C.D.C. v. M.E.R.W.

2024 BCSC 1509 C.D.C. v. M.E.R.W.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: C.D.C. v. M.E.R.W., 2024 BCSC 1509 Date: 20240816 Docket: E221606 Registry: Vancouver Between: C.D.C. Claimant And M.E.R.W. Respondent Corrected Judgment: The text of the judgment was corrected at paragraph 131 on October 22, 2024 Before: The Honourable Justice Tucker Reasons for Judgment Counsel for the Claimant: N. Charlton M. Wyant The Respondent, appearing in person: M.E.R.W. Place and Date of Trial/Hearing: Vancouver, B.C. April 2-5, 8-12, 18-19 and July 25, 2024 Place and Date of Judgment: Vancouver, B.C. August 16, 2024 Table of Contents I. Introduction.. 4 II. Some Procedural Background.. 5 III. Credibility. 9 IV. Facts. 12 A. The Beginning. 12 B. The July Row.. 13 C. Separation through Mediation. 14 D. Mediation and the Agreement 15 E. Agreement and the Parenting Coach. 19 F. After the Expiry of the Interim Parenting Schedule. 20 G. Crerar Order through May 10, 2023. 21 H. Parenting Time After the Sharma Order 24 I. The Name Change Application. 26 J. The Mother's Residence. 27 K. The Incidents While in the Father's Care. 28 V. Non-Party Witness Evidence. 30 A. C.H. 30 B. D.A. 31 C. K.V. 32 VI. Further Factual Findings. 34 A. The Father's Consumption of Alcohol 34 B. Mother's Refusal to Communicate with the Father 35 C. Mother's Disregard of Communications regarding Litigation. 37 D. Deciding that E. was Not "Available"

for Parenting Time. 38 E. 2024 Summer Parenting Weeks. 39 F. Allegations of Family Violence. 40 Harassing Texts. 40 Intimidation & Threats. 41 VII. Parenting.. 45 A. Issues. 45 B. Legal Framework. 45 C. Parenting Time. 46 D. Final Decision-Making Authority. 48 Terms of Order 52 Decision regarding Pre-school 52 VIII. Income for Support Purposes. 54 A. Evidence. 54 B. Imputation of Income. 56 IX. Child Support. 58 X. Spousal Support. 61 XI. Fines & Orders for Payment. 63 A. Relevant FLA Provisions. 64 B. Failure to Disclose and Section 213. 67 C. Breach of Crerar and Sharma Orders. 68 Section 228. 68 Section 230. 68 Breach of Parenting Time Terms. 69 D. Set-off by Deduction from Child Support 69 XII. Costs. 72 XIII. Miscellaneous. 72 I. Introduction [1] The parties met in October 2019 and lived together in a marriage-like relationship from at least January 2020 through September 2021. [2] The claimant (or the "Mother") is 34 years old. [3] The respondent (or the "Father") is 31 years old. [4] The parties have one daughter, E., who was born in 2020. E was three years old at the time of trial, and will turn four this Fall. [5] It is undisputed that the parties did not live together in a marriage-like relationship for a period of two years, and thus that the parties never became spouses for purposes of property division: Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c. 25 [FLA], s. 3(1). [6] The

dispute arising in this case is primarily about parenting arrangements and child support, although the Mother also seeks spousal support under a counterclaim. [7] The Father seeks an order for joint guardianship and shared decision-making with respect to s. 41 FLA parenting responsibilities, but on terms granting him decision-making powers where there is a failure to agree (subject to a limited carve-out on a single subject area). The Mother submits that she should be granted final decision-making powers in the event of disagreement on all s. 41 matters. [8] The Father seeks equal parenting time on a 2-2-5-5 schedule, along with detailed terms for holiday parenting time, and supporting terms governing the conduct of exchanges, communications, and travel. The Mother seeks an order that E. reside primarily with her, granting the Father flexible time on weeknights and overnight parenting time every other weekend. The Mother also seeks orders that the exchanges of E. be done using family and friends as representatives (i.e., not directly between the parties) and that there be no exchanges at her residence. [9] With respect to child support, the Father seeks a set-off of guideline table amounts based on an imputation of income to the Mother. The Mother testified that her estimated present actual income is $20,400, and seeks support based on that income. [10] The Mother also advanced

a claim for spousal support. Her claim is advanced on her testimony that she requires pelvic floor therapy as a result of her pregnancy with E. The Father takes the position that the Mother has not established an entitlement to spousal support. [11] An anonymized version of the final order terms sought by the Father is attached as Schedule A. These reasons for judgment refer to terms sought by reference to paragraphs of Schedule A. (While the paragraph numbering in Schedule A is non-consecutive, I have adhered to it notwithstanding the numbering errors.) II. Some Procedural Background [12] Both parties retained counsel shortly following separation. The Father has been represented from the outset, and up until trial, by Ms. Charlton. The Mother engaged Anne Demeulemeester after separation. [13] The parties and their then counsel attended a mediation in February 2022. The mediation resulted in an agreement regarding certain matters ("Agreement"), and set an interim parenting schedule ("Interim Parenting Schedule") covering the period from mediation through to August 31, 2022. [14] Ms. Demeulemeester ceased to act for the Mother in or about May 2022. [15] The Father filed a notice of family claim on June 23, 2022. [16] On July 29, 2022, the Mother filed a response to the family claim and a counterclaim. The Father filed a response to the counterclaim on August 24, 2022. [17] The

parties attended a judicial case conference on November 18, 2022. The Mother was represented by Donald Wilson at the conference and subsequently retained Mr. Wilson as counsel. The trial date was set by consent as April 2, 2024 at the conference. [18] On November 18, 2022, the Father filed a notice of application regarding interim parenting arrangements. Both parties were represented by counsel in a December 2022 hearing before Justice Crerar. [19] In March 2023, Mr. Wilson filed a notice of withdrawal providing a mailing address and email address for service to the Mother. [20] On April 26, 2023, the Father filed a second notice of application regarding parenting arrangements. On May 10, 2023, the parties appeared before Justice Sharma, with the Mother representing herself. The application was settled by consent. At the time of the appearance before Justice Sharma, the Mother asked Ms. Charlton to send correspondence directed to her to a specific email address and to have her office telephone the Mother to advise that correspondence had been sent. Ms. Charlton's firm followed the requested procedure, but often received a mail box full message when the phone call was made. As the Mother was generally non-responsive, Ms. Charlton adopted a practice of sending correspondence to the email address set out in the notice of withdrawal as well as the one the Mother had provided at the

time of the Sharma application. [21] On November 28, 2023, there was a second judicial case conference. The Mother attended by MS Teams. An order was made requiring the parties to exchange lists of documents by January 15, 2024. [22] The Father set an examination for discovery for February 6, 2024. The Mother did not attend. The Father obtained an order from Association Judge Robertson ordering the Mother to attend examination for discovery on February 21, 2024. The Mother did not attend. The Father set a third examination for discovery, which the Mother again did not attend. [23] On February 15, 2024, a trial management conference was held. The Mother did not attend. Various procedural orders were made, including orders requiring both parties to provide will-say statements, final lists of documents and file F8 financial statements. [24] As of trial, the Mother had failed to produce a list of documents or provide an F8 financial statement. Her entire financial disclosure consisted of two documents provided to the Father by Ms. Demeulemeester during the February 2022 mediation. [25] Notwithstanding the concerted efforts of Ms. Charlton and the Father himself to engage the Mother in the trial process, the Mother failed to respond to communications or correspondence relating to the upcoming trial. On March 6, 2024, and again on March 11, 2024, the Mother was served trial documents

by email, including the trial certificate and a notice to admit. There was no response. [26] Due to the Mother's failure to respond, on March 14, 2024, Ms. Charlton had her personally served with copies of the following: a) the notice to admit; b) the trial certificate; c) the notice of trial; and d) hard copies of all of the correspondence sent to the Mother in the period after the second judicial case conference. [27] On March 29, 2024, Ms. Charlton wrote to the Mother offering to her with copies of the Father's document books in advance of the trial. The Mother did not respond. [28] On April 1, 2024, Ms. Charlton sent the Mother a copy of her proposed order after trial. Once again, there was no response. [29] The trial commenced on April 2, 2024. The Mother did not attend Court on the first day of trial. She had provided no indication to Ms. Charlton or the Father that she either intended to appear at the trial or was unable to attend the trial dates. I ruled that the Court would proceed with the trial in the Mother's absence: RR. 14-7(76) and 21-6(1) of the Supreme Court Family Rules, B.C. Reg. 169/2009 [Rules]. [30] At trial, I expressed my concern that the trial list did not include any witnesses who had spent time with E. post-separation outside of the Father's parenting time. The Father's trial brief listed C.H. as a witness. C.H. and her husband own a house in Mission

with a basement suite in which the Mother and E. stayed in the period immediately before and following the parties' separation ("Mission Suite"). Although listed in the trial brief, the Father did not subpoena C.H. when it became apparent that the Mother would not attend the trial. When contacted by Ms. Charlton, C.H. agreed to appear voluntarily to provide evidence of her observations of E. [31] On the third day of trial, April 4, 2024, the Mother attended. She advised the Court that she had planned to attend all of the trial, but had been unable to attend on April 2 and 3, 2024, due to suffering a severe migraine. No medical documentation in support was provided. [32] Notwithstanding her failure to comply with the second judicial case conference order, the trial management order, or the order to attend examination for discovery, the Mother sought to participate in the remainder of the trial. I ruled that the Mother would be allowed to participate. I also made an order allowing her to obtain a digital recording of the days she had not attended. [33] The Mother fully participated in the trial. She conducted extensive cross-examinations and provided extensive testimony in direct. She made a lengthy closing submission. It was evident on cross-examination and in direct that she listened to the recording of the two days that she did not attend. Finally, notwithstanding her failure

to comply with pre-trial orders, the Mother was given leave to introduce financial documents relating to her present income and to introduce into evidence a set of photographs relating to incidents she gave testimony about in her direct evidence. III. Credibility [34] The legal principles governing credibility determinations are well-established. In assessing the truthfulness of the testimony of any witness, I am guided by the test set out in Faryna v. Chorny, [1952] 2 D.L.R. 354 (B.C.C.A.) at 357, 1951 CanLII 252 (B.C.C.A.): In short, the real test of the truth of the story of a witness in such a case must be its harmony with the preponderance of the probabilities which a practical and informed person would readily recognize as reasonable in that place and in those conditions. [35] The factors to be considered are those described by Justice Dillon in Bradshaw v. Stenner, 2010 BCSC 1398, aff'd 2012 BCCA 296: [186] Credibility involves an assessment of the trustworthiness of a witness' testimony based upon the veracity or sincerity of a witness and the accuracy of the evidence that the witness provides. The art of assessment involves examination of various factors such as the ability and opportunity to observe events, the firmness of his memory, the ability to resist the influence of interest to modify his recollection, whether the witness' evidence harmonizes with independent

evidence that has been accepted, whether the witness changes his testimony during direct and cross-examination, whether the witness' testimony seems unreasonable, impossible, or unlikely, whether a witness has a motive to lie, and the demeanour of a witness generally. Ultimately, the validity of the evidence depends on whether the evidence is consistent with the probabilities affecting the case as a whole and shown to be in existence at the time. [Citations omitted.] [36] In the period immediately following separation, and especially so from mid-2022 onwards, much of the direct communication between the parties was by text messaging or email. Thus, many concrete details are beyond dispute. However, on some issues, the parties have provided sharply conflicting evidence. Central among these areas of conflict are: a) the Father's consumption of alcohol during the relationship; b) whether there was family violence; and c) whether E. suffered anything other than routine bumps and scrapes while in the Father's care. [37] The bulk of the trial was taken up with party testimony. Only three non-party witnesses were called: C.H., D.A. and K.V. As already noted, C.H. owns the Mission Suite and her family resided in the house that contains the Mission Suite. C.H. is the Mother's childhood best friend. D.A. is the Father's childhood friend. He is also part-owner of the company the Father is

employed by. K.V. was the mutual friend who introduced the parties in 2020. K.V. has known the Father since middle school. However, K.V. also had an independent friendship with the Mother, who she met as a co-worker. [38] I have no concerns about the credibility of the non-party witnesses. All three provided coherent, considered and measured testimony. D.A. and K.V. both made reasonable concessions on cross-examination. C.H. was not cross-examined. However, she agreed to appear as a witness without being subpoenaed on the basis that she would be asked to give evidence as to her observations of E. She did so for the purpose of assisting the Court's assessment of E.'s best interests. I find C.H.'s testimony regarding her observations of E. to be both credible and reliable. [39] To the extent that C.H.'s testimony went beyond her own direct observations of E., I am not relying on that evidence. I do not, in doing so, mean to imply any criticism of her testimony. I am disregarding it simply because it was not subject to cross-examination and the Mother did, in her own evidence, take issue with some of C.H.'s evidence in this respect. [40] I found the Father to be a credible and reliable witness. He did not attempt to present an idealized version of himself. On cross-examination, he admitted to various flaws and failings. He was also measured in his portrayal of the Mother. Although

critical of her conduct toward him a co-parent, he consistently characterized the Mother as a good and loving parent. I note that this was the tenor of his testimony throughout (i.e., even in first two days when the Mother did not attend and there was no expectation of being subject to cross-examination). Finally, the Father's evidence was consistent with other credible evidence, including the testimony of the non-party witnesses, the parties' text exchanges and the Father's Soberlink test results. [41] The Mother's testimony, on the other hand, was highly problematic. A more detailed consideration of certain aspects of the Mother's evidence is set out below. Generally, however, the Mother's evidence is neither credible nor reliable. [42] It is apparent that the Mother bears an intense animosity toward the Father (and the Father's parents). This animosity did not merely colour her testimony, it saturated it. For the reasons set out below, I am satisfied that her animus is far more motivating to her than her oath. [43] The Mother's testimony was also consistently inconsistent. She contradicted herself on significant matters and minor matters alike. She tended to make definitive statements of fact in her direct testimony, only to abandon that view of the facts altogether and provide fundamentally different testimony once the inconsistency or improbability of her direct evidence

was brought to her attention on cross-examination. [44] As an example, the Mother frequently invokes suffering migraines as a justification for either doing or failing to do things. Nonetheless, her testimony about her migraines was ever changing. Initially, migraines were a long-standing heath problem for her, were profoundly debilitating in effect, and each lasted some three to four days. When it was pointed out to her that migraines of the sort she described would significantly impair her ability to parent a toddler during her parenting time, her pattern of migraines migrated to only weekends. The trigger for these weekend migraines was said to often be the stress she experienced in having to exchange E. with the Father. When it was pointed out that she had already given testimony about the many activities she engages in on weekends when she does not have E., she testified that weekend migraines were only a recent development. There is no medical evidence whatsoever supporting the Mother's claim of migraines. I am not satisfied on the evidence that the Mother gets migraines at all, but even if she does get migraines at times, I am more than satisfied that she freely and frequently makes false claims of having had a migraine as catch-all excuse for failing to meet her legal and other obligations. [45] As a further example of a fundamental inconsistency, when cross-examined

about the fact that she ignored the Father's texts attempting to align their household practices on naps, soother weaning and potty training, the Mother testified that she had read on the internet that having inconsistent practices between homes was fine and thus reasonably believed the Father should use his own judgment rather than text her. I do not believe the Mother's assertion that she thought inconsistent practices on these matters was fine. The assertion is inherently improbable. Further, the text messages in evidence show her repeatedly insisting that the Father adhere to routines she had established in her household and she complained, elsewhere in her own testimony, about how E.'s soother use was thrown off by the Father's inconsistent approach. [46] These are but two examples of the conflicting testimony and untruths that were peppered throughout the Mother's testimony. Further examples are set out later in these reasons. On that basis, to the extent that the Mother's evidence conflicts with that of the Father, I accept the Father's in preference. To the extent that it conflicts with that of non-party witness evidence, I prefer that of the non-party witness. I am satisfied that the Mother's testimony is so generally unreliable that it can only be accepted where her evidence is corroborated by other evidence. IV. Facts A. The Beginning [47] By all accounts, the Mother

and the Father had a great deal in common and appear to have recognized one another as kindred spirits at first introduction. [48] The parties met in the fall of 2019 at a Halloween party, where they introduced by K.V. The parties were living in the Father's PC House, in a marriage-like relationship, by January 2020. The Mother learned she was pregnant with E. in February 2020. [49] At the time the parties first met, the Mother worked as a medical office assistant. She has completed two certificate programs from Douglas College: Office Administrative Assistant and Medical Office Assistant. [50] The Father is a journeyman sheet metal worker and has a Red Seal certification. He is currently employed in a position that involves office duties rather than physical labour. When the parties met, the Father owned the PC House as well some vehicles. [51] In September 2020, the Mother began a planned 18-month maternity leave from her position at the medical clinic. [52] E. was born in October 2020. [53] At some point, the parties got engaged. [54] The Father's parents ("Grandparents") own a summer house ("Summer House") on the Sunshine Coast. The parties spent considerable time visiting them at the Summer House, both before and after E. was born. B. The July Row In July 2021, while at the Summer House, the Mother and Grandparents got into a row ("July Row"). The Father was an observer,

not a participant. As is common with family arguments, the initial disagreement was pedestrian but the argument escalated. At some point, the Mother told the Grandparents they would see little of E. in the future. The Grandfather said they would get a lawyer if need be. As tensions escalated, the Father left them arguing in the living room, and retreated into a bedroom by himself. Sitting there, listening to the spiralling argument out in the living room, he eventually punched the wall in frustration. [55] As a result of the July Row, the Mother wanted to leave the Summer House that night. The Father said they could leave in the morning. They had had drinks with dinner and there was no ferry at that time of night in any event. At the ferry dock in the morning, the Mother returned her engagement ring. She was upset that the Father had not taken her side in the July Row nor agreed to leave that very night. [56] The parties tried some counselling, but things did not improve. The Mother said she wanted time apart. She took E. and went to stay in the Mission Suite for two weeks. [57] After she moved to the Mission Suite, the Mother said she would only come back to the PC House if conditions were met. She wanted the parties and E. not to see the Grandparents. She also demanded the Father speak to his counsellor about his drinking. He testified that he did not have a problem with

alcohol, but he wanted the Mother to move back. Since the Father had a long-standing counsellor in any event, he agreed to this demand and, as promised, did bring it up for discussion with his counsellor. The Mother testified that the reason she insisted that he agree to raise it at counselling was because she was concerned "about safety". [58] After the two-week period, the Mother and E. moved back to the PC House, but the parties' relationship did not improve. The Mother began calling the Father a narcissist and an abuser. She said it was abusive behaviour to fail to back her position in the July Row and abusive behaviour to refuse to have sex just because he was upset about their relationship. [59] By September, it was agreed that they should separate. The Mother moved into the Mission Suite again on September 6, 2021. C. Separation through Mediation [60] From September 2021 through to March 2022, the Mother effectively determined what parenting time the Father could have. It was generally three to four times a week. [61] On weekdays, the Father would drive to Mission after work, arriving around 5:00 p.m. He would feed E. dinner and participate in her bedtime routine. On the weekends, he would try to get there before she woke up. His parenting time was spent in the Mission Suite and in the Mother's immediate presence. The Mother's behaviour toward the Father while he was in

the Mission Suite was variable. Sometimes she would talk about wanting to be together as a family again, other times she would berate him about the issues that led to the separation. [62] The Father was not permitted to take E. out to, for example, a park or a friend's house. They did not leave the Mission Suite unless the Mother came too. The Mother told the Father she was concerned that he would take E. and then go drinking. The Father retained counsel when it became apparent the Mother was not going to allow him any independent parenting time. [63] Although the Father denied that he had any drinking problem, the Father tried a number of things in an effort to convince the Mother to consent to independent parenting time. From November 2021 through to January 2022, he abstained from alcohol completely. He got a breathalyzer and offered to use it in front of her. Finally, he enrolled in a SoberLink program. The SoberLink program involved regular and frequent tests for alcohol consumption, with the test results being directly accessible by the Mother. [64] In December 2021, the Mother retained Anne Demeulemeester as counsel. After that, the Mother agreed to the Father spending additional time with E., but still inside the Mission Suite. The Mother continued to assert that independent parenting time was not "safe" for E. D. Mediation and the Agreement [65] The parties (and their

respective counsel) attended mediation on March 2, 2022 and entered into the Agreement. The Agreement includes the following recitals: E. The parties attended mediation with Stephanie Fabbro on March 2, 2022. The parties could not agree on a long-term parenting plan for [E.], and so instead negotiated the terms of an Interim without prejudice parenting schedule that expires on August 31,2022. [The Mother] and [The Father] also agreed to terms around guardianship and parenting responsibilities of [E.]. [The Father] agreed to participate in the SOBERLINK program in order to have solo parenting time with [E.], and this does not constitute an admission that he has a drinking problem. F. Prior to attending mediation, [The Father] paid, on [The Mother]'s behalf, the total sum of $8,500, towards [The Mother]'s lawyer retainer and [The Mother]'s one-half share of the mediator's retainer (the "Advance"). [The Mother] and [The Father] have agreed that the Advance represents lump sum spousal support, and this paid on a without prejudice basis as to entitlement and quantum. [66] The Agreement makes the Mother and Father joint guardians and provides for them both to exercise parental responsibilities, subject to an obligation to consult with one another and attempt to agree on matters. If the parties could not agree on the parental decision to be made, they agreed to try mediation before

applying to court. [67] As already noted, the Agreement established an "Interim Parenting Schedule". The Interim Parenting Schedule had three phases. The Father's parenting time rights increased over the phases: a) Phase One - March 2, 2022 until April 14, 2022: In this two-week period, the Father had five blocks of weekday parenting time to be exercised in the Mission Suite. For the exchanges, the Father was to pick up E. from the Mother on weekend mornings at 9:30 and the Mother would pick up E. from the Father at 4:00 on weekend evenings. It also provided for the Father to have one Thursday-Friday (overnight) 24-hour block. b) Phase Two - April 19, 2022 until June 16, 2022: The Father had two weekdays visits to be exercised in the Mission Suite and overnight parenting at the PC House on Friday nights. c) Phase Three - June 16, 2022 until August 31, 2022: The Father had two weekday visits to be exercised in the Mission Suite and overnight parenting Friday night through Sunday night every other weekend. The Father was allowed to take E. to the Summer House on two of his parenting time weekends, but had to facilitate a five-minute videoconference call between E. and the Mother while at the Summer House. [68] The Interim Parenting Schedule expired August 31, 2022. [69] The Agreement obliged the parties to retain a parenting coach "forthwith" to assist in developing a further

parenting schedule and to assist with parenting issues. The cost of the parenting coach was to be shared. Lindsay Jesperson was the agreed upon parenting coach (if she was available). Under the Agreement, the parties were to make best efforts to agree to a parenting schedule to apply after the Interim Parenting Schedule, either on their own or with Ms. Jesperson's assistance. If that failed, they were to re-engage in mediation. If mediation was unsuccessful or one party refused to go, an application could be made to court to set a further schedule. [70] The Father's evidence at trial, which was fully corroborated by text exchanges between the parties, was that the Mother began curbing the Father's parenting time under the Interim Parenting Schedule by insisting that E. be allowed to sleep during the Father's scheduled parenting time. For example, the Father would drive out to Mission after work, and upon reaching the Mission Suite, the Mother would then advise him that E. had just gone down for a nap. The Father would sit outside in his truck waiting to see whether E. would wake up before he had to head back to the PC House. [71] Notwithstanding that the Interim Parenting Schedule provides for weekday parenting time to be exercised in the Mission Suite, in June 2022, the Mother decided this would not be done. The Father discovered this change when, on June 21, 2022, he arrived

for his parenting time and the Mother put E. outside the door to the Mission Suite and shut the door without any conversation. The Mother subsequently texted the Father, telling him only to return E. by 5:45 p.m. [72] On subsequent weekday parenting time visits, the Mother continued to put E. outside the door for collection. As the Father had generally spent his weekday parenting time in the Mission Suite making dinner for E., he needed a plan to address dinner. He started preparing a dinner to bring out for E. They would have about an hour together, so his parenting time was generally spent either having a picnic with E. in a park (weather permitting) or a picnic-like meal inside his truck. [73] As the parties moved into Phase Three, the Father attempted to exercise his right to take E. to the Summer House for his weekend parenting time. The first Summer House weekend was uneventful. The second was in late August 2022. The Mother texted the Father immediately before the call was scheduled saying the videocall should be on Zoom. All previous videocalls between the parties had been done using Messenger. The Father texted that he did not have Zoom on his phone and would use Messenger. He tried the Mother on Messenger several times, but she did not answer. Eventually, he put E. to bed. He then received a call from the RCMP station in Sechelt saying the Mother had asked them to

perform a wellness check because the call was missed and the Father had a problem with alcohol. The Father explained that he had called on Messenger and, further, that he had done his SoberLink testing. The RCMP declined to come out to the Summer House. [74] At trial, the Mother testified that she did not want to use Messenger because it was connected to her Facebook account and she had decided to "create a new boundary" by limiting her use of social media. There was no explanation as to why this new rule had been implemented in an absolute fashion and on that particular weekend. I find that this is because there was no good reason for it. [75] The Mother also confirmed on cross-examination that she had received the Father's SoberLink test result for the Summer House weekend and that it showed no alcohol. She testified that she nonetheless thought it was reasonable to call the RCMP and ask for a wellness check because, in her view, the Father was unreasonable in not agreeing to use Zoom as she requested. I find that neither the insistence on Zoom nor the subsequent call to the RCMP were made in good faith. E. Agreement and the Parenting Coach [76] The Father contacted Ms. Jesperson in accordance with the Agreement and participated in an initial interview to establish a parenting coach relationship. The Father tried multiple times to get the Mother to engage with Ms. Jesperson.

Ms. Charlton wrote the Mother again explaining the function and value of a parenting coach. The Mother decided not to engage. Finally, the Father offered to pay the full cost of Ms. Jesperson's parenting coach services (i.e., notwithstanding the terms of the Agreement that the parties would share the cost). The Mother still failed to respond to the Father and refused to engage with Ms. Jesperson. [77] The Mother testified that her refusal to engage with a parenting coach was because she thought a parenting coach adjudicated disputes and she did not want that. However, the Mother was represented by Ms. Demeulemeester in the negotiating and signing of the Agreement. In her cross-examination, when her failure to comply with terms of the Agreement was put to her, the Mother asserted that she signed the Agreement without understanding its terms and/or as a result of being pressured to sign. However, the Mother was represented by Ms. Demeulemeester in the negotiating and signing of the Agreement and she acknowledged that she spoke with Ms. Demeulemeester after the negotiation and before signing the document. [78] The Agreement is fairly short and the negotiations were not brief. There is a term not only agreeing to work with a parenting coach, but dealing with the costs involved and agreeing to use Ms. Jesperson. It is implausible to suppose that the Agreement was signed without Ms.

Demeulemeester and/or the mediator explaining to the Mother what a parenting coach did before the Mother signed the Agreement. I find the Mother's testimony in this regard to be a contrived attempt to justify her failure to comply with the Agreement. [79] I find that the Mother understood what a parenting coach was and understood that she had agreed to use one. I am satisfied that the Mother refused to engage with Ms. Jespersen not due to any misapprehension of what a parenting coach did, but because she had no interest in setting a further parenting time schedule. She considered the expiry of the Interim Parenting Schedule without any new agreement in place to be advantageous to her, as is demonstrated by her actual conduct following the expiry. F. After the Expiry of the Interim Parenting Schedule [80] On September 1, 2022, the Father emailed the Mother saying that he would like to increase his parenting time and remove the SoberLink requirement. He proposed that pending a further agreement or court order, the Phase Three schedule should continue on a without prejudice basis. He also texted that proposal to her. [81] The Father sent a follow-up text to the Mother specifically confirming that continuing with the SoberLink testing was also part of his proposal. (The Father did, in fact, continue with SoberLink until December 2022.) [82] The Father also sought to return to

mediation regarding the expiry of the Interim Parenting Schedule. The Mother did not respond to his requests. [83] The Mother texted back that there was no agreement at all once the Interim Parenting Schedule expired and informed the Father that she would consider his parenting time on a "day to day" basis. She also asserted that the Father's failure to Zoom videoconference her from the Summer House was a wrongful withholding of her access to E. and proof that the Phase Three terms were unworkable. [84] In the days that followed, the Mother decided whether E. was "available" for parenting time or not. At one point, she advised the Father that he could not have parenting time because she and E. had Covid. The Father continued his drive to the Mission Suite anyway, to discover E., the Mother, C.H. and C.H.'s children all playing together in the yard. The Mother then said that E.'s Covid was asymptomatic. [85] On September 11, 2022, while the Father was driving E. back to Mission after some parenting time at the PC House, the Mother texted him. First, she directed him to meet her on the highway, and then to bring E. to the Mission RCMP station. After that, she began dictating various places for E. to be returned to her, but most often instructed the Father to drop E. off at the RCMP station. At the RCMP station, she insisted the Father stay back and that E. walk across the parking

lot on her own. The Father testified that the RCMP exchanges "came out of the blue". The Mother testified that a friend had suggested exchanges at the RCMP as a way to deal with the Mother's anxiety and that it was a way for her to "separate all the tension from my home". [86] On October 6, 2022, the Father texted confirming an agreement that he would have parenting time from October 7-9th. The Mother texted back saying E. was not available on the day or evening of the 8th. The Father said he would come get E. on the 7th and bring her back for her plans on the 8th. He came out to Mission to pick E. up. The Mother did not respond to his texts. He knocked at her door, but there was no response. He eventually left. [87] When he texted saying that the Mother had denied him his parenting time, she responded that E. had likely been in the bath when he arrived. She went on to text: "Your aggressive behavior and admission to trespassing AGAIN does not make me feel safe. Until we have some safeguards in place I do not think we can move forward." The allegation of trespass refers to his having knocked on her door. After this incident, the Mother asserted that "things" (i.e., the Father's parenting time) could not "move forward" until she felt safe and there were "safeguards" in place. She began maintaining that the Father needed to arrange a "third party service" for exchanges. This

became an insistent demand. G. Crerar Order through May 10, 2023 [88] On November 18, 2022, the Father filed a notice of application seeking an interim order setting his parenting time and establishing a set procedure for exchanges (i.e., who was to pick up and drop off E., and at what locations). [89] The application was heard by Justice Crerar on December 7, 2022. The Mother was represented by counsel. By consent, both parties were made guardians with parental responsibilities and the parties were obliged to consult on any important decisions and try to reach an agreement. Also by consent, absent agreement, they were to try mediation and absent agreement in mediation, to apply under s. 49 of the FLA for a judicial determination of outstanding issues. An interim schedule of parenting times and assigning responsibility for dropping E. off also went by consent. [90] The terms governing the conduct of exchanges were disputed and set by Justice Crerar. The Mother wanted the exchanges at third-party locations (as opposed to the parties' residences) and for third parties to be involved (i.e., for the exchange not to be parent to parent). She submitted this was necessary due to her anxiety and fears. [91] Justice Crerar held that E. should not be driven to third-party locations or left with third parties. The parties were ordered to exchange E. directly and for the drop offs to take

place at their residences, but not to speak or interact with one another in the process. [92] The Crerar Order established a protocol requiring a text on arrival, putting E. at or near the door, and then retreating but maintaining visual sight of E. until she went inside. Justice Crerar's reasons state: "Immediately upon seeing the other parent take custody of [E.] and take her into safety, the other parent will depart". He noted that the protocol did not oblige the Mother to make eye contact with the Father and that she could observe from "the safety of her door". [93] Finally, Justice Crerar ordered the Mother to pay $1,500 forthwith as costs in the application. [94] The Mother followed the Crerar Order for about one month. After that, she began to consistently drop E. off late at the PC House. She often said, at the last minute, that she was unable to drop off E., resulting in the Father coming out to Mission to pick E. up in order to have his parenting time. She also required the Father to drop off and pick up E. at addresses other than her residence. She frequently failed to text the Father when dropping E. off at the PC House. She did not pay the costs as ordered. [95] The Father testified that there were also issues with the exchange protocol. On occasion, E. had to stand and wait before being let into the Mother's house. This would result in E crying and, at times,

trying to walk back to him. In his view, this was upsetting for E. Often the Mother's door would open to let E. walk inside, but the Father could not see who was letting her in, which he found disconcerting. [96] There were also practical issues with the times set out under the Crerar Order. At the end of his parenting time, the Father had to drop E. back in Mission at 5:30 or 5:45 pm (depending on the day). E.'s dinner time was 5:00 pm, at which time they needed to be on the road in order to return to Mission on time. The Father tried to pack E. a meal that she could eat during the drive, but it did not work well. The Mother repeatedly texted the Father saying that E. must be given dinner at 5:00 p.m. [97] Ms. Charlton raised varying the drop off time with the Mother's legal counsel, seeking to enable the Father to give E. dinner at the PC House and then drive out to Mission. On March 3, 2023, Mr. Wilson wrote back that his firm had withdrawn as counsel. A notice of intention to withdraw was filed on March 27, 2023, giving the Mother's email and home address as her addresses for service. [98] The Father and his counsel subsequently both wrote the Mother seeking her agreement to vary the drop off time under the Crerar Order so E. could eat dinner at the PC House before driving back to Mission. The Mother was also sent communications asking her to sign a passport application.

The Mother did not respond to any of these communications. She did, however, continue to text repeatedly (it appears by cutting and pasting of the same message) that E. must be given dinner at 5:00 p.m. [99] On April 11, 2023, the Father texted the Mother that she had yet to respond to his lawyer regarding his proposed changes to the parenting schedule and to him regarding the required signing of E.'s passport. [100] On April 26, 2023, the Father filed a notice of application seeking various orders. The orders included: varying the Father's drop off time under the Crerar Order to 6:30 p.m., that each parent be granted two (non-consecutive weeks) summer parenting time, an additional holiday week of parenting time to be exercised between September 2023 and date of trial, an order allowing the Father to travel with E., and an order enabling the Father to get a passport for E. [101] On May 9, 2023, the Father texted the Mother a reminder that the court application was the next day and offered to arrange childcare for E. to enable the Mother to attend. Less than an hour later, the Mother responded with a text saying that she thought her lawyer was still representing her and asserting that she had no knowledge that the Father had been seeking to vary the Crerar Order. Notwithstanding the texts and correspondence sent to her both before and after the Father's application was filed,

her May 9, 2023 text concluded with: I really wish that you would have sent me a text asking about these changes, because I'm sure we would have been able to come to an agreement. [102] The Mother attended Court on May 10, 2023. The parties entered into a consent order before Justice Sharma that included the terms outlined above as being sought under the application. [103] At the Mother's request, the Sharma Order also included a consent term that E.'s last name would be changed to include a hyphen and the Mother's last name. The terms of the Sharma Order required the Mother to submit the required name change application "forthwith". H. Parenting Time After the Sharma Order [104] The Father exercised his two weeks of summer parenting time under the Sharma Order. However, a pattern emerged whereby after the Father exercises his summer parenting time, the Mother would deny the Father's next parenting time on the basis that E. needed sleep because her scheduled had been disrupted and/or because E. was indicating that she wanted to stay with the Mother. In both her texts and testimony, the Mother described this state of affairs as E.'s being "physically dysregulated". [105] At trial, the Mother testified that when E. is "physically dysregulated", it is not "physically possible" for her to take E. to the Father's as required by the Crerar Order. She testified that it would be

"unsafe" to put E. in a vehicle when she is physically dysregulated. She testified that she always does her "best" to comply with Crerar Order, but there is nothing more that she can do in the circumstances. [106] As a result of the Mother's views, the Father was unable to exercise his additional holiday week under the Sharma Order. On his first attempt, he provided her with his selected week. On the day before the week started, he sent her a text reminding her that his parenting time the next day was the start of his holiday week. The Mother texted back as follows: Sorry but a week long trip is not whats best for [E.]. You had previously taken her two weeks previous at different time and they were extremely hard on her which you are already aware of. This can be reviewed at a different time, however, not good for [E.] right now. [107] His second attempt to schedule the holiday week was simply ignored by the Mother. After that, the Father concluded that it would be preferable to forego the holiday week and wait for the trial, rather than try to enforce the holiday week term. [108] On cross-examination at trial, the Mother was asked about her failure to comply with the term Sharma Order term entitling the Father to identify and then take a week of additional holiday parenting time. She responded: "Well, what if I don't think it's a good idea." [109] The Mother does not deny that

she often takes the position that E. is "unavailable" for the Father's parenting time. She acknowledges that she insists that E. stay and finish a full meal and that E., if napping, be allowed to sleep, and this sometimes curbs the Father's parenting time. I note that the Mother's position in this respect fails to take any account of the fact that she is the person setting E.'s nap and meal times. [110] She says, however, that this only occurs occasionally, and that the driving factor in E.'s "availability" for parenting time is whether E. wants to go see the Father. She testified that when she raises leaving to go the Father's, E. responds with "protest behaviour", such as refusing to put her jacket on. She testified that this is also why she is so often late when dropping E. off and why her stepfather generally drives them to the PC House. She testified that she needs to spend the drive playing with E. in order to keep E. from refusing to go. When asked why she had never previously offered this as an explanation (e.g., in her texts to the Father), the Mother said she did not raise it because it "seems negative". [111] The texts demonstrate that the Mother also often states that E. cannot participate in the Father's parenting time due to her having an upset stomach or similar minor ailment. Sometimes, she supports this with a vague statement about having consulted a doctor in

relation to the issue. When the Father follows up by asking for further information (e.g., what doctor, when, and what medical advice), the Mother ignores his inquiry. When he asks for more detailed information about E. (e.g., when did she get diarrhea, what was the nature of the problem), she ignores those inquiries as well. I. The Name Change Application [112] The Father sought the passport and travel terms under the Sharma Order because he wanted to take E. to Disneyland. Having consented to the Mother's request for a name change, the Father was left waiting on the name change application in order to apply for a passport. I am satisfied that the Mother knew he was waiting on the name change application. [113] In early June, the Mother taped some documents to her front door. She did not include a note or label them with the Father's name, so the Father did not remove them from the door. The taped documents related to the name change application. This resulted in a dispute. The Father said he left the documents there because there was no note and he was uncertain as to whether they were for him. He asked her to communicate more clearly. The Mother responded that the documents were quite obviously for him and accused him of delaying the name change application. [114] Following this exchange, the Mother then took a marker and wrote a note in large text on the door above the

taped documents. The note read "See you next Tuesday". On cross-examination, the Mother agreed she wrote the note and that it was directed to the Father. She denied having ever used the phrase as a vulgarity. She said that he had said she should leave notes, so she left a note. She maintained that she was only referring to his parenting time and the fact that he had time with E. the next Tuesday. This is patently untenable testimony. It is preposterous to suppose the Mother would leave the Father a chatty comment about parenting time given her attitude toward his parenting time, let alone to have chosen to do so using permanent marker on the suite door. [115] The Father completed the application form and returned it on June 8, 2023, along with $137 in cash, the amount required to file the application. He left the money for the Mother even though the Sharma Order made the Mother responsible for submitting the application. [116] As of trial, the Mother had still not submitted the name change application. The Mother testified that she lost both her own and E.'s birth certificate and so had been unable to file the application. She agreed that she had not looked into ordering replacement certificates. [117] The Father testified at trial that he had recently applied for E.'s passport under her name as it stands. J. The Mother's Residence [118] Following the Mother's disagreement with

C.H. about paying rent for the Mission Suite, she moved from the Mission Suite into a detached house in Mission. The Father only discovered that the Mother was moving when C.H. contacted him asking if he knew when the Mother intended on moving. The Mother never did advise the Father that she had moved. [119] On November 29, 2023, the Father texted asking whether he was drop to E. off at the Mission Suite that afternoon or if she was living somewhere else. At 5:00 p.m., the Mother texted the Father that drop off that day and henceforth should be at a different address in Mission. [120] The Mother did not inform the Father that there was another person living at the Mission house with her and E. Prior to the trial, all the Father knew - through E. herself - was that she and mommy were living with "Matt". At trial, the Mother confirmed that "Matt" is the same person that had been staying overnight with her at the Mission Suite. The Mother only provided Matt's last name at trial in response to a direct question by the Court. K. The Incidents While in the Father's Care [121] The Mother raised a number of incidents in which she alleged that E. had suffered an injury or harm while in the Father's care. These were that he had returned E. to her care: a) with bruises that looked like a dog bite in July 2022; b) in an unacceptably dirty diaper in October 2022; c) with marks on her lower

legs in March 2023; and d) with an unexplained "injury/abrasion near her vulva/ inner thigh" in July 2023. [122] The Mother provided photographs relating to the first three incidents. [123] In the diaper photograph, E. has on pants and shoes, but no top. Two small bits of diaper material protrude from the waistband of the pants. The Mother asserts that this photograph shows "poop coming out of her diaper". She described her own reaction to the incident as having been "really scared" and concerned that the Father might have done it in "retribution". [124] The photograph does not show feces. Nor, for that matter, does it show the condition of E.'s diaper. Notably, anyone taking a photograph for the purpose of documenting an unacceptable diaper situation would not take a photograph of this kind. The simple and obvious thing to do in such a case would be to take a photograph that shows the diaper. If the state of affairs had been alarming, I am satisfied that is what the Mother would have done. Further, it is undisputed that the photograph was taken after the Father had dropped E. off at a third party's house (as a third party exchange at the Mother's insistence). Thus, the photograph does not show E.'s condition at the time of drop off, but rather on the Mother's arrival to the third party location. A diaper can fill quickly. [125] The dog-bite photograph is also lacking. It

depicts several small bruises above the knee on the outside of E.'s upper leg. The larger bruises might be the size of a dime. The bruising is pale. The shape does not suggest a dog bite. If anything, it looks as though E. encountered something having a square-shaped outline. In my view, it is far more likely that the photograph depicts innocuous bruises of the sort commonly collected during play. [126] The photographs of E.'s lower legs show straight horizontal red marks at her ankle level. The Father noted the marks at the time he dropped E. off with the Mother and explained that they were caused by E. walking in boots after her socks slipped down. The photograph does not support the Mother's characterization of the marks as "alarming" and looking like "burns". The Father's explanation is consistent with the marks and with the superficial nature of the injury. [127] With respect to the fourth allegation, on July 4, 2023, the Father texted the Mother, at the time he dropped E. off, that she had a diaper rash from playing in a wet swim diaper at a water park the day before. He noted that he had been applying cream to the area. On July 6, 2023, the Mother texted that it was not a diaper rash but rather an "injury/ abrasion near her vulva/inner thigh". The Father denied this, and repeated that it was a diaper rash. Notably, the Mother copied and pasted the same text several times

in a row in response to the Father. When the Father did not respond further, the issue simply went away. I have no doubt that if there had been any merit to the Mother's assertions, the matter would not have so simply resolved. I accept the Father's explanation for the diaper rash. [128] It is worth noting that despite the incidents she complains of, the evidence indicates that the Mother does not consider herself equally bound to explain E.'s various childhood injuries to the Father. In May 2023, when the Mother dropped E. off at the Father's with a bruised forehead and scratches along her face, she texted to say that E. had been injured while "learning about gravity". When the Father asked to know what specifically had happened, the Mother did not respond. V. Non-Party Witness Evidence A. C.H. [129] C.H. was the Mother's childhood best friend. C.H. has known E. since she was born. During the time E. and the Mother resided in the Mission Suite, C.H. and her family resided in the suite above and C.H. saw E. daily. [130] C.H. said she and her husband let the Mother stay in the Mission Suite rent-free for a time in order to enable the Mother to get her life together post-separation, but that their relationship with the Mother became strained after they asked the Mother to start paying some rent. C.H. has not seen or spent time with E. since the Mother moved out of the Mission

Suite. [131] C.H. described E as "fierce", "funny", and a "firecracker". C.H. observed many parental exchanges at the Mission Suite. She testified that E. had "little problems" with the transition concept and that during exchanges E. would not want to leave the Mission Suite, but that when she was brought back at drop off, she would similarly not want to leave the Father's care. C.H. said that E. would cry a little when the Father came to pick her up, but then would cry a little and try to hold on to him when he came to drop her back off with the Mother. She described E.'s distress as short-lived, saying that E. only seemed to have difficulty "in the moment" of transition. She painted a picture of E. as a loving and resilient child who was outgoing and happy as soon as she adapted to a new situation. B. D.A. [132] D.A. has known the Father and his family since childhood. He is also a part-owner of the business the Father is employed with. [133] D.A. testified that he spent a lot of time with both parties when they were together, and that he saw them every week before E. was born. After E. was born, D.A., along with his spouse and children, regularly visited the parties and his children regularly played with E. [134] D.A. and his family live near the PC House and they regularly spend time with the Father and E. He says he sees the Father and E. together about four or five times

a month. Their families do various activities together like camping, bike rides, or just going as a group to play in the local park. [135] He described E. as tending to be somewhat shy when introduced or re-introduced to people, but becoming sociable very quickly. He described her as strong-willed and liking to be at the very centre of things once she feels comfortable. He described E.'s interactions with the Father, stating that E. looks to the Father for reassurance when she is uncertain and seeks him out for comfort when she is upset. He described E. and the Father as closely bonded and E. as very loving with the Grandparents. [136] D.A. has often been present when the Father has told E. that they need to leave to go back to Mission. He said that E. often says that she does not want to leave or wants to stay and play, but the Father responds by encouraging her and by saying that it will be fun to go see the Mother. [137] He testified that the Father does not speak negatively about the Mother in E.'s presence, nor does he allow anyone else to do so. [138] On cross-examination, D.A. agreed that he and the Father had occasionally overindulged in drinking when they were young, but that with the passing of time , their focus had changed to family and children. He testified that now, when their families have dinner together or go camping for example, he and the Father stay within

"the legal limit". He explained that by the "legal limit" he means that they only have one or two beers. He said that sometimes he and the Father have drinks after work on a Friday, but it is the same - they have one or two beers and need to go do things afterward. Absent a special occasion like a wedding, they are not "party-ing". He testified that the Father had no difficulty with not drinking in order to comply with the SoberLink program. He was not moved from this testimony on cross-examination. [139] D.A. confirmed the Father's testimony that his work hours as an operations manager are flexible and within his control provided only that his work is done at the week's end. He confirmed that the company has no objection to the Father sometimes working from home. C. K.V. [140] K.V. has known the Father since middle school. However, K.V. also had an independent friendship with the Mother, who she met through work, as they were medical assistants together at the same clinic from 2018 through 2020 or so. [141] K.V. and the Mother went off on maternity leave from the clinic at about the same time. K.V. has two children. Her younger child is the same age as E. and they used to play together. [142] K.V. described E. as an independent child. She said E. takes some time to warm up to new people, but then is outgoing and happy by nature. [143] K.V. described the Mother as a highly

capable medical office assistant and as the person in the office that the other assistants would call upon for help. She said that assistants would ask the Mother to help deal with difficult patients because she was adept at it. [144] After the July Row, she felt that the Mother's personality changed. She described the Mother's behaviour after the July Row as angry, erratic and self-centred. She also found the Mother to be very invested in slandering the Father after the July Row, labelling him a poor parent, narcissistic and an alcoholic. K.V. testified that she eventually stopped spending time with the Mother. [145] K.V. testified that the Mother's post-July Row description of the Father did not accord with her own experience and observations of the Father, nor with the Mother's own glowing comments about the Father prior to the July Row. [146] On cross-examination, K.V. reiterated that the Mother's comments about the Father and his parenting prior to the July Row was entirely positive, and that the Mother only began to comment negatively about his character, family, and alcohol use afterward. K.V. described the Mother as having done a "180" degree turn in her position on the Father following the July Row. K.V. testified that the Mother treated her as a confidant and had shared a lot with her, but had never once said anything negative about the Father and his consumption of

alcohol prior to the July Row. [147] K.V. testified that she socializes with the Father, that she has only seen him drink alcohol in socially appropriate contexts and that he does not drink to excess. She testified that prior the parties' separation, she witnessed both parties engage in social drinking around E. and neither party regarded this as in any way problematic at the time. [148] K.V. testified that upon her own return to work from maternity leave (her leave was shorter than the Mother's), she was promoted to a supervisory position. K.V. testified that in the period leading up to the Mother's expected return date from her maternity leave, she attempted to contact the Mother regarding the work schedule, but the Mother did not respond to her. She testified that the Mother eventually sent the clinic a letter stating that she would not be returning to work as a result of unspecified "medical issues". K.V. testified that the clinic considered her employment to have been terminated when the Mother failed to return without being granted further leave. VI. Further Factual Findings A. The Father's Consumption of Alcohol [149] The Mother's case that the Father has a drinking problem rests entirely on her own testimony to that effect. The Mother testified that the Father would generally drink to excess by consuming extra alcohol when there was no one there to witness it. She

claimed, for example, that he would go to the garage to get a beer from the fridge, she would hear the sound of a beer can being opened, and then he would return with a "new one", indicating he had quickly consumed one beer in the garage. She testified that over the course of the evening, he would become intoxicated to the point of sitting on the couch incoherent at the end of the night and being passed out on the floor in the mornings. [150] The Mother further testified that when they went camping out with others as a group, the Father would sit by the fire drinking all by himself after everyone else went to bed and would drink until he fell to the ground. She also testified that she found empty containers around the house (e.g., hidden in the bathroom cupboard), and that this showed that he was drinking secretly. Notably, there is no circumstantial evidence other than this testimony indicating a drinking problem. There is, for example, no evidence of any employment issues nor of drinking and driving. [151] The Father's testimony about his drinking is credible. He did not deny social drinking. He testified that he did during the relationship and still does sometimes have a beer or two while watching television in the evening. The Father's evidence is consistent with the evidence of D.A. and K.V., both of whom are credible witnesses, regularly socialized with the parties during

the relationship (including on group camping trips) and who have continued to socialize with the Father after the separation. I find that the Father, D.A. and K.V. have provided an accurate description of the Father's alcohol consumption. It bears no resemblance to the Mother's portrait of regular excess drinking. [152] I also accept K.V.'s evidence that the Mother treated her as a close friend and confidant throughout the period of the parties' relationship, but never once complained to her, before the July Row, about the Father's drinking. I accept K.V.'s testimony that the Mother made a 180 degree turn in terms of her portrayal of and attitude toward the Father, and that she launched into the negative portrayal on the heels of the July Row. [153] I further accept that the only reason the Father agreed to raise drinking as a topic with his counsellor was because he wanted the Mother to return to the PC House and work on their relationship after the July Row. [154] Further, I am satisfied that the Father's evidence about his drinking habits is supported by the months of Soberlink evidence which displays no indication of the Father ever being intoxicated at the time of testing. The apparent ease with which the Father was able to be fully compliant with SoberLink testing is also consistent with his testimony. [155] The Mother's testimony about the Father having a serious

drinking problem is not credible. It simply does not fit with the other evidence that I accept. I am satisfied that after she returned her engagement ring, the Mother began a campaign to paint the Father as a bad person and incapable parent. I am satisfied that her evidence regarding his level and frequency of intoxication is fabricated. B. Mother's Refusal to Communicate with the Father [156] There are a large number of text messages and email communications in evidence. These demonstrate that the Father made ongoing and consistent attempts to communicate with the Mother about parenting arrangements, parenting time and other co-parent issues, but received little, if any, meaningful response. [157] The Mother testified that she was unresponsive because she found the Father's communications overwhelming. She says his texts were overwhelming in volume and in length. She says her high level of anxiety and related challenges absorbing written information made her incapable of responding to those texts or emails. [158] I do not accept the Mother's claims of disabling anxiety. There is no supporting evidence or diagnosis for her claims. I note that this is so notwithstanding Justice Crerar's express comment (albeit in the nature of an aside) that evidence of that kind will generally be required to make out such claims on the merits. [159] The Mother's general lack of credibility is a

significant factor in rejecting her own testimony on the point. However, there are other factors as well. [160] As already noted, the Mother ably represented herself during the trial. In doing so, she conducted an extensive and organized cross-examination of the Father. She exhibited no distress in the effort. She provided lengthy direct testimony, and she was argumentative and spirited under cross-examination. Her delivery in closing argument was rather leisurely. None of this comports with her testimony portraying herself as overcome and riddled with anxiety and therefore being unable to read or respond to texts from the Father. [161] Additionally, the Mother completed two administrative college programs. She was employed as a medical office assistant in a sizable medical office. She was a highly effective assistant in that employment, which required her to multi-task, collate medical information, and deal with difficult people. This comports with her conduct of the trial. [162] K.V. testified that just before the Mother went on maternity leave, her work performance and ethic was dropping as compared to usual. K.V. also testified that the Mother's behaviour following the July Row was erratic and self-involved. However, while this supports the inference that the Mother began acting out of character after the separation, it does not provide any support for the Mother's claims

of disability and being completely incapable of responding to communications. [163] A very sizable sample of the parties' text communications are in evidence. I have reviewed these. The Father's text messages are neither excessive in number nor lengthy. They are, to the contrary, factual, clear and to the point. [164] Finally, on review of the text exchanges in evidence, I find that the Mother's responses do not suggest panic or lack of comprehension. To the contrary, in my view, they reveal a good deal of gamesmanship. As an example, I note her May 9, 2023 text asserting that she is sure the parties could have agreed to vary the return time under the Crerar Order had she only known it was an issue. The Mother's failure to participate in any meaningful exchange is strategic, not tragic. [165] I am quite satisfied that the Mother was capable of reading and responding to the texts sent to her by the Father. I find that the Mother deliberately and knowingly disregarded the Father's communications. I further find that she did so with the goal of sabotaging or at least delaying his efforts to exercise parenting time. C. Mother's Disregard of Communications regarding Litigation [166] I am also satisfied that the Mother deliberately and knowingly failed to respond to the correspondence and court documents she was sent by the Father's counsel in this proceeding. [167] She asked Ms.

Charlton to have her office follow a cumbersome procedure to notify her about steps in the litigation. To Ms. Charlton's credit, those procedures were followed. The procedures involved calling the Mother to notify her that documents had been sent, which was thwarted by Mother allowing her voicemail box to remain full. On her own evidence, if she had any actual problem with checking the email on her phone, she could have asked to use Matt's computer. Her testimony for why she had not done that was that she did not want to ask because it was such an intrusive favour. This seems dramatically at odds with her own testimony that she regularly asked Matt to sleep on the floor of her room in the Mission Suite in order to make her feel "safe". The Mother's testimony about her inability to keep up on email correspondence is not credible. [168] In any event, she also ignored the correspondence and documents when Ms. Charlton had a process server attend her home and hand them to her personally. [169] I am satisfied that the Mother was well capable of reviewing and generally comprehending the correspondence and court documents she was provided. If she wanted to understand the legal aspects of them more thoroughly, there were research sources and free services that she could have consulted. (I also find it more likely than not that the Mother did, in fact, review at least some of the

correspondence that was sent to her. I note, in this regard, her ability and propensity to appear before the court at the last possible moment and readily participate in the trial.) [170] Whether she reviewed them all or not, I am satisfied that the Mother understood the significance of the litigation-related correspondence and documents being sent to her. She disregarded it because she hoped doing so would enable her to frustrate or delay the litigation. D. Deciding that E. was Not "Available" for Parenting Time [171] I find that the Mother wrongfully denied the Father the opportunity to exercise his parenting time with her assertions that E. was "unavailable". I find her testimony explaining her conduct and her claim that she was acting in good faith to be disingenuous. [172] The Mother's position that E. absolutely could not be interrupted if she was napping or eating is unreasonable. It also disregards the more foundational fact that she was in a position to determine when E. would take naps and eat meals. She chose a schedule that would result in these activities infringing on the Father's parenting time. [173] Additionally, the Mother's testimony that it was not "possible" for E. to be taken to the Father's house for his parenting time if E. was feeling "physically dysregulated" is absurd. All toddlers get grumpy and tired and may, on occasion, throw tantrums. Tired and

grumpy children are transported where they need to go every day. E.'s mood changes are no excuse for infringing upon the Father's parenting time. E. can be tired and grumpy, or have a tummy ache, on the Father's parenting time - it is part of parenting. [174] Similarly, the Mother's assertion that she is "unable" to take E. to the Father's house for his parenting time if E. is reluctant to go is untenable. I note that every witness other than the Mother testified that E. generally resists change, but overcomes it easily and adapts quickly. C.H. testified that E. is equally resistant regardless of the direction of the parental exchange. Whereas the Father provides a few words of encouragement about how fun it will be to see the Mother, the Mother uses E.'s natural hesitance as a bad faith excuse to keep E. with her. I note that were I not satisfied that the Mother's claims in this respect are disingenuous, her testimony would raise issues regarding her own ability to parent. It is an abdication of parental responsibility to allow a toddler to determine her own parenting time. E. 2024 Summer Parenting Weeks [175] While the trial decision was on reserve, the Father applied for an order providing for two summer parenting time weeks (as under the Sharma Order). The Mother filed no response to the application, but appeared at the hearing and opposed the order sought. [176] I granted

the Father's application on the basis that the summer parenting time exercised under the Sharma Order had been successful. The Mother argued that E. had been tired after the previous year's summer parenting weeks, but even if that were true, E. is now another year older. [177] I note that the Mother's conduct regarding the 2024 summer weeks was in line with her previous conduct. That is, she disregarded the Father's request for time until advised the application was being filed. She failed to file a response to application, but then sought to oppose the order at the hearing. F. Allegations of Family Violence [178] Under the FLA, the definition of "family violence" includes the psychological or emotional abuse of a family member by "intimidation, harassment, coercion or threats": FLA, s. 1(1). The Mother testified that the Father had intimidated her during the course of the relationship, and that he had intimidated, harassed and threatened her after the relationship. [179] Notably, the Mother's testimony that there was "family violence" was literal. That is, she used the conclusory term. She also testified that there had been "intimidation", "harassment" and "threats". However, she provided very little in the way of testimony that described objective conduct. Harassing Texts [180] The Mother contends that many of the Father's texts were unnecessary and/or did not relate to E.

She asserts that his conduct in sending these unnecessary and/or irrelevant texts amount to harassment. [181] The Father did adopt a practice of texting to alert the Mother about upcoming arrangements for the next day (e.g., I will be picking up E. at 4:30 tomorrow for the weekend). The Mother says this was unnecessary as she was aware of the terms of the Agreement and the court orders. She says that texting her unnecessary information constituted a form of harassment. [182] If the Mother generally complied with the terms of the Agreement and the court orders, these texts might be found to be unwarranted, but she did not. She frequently departed from the terms based on her own last-minute assessment of what was appropriate. [183] I do not consider the Father's texts seeking to confirm what he was expecting to happen in the next 24 hours or so to be inappropriate, let alone harassing. In the circumstances, it was reasonable and prudent to attempt to fend off any imminent departures from the court orders. [184] Further, the Father's texts do relate to parenting matters. They relate to E., to exercising parenting time, or to matters related to his shared parental responsibility. They are occasionally pertaining to the litigation, but only on occasions where the Mother failed to respond to correspondence from Ms. Charlton, and in any event, the litigation is centred precisely on

parenting matters. [185] Finally, although frustration is at times evident in the content of the Father's texts, his texts are consistently civil and restrained. [186] In conclusion, the Father's communications were appropriate. It follows that the Mother's allegations of harassment are unfounded and rejected. Intimidation & Threats [187] The Mother's testimony was often hyperbolic. For example, she characterized the Father's failure to stand up for her in the July Row as "abusive" behaviour. She testified that the Father's failure to use Zoom for the videocall from the Summer House, prior to her calling the RCMP, was an example of his being "really aggressive" toward her. [188] With regard to intimidation, the Mother testified that the Father's conduct toward her when they disagreed was intimidating because it was evident that he was a lot stronger than she was. She did not, however, describe the Father as engaging in any specific conduct in which he used his apparent strength against her or to intimidate her. This is not evidence of objective conduct by the Father and is not capable of grounding a finding. She testified that at times he spoke with "a raised tone in his voice". This assertion is too vague to be meaningful and, again, does not rise to intimidation. [189] The Mother testified that she was intimidated because the Father punched the wall in the bedroom he was in

during the July Row. I accept the Father's evidence that he did so out of frustration, not anger. While such behaviour is no admirable, the evidence satisfies me that this was a singular and out of character event at a moment of extreme despair. I also note that it happened after the Father had left the room the others were in, and only as he sat alone listening to the argument spiral. Notably, the Mother was unable to identify any other outburst or any other objective act that could be characterized as violent at all, either in or out of her immediate presence or during or after their relationship. [190] The Mother eventually decided that the Father could no longer exercise his parenting time inside the Mission Suite. She testified that she did this because the Father had engaged in the following conduct inside the Mission Suite that she found intimidating and harassing: a) she testified that he had looked through her things while he was in the Mission Suite; b) he said that he looked into the suite through the windows; and c) on one particular occasion, she asserts that the Father entered the Mission Suite in a manner inconsistent with her instructions (and thus "without permission") and that his doing so caused her to panic. She testified that because she was panicked, she directed him where to sit and what do. The Father responded to this series of directions by

video-recording her with the camera on his phone. [191] I accept the Father's testimony that he did not look through her things while he was in the Mission Suite. It was a one-bedroom suite and the Mother was in it at all times the Father visited. He was there for a limited period of time and was trying to visit with E. I find the Mother's claim highly improbable in the circumstances. [192] I also accept the Father's testimony that he did not make any attempt to peer into the Mission Suite through the windows in any manner that could have been construed as intimidating or threatening. [193] With respect to the central event, I accept the Father's testimony that the Mother had given him varying directions as to whether to come through the main door of the house or come to the suite door. The Mother's testimony also indicates that she was at time adopting different practices depending on whether C.H. was at home in the main house or not. I also accept the Father's testimony that he was attempting to follow her directions when he entered the suite. [194] It would be against his own interests for the Father to barge his way into the Mission Suite. He had plenty of motivation to stay in the Mother's good graces. He was hoping to get her to agree to a parenting schedule extending the Interim Parenting Schedule and also hoping she might agree to increased parenting time. Conversely,

he stood to gain nothing but grief by deliberately entering the suite contrary to her instructions. [195] Finally, even if the Father misunderstood and came into the Mission Suite in a way that she was not anticipating, it would not amount to intimidating behaviour to do so. It was by a route that he had previously been told to use. It was at a time that he was expected as it was his set parenting time. [196] Finally, the Father says that he began recording her on that occasion because she was acting in an odd manner and he felt he needed to document it. On the Mother's own description of her reaction, it was out of character. She testified that she began yelling about where he had to sit and whether he could move. The Father was taken aback. I do not find it unreasonable for him to have responded by making a recording of the events unfolding. For better or worse, video-recording with a cell phone has become a commonplace means of documenting anything out of the ordinary. [197] Further, the Mother testified that she had a digital camera inside the Mission Suite and that she had it there to influence the Father's behaviour. It is untenable for the Mother to assert that there was something inherently intimidating about being recorded, when she herself was attempting to do the very same. [198] This brings us to the Mother's assertion that the Father made threats to her. She

testified that on at least two occasions in the Mission Suite he "threatened court", said that he would win and said she would have to "pay". [199] Whether words constitute "threats" is to be determined by an objective test: R. v. McCraw, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 72 at 83, 1991 CanLII 29 (S.C.C.). In R. v. Clemente, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 758 at 763, 1994 CanLII 49 (S.C.C.), Cory J. wrote: To determine if a reasonable person would consider that the words were uttered as a threat the court must regard them objectively, and review them in light of the circumstances in which they were uttered, the manner in which they were spoken, and the person to whom they were addressed. [200] In Thornton v. Byers (1999), 173 D.L.R. (4th) 568, [1999] O.J. No. 1250 (Ont. Gen. Div.), the plaintiff was arrested for uttering a death threat after he told his wife that he wished she was dead. He later brought an action for false arrest and false imprisonment against the police. Lofchik J. considered several definitions of the word "threat" at para. 13: "Threat" is defined in the Oxford Illustrated Dictionary, Oxford University Press (1962) as follows: Declaration of intention to punish or hurt; and by Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.) as follows: A communicated intent to inflict physical or other harm on any person or property. A declaration of an intention to injure another or his property by some unlawful act . . .

A declaration of intention or determination to inflict punishment, loss, or pain on another, or to injure another by the commission of some unlawful act . . . A menace; especially any menace of such a nature and extent as to unsettle the mind of the person on whom it operates and to take away from his acts that free and voluntary action which alone constitutes consent. A declaration of one's purpose of intention towards injury to the person, property or right of another, with a view of restraining such person's freedom of action. [201] Lofchik J. went on to conclude that the words spoken by Mr. Thorton did not objectively constitute "a 'threat' within the ordinary meaning of that word" (at para. 15). [202] Here, the Mother has provided only a paraphrased version of what she alleges the Father said. However, even on her own paraphrasing, what was said was not objectively a threat within the ordinary meaning of the word. The Father had started a family claim and a counterclaim had been filed. If the Father prevailed, the Mother would be required to pay costs. His assertion was that he would, in fact, prevail. The Mother did not testify to any surrounding circumstances that could elevate those comments such that they could be considered threats. [203] The evidence does not establish any family violence. VII. Parenting A. Issues [204] The issues to be determined are as follows: a)

parenting time; and b) parenting responsibilities. B. Legal Framework [205] The Court is required to consider only the best interests of the child in making orders related to parenting, as set out in s. 37 of the FLA: 37 (1) In making an agreement or order under this Part respecting guardianship, parenting arrangements or contact with a child, the parties and the court must consider the best interests of the child only. (2) To determine what is in the best interests of a child, all of the child's needs and circumstances must be considered, including the following: (a) the child's health and emotional well-being; (b) the child's views, unless it would be inappropriate to consider them; (c) the nature and strength of the relationships between the child and significant persons in the child's life; (d) the history of the child's care; (e) the child's need for stability, given the child's age and stage of development; (f) the ability of each person who is a guardian or seeks guardianship of the child, or who has or seeks parental responsibilities, parenting time or contact with the child, to exercise his or her responsibilities; (g) the impact of any family violence on the child's safety, security or well-being, whether the family violence is directed toward the child or another family member; (h) whether the actions of a person responsible for family violence indicate that the

person may be impaired in his or her ability to care for the child and meet the child's needs; (i) the appropriateness of an arrangement that would require the child's guardians to cooperate on issues affecting the child, including whether requiring cooperation would increase any risks to the safety, security or well-being of the child or other family members; (j) any civil or criminal proceeding relevant to the child's safety, security or well-being. (3) An agreement or order is not in the best interests of a child unless it protects, to the greatest extent possible, the child's physical, psychological and emotional safety, security and well-being. (4) In making an order under this Part, a court may consider a person's conduct only if it substantially affects a factor set out in subsection (2), and only to the extent that it affects that factor. C. Parenting Time [206] E. is a happy, social and resilient child. E. is strongly bonded with both parents and enjoys herself in both households. [207] To confirm my findings above, there has been no family violence and the Father does not have any problem with alcohol use. [208] The evidence establishes that the Father is a capable and caring parent. He has been an active parent and has helped care for E. since she was born. He has sought to increase his parenting time ever since separation. E. has been well looked after in his care.

The Father has employment on terms that allow him to fully participate in a shared parenting regime. [209] I am satisfied that it is in E.'s best interests that the parties have equally shared parenting time, as this would enable her to fully engage with both parents and be an integral part of both households. [210] E. is somewhat resistant to change, but she is equally apprehensive regardless of which parent she is leaving and which she is going to see. It is simply her nature. She needs nothing more than encouragement, and quickly adapts once the moment of transition passes. The evidence indicates that both parties intend to continue to reside in their current neighbourhoods. That means the parents will continue to live in two different communities. In the circumstances, it is in E.'s best interest to have a parenting arrangement that minimizes exchanges, both to reduce the frequency of transitions for E. and to minimize the amount of time she will need to spend in transit in order for the transfers to take place. [211] Further, given E.'s age, it is preferable to establish a parenting arrangement now that can be continued as it is when E. begins to attend school. This will provide her with a sense of stability and continuity. [212] Finally, in the circumstances, a move to a shared parenting schedule following this decision will not be overly disruptive for E. The Father's

parenting time has been steadily increasing over time as it is, and the Father has had full weeks of parenting time with E. both last summer and, more recently, under the order granted by me following the conclusion of the trial. [213] The order will be for shared parenting on a 2-2-5-5 schedule. Paragraph 7 of Schedule A will form part of the final order. [214] I also agree with the Father's submission that a detailed order governing holiday parenting time is appropriate in the circumstances. [215] The proposed terms set out in paras. 15-18 of Schedule A will form part of the final order. [216] The proposed terms found in paras. 11, 12 and 14 of Schedule A, regarding E.'s transitions between the parties, will apply. Notably, para. 11 requires exchange drop off and pick ups (other than those taking place at pre-school or school), to be conducted at parties' residences, but allows the Mother to appoint a trusted adult to act on her behalf if she wishes. Her evidence indicated that her stepfather and Matt are both available to assist her. However, to be clear, the parent dropping E. off is entitled to see both the individual accepting E. and to witness her being taken into care. D. Final Decision-Making Authority [217] Section 40 of the FLA provides: Parenting arrangements 40 (1) Only a guardian may have parental responsibilities and parenting time with respect to a child. (2)

Unless an agreement or order allocates parental responsibilities differently, each child's guardian may exercise all parental responsibilities with respect to the child in consultation with the child's other guardians, unless consultation would be unreasonable or inappropriate in the circumstances. (3) Parental responsibilities may be allocated under an agreement or order such that they may be exercised by (a) one or more guardians only, or (b) each guardian acting separately or all guardians acting together. (4) In the making of parenting arrangements, no particular arrangement is presumed to be in the best interests of the child and without limiting that, the following must not be presumed: (a) that parental responsibilities should be allocated equally among guardians; ...; (c) that decisions among guardians should be made separately or together. [218] Section 41 lists the following parental responsibilities: Parental responsibilities 41 For the purposes of this Part, parental responsibilities with respect to a child are as follows: (a) making day-to-day decisions affecting the child and having day-to-day care, control and supervision of the child; (b) making decisions respecting where the child will reside; (c) making decisions respecting with whom the child will live and associate; (d) making decisions respecting the child's education and participation in extracurricular

activities, including the nature, extent and location; (e) making decisions respecting the child's cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage, including, if the child is an Indigenous child, the child's Indigenous identity; (f) subject to section 17 of the Infants Act, giving, refusing or withdrawing consent to medical, dental and other health-related treatments for the child; (g) applying for a passport, licence, permit, benefit, privilege or other thing for the child; (h) giving, refusing or withdrawing consent for the child, if consent is required; (i) receiving and responding to any notice that a parent or guardian is entitled or required by law to receive; (j) requesting and receiving from third parties health, education or other information respecting the child; (k) subject to any applicable provincial legislation, (i) starting, defending, compromising or settling any proceeding relating to the child, and (ii) identifying, advancing and protecting the child's legal and financial interests; (l) exercising any other responsibilities reasonably necessary to nurture the child's development. [219] The allocation of parental responsibilities was discussed in K.P.B. v. K.E., 2019 BCCA 152: [22] A provision granting one parent final decision-making authority is not uncommon, particularly in high conflict relationships. It provides a mechanism whereby

the parties do not have to apply to the court to determine every parenting issue on which they may disagree. The purpose of the provision is to minimize the negative consequences of ongoing litigation. An alternative measure sometimes employed is the appointment of a parenting co-ordinator pursuant s. 15 of the FLA; however, that is at a cost to the parties and may not always be an affordable option. [220] In J.E.H. v. P.L.H., 2013 BCSC 752 at para 58, Justice Abrioux (then of this Court) summarized the principles applicable to decision-making as follows: · there has been a general unwillingness to impose mandatory joint decision-making on parents who cannot get along and are unable to communicate. This is out of concern for the well-being of the children; · the ability of the parents to communicate and cooperate remains an important factor when considering the best interests of a child[;] · joint guardianship with no ultimate decision-maker may not be appropriate on the basis that the cost and delay of applying to court each time the parents cannot agree is not warranted. Ultimately a decision has to be made. In such circumstances, the primary caregiver is best able to make the decision after making an effort to seek a consensus with the other parent[;] · a particular parent's understanding of the general and special needs of a child, such as autism spectrum disorders, is a

factor which can be taken into account with respect to custody, guardianship, where the primary residence should be and which parent should have the ultimate decision-making power[;] · final decision-making authority can be ordered in situations to avoid continuing conflict due to the level of acrimony between the parents[;] · the Joyce model of guardianship [which requires the custodial parent to consult with the access parent in regard to significant decisions which have to be made concerning the children] may well be appropriate if the court is satisfied the primary custodial parent will in fact consult and seek the input of the other parent prior to making major decisions[.] [Citations omitted.] [221] In this case, neither party takes the position that shared decision-making authority is appropriate. Both parties say consultation is appropriate. The Mother submits that she should have final decision-making authority on all matters. The Father submits that he should have final decision-making authority on all matters with the exception of any matters relating to E.'s Métis heritage. [222] Since the moment of separation, the Mother has regarded herself as E.'s sole parent for purposes of parental decision-making. She has made no effort to keep the Father informed of key matters relating to E.'s health and development. She has made no effort to consult and she has disregarded

his requests for information. As an example, when he wanted to know whether E. had had all her vaccinations, the Mother told him to check with the public health authority. At trial, she maintained that she was under no obligation to keep him informed and that it was a full and complete answer that an inquiry could be made to a public body. [223] The Father, on the other hand, has consistently attempted to share information with the Mother. When he wanted to take E. to see dentist, he raised it with the Mother and provided the Mother with a report after the appointment. When he took E. to the doctor for a general check-up, he took her to the Mother's own family doctor. After the appointment, he reported back to the Mother. [224] Similarly, the Mother did not consult the Father before she put E. in daycare, nor before registering her for a pre-school. Notably, she did not consult with the Father about the pre-school despite contemplating enrolling E. in a pre-school that started very soon (as opposed to start in September 2024, which is what the Mother ultimately registered her for). In comparison, the Father attempted to raise pre-school registration with the Mother, but she did not respond. When there was no response, the Father began to explore pre-schools. He looked into six or seven and put E. on some waitlists. He was ultimately able to register her at Little Rainbow House,

the same pre-school that D.A.'s children had attended and which D.A. had recommended to the Father. [225] In short, the Mother has determined E.'s best interests in accordance with her own views and has, to the extent she shared them at all, presented her decisions to the Father as a fait accompli. Moreover, as confirmed in her testimony, she believes that she is entitled to do so regardless of whether there is a court order bearing on the point. Nothing in the evidence suggests that the Mother would give any real consideration to the Father's views on E.'s best interests in future. [226] The Mother testified that she has, in fact, attempted to communicate with the Father in good faith and to the best of her ability. As already set out, I reject her testimony to that effect. Nothing in the evidence provides any basis for concluding that the Mother would operate in good faith on a go forward basis. In fact, her lack of accountability on the matter indicates that she will continue to make unilateral decisions about E. without informing or consulting the Father. [227] While the parties' parenting relationship is not high-conflict in the typical sense, it is not any less dysfunctional. Indeed, it is more dysfunctional than typical. The reason the parties have had no conflicts about parental decision-making is because the Father has been entirely excluded. There has not been

sufficient mutual engagement for disagreement. The parties have proven unable to communicate because the Mother refuses to communicate. On that basis, the principled policy basis for giving final decision-making authority to one parent is fully engaged. Further, in the circumstances, that one person can only be the Father. [228] The Father is granted final decision-making authority, following consultation, for all parental responsibilities subject to one caveat. The evidence establishes that the Mother recently discovered that she has Métis heritage. The Mother has testified that she wishes E. to appreciate her Métis heritage. The Father's proposed order makes a carve out for this exception. The carve out is appropriate. Terms of Order [229] An order in the terms set out under the headings Guardianship and Parental Responsibilities in Schedule A is appropriate, subject to the following. The second sentence in para. 2 under Parental Responsibilities should be amended so that: (1) the right to proceed in the absence of a response is reciprocal, (2) the time limit for response is for providing a substantive response (e.g., taking a position on the decision to be made or seeking additional relevant information); and that time limit should be seven days. The two amendments are directed at creating an order that fosters timely consultation and meaningful exchanges, rather than simply

triggering a right to proceed. [230] As set out in Schedule A, the Father has proposed terms that address medical and dental issues (paras. 19-22); travel and passports (paras. 23-29); E.'s personal belongings (paras. 30 and 31); communications with E. and with one another (paras. 32-34); and extracurricular activities (paras. 35-37). These terms are all appropriate in the circumstances and are so ordered. Decision regarding Pre-school [231] The parties have each registered E. in a pre-school starting in September 2024. As already noted, while the Father attempted to engage the Mother on the topic, his attempts did not lead to any discussions on the point. They have each proceeded without consultation. It is too late for any such consultation to occur now. I note that each described their chosen pre-school and their reasons for choosing it in their testimony. Neither was persuaded by the other. [232] Given the timing of this decision, it is appropriate for the Court to determine which of these pre-schools E. should attend in September 2024. [233] The Mother testified that she registered E. in a pre-school in Mission. However, she failed to produce any documents regarding the pre-school program or ones to establish that E. is, in fact, registered for an available space there. The Mother described the pre-school as being one for Indigenous children that offered beneficial

programs and was government subsidized. Her testimony in this regard was vague and generic. [234] The Father has registered E. in the Little Rainbow House Preschool. Little Rainbow House is located in Port Coquitlam and is the pre-school that two of D.A.'s children recently attended. The Father has provided supporting documents in respect of the pre-school program and establishing E.'s registration and the cost of attending. [235] Whatever merit there might be to the Mother's proposal, she has not put the Court in a position to evaluate it as an alternative. The Court orders that E. will attend Little Rainbow House starting in September 2024. [236] Further, to my finding that E. will attend Little Rainbow House, the following proposed terms set out in Schedule A are appropriate: para. 8 (stating that E. will attend Little Rainbow House Preschool); and para. 13 (requiring parental drop off and pick ups for exchanges to take place at Little Rainbow House for preschool days, effective September 2024). [237] The Father's proposed terms of order under Schedule A seeks terms pre-determining E.'s elementary school and/or requiring E. to attend elementary school in the school catchment basin for the PC House. These terms are not included in the final order. These are matters on which there should be consultation and an attempt to reach agreement. VIII. Income for Support Purposes A.

Evidence [238] The Father is a salaried employee. His Line 150 income is as follows: a) 2023: $115,278.91; b) 2022: $114,982; c) 2021: $100,127; and d) 2020: $90,409. [239] As already noted, the Mother never produced a list of documents and never completed a F8 financial statement. [240] The Father put into evidence two documents she disclosed during the 2022 mediation: a photograph of the summary page from her 2020 Notice of Assessment and a 2021 T4E Statement of Employment Insurance and Other Benefits. These documents indicate that: a) in 2020, the Mother's Line 150 income was $39,851.00, which reflects the income she earned over a nine or ten month period, as she began her leave in or around September 5, 2020. The Mother gave inconsistent evidence as to whether her leave was paid. Depending on whether her leave was paid or not, she would have earned annual income of $47,821 or $53,134 if she worked the entire year; b) in 2021, she earned income of at least $22,347, as reported on her T4E Statement of Employment Insurance and Other Benefits. [241] The Mother testified that the last time she completed an income tax return was in 2021. She said that she had not done so after 2021 because she was still trying to determine whether the medical clinic owed her any severance. She testified that she had not contacted the medical clinic to clear the issue up because she was still

trying to figure out what to say. [242] The Mother testified that when her maternity leave from the clinic ended, she was "really stressed" and her "doctor supported her", so she told her employer that she couldn't come back from leave. [243] She testified that she has not looked for work as a medical office assistant since she left her former job. She said she has decided to not to continue in that field because the medical system is corrupt and the work is very stressful. She thought that she might work as an administrative assistant for a school district at some point in the future. Asked if she had looked for any positions at all since the separation, she said she was limited in what she could do because she is a person with "persistent multiple barriers" to employment. [244] The Mother was given leave by the Court to produce documents related to her current income as of trial. She produced three additional documents: a) A Vancity Credit Union T5 (statement of investment income) for the year 2022 showing zero investment income. She testified that she does not know what this document is. b) A 2023 T4A from an entity "Maplebear Canada ULC" showing fees for services paid in the amount of $2,308.63. c) A personal information disclosure form signed on September 15, 2023, authorizing the provincial government to release information regarding an application for "income assistance

under the Employment and Assistance Act [S.B.C. 2002, c. 40] as a person who has persistent multiple barriers to employment." [245] With respect to the latter document, no corresponding application under the Employment and Assistance Act was produced. The Mother testified that she had received some income assistance in July 18, 2023, in the amount of $1,405. It was unclear from her testimony what disability benefit she was receiving, how she would be receiving it, or how she had qualified for any benefit. She did not produce any documents whatsoever relating to the asserted benefit. [246] Instacart is a grocery delivery and pick-up service. The Mother testified that in January 2023, she became a "full access shopper" with Instacart and works occasionally filling orders as a personal shopper. She testified that Maplebear Canada ULC is Instacart and that the T4A document produced shows the total amount that she made through Instacart in 2023. She testified that Instacart enables her to work the hours of her own choosing, and that she has worked about five hours a month. [247] The Mother testified that she had successfully applied for subsidized childcare for E. and that E. was in daycare once or twice a week from that time until the month or so prior to the trial. The Mother did not testify about how she occupies herself while E. is in daycare. [248] The Mother testified that she

spends her weekends doing activities such as camping and 4x4-ing with Matt and other friends. [249] The Mother testified that during the two summer weeks in 2023 that E. spent with the Father, she had taken some time for herself and had treated it as her own vacation, visiting friends, going camping, and going to the PNE. B. Imputation of Income [250] Section 19 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175 [Guidelines] allows the Court broad discretion to impute income to a party as it considers appropriate: 19 The court may impute income to a spouse as it considers appropriate in the circumstances, which circumstances include the following: (a) the spouse is intentionally under-employed or unemployed, other than where the under-employment or unemployment is required by the needs of a child of the marriage or any child under the age of majority or by the reasonable educational or health needs of the spouse; (f) the spouse has failed to provide income information when under a legal obligation to do so. [251] Sections 213 and 228 of the FLA enable the Court to draw an adverse inference, including with respect to imputed income, against a party based on their failure to produce financial documents relevant to the determination of their income. [252] Here, the Mother has failed to produce documents or provide a Form F8 Financial Statement notwithstanding the requirements

under the Rules and orders of this Court. The Mother also failed to attend a court-ordered examination for discovery. Finally, even when the Mother was given leave during the trial to produce documents relating to her present income, the Mother still made no meaningful production of documents. [253] The test for imputing income for intentional under-employment is as set out in Marquez v. Zapiola, 2013 BCCA 433: (iii) Imputing income for child and spousal support [36] For the purposes of both child and spousal support, there is a broad judicial discretion to impute income to either or both spouses. However, the party seeking to have income imputed to the other spouse has the burden of establishing an evidentiary basis for such a finding. [37] The test for imputing income for intentional under-employment or unemployment is one of reasonableness, having regard to the parties' capacity to earn income in light of their age, education, health, work history and work availability. A spouse's capacity to earn income will include that person's ability to work or to be trained to work. [Citations omitted.] [254] The Father submits that the Court should draw an adverse inference here given the Mother's failure to comply with the Rules and Court orders regarding documents and to provide a F8 financial statement. He argues that she has produced no medical evidence indicating that she is

disabled from working and that her evidence about migraines is full of contradictions and inconsistencies. He contends that she is a trained medical office assistant and that she had a position in that field and was entitled to return to it after her maternity leave, but instead effectively resigned by declining to return to work without establishing a basis for further leave. The Father says the Mother is capable of working, yet is not. It is further asserted that she would be entitled to certain government benefits if she filed income taxes, but she has failed to do that. [255] The Father submits that the Mother is intentionally underemployed and that an annual income of $50,000 ought to be imputed to her. In the alternative, he seeks an imputation of $36,192 gross annually, calculated based on $17.40 per hour, 40 hours per week, 52 weeks per year (on the basis of the minimum wage increasing to $17.40 effective June 2024). [256] I agree that an imputation of income is appropriate. The Mother has failed to comply with her disclosure obligations under the Rules and court orders, and has also failed to provide any credible evidence of any medical inability to work. She has training and work experience as a medical office assistant. [257] Because it is unknown whether the Mother's leave was paid for at the medical clinic, the Father quite fairly allows that her annual earnings at

her last employment might have been $47,800. In all the circumstances, I find it appropriate to impute her an annual income of $45,000. [258] The Mother is imputed an income of $45,000. IX. Child Support [259] To date, child support has not been the subject of any court orders or any written agreements. The Father has voluntarily paid child support to the Mother since separation based on his annual income. No retroactive adjustments were sought. The issue of child support is prospective. [260] The amount of child support payable is presumptively the amount set out by the Guidelines table. Section 9 of the Guidelines applies where there is shared parenting such that each spouse has not less than 40 percent of the parenting time over the course of a year. The parenting time ordered above is a shared parenting arrangement for purposes of s. 9. [261] Where there is a shared parenting arrangement for purposes, s.9 of the Guidelines establishes that the Court must determine the appropriate amount of child support payable, taking into account the following three factors: a) the amounts set out in the applicable tables for each spouse; b) the increased costs of shared parenting time arrangements; and c) the conditions, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse and of any child for whom support is sought. [262] In C.A.S. v. A.B.S., 2019 BCSC 948, Marchand J. (as he then was)

summarized the key principles in the s. 9 analysis: [56] The leading case on s. 9 of the Guidelines is Contino v. Leonelli-Contino, 2005 SCC 63. The key principles from Contino are: - The court must determine child support in accordance with the three listed factors in s. 9 once the 40% threshold is met; - The court must emphasize flexibility and fairness to ensure the economic reality and particular circumstances of each family are properly accounted for; - The three factors structure the exercise of the court's discretion but no factor prevails over the others; - The weight given to each factor varies with the particular facts of each case; - There is no presumption in favour of any particular award of child support, be that at, above or below the full Guidelines amount; - The preferable starting point is to determine the straight set-off amount of child support that each party would pay to the other under the Guidelines; - The court, however, has the discretion to modify the set-off amount where, considering the financial realities of the parents, it would lead to a significant variation in the standard of living experienced by the child as she moves from one household to the other; - The court is to examine the budgets and actual expenditures of both parents in addressing the needs of the child, determine whether shared custody has resulted in increased costs globally and

apportion these costs between the parents in accordance with their incomes; - Keeping in mind the objectives of the Guidelines to ensure a fair standard of support for children and fair contributions from both parents, the court has broad discretion to analyse the resources and needs of both the parents and the child; and - The court will look at the standard of living of the child in each household and the ability of each parent to absorb the costs associated with maintaining the appropriate standard of living in the circumstances. [263] The Mother did not complete an F8 financial statement and did not disclose any documents relevant to her cost or standard of living. Further, I find that the evidence strongly indicates that the Mother does not have a roommate, but rather is re-partnered. The Mother, E. and Matt reside together in a detached house, which has a front and back yard. The Mother testified that she pays approximately $950 per month in rent, $40 for internet and an average of $300 every two months for electricity, but there is nothing to corroborate her testimony. The Mother has a serviceable vehicle that was purchased during the parties' relationship. [264] The Father owns the PC House, a truck and camper trailer. He testified that his parents gave him a loan to assist him in buying the PC House on advantageous, non-commercial terms. The evidence suggests that the

PC House is modest. There is no evidence that the Father has a luxurious lifestyle. His vacation time is generally spent camping or at the Summer House. [265] There is nothing in the evidence before me that warrants an exercise of discretion moving away from a straight set-off. I find that a straight set-off of table Guideline amounts is appropriate. [266] The proposed terms set out in paragraphs 38-42 and 44 of Schedule A are accepted in principle, but must be adjusted to reflect an imputed income of $45,000 (para. 39), and all calculations within these terms must be correspondingly adjusted. [267] While it is reasonable in the circumstances for the order to include an imputation of minimum income on an ongoing basis, the Mother should be at liberty to apply to the Court for a departure from this term to ensure that the imputation is not, in any given year, an unreasonable one (e.g., if the Mother were to go on unpaid maternity leave). [268] Additionally, the proposed term set out in para. 43 of Schedule A should be amended to read as follows: In each year, the respondent's income will be the greater of her actual income or $45,000, subject to the following qualification. The Mother is at liberty to bring an application to establish there is a valid reason for departing from the imputation in a given year. X. Spousal Support [269] The Mother sought spousal support under her

counterclaim. [270] As already documented, the Mother has failed to comply with the Rules at numerous steps in the litigation, and has breached numerous court orders with respect to her document disclosure obligations and her attendance for examination for discovery. [271] Rule 21-5 permits the Court to make any of the following orders where a party does not comply with the Rules: If party does not comply with the rules (1)If a party does not comply with these Supreme Court Family Rules, the court may do one or more of the following: (a) if the party who has not complied is a claimant or a respondent who has brought a counterclaim, (i) strike out the notice of family claim, counterclaim or petition, and (ii) grant judgment dismissing the claims made in the notice of family claim, counterclaim or petition; (b) if the party who has not complied is a respondent or a respondent to counterclaim, strike out the response to family claim, response to counterclaim or response to petition; (c) set aside a step taken; (d) make an order for costs against the party; (e) make any other order it considers will further the object of these Supreme Court Family Rules. [272] Given the Mother's non-compliance and non-participation in the litigation up until trial, I am of the view that her spousal support claim should be struck. Having failed to participate in the entire litigation, the Mother

cannot be permitted to simply show up at trial (in fact, show up late to trial) and purport to prosecute her counterclaim. [273] Additionally, I am of the view that notwithstanding my decision to strike her claim, the claim would be unsuccessful in any event. [274] The law requires the Mother to establish her entitlement to support with regard to the objectives of spousal support orders. These objectives include: a) recognizing any economic disadvantages or advantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown; b) apportioning the financial consequences arising from care of the children, beyond the duty to provide child support; c) relieving economic hardship arising from the marriage breakdown; and d) as far as is practicable, promoting economic self-sufficiency of the former spouses and to relieve them of any economic hardship arising from the breakdown of the marriage. [275] There are three forms of spousal support which a spouse may be entitled to: compensatory, non-compensatory, and contractual: Zacharias v. Zacharias, 2015 BCCA 376 at paras. 25-27. [276] In her opening, the Mother asserted that she was seeking spousal support because she required pelvic floor therapy as a result of the pregnancy. There was no medical evidence to corroborate her claim that she suffered or suffers a pelvic floor injury as a result of her pregnancy. There is no evidence, even

in the form of testimony from the Mother, that her asserted need for pelvic floor therapy somehow impedes her ability work. [277] Although the Mother only expressly relied on the need for pelvic support therapy in advancing her claim, there is also no medical or other reliable evidence that the Mother suffers from migraines or from disabling levels of anxiety, nor any reliable or persuasive evidence that suffering from these conditions impedes her ability to work. [278] Additionally, the Mother has not provided an F8 Financial Statement in the proceeding and has provided no reliable evidence regarding her current or cost of living. She appears to have re-partnered, and there has been no related financial disclosure in that respect either. The Father did not receive a financial advantage from the relationship and the Mother has not established any financial disadvantage from the relationship. There is no evidence on which the Court could conclude that a need for spousal support has been established. The Mother has not proven entitlement to either compensatory or non-compensatory spousal support. [279] The Mother's claim for spousal support is struck. Had it not been struck, it would have dismissed in any event on the evidence. XI. Fines & Orders for Payment [280] The Father seeks an order that the Mother pay the following: a) Under s. 213(2)(d)(iii) of the FLA, a $5,000 fine for

her breach of her disclosure obligations under the Rules; and b) Under s. 228(1)(c)(iii) and 230(2)(b)(iii) of the FLA, a $5,000 fine for her breaches of the Crerar and Sharma Orders. [281] The Father also seeks an order allowing him to deduct $200 on a monthly basis from the amount payable by him as basic child support until the following have been paid in full: a) The $10,000 in fines sought above; b) The $1,500 cost award ordered to be paid forthwith under the Crerar Order; c) The $750 cost award ordered to be paid forthwith by Associate Judge Robertson on February 13, 2024; and d) costs of this proceeding (sought in the amount of $40,000). A. Relevant FLA Provisions [282] Section 213 reads: Enforcing orders respecting disclosure 213 (1) This section applies if a person (a) fails to comply with (i) an order for disclosure made under section 212 [orders respecting disclosure], or (ii) a requirement to disclose information in accordance with the Supreme Court Family Rules or the Provincial Court Family Rules, within the time or in the manner required by the order or Rules, or (b) provides information that is incomplete, false or misleading. (2) In the circumstances set out in subsection (1), the court may do one or more of the following: (a) make an order under section 212; (b) draw an inference that is adverse to the person, including attributing income to that person in an

amount that the court considers appropriate, and make an order based on the inference; (c) require a party to give security in any form that the court directs; (d) make an order requiring the person described in subsection (1) to pay (i) a party for all or part of the expenses reasonably and necessarily incurred as a result of the non-disclosure of information or the incomplete, false or misleading disclosure, including fees and expenses related to family dispute resolution, (ii) an amount not exceeding $5 000 to or for the benefit of a party, or a spouse or child whose interests were affected by the non-disclosure of information or the incomplete, false or misleading disclosure, or (iii) a fine not exceeding $5 000; (e) make any other order the court considers appropriate. [283] Section 228 is part of Division 5 (Orders Respecting Conduct) of Part 10 (Court Process) of the FLA. Section 228(1) reads: Enforcing orders respecting conduct 228 (1) If a party fails to comply with an order made under this Division, the court may do one or more of the following: (a) make a further order under this Division; (b) draw an inference that is adverse to the party, and make an order based on the inference; (c) make an order requiring the party to pay (i) the other party for all or part of the expenses reasonably and necessarily incurred as a result of the non-compliance, including fees and

expenses related to family dispute resolution, (ii) an amount not exceeding $5 000 to or for the benefit of the other party, or a spouse or child whose interests were affected by the non-compliance, or (iii) a fine not exceeding $5 000; (d)make any other order the court considers necessary to secure compliance. [Emphasis added.] [284] Section 230 is part of Division 6 (Enforcement Generally) of Part 10 of the FLA. Section 230 reads: Enforcing orders generally 230 (1) Subject to section 188 [enforcing orders respecting protection], an order under this section may be made only if no other provision of this Act applies for the purposes of enforcing an order made under this Act. (2) For the purposes of enforcing an order made under this Act, the court on application by a party may make an order to do one or more of the following: (a) require a party to give security in any form the court directs; (b) require a party to pay (i) the other party for all or part of the expenses reasonably and necessarily incurred as a result of the party's actions, including fees and expenses related to family dispute resolution, (ii) an amount not exceeding $5 000 to or for the benefit of the other party, or a spouse or child whose interests were affected by the party's actions, or (iii) a fine not exceeding $5 000. [Emphasis added.] [285] The Father did not seek fines or other orders under s.

61. However, s. 61 is relevant here, given that s. 230 is expressly limited to enforcing orders that cannot be enforced under another provision of the FLA. Section 61 is a provision within Division 5 (Compliance Respecting Parenting Time or Contact with a Child) of Part 4 (Care of and Time with Children) of the FLA, and therefore is another provision in the FLA available for the purposes of enforcing an order relating to parenting time made under the Act. Section 61 includes the following provisions: Denial of parenting time or contact 61 (1) An application under this section may be made only (a) by a person entitled under an agreement or order to parenting time or contact with a child, and (b) within 12 months after the person was denied parenting time or contact with a child. (2) If satisfied that an applicant has been wrongfully denied parenting time or contact with a child by a child's guardian, the court on application may make an order to do one or more of the following: (c) specify a period of time during which the applicant may exercise compensatory parenting time or contact with the child; (d) require the guardian to reimburse the applicant for expenses reasonably and necessarily incurred by the applicant as a result of the denial, including travel expenses, lost wages and child care expenses; (e) require that the transfer of the child from one party to another be

supervised by another person named in the order; (f) if the court is satisfied that the guardian may not comply with an order made under this section, order that guardian to (i) give security in any form the court directs, or (ii) report to the court, or to a person named by the court, at the time and in the manner specified by the court; (g) require the guardian to pay (i) an amount not exceeding $5 000 to or for the benefit of the applicant or a child whose interests were affected by the denial, or (ii) a fine not exceeding $5 000. B. Failure to Disclose and Section 213 [286] The Mother failed to comply with the document disclosure terms of the order made at the second judicial case conference, failed to comply with any of the terms (including the disclosure related terms) of the trial management case order, and failed to comply with her obligations under the Rules, including the obligation to deliver and file an F8 Financial Statement. [287] The Mother's failure to produce documents was injurious to the Mother's case. The Mother's failure to produce documents related to income and ability to work resulted in an adverse inference and an imputation of income. Her failure to produce financial documents or provide a F8 Financial Statement prevented the Mother from asserting that child support should be set other than in accordance with the Guidelines. The Mother's claim for

spousal support was struck. [288] While the Court is clearly empowered to do one "or more" of the things set out in s. 213(2) where there has been a failure to comply, an adverse inference was drawn against her and her spousal support claim was struck. Those are, in and of themselves, significant adverse consequences. Further, in this case there is no evidence that the Mother's failure to disclose documents caused the Father to incur added expense to conduct the litigation. [289] I do not consider the further imposition of a fine to be warranted in the circumstances. C. Breach of Crerar and Sharma Orders Section 228 [290] The Crerar Order does not make express reference to any Part 10, Division 5 provisions, but it is at least arguable that the orders dealing with how the exchanges were to be conducted could have been made as conduct orders under Division 5. [291] While E. ought not to have had to wait to be let in after she was dropped at the door, and it was very reasonable for the Father to want to see who it was that received E. into the Mother's house, the Crerar Order was not specific on either of those points. The Mother also involved her stepfather in the drop off process, but that was not a serious departure from the spirit of the order and the Father himself testified that both he and E. were comfortable with the stepfather acting as an intermediary to assist with

exchanges. The Mother did not always text as required by the protocol under the Crerar Order, but that failure did not make the protocol ineffective. [292] Assuming, without deciding, that the exchange protocol terms under the Crerar Order do constitute conduct orders made under Division 5 of Part 10, I do not find that the Mother's breaches are so significant as to warrant a fine. [293] Under the Sharma Order, the orders relating to possession of E.'s passport and terms for travelling with E. are made under ss. 222 and 227, both of which are found in Division 5 of Part 10 of the FLA. There is no evidence that either of these terms have been breached. Section 230 [294] The Sharma Order directed the Mother to submit the name change application forthwith. The Mother testified that she had still not done so as of the date of trial. She provided no credible justification for her failure to do so. [295] The Mother failed to attend the second examination for discovery as ordered by Associate Judge Robertson. [296] The Mother had, as of trial, failed to pay the fixed costs of $750 ordered to be paid forthwith under that February 2024 order. [297] The Mother had, as of trial, failed to pay the fixed costs in the amount of $1,500 order to be paid forthwith under the December 2022 Crerar Order. [298] The Mother testified that she had something in the area of $50,000 in savings at the

time of separation and had about $3,000 of that amount left as of trial. Accordingly, I find that she had the ability to pay the costs ordered forthwith under the Robinson and Crerar Orders and willfully did not, resulting in the breach of the payment terms of those orders. [299] I consider it appropriate to impose a fine of $2,500 for these breaches under s. 230(2)(b)(iii). Breach of Parenting Time Terms [300] As noted, s. 230 applies only if no other provisions under the FLA applies for the purposes of enforcing an order. Section 61 governs the wrongful denial of parenting time. [301] No relief was sought under s.

61. D. Set-off by Deduction from Child Support [302] The Father seeks an order allowing him to make monthly deductions from basic child support to offset the total amount owing in respect of the following: any fine imposed above (i.e., the $2,500 imposed under s. s. 230(2)(b)(iii)); the $1,500 costs award owing under the Crerar Order; the $750 costs award owing under the Robertson Order; and, an award of costs in this trial (sought in the amount of $40,000). [303] In Ambrose v. Ambrose, 1994 CanLII 2215 (B.C.S.C.), the mother applied for a declaration of arrears of child maintenance. The father sought to have a sum said to be owing to him as a result of the separation of assets set off against the arrears. Justice Brenner (as he then was) stated: The applicant mother claims arrears of $18,088 (after an adjustment during the hearing of the application). Of that sum, $13,500 represents taxes paid by the former husband arising from share transactions that occurred as part of the separation and for which he says he is entitled to a credit. The balance of the arrears represents payments made by the father for the benefit of the children. The $13,500 portion of the arrears is said to be a debt owed to the father by the mother. Was he entitled to deduct this amount from child support payments? During submissions I questioned the father's counsel as to the basis in law which would

allow a parent to deduct from child support payments monies said to be the obligation of the recipient parent. No authority was cited to me for this proposition. It is difficult to see the basis for such. Child support payments are intended to benefit the children of a marriage and in my view, a debt of a custodial parent owed to the payor parent cannot be used as the grounds for withholding child support payments. Inter-parental obligations are matters to be sorted out between the parties; they cannot be used as an excuse to withhold child support. Accordingly, I conclude that the arrears of $13,500 are payable. [Emphasis added.] [304] Counsel for the Father relies on J.H. v. D.G., 2023 BCPC 209, for the proposition that this a general rule to which exceptions may be made. In that case, J.H. had unilaterally relocated to a different city and did not respond D.G.'s attempts to contact her to arrange parenting time under court orders. D.G. brought an application to enforce the parenting orders and an application prohibiting the relocation. [305] At the hearing, it was held that J.H. had wrongfully denied court-ordered parenting time and also failed to comply with orders to pay expenses as a penalty under s. 230(2)(b)(i) of the FLA. In determining remedy, the court said: [96] I recognize that it is equally meaningless for the court to impose a monetary penalty that J.H. will

ignore with impunity, as is her habit. For this reason, I am ordering that commencing July 1, 2023, D.G. is entitled to deduct $150 per month from the monies he pays to J.H. for child support for C. until the $2,500 penalty is paid in full. Because child support is the right of the child, I further order that D.G. will use the penalty monies he deducts from child support for C.'s benefit as he deems appropriate.

BREACHES OF PENALTY ORDERS [109] I find that J.H. has failed or refused to comply with Terms 8 and 9 of Judge Mulder's July 12, 2022 Order requiring her to compensate D.G. for the expenses he incurred as a result of J.H. failing to vacate the E.S. Residence by August 1, 2021. [111] There is $5,500 outstanding on the debt (the "Debt") Judge Mulder ordered (Terms 7 and 8) J.H. pay to D.G. for breaching Terms 10 and 11 of Judge Becknell's April 23, 2021 Order. J.H. has breached and continues to breach Terms 7 and 8 of Judge Mulder's July 12, 2022 Order by failing to pay to D.G. $500 per month towards the satisfaction of the debt. [112] I am ordering that commencing August 1, 2023, D.G. is entitled to deduct up to $300 per month from the monies he pays to J.H. for child support for C. until the debt is paid in full. In making this order, I have not lost sight of the fact that child support is the right of the child. I am aware that courts do not generally allow a payor parent to deduct from child support monies attributable to a family debt. I am not permitting D.G. to deduct from child support monies he paid to third-party creditors for debts accrued during the currency of his relationship with J.H. I am permitting him to offset from the monies he pays to J.H. for ongoing child support a portion of the monies Judge Mulder ordered she pay to D.G. post-separation [Emphasis

added.] [306] The reasons in J.H. acknowledge the existence of a general rule against allowing a payor to deduct the debts owing to them from child support payments, but do not cite case authority in support of the general rule. It is not clear whether the Court there had Ambrose before it for consideration. However, if the Court did have Ambrose before it, and if the intention of the Court was to indicate that a debt arising between parents under an order in family law proceeding is anything other than an interparental debt obligation, as that term was used by Brenner J., I disagree. I note that all costs awards made in family law proceedings give rise to an interparental debt that does not arise from a payment to a third-party creditor. [307] In note that if court orders in the family proceeding constituted a carve out to the general rule in Ambrose, then cost awards would routinely set off against child support - the general rule would be gutted. [308] The application for an order allowing deductions from child support payments as a set off against amounts owing is dismissed. The Father should collect any monies owing to him in the usual manner. [309] Based on my findings above, para. 45 and 47 of Schedule A should be deleted. Paragraph 46 should be amended to reflect my finding that the Mother must pay the Father $2,500 under s. 230(2)(b)(iii). XII. Costs [310] The Father

has been successful at trial and entitled to costs. [311] The Father provided full submissions on costs and included a draft bill of costs as a schedule to his written submission. He argues that it will be cost-effective for the Court to determine the costs. [312] The total costs and disbursements set out in the draft bill of costs is $39,500 for Part B Tariff costs (on a scale of ordinary difficulty) and $10,995.48 for Part E Disbursements, for a total (including tax) of $50,495.48. The listed disbursements include court reporter fees for the examinations for discovery that the Mother failed to attend. [313] The Father seeks an award for the amount of $40,000. [314] I am satisfied that the amount $40,000 is reasonable. [315] For clarity, the amount of $40,000 is inclusive of any costs owing in respect of the post-trial application for summer parenting time. The summer time application took a half-hour for hearing and was determined in reliance on the evidence heard in trial. No separate award of costs is warranted. XIII. Miscellaneous [316] The Father seeks an order enabling him to bring further applications on five days' notice in the event the Mother breaches the parenting orders in the final order. There is no basis for seeking what amounts to permanent short leave. The request is denied. [317] [318] I decline to seize myself of this proceeding, but the parties are at

liberty to inquire as to whether I am available to hear future applications. "Tucker J." ______ Court File No.: E221606 Court Registry: Vancouver In the Supreme Court of British Columbia __________ _________ ___ _____ _____ _______________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________ THIS COURT ORDERS THAT: Parenting Arrangements Guardianship 1. Pursuant to section 39(2) of the Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c. 25 (the "Family Law Act'), the parties will remain joint guardians of E. Parental Responsibilities 1. The parties will share the following parenting responsibilities and decision-making related to E., to be exercised in the best interests of E., pursuant to section 41 of the Family Law Act, which include: (a) making day-to-day decisions affecting E. and having day-to-day care, control and supervision of

E.; (b) making decisions respecting where E. will reside; (c) making decisions respecting with whom E. will associate; (d) making decisions respecting E.'s education and participation in extracurricular activities, including the nature, extent and location; (e) making decisions respecting E.'s cultural, linguistic, religious, and spiritual upbringing and heritage; (f) subject to section 17 of the Infants Act, giving, refusing, or withdrawing consent to medical, dental, and other health-related treatments for E.; (g) applying for a license, permit, benefit, privilege, or other thing for E.; (h) giving, refusing or withdrawing consent for E., if consent is required; (i) receiving or responding to any notice that a parent or guardian is entitled or required by law to receive; (j) requesting and receiving from third parties' health, education, or other information respecting E.; (k) subject to any applicable provincial legislation, (i) starting, defending, compromising, or settling any proceeding relating to E., and (ii) identifying, advancing, and protecting E.'s legal and financial interests, and (l) exercising any other responsibilities reasonably necessary (collectively, the "Parenting Responsibilities") 2. For the exercise of any Parenting Responsibilities, both parties must consult each other about important decisions affecting E. and try to reach an agreement. However, if

the parties are unable to agree or the respondent does not respond to written communication, which includes email and text message, from the claimant related to the Parental Responsibilities within 72 hours: (a) the claimant will have final decision-making authority over the Parental Responsibilities, save and except paragraph 2(e) of this Order as it relates to E.'s participation in her Metis heritage, subject to the respondent's right pursuant to section 49 of the Family Law Act to make an application to the court for directions if she disagrees; and (b) the respondent will have final decision-making authority over the Parental Responsibilities set out at paragraph 2(e) of this Order only as it relates to E.'s participation in her Metis heritage, subject to the claimant's right pursuant to section 49 of the Family Law Act to make an application to the court for directions if she disagrees.

3. During their respective parenting time, the parties may exercise the parental responsibility of making day-to-day decisions affecting E., provided that they must advise the other parent of any matters of a significant nature affecting E..

4. If either party dies, the remaining party will be the guardian of E. with all of the Parental Responsibilities. The remaining party will ensure that E. has reasonable contact with the deceased party's extended family.

5. Each party will be at liberty to appoint a guardian under section 53 of the Family Law Act, to take effect only on the death of both of the parties.

6. Neither party will appoint a standby guardian under section 55 of the Family Law Act unless agreed upon by both of the parties. Regular Parenting Schedule 7. The parties will share egual parenting of E. pursuant to the following 2-2-5-5 regular parenting schedule: Week One Mon Tues Wed Thurs Fri Sat Sun Claimant: The respondent drops E. off into the claimant's care pursuant to the transition terms below Claimant Respondent: The claimant drops E. off into the respondent's care pursuant to the transition terms below. Respondent Claimant: The respondent drops E. off into the claimant's care pursuant to the transition terms below Claimant Claimant Week Two Mon Tues Wed Thurs Fri Sat Sun Claimant Claimant Respondent: The claimant drops E. off into the respondent 's care pursuant to the transition terms below. Respondent Respondent Respondent Respondent (the "Regular Parenting Schedule") School 8. Commencing September 2024, E. will attend preschool at Little Rainbow House Preschool ("Little Rainbow House") in Coquitlam, B.C., unless otherwise agreed.

9. Commencing September 2025, E. will attend one of the following elementary schools: (a) Hazel Trembath Elementary in Coquitlam, B.C.; (b) Castle Park Elementary in Port Coquitlam, B.C.; (c) Ecole Kilmer Elementary in Port Coquitlam, B.C.; or (d) another elementary school within the claimant's catchment. (collectively, the "Elementary Schools") 10. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Order, if the parties are unable to agree on which Elementary School E. will attend, the claimant will have final decision-making authority, subject to the respondent's right pursuant to section 49 of the Family Law Act to make an application to the court for directions if she disagrees. Transitions (Pick Up and Drop Off) 11. During transitions, the parties will be civil and courteous to one another and will not discuss any contentious issues. Unless otherwise specified in paragraphs 13 to 15 of this Order, all exchanges will occur in person at the parties' residences, and the parties, or a trusted adult they appoint to conduct the exchanges as described in this Order on their behalf, will physically transition E. directly into the other parties' care.

12. Commencing immediately and continuing until September 2024, the party who has E. in his or her care the night before the transition (the "On-Duty Parent") will drop E. as off at the residence of the other parent (the "Off-Duty Parent") at 9:00 a.m. the following morning.

13. Commencing September 2024, the parties will transition E. as follows: (a) on preschool days, the On-Duty Parent will drop E. off at Little Rainbow House at 9:00 a.m. and the Off-Duty Parent will pick E. up at Little Rainbow House at 1:00 p.m.; and (b) if there is no preschool on a transition day, the On-Duty parent will drop E. off at the residence of the Off-Duty Parent at 9:00 a.m.

14. Commencing September 2025, the On-Duty Parent will drop E. off at school and the Off-Duty Parent will pick E. up from school. If there is no school on a transition day, the transition will take place at either parties' residence in person at 9:00 a.m., and the On-Duty Parent will drop E. off at the residence of the Off-Duty Parent. Chanqes to the Regular Parenting Schedule 15. If either party requests a reasonable change to the Regular Parenting Schedule to accommodate special circumstances or requests, the other parent will try to accommodate such requests and will not unreasonably withhold their consent. Any such variations will be by written agreement of both parties, which may include e-mail or text message. Whenever possible, the parties will make requests for changes to the Regular Parenting Schedule at least 48 hours in advance.

16. There will be no make-up time for any changes to the Regular Parenting Schedule, unless both parties agree. Holiday and Special Occasion Parenting Schedule 17. Except as otherwise provided in this Order, E. will spend Statutory Holidays and Non- Instructional Days, which includes Professional Development Days, Easter, Halloween, and Thanksgiving, with the party with whom E. is scheduled to reside pursuant to the Regular Parenting Schedule and there will be no adjustments to the Regular Parenting Schedule.

18. The Regular Parenting Schedule will apply except as temporarily suspended during the following times (collectively, the "Holiday Parenting Schedule"), and the Regular Parenting Schedule will recommence as soon as possible following that particular time: (a) Mother's Day and Father's Day: (i) the claimant will have parenting time with E. on Father's Day, regardless of which party has parenting time under the Regular Parenting Schedule, from 9:00 a.m. until 6:30 p.m.; and (ii) the respondent will have parenting time with E. on Mother's Day, regardless of which party has parenting time under the Regular Parenting Schedule, from 9:00 a.m. and 6:30 p.m.; (b) Commencing immediately and continuing until September 2025: (i) The Regular Parenting Schedule will continue to apply during the summer except that each party will have two non-consecutive weeks of summer parenting time with E., one week in July and one week in August, from a Monday to the following Monday to coincide with their respective parenting time under the Regular Parenting Schedule. (A) in 2024, the claimant will exercise his summer parenting time as follows: (1) July 22 to 29, 2024; and (2) August 5 to 12, 2024; (B) the respondent will provide her dates for her 2024 summer parenting time to the claimant by May 1,- 2024; and (C) the respondent will provide her dates for her summer parenting time in 2025 to the

claimant by February 1, 2025, and the claimant will provide his dates to the respondent by March 1, 2025; and (ii) each party will have an additional week of holiday parenting time between September 2024 and June 2025. The claimant will select his dates for his additional week of holiday parenting time and relay those dates to the respondent by July 1, 2024; and the respondent will select her dates for her additional week of holiday parenting time and relay those dates to the claimant by August 1, 2024; and (iii) the parties will divide the 2024 Christmas holiday period as follows: (A) the claimant will have parenting time with E. 12:00 p.m. on December 24, 2024 until 12:00 p.m. on December 25, 2024, and the respondent will have parenting time with E. from 12:00 p.m. on December 25, 2024 until 12:00 p.m. on December 26, 2024; and (B) the respondent will have E. for New Year's Eve, from 12:00 p.m. on December 31st to 12:00 p.m. on January 1, 2025; (c) Commencing September 2025: (i) Spring Break: the spring break period commences when school finishes on Friday and ends when school resumes the Monday morning following the break (the "Spring Break Period"). (A) the parties will share the Spring Break Period evenly. In odd years, the claimant will have the first half and the respondent will have the second half. In even years, the respondent will have the first half and the claimant

will have the second half; and (B) unless otherwise agreed, the exchange time during the Spring Break Period will be at 10:00 a.m. on the Saturday between the two weeks. Whichever party has the first half will drop E. off at the other party's residence; (ii) Summer: the summer holiday period commences after school on the last day of school in June and ends on the morning when school resumes in September (the "Summer Holiday Period"); (A) the Regular Parenting Schedule will continue to apply during the summer, except that each party will be entitled to take E. for 10 consecutive days of summer parenting time. In odd years, the claimant will select his vacation days first, and in even years, the respondent will select her vacation days first; (B) the party who selects first will notify the other party of their dates no later than March 1st of each year. The party who selects second pick will notify the other parent of their dates no later than April 1st of each year; and (C) the parties will finalize the Summer Holiday Period schedule by April 15th of each year; (iii) Winter Holiday: the winter holiday period commences after school on the last day of school in December and continues until drop off at school on the first day of school in January, and includes Christmas and New Years (the "Winter Holiday Period"); (A) The parties will divide the Winter Holiday Period approximately

evenly with each party having consecutive periods of parenting time, subject to the Christmas Parenting Time and New Years Parenting Time, as defined below; (B) In even years, the claimant will select his dates first, and the respondent will select her dates first in odd years. The party who selects first will provide their dates to the other party by October 15th of each year, and the party who selects second will provide their dates to the other party by November 1st of each year; (C) In even years, E. will be with the claimant from 12:00 p.m. on December 24th until 12:00 p.m. on December 25th, and with the respondent from 12:00 p.m. on December 25th until 12:00 p.m. on December 26th. In odd years E. will be with the respondent from 12:00 p.m. on December 24th until 12:00 p.m. on December 25th, and with the claimant from 12:00 p.m. on December 25th until 12:00 p.m. on December 26th; (the "Christmas Parenting Time") (D) in odd years, the respondent will have E. for New Year's Eve, from 12:00 p.m. on December 31st to 12:00 p.m. on January 1st. In even years, the claimant will have E. for New Year's Eve, from 12:00 p.m. on December 31st to 12:00 p.m. on January 1st; and (the "New Years Parenting Time ") (E) the parties will finalize the Winter Holiday Period schedule by November 15th of each year; and (iv) Additional Holiday Parenting Time: Each party will have an additional

week of holiday parenting time between September and June of each year (the "Additional Holiday Parenting Time"). In even years, the claimant will select his dates for the Additional Holiday Parenting Time first, and in odd years the respondent will select her dates for the Additional Holiday Parenting time first; (A) The party who has selects first will notify the other party of their dates no later than July 1st of each year. The parent who selects second will notify the other parent of their dates no later than August 1st of each year; and (B) the parties will finalize the Additional Holiday Parenting Time schedule by August 15th of each year. Medical and Dental Issues 19. Unless otherwise agreed, E.'s family physician will be ______.

20. Unless otherwise agreed, E.'s dentist will be ___.

21. Both parties will: (a) keep the other parent informed of any illnesses or injuries that relate to E.; (b) share all medical information with the other parent; and (c) provide a written summary of what occurred at any medical or dental appointment they attend with E. to the other party within 72 hours (including, but not limited to, when E. receives any vaccinations).

22. If an emergency arises, the On-Duty Parent will notify the Off-Duty Parent as soon as possible. The On-Duty Parent may make immediate emergency decisions if they cannot reach the Off-Duty Parent despite making reasonable efforts to do so. The parties will follow the reasonable recommendations of E.'s medical professionals. Travel and Passports 23. The parties may travel with E. within North America, which includes Mexico, during his or her parenting time, without the non-travelling party's consent, provided that the travelling-party gives the non-travelling parent notice.

24. The parties may travel with E. outside of North America, which includes Mexico, during his or her parenting time, without the non-travelling party's consent, provided the travelling-party provides the non-travelling party with the following information: (a) the location, including address and contact telephone number, of the travel; (b) the duration of the travel; (c) flight numbers and airline itinerary, if applicable; and (d) a phone number of a contact person in case of an emergency; 25. The non-travelling party will cooperate with requests from the travelling-party to provide the necessary authorizations to permit E. to travel with the travelling-party pursuant to this Order and will provide the other party with a notarized letter consenting to E. traveling with the other party within 72 hours of the request.

26. A party who travels with E. will ensure that he or she has adequate travel medical insurance to cover the cost of any medical care E. may require outside of Canada.

27. If the travelling-party fails to obtain adequate travel medical insurance for the benefit of E. while travelling outside of Canada, that party will be solely responsible, and will indemnify and save harmless the other parent in respect of, any and all medical costs incurred for the benefit of E. if she becomes sick and injured while travelling outside of Canada with the travelling-party and requires medical care.

28. E.'s passport will remain with the claimant and will only be released to the respondent to facilitate her travel with E. across borders pursuant to paragraphs 24 and 25 of this Order at which point it would then be returned immediately to the claimant. The claimant will not unreasonably withhold E.'s passport.

29. The requirement that the claimant obtain the respondent's consent and signature to apply for a passport for E. is dispensed with. E.'s Belongings 30. The parties will allow E. to take personal items, including, but not limited to, clothing, toys, sports, equipment, electronic devices and gifts from the other parent and third parties (collectively, the "Personal Items") between the parties' residences. Neither party will restrict E.'s ability to take Personal Items between the parties' residences.

31. Each party will ensure that they each have sufficient clothing for E. at their own residence respectively to ensure that E. is not required to transport a suitcase of clothing between the parties' residence. Communication 32. The parties will: (a) put the best interests of E. before their own interests; (b) encourage E. to have a good relationship with the other party and speak to E. in a positive and respectful manner; (c) make reasonable efforts to maintain polite, respectful communications with each other; and (d) refrain from any negative or hostile criticism, communication or argument with or regarding the other party in the front of E. or within earshot of E..

33. The parties will not: (a) question E. about the other party or time spent with the other party beyond simple conversational questions; (b) discuss with E. any inappropriate adult, court or legal matters; or (c) blame, criticize or disparage the other parent to E.

34. The parties will respond to written communication, including email and text messages, within 24 hours of receipt, unless the communication relates to an imminent exchange or is urgent, in which case the response will be immediate. Extracurricular Activities 35. The parties will agree upon which sports and activities (the "Extracurricular Activities") in which E. will participate each year, and will consider E.'s views when making such decisions. In the event the parties are unable to agree, each party will be entitled to enroll E. in Extracurricular Activities during their respective parenting time provided that they are solely responsible for paying the cost of same.

36. Both parties will be entitled to attend E.'s Extracurricular Activities and school activities and events regardless of who has parenting time with E. when the Extracurricular Activities and school activities and events occur.

37. The parties will support E. in maintaining her commitments to the Extracurricular Activities and will each make best efforts to ensure that E. attend any Extracurricular Activities during their respective parenting time. Child Support Basic Child Support 38. The claimant's Guideline income is determined to be $115,279.

39. Pursuant to sections 19(1)(a) and (f) of the Guidelines, income is imputed to the respondent in the amount of $50,000.

40. Pursuant to section 9 of the Guidelines, the claimant will pay the set-off of child support to the respondent in the amount of $586 per month, commencing on the fifteenth of the month and continuing each month thereafter until such time as E. is no longer a child of the relationship as defined by the Family Law Act, calculated as follows: (a) the monthly child support payable by the claimant is $1,074; (b) the monthly child support payable by the respondent is $470; and (c) the respondent's proportional share of the cost of the portion of medical and dental insurance premiums attributable to E., namely $18, will be deducted from the child support payable by the claimant; (the "Basic Child Support"). Section 7 Expenses 41. The parties will share E.'s section 7 expenses in proportion with their respective incomes, with the claimant paying 70%, and the respondent paying 30%. The section 7 expenses of E. will include: (a) child care expenses incurred as a result of the employment, illness, disability or education or training for employment; (b) that portion of the medical and dental insurance premiums attributable to the E., which at this time is $60 per month; (c) health-related expenses that exceed insurance reimbursement by at least $100 annually, including orthodontic treatment, professional counselling provided by a psychologist, social worker, psychiatrist or any other

person, physiotherapy, occupational therapy, speech therapy and prescription drugs, hearing aids, glasses and contact lenses; (d) extraordinary expenses for primary or secondary school education or for any other educational programs that meet the child's particular needs; (e) any other expense that the parties' agree in writing, which may include by email or text message, qualifies as a section 7 expense; (collectively, the "Special Expenses"). Review of Child Support 42. Each year, commencing in May 2025, the parties will exchange all information required by the Guidelines by May 15th to determine each of the parties' respective incomes pursuant to the Guidelines, including but not limited to the following: (a) A copy of his or her income tax return for the previous calendar year; (b) A copy of his of her notice of assessment or reassessment for the previous calendar year; and (c) A copy of the financial statements for any incorporated or incorporated business operated by the party for the previous calendar year.

43. In each year, the respondent's income will be the greater of her actual income or $50,000.

44. Following the exchange of income information as set out in paragraphs 43 and 44 of this Order, the parties will review and adjust, if necessary, the Basic Child Support and proportionate sharing of the Special Expenses payable by each party, effective June 15th of each year. Fines 45. Pursuant to section 213(2)(d)(iii) of the Family Law Act, the respondent will pay a fine to the claimant in the amount of $5,000 related breaches of her disclosure obligations under the Rules by the respondent (the "Disclosure Fine").

46. Pursuant to sections 228(1 )(c)(iii) and 230(2)(b)(iii) of the Family Law Act, the respondent will pay a fine to the claimant in the amount of $5,000 related various breaches of parenting orders by the respondent (the "Parenting Orders Fine").

47. The claimant is entitled to deduct $200 from the Basic Child Support until such time as the respondent has paid the following in full: (a) the Disclosure Fine; (b) the Parenting Orders Fine; (c) the cost award made by Justice Crerar on December 7, 2022, in the amount of $1,500; (d) the cost award made by Associate Judge Robertson on February 13, 2024, in the amount of $750; and (e) costs of this proceeding in the amount of $40,000 as set out in paragraph 49 of this Order. Other 111. The claimant is entitled to bring an application on five days notice ___ in the event that she breaches the parenting orders, including, but not limited to, transitions, the Regular Parenting Schedule, the Holiday Parenting Schedule, the exercising of final ­decision-making authority, travel, and E.'s passport; and 112. Justice Tucker will remain seized of matters pertaining to the enforcement of the parenting-related orders, including, but not limited to, transitions, the Regular Parenting Schedule, the Holiday Parenting Schedule, the exercising of final-decision-making authority, travel, and E.'s passport.

48. The requirement that the respondent sign this Order is dispensed with.

49. The respondent will pay fixed costs of this proceeding in the amount of $40,000 to the claimant. THE PARTIES APPROVE THE FORM OF THIS ORDER AND CONSENT TO EACH OF THE ORDERS, IF ANY, THAT ARE INDICATED ABOVE AS BEING BY CONSENT. Signature of [ ] party [x] lawyer for the Claimant Nikki L. Charlton By the Court. Registrar