MacNutt v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General)

MacNutt v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General) Court Supreme Court Date 2009-03-09 Citation 2009 NSSC 70 Docket Hfx 179245 Judge/Registrar/Adjudicator Coady, Kevin (Honourable Justice) (SC) Document Type Decision Decision Content SUPREME COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA Citation: MacNutt v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General), 2009 NSSC 70 Date: 20090309 Docket: Hfx.No. 179245 Registry: Halifax Between: Cathy M. MacNutt Plaintiff v. The Attorney General of Nova Scotia representing Her Majesty the Queen in right of the Province of Nova Scotia Defendant Judge: The Honourable Justice Kevin Coady Heard: January 29, 2009, in Halifax, Nova Scotia Decision: March 9, 2009 Counsel: Ronald A. Pink, QC, for the Plaintiff Stephen McGrath, for the Defendant By the Court: [1] This application was heard in Chambers at Halifax on January 29, 2009. At issue is whether Ms. MacNutt qualifies for a Deputy Ministers pension which was created pursuant to s.88 of the Public Service Act., R.S.N.S. 1989 c.376. On November 16, 2000 Ms. MacNutt wrote to the Director of Pension Services seeking this pension. The Respondent replied indicating that she did not qualify. She started this action. [2] On August 28, 2008 Ms. MacNutt filed an Interlocutory Notice in which she seeks an order pursuant to Civil Procedure Rule 25.01(1)(a) (1972) to have questions or issues of law determined prior to trial. The parties have filed an agreed statement of facts and agree that the ruling on this application will determine and dispose of this action. [3] This application will be decided on the statutory interpretation of s. 88 of the Public Service Act which states: Early retirement 88(1) Notwithstanding anything in the Public Service Superannuation Act, or the regulations made pursuant thereto, respecting retirement, the Governor in Council may designate any person, or class of persons, or member of a class of persons, appointed to positions in the public service as a special class who have a right to retire after a minimum number of years in the public service and upon attaining an age prescribed for early retirement. (2) A person entitled to retire pursuant to this Section may elect to retire from the public service and receive an immediate pension pursuant to this Section. (3) For the purpose of this Section, the Governor in Council may, from time to time, either generally or specifically, (a) prescribe the minimum number of years in the public service required for early retirement; (b) prescribe the minimum age for early retirement; (c) order a special payment to a person entitled to retire pursuant to this Section; (d) give additional service credit for the purpose of the calculation of a pension pursuant to this Section; (e) determine the basis of calculating a pension; (f) order that the pension be increased in relation to the cost of living, or otherwise, as the Governor in Council may determine. (4) All survivor and other benefits which apply to a superannuation allowance paid under the Public Service Superannuation Act apply in respect of the pension payable pursuant to this Section as if they were set forth herein, except that the benefits shall be based upon the pension payable pursuant to this Section. (5) Notwithstanding Section 24 of the Public Service Superannuation Act, an election to retire and receive a pension pursuant to this Section does not affect a person’s entitlement to an allowance or benefits pursuant to that Act. (6) Where a person elects to retire and receive a pension pursuant to this Section, and where that person or that person’s survivor is or becomes entitled to a superannuation allowance or other benefits pursuant to the Public Service Superannuation Act, payments made in accordance with this Section shall be reduced by the amount of that allowance or those benefits. (7) All payments made pursuant to this Section shall be charged to the Consolidated Fund of the Province. (8) A regulation made pursuant to this Section may, if it so provides, be made retroactive in its operation to a date not earlier than the first day of April, 1986. (9) In this Section, “public service” means public service within the meaning and for the purpose of the Public Service Superannuation Act. R.S., c.376, s.88. [4] The parties agree that the statutory interpretation of the word “retire” will determine this application. [5] Ms. MacNutt argues that “retire” in s. 88(2) means when she starts to receive pension benefits. She submits that the definition of retire in pension law cases differs from the definition attached to common parlance. Ms. MacNutt relies, in part, on the widely respected text of Ari N. Kaplan titled Pension Law and, in particular, the following which appears at page 262: a) Meaning of retirement An employee who is eligible to retire under a pension plan is entitled to commence receiving payment of his or her pension. The word “retire” has different meanings when used in the context of employment law and pension law. While an employee may retire from employment, this is not synonymous with retiring from a pension plan. The former is descriptive of one particular reason for termination of employment. Retirement from employment can be voluntary or involuntary and the statutory and common law rules applicable to termination from employment will apply. In contrast, retirement under a pension plan denotes that an employee has triggered commencement of his or her pension. To illustrate this concept, the federal PBSA defines the term “retire” by reference to an employee “commencing to receive an immediate pension benefit, whether the member’s employment has terminated or not.” [6] The implication of this interpretation is that Ms. MacNutt becomes eligible upon satisfying age and service requirements and that there is no necessity that she be employed when that happens. [7] The Attorney General of Nova Scotia (AGNS) argues that “retire” in s. 88(2) means retirement from employment. The implication of that interpretation is that Ms. MacNutt, in order to qualify for this pension, would have to be employed when she met the age and service requirements. [8] The parties agree on the following facts: 1. The Plaintiff, Cathy M. MacNutt (“Ms. MacNutt”), was employed by the Defendant, the Province of Nova Scotia (the “Province”), from 1972 to 1975 and from 1980 to 1994. 2. Ms. MacNutt was employed as an economist with the Nova Scotia Department of Trade and Industry from 1972 to 1975. 3. Between 1975 and 1980, Ms. MacNutt worked for the Federal Government. 4. On July 16, 1981, under a reciprocal agreement between the Province of Nova Scotia and Government of Canada, Ms. MacNutt transferred her service during this period to the Province as pensionable service for purposes of the Public Service Superannuation Act, and funds contributed on behalf of Ms. MacNutt to her federal pension plan were transferred to Nova Scotia’s superannuation fund. 5. On August 18, 1980, Ms. MacNutt was appointed Deputy Minister of Consumer Affairs and held that post until June 1, 1991 (Order-in-Council (“OIC”) 80-1145 attached at Tab 1 and OIC 80-1278 attached at Tab 2). 6. Ms. MacNutt was also appointed Deputy Minister responsible for the administration of the Women’s Directorate in April 1988. 7. Effective June 1, 1991, Ms. MacNutt was appointed Deputy Minister of Health and Fitness. 8. Ms. MacNutt’s employment with the Province of Nova Scotia ended on September 9, 1993 when her appointment as Deputy Minister of Health and Fitness was revoked under OIC 93-742. Ms. MacNutt’s appointment as Deputy Minister responsible for the administration of the Women’s Directorate was also revoked. 9. On September 9, 1993, Ms. MacNutt was 43 years, 11 months of age, had accrued 20 years, 7 months of pensionable service and had served as a Deputy Minister for 13 years. 10. Pursuant to a negotiated agreement, Ms. MacNutt received severance from the Province in the form of salary continuance for a period of approximately 11 months ending August 6, 1994. Ms. MacNutt exercised an option under the severance agreement to accrue additional pensionable service during the salary continuation period. 11. At the end of the salary continuation period on August 6, 1994, Ms. MacNutt was 44 years, 10 months of age, had accrued 21 years and 6 months of pensionable service and had served as a Deputy Minister for 13 years. 12. Ms. MacNutt was a member of and contributed to the Public Service Superannuation Plan under the Public Service Superannuation Act until the end of her salary continuance period. As such, she was entitled to a pension pursuant to the provisions of the Public Service Superannuation Act. 13. On September 9, 1993, Deputy Ministers in the Nova Scotia public service were entitled to a pension under the Public Service Superannuation Act and a pension pursuant to s.88 of the Public Service Act if the Deputy Minister satisfied the requirements of s.88 of the Public Service Act and OIC 81-1097G as amended. 14. OIC 81-1097G, as amended by OIC 82-1284, sets out the formula for calculating a pension pursuant to s.88 of the Public Service Act. 15. On September 9, 1993 and August 6, 1994, OIC 81-1097G, as amended, set out the minimum age and the number of years of service in the public sector, and as a Deputy Minister, to qualify for a pension pursuant to s.88 of the Public Service Act. 16. On August 3, 1988, OIC 81-1097G was amended by OIC 88-828. 17. On May 27, 1998, OIC 98-228 was passed. 18. On September 22, 1998, OIC 81-1097G was amended by OIC 1998-469. 19. On October 14, 1999 Ms. MacNutt attained the age of 50. On October 14, 2004 Ms. MacNutt attained the age of 55. 20. On November 16, 2000, Ms. MacNutt wrote to the Director of the Pension Services Group in the Department of Finance to inquire about pension pursuant to s.88 of the Public Service Act. In reply, on December 11, 2000, Ms. MacNutt was told that she did not qualify for a pension pursuant to s.88 of the Public Service Act. [9] Additionally the parties agree that the following are the issues to be determined on this application: 1. Is Ms. MacNutt entitled to a pension pursuant to s.88 of the Public Service Act upon attaining the age of 55 on October 14, 2004? 2. Is Ms MacNutt entitled to a pension pursuant to s.88 of the Public Service Act upon attaining the age of 50 on October 14, 1999? [10] It is helpful to this analysis to review the relevant history of the “Deputy Minister” pension. It was established in 1980 as a pension payable between the time they retired and when they began to receive their regular pension. Section 58(2) of the Public Service Act stated: “A person entitled to retire pursuant to this section may elect to retire from the Public Service and receive an immediate pension until such time as he dies or is entitled to a superannuation allowance pursuant to the Public Service Superannuation Act.” [11] This was a non-contributory pension and was paid from the Province’s consolidated fund. [12] On August 28, 1981 an Order in Council issued as follows: (a) “For the purposes of section 58 of the said Act, the Governor in Council designates the following class of persons as a special class who will have the right to retire in accordance with said section 58 and this order. - The Deputy Minister of Consumer Affairs (b) The minimum number of years in the public service required for early retirement pursuant to section 58 shall be twenty years of service, of which at least five years shall have been served while holding the status of Deputy Head; (c) The minimum age for early retirement pursuant to said section 58 shall be fifty-five (55) years of age; [13] On August 3, 1988 an Order in Council issued amending the August 28, 1981 order “respecting retirement of senior public servants” by: (1) Repealing paragraph (a) thereof and substituting therefore the following: (a) For the purposes of section 58 of the said act, the Governor in Council designates as a special class persons who shall have the right to retire in accordance with said section 58 and this order, those who hold or have held the position of: (1) Deputy Minister of any of the following departments: - Consumer Affairs [14] On May 27, 1998 an Order in Council issued “to amend order in council 81-1097G, dated August 28, 1981, as amended”, respecting the retirement of senior public servants by: (2) Striking out “fifty-five (55)” in paragraph (c) and substituting “fifty (50)”. [15] The law respecting statutory interpretation was fully canvassed in Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services), [2004] S.C. J. 51. Deschamps, J. stated as follows: The established approach to statutory interpretation was recently reiterated by Iacobucci, J. in Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v Rex, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, 2002 SCC 42, at para. 26, citing E.A. Driedger, Construction of statutes (2nd ed.1983) at p87: “Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of parliament.” [16] The Supreme Court of Canada revisited this approach in Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. Canada, [2005] S.C.J. 56. The following appears under the heading “General Principles of Interpretation”: 10 It has been long established as a matter of statutory interpretation that “the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament”: see 65302 British Columbia Ltd. v. Canada, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 804, at para.50. The interpretation of a statutory provision must be made according to a textual, contextual and purposive analysis to find a meaning that is harmonious with the Act as a whole. When the words of a provision are precise and unequivocal, the ordinary meaning of the words play a dominant role in the interpretive process. On the other hand, where the words can support more than one reasonable meaning, the ordinary meaning of the words plays a lesser role. The relative effects of ordinary meaning, context and purpose on the interpretive process may vary, but in all cases the court must seek to read the provisions of an Act as a harmonious whole. [17] In Myers v. Mannette, [2003] N.S.J. No. 197 Hamilton, J.A. referenced Bishop-Beckwith Marsh Body v Wolfville (1996), 151 N.S.R. (2d) 333 (N.S.C.A.): 24 A starting point for interpreting this legislation is found in Bishop-Beckwith Marsh Body v. Wolfville (Town) (1996), 151 N.S.R. (2d) 333 (N.S. C.A.). at page 336 the court states: [13] In the forward to Driedger on the Construction of Statutes (3rd Ed., 1994), by Ruth Sullivan, the author states: “I share Driedger’s conviction that statutory interpretation is not a rule-governed activity, but rather an activity in which rules are used either effectively or ineffectively.” [14] At p.131 Professor Sullivan sets out the modern rule of interpretation which, in my opinion, is applicable as it implicitly recognizes the ordinary meaning rule as well as the purposive approach to statutory interpretation. She states at p.131: “There is only one rule in modern interpretation, namely, courts are obliged to determine the meaning of legislation in its total context, having regard to the purpose of the legislation, the consequences of proposed interpretation, the presumptions and special rules of interpretation, as well as admissible external aids. In other words, the courts must consider and take into account all relevant and admissible indicators of legislative meaning. After taking these into account, the court must then adopt an interpretation that is appropriate. An appropriate interpretation is one that can be justified in terms of (a) its plausibility, that is, its compliance with the legislative text; (b) its efficacy, that is, its promotion of the legislative purpose; and (c) its acceptability, that is, the outcome is reasonable and just.” [18] The authorities establish that there is a presumption in favour of applying an ordinary, non-technical approach to the interpretation of legislation. This presumption stands unless there is a clear indication of a more technical meaning. Professor Ruth Sullivan (Sullivan on Construction of Statues (5th ED)(2008) states at page 49: “When words are ambiguous in the sense that they could bear either a technical or a non-technical meaning in the context in which they appear, there is a presumption that the ordinary, non-technical meaning was intended. In the words of Pollock B. In Grenfell v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, if a statute contains language that is capable of being construed in a popular sense, it ... is not to be construed according to the strict or technical meaning of the language contained in it, but ... is to be construed in its popular sense; meaning, of course, by the words “popular sense” that sense which people conversant with the subject matter with which the statute is dealing would attribute to it. As Marceau J. explains in Deputy Minister of National Revenue, Customs and Excise v. Hydro-Quebec, “the rule is a semantic one ... and is based on the simple idea that the representatives of the people normally express themselves in the language of the people.” [19] The choice between the ordinary and the technical meanings of a word or expression does not turn on the subject matter of the legislation. Even when dealing with technical matters, the legislature is presumed to use words in their ordinary sense. Pfizer Co. v. Deputy Minister of National Revenue, Customs and Excise, [1977] 1 S.C.R. 456 (S.C.C.). [20] Provincial legislation is subject to the Interpretation Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 235. Section 9 falls under the heading “Interpretation of Words and Generally” and is relevant to this application. Section 9(5) is as follows: (5) Every enactment shall be deemed remedial and interpreted to ensure the attainment of its objects by considering among other matters (a) The occasion and necessity for the enactment; (b) The circumstances existing at the time it was passed; (c) The mischief to be remedied; (d) The object to be obtained; (e) The former law, including other enactments upon the same or similar subjects; (f) The consequences of a different interpretation; and (g) The history of legislation on the subject. [21] The Oxford Universal Dictionary defines remedial as “affording a remedy, tending to relieve or redress.” The use of this language, and the enumerated factors in section 5, represent a codification of the principles that statutes should be interpreted to reflect the object of the act and the intention of the legislature. [22] It is my view that the Deputy Ministers pension was intended to be an early retirement incentive and, as such, the word “retire” in s. 88(2) of the Public Service Act means to retire from employment. To interpret “retire” as retiring from the pension would defeat the legislative intent of the program. The purpose of the pension was not to create a deferred benefit, but rather, an immediate benefit to bridge a Deputy Minister’s income between early retirement and the receipt of benefits pursuant to the Public Service Superannuation Act. I will now reference the factors that support this conclusion. [23] The starting point is s.88(2) of the Public Service Act. The words are clear in their purpose. The words “elect to retire from the public service” suggest that the proper interpretation is retire from employment. That is the ordinary meaning of those words. If the legislature intended the benefit deferred, they would have indicated such by defining “retire” so as to reflect this purpose. This conclusion is supported by the additional language “receive an immediate pension.” The authorities require that I consider this section in its entire context. These two phrases, when read together, dictate against a deferred pension. If the legislature intended to create a deferred pension it would have made that clear. [24] Principles of statutory interpretation direct that I give these words their ordinary meaning. The presumption against technical interpretations has not been displaced by Ms. MacNutt. This view is enforced by Professor Sullivan’s view that if a word or expression has both a legal or non-technical meaning, the non- technical meaning is presumed. [25] The Federal Pension Benefits Standards Act is an example of where the legislature stated that a legal and technical interpretation would attach to the word “retire”. The following definition appears in that legislation: “For the purposes of this Act, a member of a pension plan shall be deemed to retire on commencing to receive an immediate pension benefit whether, the member’s employment is terminated or not.” [26] Further support for this interpretation may be found in Sweeney v Ontario (Workers Compensation Board) (1989), 70 O.R. (2d) 344 (Ontario Supreme Court). In many ways that case resembles Ms. MacNutt’s in that the interpretation of “retire” arises from similar legislation. The following is the benefit conferring legislation: A member who has completed twenty years service may elect to retire on pension at any time within a period of five years immediately preceding his attaining normal retirement age and, in that event, the date on which the member retires shall be regarded as the normal retirement age, and the pension payable to him shall be calculated in accordance with section 7. [27] The court offered the following interpretation of the word retire in that legislation: 9 The term “retirement” is not defined in the Plan. Counsel for the plaintiff referred to the case of Specht v The Queen, [1975] C.T.C. 126 (F.C.T.D.), to support the proposition that retirement cannot be equated with resignation or cessation of employment. However, I find that case supports the view that “retirement” must mean a cessation of, or withdrawal from occupation or active life. A person cannot, therefore, “elect to retire” within the meaning of that phrase in s.8(3) of the Plan at a point in time subsequent to actual cessation of employment because “retire” must include cessation of employment. [28] The court concluded that the Plan did not apply to members who terminate employment prior to attaining the age of sixty. [29] Ms. MacNutt argues that support for her interpretation can be found in Order in Council 88-828 (August 3, 1988) which expanded the special class entitled to this benefit. The initial conferring Order in Council 81-1097G (August 28, 1981) stated as follows: “(a) For purposes of section 58 of the said Act, the Governor in Council designates the following class of persons as a special class who shall have the right to retire in accordance with said section 58 and this order: The Deputy Minister of Consumer Affairs.” [30] Order in Council 88-828 amended the above section with the following: (1) Repealing paragraph (a) thereof and substituting therefor the following: (a) For the purposes of section 58 of the said Act, the Governor in Council designates as a special class of persons who shall have the right to retire in accordance with said section 58 and this order, those who hold or have held the position of (1) Deputy Ministers of any of the following departments: Consumer Affairs. [31] Ms. MacNutt’s view of this amendment is found in her brief as follows: “The OIC change in 1988 that designated ‘those who hold or have held various higher ranking positions as entitled to a pension explicitly made the Deputy Minister pension available to former Deputy Ministers, such as the plaintiff, who could now retire once they satisfied all the requirements of the OICs.” [32] Respectfully, I cannot accept that these words were intended to confer a deferred pension on persons who reach the age requirement after cessation of employment. This is early retirement legislation. It requires a quantum adjustment once the persons’ Public Service Superannuation Act benefits go into pay. [33] I interpret the words “have held” to relate to when the person served their five years as Deputy Minister. It is meant to confer benefits on persons retiring early who served their five years as Deputy Minister earlier in their career. [34] Ms. MacNutt argues that the s. 88(2) benefits evolved from an early retirement scheme into a pension scheme and therefore her interpretation of “retire” should prevail. She states in her brief: “The historical context of the Deputy Minister pension provisions in the Public Service Act and the OICs demonstrate that the original provisions evolved from a pure ‘early retirement’ scheme to a form of supplementary pension benefit to those designated, higher ranking civil servants ... the OICs made pursuant to the Public Service Act ... demonstrate the evolution of this pension scheme. In particular, the OIC change in 1988 that designated ‘those who hold or have held’ various higher ranking positions as entitled to a pension explicitly made the Deputy Minister pension available to former Deputy Ministers, such as the plaintiff, who could not retire once they satisfied all the requirements of the OICs.” [35] Respectfully, I cannot accept that this evolution was the intention or the effect of the various Orders in Council. If the legislature intended such a drastic change, there would be clear language in Order in Council 88-828. I view the various Orders in Council as ongoing steps to vary the requirements for, and the benefits of, s. 88(2) of the Public Service Act. There is nothing in these orders that would displace the presumption that “retire” be defined as cessation from employment. [36] The legislature debates relating to s. 88 of the Public Service Act provide some insight into the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act and the intention of the lawmakers. I am mindful of Sopinka, J’s comments in R. v Morgentaler, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 463 at page 484: ... until recently the courts have balked at admitting evidence of legislative debates and speeches. ... The main criticism of such evidence has been that it cannot represent the “intent” of the legislature, an incorporeal body, but that is equally true of other forms of legislative history. Provided that the court remains mindful of the limited liability and weight of Hansard evidence, it should be admitted as relevant to both the background and purpose of legislation. [37] The following appears in Hansard for May 9, 1980: The second provision of significance in this bill is Section 6 of the bill, which refers to Section 58 of the Act. Briefly put, this provision will give the Governor in Council a power to designate a person or class of persons in the context of possible early retirement. Now, this is something which as Chairman of the Management Board I found is desirable and perhaps necessary. It is simply that it gives the government an additional management tool to deal with people at the senior levels of the public service who may for one reason or another want to take early retirement. It is not intended that this would be applied across the whole public service. It is a management tool which will give the government greater flexibility in dealing with people at the very senior levels of the public service in terms of early retirement. I do want to emphasize, Mr. Speaker, that this bill is no way intended to bring early retirement in across the civil service or anything of that sort. It is simply to create an option in dealing with people at the very highest levels of the public service where the Governor in Council may deem that appropriate in the circumstance. It is obviously the type of thing that would have to be exercised with a great deal of discretion and not on a great many occasions. ... at the present time, dealing with the senior levels of management within the public service, there is no option available for early retirement, and you can have a situation where, and I am talking about deputies, deputy ministers, or deputy heads-people at the very top of the order-who may want to leave the service, but they cannot. They have to stay in until they are 65, because of the need to get the pension, and this introduces a flexibility into that kind of situation. So that if you have, say, a deputy who has perhaps reached the age of 60, he may have been in the service for 30 or 40 years, who wants to get out and cannot do it, there is a special situation there because the demands that are made on deputy ministers and deputy heads are the heaviest demand made on anybody in the public service, outside of the ministers themselves, and I think that has to be kept in mind. [38] The language used above indicates the sole purpose of s. 88 was to facilitate early retirement of Deputy Ministers and to provide a bridging benefit until their superannuation pension went into pay. As stated earlier, I see no evidence that the legislature ever changed that purpose. There is nothing in these Hansard excerpts that would challenge interpreting “retire” as the cessation of employment. [39] Ms. MacNutt further argues that s. 88 is a benefit conferring provision and is therefore social welfare legislation. Consequently, any ambiguities as to the interpretation of “retire” must be interpreted in favour of the claimants of those benefits. [40] I accept that s. 88 creates a pension. However, it is very unlike the Public Service Superannuation Act. It is a benefit that the legislature described as a “special benefit” and “the type of thing that would have to be exercised with a great deal of discretion and not on a great many occasions.” Section 88 creates an early retirement incentive that is non-contributory and paid from the Province’s Consolidated Fund. It is adjusted when the Public Service Superannuation pension goes into pay. It is not by its very nature social welfare legislation. I accept that it is more like a management tool to facilitate early retirement. Even if I were to conclude that there was ambiguity in s.88, this is not the kind of benefit conferring case where that ambiguity should be decided in favour of the claimant. [41] Ms. MacNutt further argues that s.88 must include a deferred pension if it operates in sync with the benefits under the Public Service Superannuation Act. I conclude the links between the two are administrative and that these links do not collapse these separate statutes into one. The benefits under each statute remains distinguishable. [42] Ms. MacNutt argues that it is a well established principle of statutory interpretation that the legislature does not intend to produce absurd consequences. Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd., [1998] S.C.J. No.2. Absurdity is attached to interpretations which defeat the purpose of the statute. The absurdity alleged by Ms. MacNutt is the possibility that the government could terminate a Deputy Minister who had only days to qualify for s. 88 benefits. [43] In Rizzo, supra, Iacobucci, J., offered the following comments about absurd consequences at paragraph 27: “According to Cote, supra, an interpretation can be considered absurd if it leads to ridiculous or frivolous consequences, if it is extremely unreasonable or inequitable, if it is illogical or incoherent, or if it is incompatible with other provisions or with the object of the legislative enactment.” [44] I cannot accept that interpreting “retire” in s. 88 to mean cessation of employment could attract these strong descriptives. The absurdity referred to by Ms. MacNutt could be applied to any pension where there are age and service requirements. [45] In conclusion I find that the word “retire” in s. 88(2) of the Public Service Act means retirement from employment. This is an early retirement benefit that does not provide a deferred pension. Any Deputy Minister in the special class who wishes to retire early must reach the age and service requirement while still employed in the public service. The alternative interpretation would defeat the purpose of early retirement. When Ms. MacNutt left the public service on August 6, 1994 she was forty-four (44) years old and as such, had not met the age requirement. Consequently she is not entitled to benefits pursuant to s.88. [46] In light of this conclusion, issue number two does not require a response. Also there is no need to address the respondent’s argument that Ms. MacNutt’s five years with the Government of Canada attaches to the service requirement of s.88 benefits. [47] I will hear the parties on costs should they be unable to agree. J.