Ravelston Corporation Limited (Re)

Ravelston Corporation Limited (Re) Collection Decisions of the Court of Appeal Date 2007-04-13 Neutral citation 2007 ONCA 268 Docket numbers C46730, M34868 Judges Borins, Stephen Subject Civil Decision Content CITATION: Ravelston Corporation Limited (Re), 2007 ONCA 268 DATE: 20070413 DOCKET: M34868 (C46730) COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO BORINS J.A. (IN‑CHAMBERS) BETWEEN: IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF THE RAVELSTON CORPORATION LIMITED AND RAVELSTON MANAGEMENT INC. AND IN THE MATTER OF THE BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY ACT, R.S.O. 1985, c. B-3, AS AMENDED, AND THE COURTS OF JUSTICE ACT, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, AS AMENDED George S. Glezos and Bryce Rudyk, for the applicant Conrad Black. Alex L. MacFarlane and Tushara Weerasooriya, for the respondent, RSM Richter Inc. Interim Receiver for Ravelston Corporation Limited and Ravelston Management Inc. Matthew P. Gottlieb and Davit D. Akman, for the respondent, Hollinger Inc. Robyn M. Ryan Bell, for the respondent, Sun‑Times Media Group, Inc. Heard: March 22, 2007 On appeal from the order of Justice Peter A. Cumming of the Superior Court of Justice dated February 15, 2007. BORINS J.A. I [1] Pursuant to the orders of Farley J. of April 20, 2005 and May 18, 2005, RSM Richter Inc. ("Richter") was appointed receiver and manager and interim receiver of the property, assets and undertaking of what is referred to in these proceedings as the Ravelston Companies, including the Ravelston Corporation Limited ("RCL"), Ravelston Management Inc. ("RMI") and Argus Corporation Limited ("Argus"). On April 20, 2005 the court also issued an order granting RCL and RMI protection under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (“CCAA”) and appointing Richter as the monitor. [2] Initially, Farley J. was the supervisory judge in this complex and long‑term insolvency. The current supervisory judge is Cumming J. From the outset of its appointment as receiver, Richter has regularly filed reports with the court detailing the steps that it has taken in fulfilling its mandate, asking that the court approve each report and the recommendations contained in it and, frequently, asking the court's approval to take a particular step or to follow a particular course of action. [3] The motion before Cumming J., giving rise to this motion for leave to appeal, emanated from Richter's Nineteenth Report recommending the preparation of a report (the "Payments Report") setting out a factual account of the monies received by, and the distributions made by, RCL, RMI and Angus during the respective periods January 3, 1997 to April 20, 2005, July 3, 2002 to April 20, 2005, and January 1, 1999 to April 30, 2005. Pursuant to Richter's motion for authorization to complete and file the Payments Report with the Superior Court of Justice, on January 12, 2007 Cumming J. ordered Richter to complete the Payments Report, provided that it would not be filed or disseminated to any party until further order of the Superior Court. Pursuant to a further motion brought by Richter, on February 15, 2007, Cumming J. ordered Richter to file the Payments Report with the Superior Court. The Payments Report contains data as to payments made by RCL, RMI and Argus to corporate officers of these companies, including Conrad Black, who is a defendant in ongoing criminal proceedings in the United States District Court in Chicago. Before Cumming J., only Lord Black opposed the filing of the Payments Report. [4] Lord Black subsequently moved under s. 193(e) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 ("BIA") for leave to appeal Cumming J.'s order of February 15, 2007 to the Court of Appeal. On March 22, 2007 I dismissed Black's motion with reasons to follow. These are my reasons. II [5] In its Nineteenth Report, Richter indicated that on December 14, 2006 the United States Attorney's Office ("USAO") asked it to prepare and provide a schedule of payments, including salaries, bonuses and dividends, made by the Ravelston Companies to Lord Black and others between January, 1998 and January, 2004. The USAO is a stakeholder in the Ravelston estate, as is Lord Black. A number of other stakeholders have also requested similar information from Richter. Before Cumming J., and before this court, Lord Black contended that because on its filing the Payments Report would become a public document and available to all stakeholders, including the USAO, the information contained in the Report may assist the prosecution in the ongoing criminal proceedings. He contended that there may be unfairness in the use of the information revealed by the Payments Report. Lord Black, therefore, submitted that the Report should not be filed until the conclusion of the criminal proceedings against him. [6] In his reasons, reported at [2007] O.J. No. 536 (S.C.J.), Cumming J. pointed out at para. 26 that in the normal course of events the Payments Report would be filed with the court by the receiver when it is completed, to be used by the receiver in administering the estate, and to be used by all stakeholders in assessing their positions and in making representations to the receiver. At para. 27, Cumming J. stated that Lord Black had not provided any evidence that the filing of the Payments Report would be to his prejudice as a financial stakeholder having an economic interest in the Ravelston estate. To this I would add that Lord Black has also failed to provide any evidence that the filing of the Payments Report would prejudice the fairness of his criminal trial. As Cumming J. correctly observed, the possible use by the prosecution of any information contained in the Report as evidence against Black is a consideration for the United States District Court in Chicago. [7] In rejecting Black's attempt to seal the Report, at para. 33 Cumming J. stated: It is the personal interest of Lord Black at stake in the criminal proceedings which results in his request to delay the release of the Payments Report. The Receiver submits that such a personal interest, as opposed to an economic interest, is beyond the Receiver's area of proper consideration in the administration of the estate. The Receiver is not obliged to protect the interests of stakeholders which are unrelated to the administration of a debtor's estate, such as the interest of a stakeholder to avoid alleged prejudice in criminal proceedings. The Receiver's role is to make business decisions in the best interests of the estate after a careful cost/benefit analysis and the weighing of competing interests. Ravelston Corp. (Re) (2005), 24 C.B.R. (5th) 256 (Ont. C.A.) [8] In the opinion of Cumming J., the receiver's decision to provide the Payments Report and to file it with the court as relevant information for the benefit of the stakeholders was "within the bounds of reasonableness". At para. 47, he added: [A]n Order sealing the Payment Report until the close of Lord Black's criminal trial would be inappropriate. There is not any social value established on evidence by Lord Black which is of superordinate importance to the rights of the public to open access to court records and the interest of the estate's stakeholders to proceed unimpeded with the receivership. There is a strong presumption against any order that restricts public access to court proceedings or records that must be met by an applicant before a sealing order may properly issue. R. v. Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd., [2005] 2 S.C.R. 188. III [9] In his motion for leave to appeal, Lord Black submits that Cumming J. committed two errors: (1) he erred in his duty to supervise the receiver to ensure that it met its fiduciary duty to all stakeholders to act in an even‑handed manner; and (2) he erred in his understanding of the principle of comity and failed to consider the prejudice to Lord Black, a Canadian resident, arising from the use of the Payments Report in the American criminal proceedings against Lord Black. [10] Lord Black contends that his proposed appeal raises issues significant to bankruptcy practice for which there is no guidance, including the extent and nature of the court’s role in supervising the work of a court‑appointed receiver whose interests, which are adverse to a major stakeholder, conflict with his duties to act in an even‑handed manner, and the appropriate conduct of the receiver where it has consequences to stakeholders beyond the Canadian border. Lord Black also contends that granting leave to appeal will not hinder the administration of the receivership as the receiver conceded in submissions before Cumming J. that there is no need to file the Payments Report now for any reason relating to the administration of the receivership. IV [11] As Armstrong J.A. noted, at para. 15 of SVCM Capital Ltd. v. Fiber Connections Inc. (2005), 10 C.B.R. (5th) 201 (Ont. C.A.) there appears to be a “measure of confusion” in respect to the test for leave to appeal under s. 193(e) of the BIA. However, the caselaw is clear that one factor that is considered in all cases is whether the appeal is prima facie meritorious, a factor that Armstrong J.A. relied on in SVCM. See, e.g., R.J. Nicol Construction Ltd. (Trustee of) v. Nicol (1995), 30 C.B.R. (3d) 90 (Ont. C.A.); Re Baker (1995), 22 O.R. (3d) 376 (C.A.); GMAC Commercial Credit Corp. of Canada v. TCT Logistics Inc., [2003] O.J. No. 5761 (C.A.); Ravelston Corp. (Re) (2005), 24 C.B.R. (5th) 256 (Ont. C.A.). Similarly, this factor is also considered by the court in applications seeking leave to appeal under s. 193(e) from orders made under the CCAA: Stelco Inc. (Re) (2005), 78 O.R. (3d) 254 (C.A.). [12] Ravelston, supra, is a helpful example of the need for a prima facie meritorious appeal as the starting point in the application of the test under s. 193(e). If the proposed appeal is found to be prima facie meritorious, the court must then consider whether the other elements of the test have been met. At paras. 27‑32 of Ravelston, Doherty J.A. provided this helpful guidance: As indicated above, s. 193(e) permits leave to appeal from any order on any issue that the court determines warrants leave to appeal. There are no statutory criteria governing the granting of leave. Appellate courts, using different formulations, have identified various factors that should be addressed when deciding whether to grant leave under s. 193(e) of the BIA. The cases recognize, however, that the granting of leave to appeal is an exercise in judicial discretion that must be case-specific, and cannot be completely captured in any single formulation of the relevant criteria: [Citations omitted.] The inquiry into whether leave to appeal should be granted must, however, begin with some consideration of the merits of the proposed appeal. If the appeal cannot possibly succeed, there is no point in granting leave to appeal regardless of how many other factors might support the granting of leave to appeal. A leave to appeal application is not the time to assess, much less decide, the ultimate merits of a proposed appeal. However, the applicant must be able to convince the court that there are legitimately arguable points raised so as to create a realistic possibility of success on the appeal. Granting leave to appeal if the merits fall short of even that relatively low bar would be a waste of court resources and would needlessly delay and complicate insolvency proceedings. In Re Canadian Airlines Corp. (2000), 261 A.R. 120 at para. 35 (C.A.), Wittmann J.A. (in chambers) was faced with an application for leave under the CCAA. He referred to earlier cases which had listed four criteria for the granting of leave, one of which was that “the appeal is prima facie meritorious.” He described the necessary merits inquiry in this way: … There must appear to be an error in principle of law or a palpable and overriding error of fact. Exercise of discretion by a supervising judge, so long as it is exercised judicially, is not a matter for interference by an appellate court, even if the appellate court were inclined to decide the matter another way. It is precisely this kind of a factor which breathes life into the modifier “prima facie” meritorious. I think the same level of merits inquiry is warranted on an application for leave to appeal under the BIA. I would describe an appeal which raises an apparent error in law or apparent palpable and overriding factual error as an appeal that has a realistic possibility of success. The court need address the other matters relevant to the exercise of its discretion on a leave to appeal application only if the applicant demonstrates that the appeal has prima facie merit. I do not reach those other considerations on this motion. V [13] As I have indicated, Lord Black’s proposed appeal focuses on two aspects of the reasons of Cumming J. He submitted that Cumming J. failed to act fairly and even‑handedly in preferring the interests of the other stakeholder, USAO to his interests, thereby possibly prejudicing his right to a fair trial in the American criminal proceedings. Second, he contends that Cumming J. erred in his understanding of the principles of comity. In my view, neither of the proposed grounds of appeal is prima facie meritorious. [14] There are two important principles that this court has endorsed in considering whether leave to appeal should be granted in bankruptcy and CCAA proceedings. In Ravelston Corp. (Re), [2007] O.J. No. 749 at para. 3 (C.A.), the court stated: “It is well established that an appellate court owes substantial deference to the discretion of a commercial court judge charged with the responsibility of supervising insolvency and restructuring proceedings and that absent demonstrable error, it will not interfere.” In Ravelston Corp. (Re) (2005), 24 C.B.R. (5th) 256 at para. 40 (Ont. C.A.), Doherty J.A. stated: “If the receiver’s decision is within the broad bounds of reasonableness, and if it proceeds fairly, having considered the interests of all the stakeholders, the court will support the receiver’s decision.” These principles, necessarily, inform the determination of whether the proposed appeal is prima facie meritorious. [15] Turning to the first proposed ground of appeal, as Cumming J. said, the Payments Report is a necessary and normative analysis and part of the receiver’s fiduciary duties in determining the financial situation of the bankrupt’s estate. It will permit the stakeholders to learn and better understand the historical transactions of the insolvent business. Moreover, the motion judge found that the receiver had considered all relevant interests relating to the administration of the Ravelston estate in its decision to complete the Payments Report and to file it with the court. The interests that are relevant are those that are economic in nature, involving the debtor’s assets, property and undertaking. [16] Lord Black has raised no competing economic interest to delay the filing of the Payments Report on its completion. Therefore, Cumming J. was correct in finding that his interest in avoiding possible prejudice in the American criminal proceedings was not a relevant interest to be weighed by the receiver in fulfilling its mandate to make business decisions in the best interests of the estate. Lord Black’s alleged interest is not related to the administration of, or his economic interest in, the Ravelston estate. His sole interest in seeking to prevent the disclosure of the Payments Report is in his capacity as defendant in the American criminal proceedings. [17] It is noteworthy that Lord Black presented no evidence that the filing of the Payments Report would prejudice him in his capacity as a stakeholder having an economic interest in the Ravelston estate. Nor did he adduce any evidence that the filing of the Report would prejudice his right to a fair trial in the criminal proceeding. In my view, this is not surprising as it is difficult to understand how any relevant information in the Payments Report introduced in evidence by the United States Attorney could prejudice Lord Black’s right to a fair trial. There is nothing unfair in the prosecution’s introduction of relevant and admissible evidence against a defendant in a criminal trial. [18] I see no viable argument that Cumming J. erred in principle in the exercise of his discretion in approving the filing of the Payments Report. The proposed appeal has no realistic possibility of success if leave to appeal were granted as it raises no apparent error in law or palpable and overriding factual error. In other words, Cumming J. made no apparent error in law or apparent palpable and overriding error of fact in his supervision of the receiver. [19] As for the second proposed ground of appeal, Lord Black contends that Cumming J.’s misapprehension of the principle of comity caused him to refuse to consider the prejudice to him from the use of the Payments Report by the USAO. In my view, this contention is also untenable. [20] The motion judge’s comments in respect to comity were general in nature. He stated that comity requires that each society, and its courts, must recognize and respect the legal processes of the courts of other societies, and that, accordingly, it would be for the United States District Court to determine the admissibility of any information contained in the Payments Report that the prosecution may seek to introduce against Lord Black in his criminal trial. Cumming J. was never asked to rule on any foreign law or procedure, nor was evidence of a foreign law or procedure introduced. He made it clear at para. 25 that “[t]he issue as to whether the Payments Report is to be filed in this Court is, of course, a mater for this Court alone”. He properly recognized that there was nothing improper in the receiver voluntarily providing the information in the Payments Report to the USAO, especially where the information may be relevant to the administration of justice. [21] I see no viable argument that Cumming J. erred in principle in his comments on the principle of comity. The proposed appeal has no realistic chance of success if leave to appeal were granted as it raises no apparent error in law or palpable and overriding factual error. VI [22] I would confirm the order that I made at the close of argument on March 22, 2007 refusing Lord Black’s motion for leave to appeal the order of Cumming J. to this court. The parties have agreed that the successful responding parties should have their costs, and have agreed on the amount of costs as follows: RSM Richter Inc. – $5,000; Hollinger Inc. – $2,500; Sun‑Times Media Group, Inc. – $1,500. All costs include disbursements and GST. RELEASED: April 13, 2007 “SB” “S. Borins J.A.”