Blakeney v. Nova Scotia (Police Review Board)

Blakeney v. Nova Scotia (Police Review Board) Court Court of Appeal Date 1995-01-26 Citation 1995 NSCA 21 Docket CA 107304 Judge/Registrar/Adjudicator Clarke, Lorne O. (Honourable Chief Justice); Jones, Malachi C. (Honourable Justice) (CA); Matthews, Kenneth M., (Honourable Justice) Document Type Decision Decision Content C.A. No. 107304 NOVA SCOTIA COURT OF APPEAL Cite as: Blakeney v. Nova Scotia (Police Review Board), 1995 NSCA 21 Clarke, C.J.N.S.; Jones and Matthews, JJ.A. BETWEEN: CONSTABLE WILLIAM BLAKENEY ) David W. Fisher ) for the Appellant Appellant ) ) - and - ) Paul Drysdale ) for the Respondents ) THE POLICE REVIEW BOARD, BARRY J. ) ALEXANDER, GARY R. MILLER and ) Appeal Heard: ELAINE WHITE, chairman and members ) January 26, 1995 respectively of the Police Review Board, ) THE TOWN OF AMHERST and the AMHERST) MUNICIPAL BOARD OF POLICE ) Judgment Delivered: COMMISSIONERS ) January 26, 1995 Respondents ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) THE COURT: Appeal dismissed from refusal of certiorari to quash a decision of the Police Review Board, per oral reasons for judgment of Clarke, C.J.N.S.; Jones and Matthews, JJ.A. concurring. The reasons for judgment of the Court were delivered orally by: CLARKE, C.J.N.S.: This is an appeal from the refusal of Chief Justice Glube to grant the appellant an order in the nature of certiorari to quash a decision of the Police Review Board. The Board upheld the decision of the Chief of Police that the appellant committed a disciplinary default resulting in a written reprimand. The appellant is a police constable in Amherst where he and his wife live. Their next door neighbour, William J. Rowe, is afraid of their dog. On April 3, 1993, Mr. Rowe returned home while the dog was outside the Blakeney residence. Mr. Rowe said that the dog chased him across his yard and barked and growled at him. Mr. Rowe telephoned Mrs. Blakeney. Being distressed by the call, she told her husband about it when he came home. Constable Blakeney telephoned Mr. Rowe. They had a heated conversation during which Constable Blakeney called Mr. Rowe a "senile old bastard". Mr. Rowe filed a public complaint with the Amherst Police Department. Chief Parlee determined Constable Blakeney abused his authority by being discourteous to Mr. Rowe. The Chief found Constable Blakeney violated Regulation 5(1)(g)(iii), made pursuant to the Police Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 348. The Regulation provides: 5 (1) A member of a municipal police force commits a disciplinary default where the member ... (g) abuses authority by ... (iii) being discourteous or uncivil to any member of the public having regard to all the circumstances; Chief Parlee issued a written reprimand under s. 4(a) of the Code, saying that "this is an abuse of authority" and the inappropriate response "leaves the public or the individual with less than a professional impression of you or this department". Constable Blakeney appealed to the Police Review Board. It held a de novo hearing during which Constable Blakeney admitted he made the remarks which Chief Parlee found inappropriate. The Board dismissed the appeal. In upholding the decision and action taken by Chief Parlee, the Board, in its majority decision, wrote: In this case, Constable Blakeney was in a position of authority. The public expects that a police officer should always conduct himself with respect and courtesy towards members of the public. The public expects this whether the police officer is on or off duty. Constable Blakeney applied to the Supreme Court for an order in the nature of certiorari to quash the decision of the Police Review Board. In dismissing the application Chief Justice Glube wrote: Section 33(3) of the Police Act and s. 27(4) of the Regulations state the decision of the Board is final. The ground for overturning such a decision depends upon whether the decision is patently unreasonable. Curial deference should be given to an administrative body with a specialized purpose such as the Police Review Board (see White v. Dartmouth (City) et al. (1991) 106 N.S.R. (2d) 45 at p. 50). She concluded the decision made by the Board was within its jurisdiction and was not patently unreasonable. That being the case it was for the Board to decide and not the Court. In her reference to White at p. 50 (106 N.S.R. (2d)), Justice Saunders stated: 19 There is good reason for affirming a hands-off policy. Curial deference is extended to administrative tribunals on account of their specialized purpose, expertise and the speed and efficiency with which they do their work. It is now well established that judicial review will only occur if a tribunal has erred by reaching a patently unreasonable conclusion to a question within its jurisdiction; or it commits a simple error in interpreting or applying a legislative provision which confers (or limits) its jurisdiction. In his appeal to this Court the appellant contends Chief Justice Glube erred in law by applying an improper standard of review which led to the conclusion that Constable Blakeney was abusing his authority in these circumstances. After reviewing the record and considering the oral and written submissions of counsel, we are persuaded that Chief Justice Glube committed no reversible error in law. Decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, and this Court, confirm that where a tribunal such as the Police Review Board acts within its jurisdiction and renders a decision which is neither irrational nor patently unreasonable, it has the right to make such a decision. Mr. Justice La Forest of the Supreme Court of Canada wrote in Caimaw v. Paccar of Canada Ltd., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 983, wrote at p. 1003: Where, as here, an administrative tribunal is protected by a privative clause, this Court has indicated that it will only review the decision of the Board if that Board has either made an error in interpreting the provisions conferring jurisdiction on it, or has exceeded its jurisdiction by making a patently unreasonable error of law in the performance of its function; see Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor Corp., [1979] 2 S.C.R. 227. At p. 1004, he stated: ... Mere disagreement with the result arrived at by the tribunal does not make that result "patently unreasonable". To like effect is the opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada in Pezim v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Brokers), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 557, concerning the judicial review of a tribunal where no privative clause existed. The conclusion reached by Chief Justice Glube is consistent with the existing state of the law. That is to say that the Police Review Board came to a decision that was not patently unreasonable. It was one which the language of the enabling legislation could bear and for which there was evidence in support. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed. The respondent, The Town of Amherst, is awarded costs of $500.00 including its disbursements. C.J.N.S. Concurred in: Jones, J. A. Matthews, J.A.