridger appropriated his cheque book and wrote out a draft on his account. He must have abandoned his lifelong adherence to secrecy and exclusive control over his money. There was no evidence that this was so. [41] The burden of proof lies on the party attacking the power of attorney to show that the person giving it was not competent. The whole of the evidence adduced by the defendants and Mrs. Bridger's own testimony in chief and under cross-examination painted Mr. Bridger as a person who, earlier in life when his competency was not in question, was obsessively concerned over his money. I must conclude

that under normal circumstances and in his right mind he would have been adamantly opposed to giving his wife total control over his affairs. Given that mindset, some explanation other than incompetence must needs be supplied if the court is to accept the proposition that Mr. Bridger knew what he was doing when he signed the power of attorney. The evidence here did not supply that explanation. [42] Absent some innocent explanation for Mr. Bridger's lack of concern about the cheque writing and given the confusion he displayed to his brother and daughters earlier in 1994 and 1995, I am driven to conclude that in April 1996 Mr. Bridger's dementia was far enough gone that he could not appreciate what was going on around him. He did not, therefore, have the mental capacity to give Mrs. Bridger his power of attorney. [43] I do not mean to say that Mrs. Bridger got the power of attorney for some nefarious purpose. Her motives were pure - she was facing an increasingly difficult situation; her husband was becoming more and more difficult to manage and she needed to take some steps so that she could manage his affairs. The problem simply is that she waited too long. By April 1996 the correct thing for her to have done was to have a committee appointed over Mr. Bridger's estate. [44] In any event, it does not much matter whether the power of attorney was valid or not. In either case Mrs.

Bridger owed her husband a fiduciary duty with respect to her dealings in his affairs. As to the nature of that fiduciary duty, Garson J. put it best in Egli (supra): 82 It is the attorney's duty to use the power only for the benefit of the donor and not for the attorney's own profit, benefit or advantage (Chapman). The attorney can only use the power for his or her own benefit when it is done with the full knowledge and consent of the donor (Robertson, Mental Disability and the Law in Canada, at 183). I am not aware of any authority that detracts from this principle in circumstances where the benefit is conferred on family members. [45] I have concluded, therefore, that half of the proceeds of the sale of the two duplexes are impressed by a trust in Mr. Bridger's favour. Mrs. Bridger must account to the estate for those funds. [46] I note that in a different case where tracing was necessary and no wills variation was claimed, Mrs. Bridger's trust obligation and need to account would be relevant. In the long run, though, I do not think that it much matters here whether there is or is not a trust and whether Mrs. Bridger has preserved or has encroached on her husband's share in the proceeds of the duplex sales. That is because the mechanism for assessing a spouse's claim under the Wills Variation Act mandates an overall assessment of the parties' circumstances. Trusts and

accountings are, in this case at least, subsumed by that assessment process. Wills Variation [47] In Tataryn v. Tataryn Estate, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 807, the Supreme Court of Canada considered the principles that apply a Wills Variation Act action. I take from Tataryn, and the many cases that have considered and followed it, these propositions: 1. The Wills Variation Act requires that a testator make adequate, just, and equitable provision for surviving spouse and children; 2. What is adequate will be measured by the legal and moral duties that lie upon the testator; 3. In the case of an intact marriage, the minimum legal obligations owed to a surviving spouse will be measured by a notional division of family property and a notional application of support obligations immediately before the testator's passing (Glanville v. Glanville, (1998), 58 B.C.L.R. (3d) 240 (CA)); 4. As to moral duties, those are the standards and expectations of society as they exist from time to time; and 5. The size of the estate will influence the degree to which competing duties owed to a spouse and children may be satisfied, but as a general principle legal and moral duties owed to a spouse deserve greater weight and will be satisfied in priority to the duties owed to adult independent children. [48] Applying those principles to this case, I find that in April 2003 Mr. and Mrs. Bridger were notionally

entitled to an equal share of their family assets. Mrs. Bridger argues that she should have a more than an equal share because she initiated the purchase of the real estate and because she managed the tenants and rents for those properties. This couple was married for 38 years. The Munro Street house was clearly the matrimonial home. The titles to the duplexes were in their names as tenants in common. Although they kept their financial lives separate there can be no doubt that each contributed to the other's accumulation of assets throughout their lengthy union. There would, in my view, be no basis on which an equal division of assets could be said to be unfair to either spouse. There is, therefore, no merit in Mrs. Bridger's assertion that she should get a larger share upon a notional division of the family assets. [49] I heard no evidence that Mrs. Bridger had any significant personal savings when Mr. Bridger passed away. The family assets in play were limited to the Munro Street property, the proceeds from the duplexes, and the investments and savings in Mr. Bridger's name. [50] The whole of the proceeds of the duplex sales must be accounted for here. There was no evidence at trial that the couple discussed or contemplated making large inter vivos gifts to their children. Those gifts were not consistent with their spending pattern before Mr. Bridger became incompetent. In my

view, Mr. Bridger could not have reasonably foreseen that his wife would diminish her net worth by giving away large sums of money to her sons and grandchildren. In my opinion Mrs. Bridger has in her lifetime partially achieved the distribution of wealth she wanted to achieve upon her death. It is not, therefore, reasonable to require that Mr. Bridger's estate be divided on the basis that it was foreseeable that Mrs. Bridger would dissipate her share of the family assets prior to his death. [51] The family assets to be notionally divided are, therefore, thus: Asset Value Munro St. house $ 153,814 Redwood St. duplex $ 142,739 Bentley St. duplex $ 124,829 Less capital gains taxes -$ 14,250 Cash and investments in Mr. Bridger's name $ 311,281 Total $ 718,413 One half interest $ 359,206 [52] In April 2003 Mr. and Mrs. Bridger each had a notional entitlement to a rounded $360,000 from their accumulated estates. That figure defines Mrs. Bridger's minimum legal entitlement postulated by Esson J.A. in Glanville. [53] When Mr. Bridger died Mrs. Bridger had possession of the following assets (I use the full value of the duplexes for the reasons set out above): Asset Value Munro St. house $ 153,814 Redwood St. duplex $ 142,739 Bentley St. duplex $ 124,829 Less capital gains taxes -$ 14,250 Total $ 407,132 [54] That capital sum meets the minimum legal obligation Mr. Bridger had to his

spouse. [55] Turning then to whether Mr. Bridger would have been legally obliged to pay Mrs. Bridger spousal support immediately before his death, I note that they each had their pension incomes. Their pensions were adequate to meet their modest needs. After a notional distribution of the notional family assets, each would have had a reasonable sum to invest and, presumably, generate income. So, assuming that notional support obligations are assessed after notional property division, Mrs. Bridger's legal entitlement to receive spousal support, if it existed at all, would have been very small. [56] Mr. Bridger's moral obligation to his wife is less easy to assess. By all accounts the Bridger's marriage was not particularly happy. They did, however, stick by one another. What moral obligation do spouses owe to one another after 38 years together? A considerable obligation, I think. That obligation might be increased when, as in this case, one spouse falls ill and receives years of care, time, and effort from the other. There can be no question that Mrs. Bridger worked long and hard for Mr. Bridger as his health declined. She did as much as she could, and considerable personal cost, to allow Mr. Bridger to live at home as long as possible. Under these circumstances society's reasonable expectations, with reference to contemporary community standards, are that Mr. Bridger would

make additional provision (i.e. over and above whatever minimum legal property and support obligations lay upon him) for his wife in his will. [57] There is no doubt that Mr. Bridger owed a moral obligation to his daughters as well. He gave them no significant financial support during his lifetime. On one occasion he loaned money to one daughter but insisted that she repay him; on another occasion he flatly refused a daughter's request for help with her university expenses. Mr. Bridger appreciated his moral duty; the evidence was clear that he intended his estate to provide for his daughters after he was gone. No order varying his will should seriously frustrate that obligation. [58] Bearing in mind that duties to spouses ought to outweigh obligations to independent children, that Mrs. Bridger has already received more than one-half of the couple's combined assets, and that Mr. Bridger's estate is relatively small, I have concluded that just, adequate, and equitable provision for Mrs. Bridger would be 25% of her late husband's estate. Mr. Bridger's daughters should share the remaining 75% equally between them. Unjust enrichment [59] Given my conclusions on the Wills Variation Act suit there is no need to consider the defendants' argument that Mrs. Bridger would be unjustly enriched by an award in her favour. Conclusion [60] There will be a declaration that Mr. Bridger was not

competent to give his power of attorney on April 29, 1996. Because the money that Mrs. Bridger appropriated by using the power of attorney is money to which she would have been entitled from her husband's estate in any event, there will be no order for relief consequent to that declaration. [61] There will be an order that Mr. Bridger's will be varied so that 25% of the estate's net value go to Mrs. Bridger, and the remaining 75% go to his daughters in equal shares. Costs [62] The parties agreed that in the event that the will was varied the estate should to bear all costs. The conventional order is that all parties should recover their costs on a solicitor-client basis from the estate. I see no reason to depart from convention here, and an order for costs shall go accordingly. "P. Rogers, J." The Honourable Mr. Justice P. Rogers