R. v. Williams

R. v. Williams Collection Decisions of the Court of Appeal Date 2025-04-25 Neutral citation 2025 ONCA 327 Docket numbers C69992 Judges Miller, Bradley; Wilson, Darla A.; Pomerance, Renee M. Subject Criminal Decision Content COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO CITATION: R. v. Williams, 2025 ONCA 327[1] DATE: 20250425 DOCKET: C69992 Miller, Wilson and Pomerance JJ.A. BETWEEN His Majesty the King Respondent and Clayton Williams Appellant Paula Rochman, for the appellant Emily Marrocco, for the respondent Heard: April 22, 2025 On appeal from the conviction entered on January 29, 2020 and the sentence imposed on March 10, 2021 by Justice Nancy S. Kastner of the Ontario Court of Justice. REASONS FOR DECISION [1] The appellant was convicted of various offences arising out of the break and enter of two residences, one of which involved a sexual assault of a 13-year-old girl. The trial judge found the appellant to be a dangerous offender and imposed an indeterminate sentence. The appellant challenges various rulings on appeal. Unreasonable Verdict [2] The crux of the appellant’s position is that it was unreasonable for the trial judge to find the appellant guilty of a sexual assault because there was no evidence of forced entry into the complainant’s residence. The appellant says that the door, which was unlocked, would have made a loud sound upon opening and would have awakened the occupants of the house, including the complainant’s father, and caused the dog to bark. The appellant further suggests that aspects of the complainant’s testimony were implausible, such as how the appellant could have touched her vagina when she had her knees up to her chest, and how she managed to run past the appellant and out of the room during the interaction. The appellant argues that the testimony of the complainant’s father compels the conclusion that the assault did not take place. [3] We disagree. There was evidence upon which a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could find the appellant guilty of sexual assault. The complainant’s evidence was clear and compelling. She testified that, while she was in her bed, the appellant entered her room, was masturbating, and touched her vagina over her clothing. She managed to escape, running out of the room to wake up her father. [4] The appellant’s position is, in essence, a repetition of arguments advanced at trial and rejected by the trial judge. The trial judge considered the appellant’s arguments about method of entry, finding that the door might have been left open, or might have been opened without awakening the complainant’s father or the family dog. It was within her purview to arrive at these factual conclusions. [5] While corroborative evidence was not, as a matter of law, required, the trial judge considered the fact that a bucket had been placed underneath a window of the complainant’s bedroom, and that the complainant’s brother saw a man outside of the residence. The appellant was later found in possession of items stolen from a house in the same area, which was also the subject of a break and enter. [6] The trial judge’s verdict on the sexual assault was neither unreasonable, nor tainted by palpable and overriding error. Ruling on the Search Warrant [7] The appellant challenges the trial judge’s ruling on the validity of the search warrant authorizing entry and search of his residence. Here, too, the argument pivots on the appellant’s contention that the sexual assault could not have occurred as described by the complainant. The appellant complains that the ITO did not alert the issuing justice to the frailties in the evidence. [8] For the reasons set out above, we do not share the appellant’s view of the evidence. The complainant’s account of the events was sufficient to establish the requisite grounds to believe. [9] In any event, the trial judge conducted a full analysis of the alleged misrepresentations and omissions in the ITO. She concluded, as was open to her, that upon excising inaccurate information, and adding missing details, there was a sufficient basis on which the warrant could issue. We see no basis for intervention. Indeterminate Sentence [10] Finally, the appellant argues that the trial judge erred in imposing an indeterminate sentence, having found the appellant to be a dangerous offender. The appellant argues that the more appropriate disposition was a determinate sentence, combined with a long-term supervision order. [11] The trial judge considered whether the risk posed by the appellant could be effectively managed within the community within a determinate period. She concluded that it could not. [12] The appellant challenges this finding, on the basis that the evidence established the availability of new and improved medications and other treatment modalities that would more effectively treat him. He also argues that by the time an LTSO expired, he would likely have “aged out” of his offending behaviour and would not pose a continuing risk to the community. [13] The trial judge was not persuaded by these arguments. She noted that the appellant had feigned amenability to treatment in the past. Psychometric tests revealed that the appellant presented with a high risk of re-offending. Based on the appellant’s criminal antecedents, the expert evidence, and the risk of future sexual recidivism, the trial judge concluded that the protection of society – the paramount consideration – commanded the imposition of an indeterminate sentence. As she put it, “[a] mere hope that treatment will be successful or some optimism that an offender could be rehabilitated is not a sufficient basis to impose a determinate sentence. Until [the] offender gets control of his problem, he must remain segregated from society”. We see no error in her conclusion. [14] For all of these reasons, the appeal is dismissed. “B.W. Miller J.A.” “D.A. Wilson J.A.” “R. Pomerance J.A.” [1] This appeal is subject to an order prohibiting the disclosure of the identity of a witness pursuant to s. 486.31 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.