C.Y.C v. P.J.H.

2025 BCSC 2458 C.Y.C. v. P.J.H.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: C.Y.C. v. P.J.H., 2025 BCSC 2458 Date: 20251211 Docket: E141224 Registry: Vancouver Between: C.Y.C. Claimant And P.J.H. Respondent Before: Registrar Gaily Reasons for Decision The Claimant, appearing in person: C.Y.C. The Respondent, appearing in person: P.J.H. Place and Date of Hearing: Vancouver, B.C. November 27, 2025 Place and Date of Decision: Vancouver, B.C. December 11, 2025 Table of Contents Introduction and Background.. 3 Assessment of the Family Bill of Costs. 6 Calculation of the Interest Owing on the Arrears. 8 Assessment of the Special Costs. 10 Applicable Principles. 10 Analysis. 11 The complexity of the family law case and the difficulty or the novelty of the issues involved. 11 The skill, specialized knowledge and responsibility required of the lawyer 12 The amount involved in the proceeding. 13 The time reasonably spent in conducting the proceeding. 13 Conduct that tended to shorten or unnecessarily lengthen the proceeding. 15 The importance of the proceeding to the party whose bill is being assessed, and the result obtained. 15 The benefit to the party whose bill is being assessed of the services rendered by the lawyer 16 Rule 1-3 (i.e. proportionality) 16 The Fees Claimed as Special Costs. 16 Mr. H.'s Fees. 16 Disbursements. 17 Disposition.. 18 Introduction and Background [1] This is an assessment of the

special costs awarded to the respondent, P.J.H. ("Mr. H.") pursuant to the order of Justice Morellato. This high conflict family proceeding has been before the court for several years and Morellato J. detailed the relevant background and previous court orders in her reasons for judgment indexed at C.Y.C. v. P.J.H, 2023 BCSC 1403 (the "Reasons"). I will not repeat the background other than where it is relevant. Although both parties have been represented by counsel at various points, they represented themselves on the application before Morellato J. and before me. [2] On April 12, 2022, Mr. H. filed a notice of application seeking to vary the final order, which was pronounced by Justice Pearlman on March 7, 2016 and had been entered into by consent, with respect to child support and s. 7 expenses, as well as seeking retroactive child support from the claimant, C.Y.C. ("Ms. C.") (the "Application"). The Application was opposed, and it proceeded before Morellato J. over four and a half days, commencing on May 11, 2022, and concluding on January 20, 2023. She released the Reasons on August 11, 2023. Morellato J. found that Mr. H. had been substantially successful and awarded him costs of the Application (Reasons, para. 136). She encouraged the parties to settle the issue of costs between them, but they could not. [3] Mr. H. requested a post-judgment conference with Morellato J. to

clarify the terms of her order. The parties were scheduled to appear before Morellato J. on November 3, 2023, but Ms. C. did not appear, advising Scheduling that the hearing should proceed without her. As Morellato J. noted in the oral reasons for judgment on costs (indexed at 2024 BCSC 2480) (the "Oral Costs Reasons"), Mr. H. sought special costs of the Application. Morellato J. directed both parties to provide written submissions on the issue of special costs. Mr. H. filed his on November 10, 2023, but Ms. C. did not file any for several months. [4] The order of Morellato J. from the Application was entered on March 19, 2024. [5] On May 28, 2024, the Court sent a memorandum to the parties advising that if Ms. C. did not file written submissions by June 7, Morellato J. would proceed to render judgment without her submissions. Ms. C. retained counsel for the limited purpose of helping her with written submissions, which she filed on June 6, 2024. Mr. H. filed a further reply on June 28. [6] In the Oral Costs Reasons, released on October 11, 2024, Morellato J. determined that a special costs order against Ms. C. was warranted because Ms. C. had "failed to make proper and timely financial disclosure and to pay child support in a timely way as required by law", forcing Mr. H. to bring the Application (para. 19). She concluded the Oral Costs Reasons as follows: [25] In conclusion,

Mr. H. is awarded special costs of this Application from the time it was filed in April 2022, but not in regard to previous applications. [26] Mr. H. is also seeking interest on the awards I granted to him in my Reasons. He is entitled to his interest pursuant to the Court Order Interest Act, R.S.B.C. 1976, c. 79. [27] I once again urge the parties to reach agreement on the quantum of both the special costs award and the interest. If agreement is not reached within 45 days of this decision, the matter is referred to the Registrar for a pre-hearing conference, a subsequent hearing before the Registrar, and the Registrar's decision on the amount of costs. That decision is to be rendered and certified by the Registrar. I would hope that this would not be necessary and that the parties will reach a settlement. [7] Mr. H. sought further clarification from Morellato J. whether he was entitled to special costs relating to a case management conference ("CMC"), at which Morellato J. had ordered an examination for discovery ("EFD") of Ms. C., and the ensuing EFD, both of which preceded the hearing of the Application. Both parties provided written submissions, the last of which was filed on October 24, 2024. In the supplementary reasons to the Oral Costs Reasons released on December 18, 2024 (indexed at 2024 BCSC 2481) (the "Supplementary Costs Reasons"), Morellato J. confirmed that Mr.

H. was entitled to his costs for the CMC and the EFD on a party and party basis (para. 5). [8] On April 30, 2025, Mr. H. filed an appointment to both settle the terms of the order of Morellato J. regarding costs and to hold the pre-hearing conference ("PHC") she directed with respect to the assessment of his special costs. [9] The parties appeared before me on May 2, 2025, where I settled the terms of Morellato J.'s order on costs and it was entered that day (the "Costs Order"). [10] At the PHC, the parties disagreed about the date Mr. H.'s entitlement to special costs for the Application ended. Ms. C. also asserted that Mr. H. was not entitled to interest on the arrears because these funds were held in trust and she asserted that the funds were earning interest and to permit Mr. H. to also recover court-ordered interest on the arrears would be unfair double-recovery. I sought direction from Morellato J. on these issues, and on June 13, 2025 Morellato J. set out in a memorandum to me and to the parties the following: · the end date for the special costs awarded to Mr. H. is November 24, 2024, the date of the last written submission in the Application; and · for the purposes of the assessment of the interest owing on the arrears, Court Order Interest accrues during the time it was owed. [11] On July 16, 2025, Mr. H. filed an appointment to assess the party-and-party costs for

the CMC and the EFD, the special costs for the Application, and to calculate the interest owing on the arrears. He attached to the appointment a bill of costs in Form F71 for the CMC and EFD (the "Family Bill of Costs") and a bill of special costs (the "Bill of Special Costs"). On September 3, 2025, Mr. H. provided Ms. C. a spreadsheet showing the interest he had calculated was owing on the arrears according to the table of interest rates under the Court Order Interest Act, R.S.B.C., 1976, c. 79 [COIA] (the "Interest Spreadsheet"). [12] Ms. C. filed her 25th affidavit on September 8, 2025, to which she exhibited a list of objections to the Bill of Special Costs (Ex. C). On September 10, she filed a "response" for this hearing, setting out her objections to the special costs claimed (the "C. Response"). In response to the C. Response and to support the amounts he claimed, Mr. H. filed his 47th affidavit on October 6, and he exhibited the Interest Spreadsheet as Exhibit A to this affidavit, providing an enlarged copy at the hearing. [13] Mr. H. claims $3,480.98 on the Family Bill of Costs. On the Bill of Special Costs, he claims a total of $30,938.50 (including disbursements). He has calculated the interest owing on the arrears at $12,111.65. [14] Mr. H. spoke to his affidavit and made submissions on the amounts he claims as both the family costs and his special costs and

explained how he calculated the interest owing on the arrears. Ms. C. made submissions setting out her objections to the Bill of Special Costs and the calculations in the Interest Spreadsheet, and Mr. H. replied to her submissions. I have reviewed the affidavits of both parties as well as the C. Response in preparing this decision. [15] As the parties know, at the hearing, I assessed the Family Bill of Costs from the bench, allowing Mr. H. his costs of the CMC and EFD at $2,980.98, and my decision includes the explanation of the assessment of these costs. [16] As explained below, based on the evidence before me, I certify that the interest on the arrears to which Mr. H. is entitled under the COIA is $12,111.65. [17] As detailed below, based on the evidence before me at the assessment hearing, I allow Mr. H.'s special costs for the Application at $27,238.50. [18] One certificate of costs may be filed for both costs together. I direct Mr. H. to file a certificate of costs in Form F72 for my signature, showing that after assessment, Mr. H.'s family costs and special costs are allowed at $30,219.48. I also direct Mr. H. to file this decision showing that I have certified that he is entitled to $12,111.65 in interest under the COIA on the arrears. Assessment of the Family Bill of Costs [19] Costs in family proceedings are governed by Rule 16-1 of the Supreme Court Family Rules

[SCFR]. Rule 16-1(1) provides that if costs are payable to a party under the SCFR, those costs must be assessed in accordance with Appendix B. The schedule to Appendix B is referred to as the "Tariff". [20] On the Family Bill of Costs, for the costs associated with the CMC and the EFD, Mr. H. claimed under items 3 and 5 of the Tariff, as well as the fees he paid to Charest Legal Solutions Inc. ("Charest") for the EFD, which was the only disbursement he claimed. [21] Item 3 of the Tariff is for the preparation for an attendance at each EFD and awards costs of $1,000 for each day or part of a day of examination for discovery. There is no dispute that the EFD of Ms. C. was conducted on October 25, 2021, and I allowed the costs claimed on Item 3. [22] Item 5 of the Tariff is for the preparation and attendance at each judicial case conference or settlement conference, awarding costs of $1,000 for each half day of attendance. I determined that the costs for the CMC claimed by Mr. H. are properly claimed under Item 6 of the Tariff, which is for "preparation for and attendance at each case planning conference, uncontested application or trial management conference" (not Item 5 as he had claimed). I allowed Mr. H. $500 for the CMC (the amount awarded under Item 6). [23] Mr. H. represented himself and is not entitled to claim taxes on the costs (see R. 16-1(6)). I assessed his costs

under the Tariff at $1,500. [24] Ms. C. did not dispute the fees Mr. H. paid to Charest totalling $1,480.98 including taxes, which are supported by the Charest invoice dated November 17, 2021, a copy of which was attached to the Family Bill of Costs. I allowed this disbursement as claimed. [25] Accordingly, as I advised the parties at the hearing, following the assessment on November 27, 2025, I allowed Mr. H.'s costs under the Tariff for the CMC and EFD at $2,980.98. Calculation of the Interest Owing on the Arrears [26] In the Oral Costs Reasons, Morellato J. awarded Mr. H. interest pursuant to the COIA on the awards she had granted him in the Reasons. In the Reasons, Morellato J. determined the parties' respective Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175 [Guidelines] incomes for the purposes of calculating child support and s. 7 expenses. She set out Mr. H.'s income at para. 108, noting at para. 109 that in reaching the amounts, she had considered the Guidelines, and Mr. H.'s total income "including interest income and other investment income, as well as net rental income." At para. 110, she agreed with Ms. C.'s submission that his rental income should be included in his Guideline income and then noted that she had "included only his net rental income as reported in his income tax returns". [27] With respect to Ms. C.'s income, Morellato J. determined that for 2016, it

should be imputed at $35,000 and for 2017, it should be imputed at $45,000 (para. 97). She refused to impute income to Ms. C. for the period between December 17, 2017 and March 13, 2019 (para. 92). However, she found that Ms. C. should be imputed a salary of $65,000 from 2019 onward, but that for 2019, her income should be imputed at $35,000 (paras. 66 and 70). [28] The parties appeared before me for a reference to determine the respective s. 7 expenses and I certified the amounts owing. [29] In the Reasons, Morellato J. held that Ms. C.'s outstanding child support obligations and s. 7 expenses owed to Mr. H. "shall be paid and fully satisfied through her share of the monies currently held in trust in the parties' BMO joint account" (para. 120). As noted above, at the PHC, Ms. C. had asserted that because the arrears were being paid out of the monies held in trust, which were attracting interest at bank rates, Mr. H. could not claim interest under the COIA as it would be "double-dipping". As registrar, I have no jurisdiction to vary or ignore an order of a justice and Morellato J. clarified in the memorandum to me and the parties that Mr. H. was entitled to interest under the COIA on the arrears. [30] Mr. H.'s Interest Spreadsheet shows the arrears owing for the years 2016 through 2023 (although as Mr. H. pointed out, for the year 2018 there are no arrears), which he calculated

based on the incomes determined in the Reasons. He then calculated the interest owing based on the tables in the COIA, which show both pre- and post-judgment rates, as set out across the Interest Spreadsheet. [31] I have reviewed the tables to the COIA and confirm that the interest rates in the Interest Spreadsheet are the same rates as are in the COIA tables. [32] In the C. Response, Ms. C. stated that she "agreed with the table sent by [Mr. H.] on September 3, 2025 for interest calculation only up until 2022 as ordered by" Morellato J. (para. 9). She did not elaborate on why she had only agreed to the amounts calculated up until 2022, which was when Mr. H. had filed the Application. Morellato J.'s orders are clear that Mr. H. is entitled to COIA interest on the arrears, and this would include post-judgment interest, that is, interest accruing after 2022. [33] Before me, Ms. C. objected to the interest calculated by Mr. H. on the basis that he had not properly calculated the arrears owing because, in her view, he had not included rental income in calculating his Guidelines income. She submitted that Morellato J. had determined he was to include rental income, referring to para. 110 of the Reasons. In reply, Mr. H. submitted that he had included the net rental income in his income and had used the amounts determined by Morellato J. in the Reasons. [34] As I advised Ms. C. at

the hearing, the issue of the calculation of the parties' respective incomes for Guidelines purposes was determined by Morellato J. and is confirmed in the Reasons. As noted above, she included in Mr. H.'s annual income the rental income he had received. I do not consider this objection further. [35] At the hearing, I confirmed on the record that given the terms of the orders of Morellato J., which do not contemplate interest accruing after the assessment before me, the calculation of interest would stop on November 30, 2025. [36] Based on the evidence in the Interest Spreadsheet, confirmed by my review of the tables to the COIA, I find that the interest attaching to the arrears owing by Ms. C. to Mr. H. is $12,111.65. Assessment of the Special Costs Applicable Principles [37] Pursuant to SCFR 16-1(2), on an assessment of special costs, the registrar must allow those fees that were properly or reasonably necessary to conduct the family law case and consider all of the circumstances, including the following factors: i. The complexity of the family law case and the difficulty or the novelty of the issues involved; ii. The skill, specialized knowledge and responsibility required of the lawyer; iii. The amount involved in the family law case; iv. The time reasonably spent in conducting the family law case; v. The conduct of any party that tended to shorten, or to unnecessarily

lengthen, the duration of the family law case; vi. The importance of the family law case whose bill is being assessed, and the result obtained; vii. The benefit to the party whose bill is being assessed of the services rendered by the lawyer; and viii. Rule 1-3. [38] SCFR 16-1(4) directs that when assessing costs under R. 16-1(2), a registrar must determine which disbursements have been necessarily or properly incurred in the conduct of the family law case and allow a reasonable amount for those disbursements. [39] As is clear from the wording, SCFR R. 16-1(2) (like its equivalent civil rule 14-1(3)) contemplates that the party who is awarded their special costs is represented by counsel (R. 16-1(2)(b) and (g) expressly refer to "the lawyer") and the jurisprudence frequently analogizes special costs to actual legal fees (see, for example, Gichuru v. Smith, 2014 BCCA 414, at para. 122 [Gichuru]). [40] However, since 1995, BC courts have recognized that special costs may be awarded to a self-represented litigant, as set out in Skidmore v. Blackmore, 1995 CanLII 1537 (BC CA), 2 BCLR (3d) 201 [Skidmore]. [41] In his submissions, Mr. H. referred to and relied on my decision in Arbabi v. McLelland, 2024 BCSC 810 [Arbabi], in which I assessed the special costs awarded to a self-represented defendant in civil proceedings. In Arbabi, I reviewed the existing jurisprudence on the

methodology for the assessment of special costs awarded to a self-represented litigant (see paras. 31-38, which Mr. H. also reproduced at para. 47 of his affidavit). I concluded in Arbabi that it was appropriate to adopt the same approach as the Court of Appeal Registrar had taken in McKnight v. Hutchison, 2014 BCCA 472, when assessing special costs awarded to a self-represented litigant. Analysis [42] In assessing the special costs claimed by Mr. H. in this family matter, I follow the same approach that I took in Arbabi, which is to consider those factors under SCFR 16-1(2) as applicable in the circumstances. [43] I consider each of them in turn. The complexity of the family law case and the difficulty or the novelty of the issues involved [44] Before me, Mr. H. acknowledged that the Application before Morellato J. would not have been particularly complex or difficult for a lawyer to pursue, and it did not raise novel issues. He provided a copy of the notice of application he prepared and filed, as well as a copy of Ms. C.'s response, at the hearing (they were not exhibited to his 47th affidavit). As I requested at the hearing, he provided a copy of his list of authorities for the Application by email. [45] On the Application, Mr. H. sought to vary terms of the final consent order, which Pearlman J. made in March 2016. Among other things, he was seeking to impute income to the

parties, to vary child support, and that Ms. C. pay arrears in support. Morellato J. expressly found that Mr. H. was forced to bring the Application because of Ms. C.'s failure to pay child support and comply with the financial disclosure required of her in family proceedings. [46] In addressing the first factor under R. 16-1(2), Mr. H. submitted that because the onus was on him as the applicant, he had to research all the issues (such as information about comparable employment Ms. C. could have pursued). The legal basis of the Application cites cases and includes extracts from cases to support Mr. H.'s position. In addition, Mr. H. prepared and filed affidavits in support of the Application, and an updated financial statement (Form F8). Ms. C.'s response to the Application was not in the proper form and does not contain responsive information, but Mr. H. submitted that Ms. C. objected to everything he sought on the Application and contested his calculations. She did not deny this before me at the hearing. Ms. C. filed affidavits to support her opposition to the Application and Mr. H. prepared and filed responsive affidavits. [47] The issues on the Application are not complex or difficult issues of law for a family lawyer, but I find that they are complex issues for a self-represented litigant who would have to research the relevant law and procedure to pursue the Application.

I also find that the Application was made more difficult than it should have been by Ms. C.'s failure to comply with prior orders and the SCFR. The skill, specialized knowledge and responsibility required of the lawyer [48] As has been recognized in the authorities, this factor is not applicable when assessing the special costs awarded to a self-represented litigant when they are representing themselves. The amount involved in the proceeding [49] The Application was a family proceeding and although it resulted in income being imputed to Ms. C. and an order that she compensate Mr. H. for support arrears, plus interest under the COIA, the focus of the Application was not on a specific monetary amount (it did not involve the division of property). [50] For his special costs of the Application, Mr. H. seeks $30,938.50 (including disbursements), which as he submitted, was the amount sought by the defendant in Arbabi and which I allowed in that case. The time reasonably spent in conducting the proceeding [51] On the Bill of Special Costs, Mr. H. has calculated that he spent a total of 143.25 hours pursuing the Application, which he itemized in a table he created, showing time spent on dates from April 12, 2022 (when he filed the Application) through June 17, 2025, when he drafted and finalized his Bill of Special Costs. [52] At the hearing, Mr. H. acknowledged that in her memorandum,

Morellato J. had confirmed that the end date for the special costs awarded to him is November 24, 2024. Accordingly, Mr. H. is not entitled to claim special costs after this date. On the Bill of Special Costs, he has claimed 11.5 hours ($2,300) for the period after November 24, 2024. He is not entitled to special costs for this period and I have reduced the special costs he claims by this amount ($2,300). [53] In his affidavit #47, Mr. H. deposed that he had to conduct a lot of research to determine the issues he would address at the Application, which included reviewing the relevant provisions of the SCFR and case authorities. He also deposed that he spent a lot of time preparing his own affidavits and having them witnessed. He testified that he personally filed all the Application materials. Mr. H. submits that if he had legal representation, it would have cost him "10s of thousands of dollars more" than what he is claiming in special costs. [54] In the C. Response, Ms. C. categorized Mr. H.'s activities (as opposed to identifying dates) and submits that the time he claims is excessive and that, in some cases, it is outside the relevant period of the Application (she alleged that he included in his table time spent at the CMC and EFD, for which he was awarded family costs). Mr. H. denied that he included time that was outside the scope of the award of special costs. I

reviewed the table and did not find any time entries prior to April 12, 2022, related to the CMC or EFD held prior to that date. [55] On my review of the time entered by Mr. H. on the Bill of Special Costs, I find that the hours claimed are, for the most part, reasonably necessary for the activities he was performing, with the following exceptions. [56] As noted, Morellato J. awarded Mr. H. special costs for the Application "from the time it was filed in April 2022, but not in regard to previous applications" (Reasons, para. 25). On April 12, 2022, the date the Application was filed, Mr. H. claims that he spent a total of 17 hours, broken out into six hours to review the SCFR and the Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25 [FLA], and "drafting, reviewing and finalizing the notice application." He recorded an additional 11 hours on the same date to review the SCFR and FLA, and for "drafting, reviewing and finalizing affidavit #34 and attaching exhibits (344 paragraphs and 413 pages), swearing the Affidavit in front of a Notary, enter documents and serve on [Ms. C.]". [57] I am bound by the terms of Morellato J.'s order, which limits Mr. H.'s special costs to the date he filed the notice of Application. I do not doubt that Mr. H. spent time prior to April 12, 2022 preparing the Application, but he is not entitled to claim for that time given Morellato J.'s order. Based on the evidence

before me, I find that the 17 hours claimed on the day he filed the Application is excessive and that it is more likely than not that he has included some time for work he performed prior to that date. In the circumstances, I find that the time entered on April 12, 2022, should be reduced to 10 hours from the 17 claimed (reducing the special costs claimed by $1,400 or seven hours at $200 per hour). [58] On each of the days that the Application proceeded before Morellato J., Mr. H. has recorded 10 hours, which he submits is for his travel time to and from the courthouse and appearance in court. For each full day, he claims a total of $2,000. Ms. C. objected to these hours as excessive. Mr. H. submits that if he were awarded costs for a contested application under the Tariff (item 4), he would be allowed $1,000 for each half day of attendance, or $2,000 per day. [59] I find it reasonable that when awarded special costs, a self-represented litigant should be awarded the same amount as they would be awarded under the Tariff, and I find that Mr. H.'s calculation is reasonable in the circumstances. [60] I find that the hours Mr. H. has claimed for his special costs should be reduced by 18.5 hours, from 143.25 to 124.75, to reflect hours he included after November 24, 2024 and before April 22, 2022. This reduces the special costs claimed from $28,650 (143.25 hours at $200 per hour) to

$24,950 (124.75 hours at $200 per hour). Conduct that tended to shorten or unnecessarily lengthen the proceeding [61] Mr. H. was substantially successful on the Application before Morellato J., who subsequently awarded him special costs of the Application. As I have noted, Morellato J. found that Mr. H. was forced to bring the Application because of Ms. C.'s failure to provide financial disclosure and pay support, as required under orders and the SCFR. In her affidavit, Ms. C. deposed that from 2020 to 2023, she suffered serious illness, which prevented her from "effectively defending" herself in court proceedings. As I explained at the assessment, I have no jurisdiction to change the special costs award made by Morellato J. for the Application. [62] I find that Ms. C.'s conduct unnecessarily lengthened the family law case by requiring Mr. H. to pursue the Application. The importance of the proceeding to the party whose bill is being assessed, and the result obtained [63] I find that it was important to Mr. H. to pursue the Application to resolve the child support issues. The benefit to the party whose bill is being assessed of the services rendered by the lawyer [64] As has been recognized in the authorities, this factor is not applicable when assessing the special costs awarded to a self-represented litigant when they are representing themselves. Rule 1-3 (i.e.

proportionality) [65] Rule 1-3 sets out the objects of the SCFR, which is to "secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every proceeding on its merits", which includes, so far as is practicable, conducting the proceeding in ways that are proportionate to the amount involved in the proceeding, the importance of the issues in dispute and the complexity of the proceeding. [66] As I noted in Arbabi, in Prescott Strategic Investments Limited Partnership v. Flair Airlines Ltd., 2022 BCCA 443, at para. 27, Justice Griffin (for the Court) reiterated that "special costs are typically only awarded where the conduct of a litigant within the proceeding is reprehensible and deserves censure and rebuke." [67] Although I have reduced them, I do not find in the circumstances of this proceeding, given the basis on which Morellato J. awarded special costs to Mr. H. for the Application, that the special costs claimed are disproportionate. The Fees Claimed as Special Costs Mr. H.'s Fees [68] On the Bill of Special Costs, Mr. H. claimed $200 per hour for the time he spent on the Application. In Arbabi, I found that the hourly rate of $200 claimed by the self-represented litigant for the time she spent on the proceedings was reasonable, and proper for the conduct of the proceedings (para. 74, which Mr. H. reproduced at para. 48 of his affidavit). [69] When I consider the circumstances

of this case, as well as the relevant R. 16-1(2) factors detailed above, I find the fees claimed by Mr. H. at a rate of $200 per hour to be proper for the conduct of the Application and a reasonable amount for the time he spent pursuing the Application. Disbursements [70] The disbursements Mr. H. claims are set out on the Bill of Special Costs, totalling $2,288.50. Mr. H. did not separate the disbursements into taxable and non-taxable disbursements. He claims the filing fees for the notice of Application, as well as for five affidavits (including the updated F8 he filed for the Application), which fees total $280. I find that these disbursements were necessarily and properly incurred for the Application, and I allow them as claimed. [71] Mr. H. also claims $189 for the cost of the transcript of the Oral Costs Reasons, attaching the invoice from the court transcription service to support the amount claimed. He explained that at the time, he was not sure if the special costs Morellato J. had awarded him included the costs for the CMC and EFD and before he requested further clarification, he needed the Oral Costs Reasons. I find that the disbursement was necessarily and properly incurred, and I allow it as claimed. [72] Mr. H. also claims $1,819.50 for photocopying and he included with the Bill of Special Costs a chart detailing the number of pages of each of the pleadings and

affidavits filed for the Application, together with the authorities he filed (he provided the list of the 28 authorities he relied on at the Application). Given the evidence before me, I find that it was necessary for Mr. H. to make the copies he claimed for the material for the Application and that the amount he has claimed is reasonable in the circumstances and I allow it. [73] Based on the evidence before me, I find that the disbursements claimed by Mr. H. were necessarily and properly incurred for the Application and I allow them as claimed at $2,288.50. Disposition [74] I find that in the circumstances of this case, having regard to the factors set out in R. 16-1(2) detailed above, Mr. H. is allowed his special costs at $27,238.50 (fees of $24,950 plus disbursements of $2,288.50). [75] Because I have assessed the family costs and special costs, neither party's signature is required on the Form F72. [76] I direct Mr. H. to file a certificate of costs in Form F72 for my signature, showing that after assessment on December 11, 2025, Mr. H.'s family costs and special costs are allowed at $30,219.48 [$27,238.50 + $2,980.98]. [77] Mr. H. is to file this decision showing that I have certified that he is entitled to $12,111.65 in interest under the COIA on the arrears. "Registrar Gaily"