Chijindu v. Law Society of Ontario

Chijindu v. Law Society of Ontario Collection Decisions of the Court of Appeal Date 2025-02-07 Neutral citation 2025 ONCA 91 Docket numbers COA-24-CV-0820 Judges Hourigan, C. William; Wilson, Darla A.; Madsen, Lene Subject Civil Decision Content COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO CITATION: Chijindu v. Law Society of Ontario, 2025 ONCA 91 DATE: 20250207 DOCKET: COA-24-CV-0820 Hourigan, Wilson and Madsen JJ.A. BETWEEN Christian Chukwuedozie Chijindu Applicant (Appellant) and Law Society of Ontario Respondent (Respondent) Christian Chukwuedozie Chijindu, acting in person Rhoda Cookhorn, for the respondent Heard: February 3, 2025 On appeal from the judgment of Justice R. Lee Akazaki of the Superior Court of Ontario, dated July 22, 2024. REASONS FOR DECISION [1] The appellant’s license to practice law was revoked by the Hearing Division of the Law Society Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) in 2020, following findings in 2019 of serious professional misconduct related to the appellant’s conduct concerning a fee dispute, disobedience of orders of the Law Society of Ontario (“LSO"), rendering false accounts, and improper transfers from trust. The appellant’s appeal to the Tribunal’s Appeal Division was dismissed in 2020; his appeal to the Divisional Court was dismissed in 2021; his application for leave to appeal to this court was dismissed in 2022; and his application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was dismissed in 2022. The appellant then brought an application before the Superior Court of Justice (“SCJ”) seeking, inter alia, a declaration that his rights had been violated under ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter, declarations alleging various improprieties on the part of the LSO in its prior proceedings against him, and an order against the LSO requiring the reinstatement of his license to practice law. [2] On July 22, 2024, the motion judge granted the LSO’s motion to dismiss the appellant’s application for the reinstatement of his license to practice law. The motion judge concluded that this was a “flank attack” on the revocation decision and appeals therefrom. We see no error in this conclusion. It is evident that the appellant’s intended proceeding in the SCJ was a collateral attack on a previously rendered decision, in relation to which all rights of appeal had been exhausted. The motion judge was correct to decline to exercise jurisdiction and in finding that in any event, the remedy sought was not available to the SCJ. [3] We do not accept the appellant’s argument that s. 24(1) of the Charter gives him the right, having already exhausted his statutory remedies, to seek afresh a hearing in the SCJ. The motion judge was correct in his determination that while the SCJ has concurrent jurisdiction, this does not permit intrusion into decision-making powers specifically allocated to other bodies, in this case the LSO, and the Tribunal: R. v. Mills, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863, at paras. 104-106; Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Department of Education), 2003 SCC 62, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3. Further, while the appellant asserts that he now has “new evidence” which he says grounds his assertions of unequal treatment, the appellant could have raised Charter-based complaints within the process that lead to his disbarment. [4] Nor do we accept the appellant’s argument that the SCJ could order the LSO to reinstate his license, as sought in his application. The motion judge was correct in his determination that the remedy sought by the appellant was not available. [5] The appellant has long since exhausted his remedies, including pursuing all appeal routes unsuccessfully. The appeal is without merit and is dismissed. [6] Brief costs submissions, not to exceed two pages each (one page for reply) may be forwarded to the court on the following schedule: respondent, by February 14, 2025; appellant by February 21, 2025; and reply, if any, by respondent, by February 28, 2025. “C.W. Hourigan J.A.” “D.A. Wilson J.A.” “L. Madsen J.A.”