CreateAbundance International Institute Inc. v. Direct News Pvt Ltd.

2026 BCSC 231 CreateAbundance International Institute Inc. v. Direct News Pvt Ltd. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: CreateAbundance International Institute Inc. v. Direct News Pvt Ltd., 2026 BCSC 231 Date: 20260211 Docket: S39093 Registry: Chilliwack Between: CreateAbundance International Institute Inc., Zhong Guo, Dr. Gongbo Li and Dazhun Xinyue Zhang Plaintiffs And Direct News Pvt Ltd., MJP Media Pvt Ltd. operating as The Sunday Guardian Live, Intzar Ali, Rakesh Sharma, Kartikey A Sharma, Madhav Das Nalapat, Scott McGregor, Ina Mitchell, Bob Backin Defendants Before: The Honourable Justice Layton Reasons for Judgment In Chambers Counsel for Plaintiffs, CreateAbundance International Institute Inc., Zhong Guo, and Dazhun Xinyue Zhang: B. Vickers R.K.A. Thomas Counsel for Defendant, Ina Mitchell: M. Magaril J. Parmar Place and Date of Hearing: Abbotsford, B.C. October 14-16, 2025 Place and Date of Judgment: Abbotsford, B.C. February 11, 2026 Table of Contents Introduction.. 3 Background.. 5 Preliminary Question: Need I Conduct an Analysis under Section 4?. 7 Legal Principles Governing the Section 4 Analysis. 9 Section 4 Analysis in this Case. 14 Step 1: expression relating to a matter of public interest 15 Step 2: grounds to believe claim has substantial merit 16 Step 3: grounds to believe applicant has no valid defence. 23 Responsible Communication on a Matter of Public Interest 24 Fair Comment 34 Step 4: the weighing stage. 36 Damages Application.. 39 Application to Dismiss Action Against Non-Defaulting Defendants. 41 Procedural Background. 41 Discussion. 44 Application for Notice of Assessment of Damages Against Defaulting Defendants. 48 Costs. 53 Legal Principles. 54 Discussion. 56 Conclusion.. 66 Introduction [1] On March 13, 2021, a news website called The Sunday Guardian Live ("TSG") published an article ("Article") about the homicide of Bo Fan, a Chinese national living in Canada, and the corporation for which Ms. Fan appears to have worked, the respondent CreateAbundance International Institute Inc. ("CreateAbundance"). The Article also named and included photos of several people said to be connected to CreateAbundance, including the respondents Gongbo Li, Zhong Guo and Dazhun Xinyue Zhang. [2] The applicant Ina Mitchell was a co-author of the Article, along with Scott McGregor and Bob Mackin. [3] The respondents have sued the applicant and several others for defamation said to have arisen from the Article. Three of the defendants are based in Canada: the applicant and her co-authors Messrs. McGregor and Mackin. The remaining six defendants are India-based: (a) TSG's managing editor; (b) the two Indian companies that own and operate TSG, Direct News Pvt Ltd. ("Direct News") and MJP Media Pvt Ltd. ("MJP Media"); and (c) three individuals who are directors of one or both of Direct News and MJP Media. [4] The respondents served Direct News and MJP Media with the notice of civil claim ("NCC"). But neither company filed a response, and the respondents obtained default judgment against them. The respondents then served the NCC on the applicant. They have not, however, served the NCC on any other defendants. The respondents have attempted without success to serve the India-based individual defendants, but there is no evidence to suggest they have tried to serve Messrs. McGregor and Mackin. [5] Not long after being served with the NCC, the applicant applied to have the entire action dismissed, or alternatively to have it dismissed against her, under s. 4 of the Protection of Public Participation Act, SBC 2019, c.3 [PPPA]. She also sought full indemnity costs under s. 7 of the PPPA. [6] The respondents filed a response consenting to dismissal of the action against her under s. 4 of the PPPA. But they opposed the action being dismissed against the other defendants, and also opposed the applicant receiving full indemnity costs. [7] Before the PPPA application could be heard, the applicant informed the respondents that she would be seeking further relief on the application: damages under s. 8 of the PPPA and a declaration that she must receive notice of any assessment of damages sought by the respondents against the defaulting defendants. The respondents opposed this further relief. [8] On February 27, 2024, the PPPA application came before Justice Riley, who made several consent orders. One consent order dismissed the action against the applicant under s. 4 of the PPPA. The remaining consent orders put in place a framework for the parties to appear at a later date to argue about the four contested forms of relief sought by the applicant, and required that she file additional notices of application for some of the relief requested. [9] These four contested matters were subsequently argued before me over the course of three days, in addition to which the parties provided further written submissions at my request. [10] These are my reasons regarding the contested matters, which in the order I have addressed them are: (a) whether the applicant should receive damages under s. 8 of the PPPA; (b) whether the action should be dismissed against the other non-defaulting defendants; (c) whether the applicant should receive notice of any assessment of damages sought by the respondents against the defaulting defendants; and (d) whether the applicant should receive full indemnity costs for her applications and the action under s. 7 of the PPPA. [11] I will begin my reasons by setting out the events that led to the publication of the Article. I will then discuss the preliminary question as to whether I need conduct an analysis under s. 4 of the PPPA. After answering that question in the affirmative, I will review the legal principles governing an application to dismiss an action under s. 4, and will apply those principles to the record in this case. Finally, I will decide the contested matters listed in the previous paragraph. Background [12] On June 17, 2020, Ms. Fan was admitted to a Surrey hospital with life-threatening injuries. She died later that day. The RCMP believed Ms. Fan was a victim of homicide. [13] On June 24, 2020, the RCMP issued a video press release of a statement by spokesperson Sgt. Frank Jang that included responses to questions from the media. The information provided by Sgt. Jang included: (a) Ms. Fan was a Chinese citizen who had been in Canada since February 2019, had some friends and family here, and was last seen in the area of 168th Street and 27th Avenue in Surrey; (b) Ms. Fan was associated to an organization called Golden Touch, also referred to as Create Abundance, although her exact involvement with it was unknown; (c) the RCMP believed Golden Touch was a "self-improvement wellness organization", and Internet checks indicated that it was an international entity with local and international ties, but there was still a lot the RCMP needed to know about it; (d) the RCMP was "not making any links" between Golden Touch and Ms. Fan's homicide, and "there is no information we have uncovered to make that kind of link"; and (e) other than the information mentioned above, the RCMP had not been able to uncover much about Ms. Fan and wanted to find out as much as possible about her. [14] Sgt. Jang appealed to the public, and specifically the Chinese community, for information about Ms. Fan. He said that her association to Golden Touch was "huge for us" and the RCMP was hoping that people who had dealt with the organization or were a part of it, and perhaps friends and colleagues of Ms. Fan, would come forward with information about her and her involvement with Golden Touch. [15] The applicant is an accredited independent journalist who investigates and writes almost exclusively about what she describes in her affidavit as "Chinese interference". During her career as a journalist, which began in 2017, the applicant has not worked exclusively with or been employed by any news agency. The applicant's affidavit states that she has been frequently quoted in major news outlets as a source on the topic of interference in Canada by the Chinese state or Chinese Communist Party ("CPP"), and has contributed photographs, interviews and videos to broadcast news companies such as the Vancouver Sun. [16] The applicant received the RCMP press release regarding Ms. Fan's homicide. She was already familiar with Ms. Fan's connections to CreateAbundance from research for a then-forthcoming book, co-authored with former military and RCMP intelligence official Mr. McGregor, called the Mosaic Effect: How the Chinese Communist Party Started a Hybrid War in America's Backyard ("The Mosaic Effect"). In her affidavit, the applicant describes The Mosaic Effect as illustrating insights into the CPP's far-reaching influence and espionage in the Western world, especially Canada. [17] Given the homicide investigation and the RCMP's public call for information, the applicant viewed the connection between Ms. Fan and CreateAbundance as a matter of public interest. She co-authored the Article with Messrs. McGregor and Makin, and it was published in TSG, including online, on March 13, 2021. [18] The Article is entitled "How a murder in Canada led to the unraveling of a CCP spy operation", and refers to CreateAbundance as well as the individual respondents Mr. Guo, Ms. Zhang and Dr. Li. [19] Mr. Guo and Ms. Zhang are spouses and directors of CreateAbundance, while Dr. Li is an employee of CreateAbundance. Preliminary Question: Need I Conduct an Analysis under Section 4? [20] The respondents raised a preliminary question as to whether it is necessary for me to conduct an analysis under s. 4 of the PPPA. In this section of my reasons, I will explain how this question arose, as well as why I have decided to conduct a s. 4 analysis. [21] Section 5 of the PPPA provides that, where an applicant serves an application for dismissal under s. 4, no party may take further steps in the proceeding until that s. 4 application, including any appeals, has finally been resolved. An exception is provided for injunctions. [22] The respondents assert that s. 5 precluded them from simply discontinuing their action against the applicant once she served her application under s. 4. I was provided with no case law interpreting s. 5, but the applicant did not take a contrary position, and I will thus proceed on the basis that the respondents' assertion is correct. [23] In their written submissions, the respondents argue that the contested matters include novel issues as to whether and if so how a court should address costs and damages under ss. 7 and 8 of the PPPA where a plaintiff has consented to dismissal of a claim under s. 4 of the PPPA. As I will describe in detail below, where the applicant is successful in having the action dismissed s. 7 creates a presumption of full indemnity costs in their favour, and s. 8 provides that the court may also order damages against the respondent. [24] The novel issues arise, say the respondents, because the determination of costs and damages ordinarily requires consideration of factors that inform a court's decision whether to dismiss a claim under s. 4, yet the plaintiff's consent to a dismissal renders unnecessary the s. 4 analysis, and as initially occurred here a consenting plaintiff may have filed no materials and made no submissions pertaining to that analysis. [25] In their written submissions, the respondents suggest three approaches the court could take when faced with such a scenario. [26] First, the court could always order full indemnity costs against the plaintiff, effectively treating the consent dismissal as making irrebuttable the presumption in s. 7 in favour of such costs. Second, the court could read down s. 7 to preclude granting full indemnity costs beyond the filing of the s. 4 application, and could also read down s. 8 to preclude an award of damages. Third, the court could conduct a s. 4 analysis so as to better enable it to consider the relevant factors bearing on costs and damages, an approach with respect to which the respondents suggested some variations. [27] The respondents strongly opposed the first approach, but in oral submissions did not push the second approach with any force, and accepted that the third approach should likely be followed in this case. In further written submissions provided after the hearing of the applications, the respondents basically accepted that the third approach could apply without the need for any variations. As for the applicant, she essentially endorsed the third approach, at least insofar as her written and oral submissions engaged in a full s. 4 analysis. [28] Given the parties' positions, I need not delve into the pros and cons of the three approaches identified by the respondents. Instead, I will undertake a full s. 4 analysis so as to assist in providing a foundation for my determination with respect to costs and damages under ss. 7 and 8 of the PPPA. Legal Principles Governing the Section 4 Analysis [29] The PPPA provides a mechanism for the early screening and potential dismissal of proceedings arising from expression on matters of public interest. The target of this early screening is what are known as strategic lawsuits against public participation, often referred to by the acronym SLAPP. A SLAPP is a tactical action that seeks to suppress expression on matters of public interest, the goal being to intimidate and suppress criticism with the threat of costly litigation. The key feature of a SLAPP is thus the strategic use of the legal system to silence contrary viewpoints, and more broadly to suppress debate on matters of public interest, rather than to remedy serious harm suffered by the plaintiff. See Hansman v. Neufeld, 2023 SCC 14 at paras. 46-49; Rooney v. Galloway, 2024 BCCA 8 at paras. 17-19, leave to appeal refused 2024 CanLII 96614 (SCC). [30] The PPPA is modelled after draft legislation adopted by the Uniform Law Conference of Canada, which is in turn based on Ontario's anti-SLAPP provisions in s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c. C-43. The pretrial screening mechanism in s. 4 of the PPPA is nearly identical to that found in s. 137.1(3) and (4), making the Supreme Court of Canada's decisions dealing with the Ontario legislation applicable to interpreting s. 4: Hansman at paras. 50-52. [31] A linchpin provision in the PPPA is s. 4, which permits the screening of lawsuits that unduly limit expression on matters of public interest through the identification and pretrial dismissal of such actions, the idea being to protect that expression and safeguard the fundamental value that is public participation in democracy: 1704604 Ontario Ltd. v. Pointes Protection Association, 2020 SCC 22 [Pointes] at paras. 16 and 30. [32] Section 4 states: 4 (1) In a proceeding, a person against whom the proceeding has been brought may apply for a dismissal order under subsection (2) on the basis that (a) the proceeding arises from an expression made by the applicant, and (b) the expression relates to a matter of public interest. (2) If the applicant satisfies the court that the proceeding arises from an expression referred to in subsection (1), the court must make a dismissal order unless the respondent satisfies the court that (a) there are grounds to believe that (i) the proceeding has substantial merit, and (ii) the applicant has no valid defence in the proceeding, and (b) the harm likely to have been or to be suffered by the respondent as a result of the applicant's expression is serious enough that the public interest in continuing the proceeding outweighs the public interest in protecting that expression. [33] Section 4 creates a multi-step process for determining whether the proposed action should proceed. [34] At the first step, s. 4(1) puts the onus on the applicant - the defendant in the action - to show on a balance of probabilities that: (a) the proceeding arises from an expression made by the defendant; and (b) the expression relates to a matter of public interest. If the applicant fails to meet this onus, the application will be dismissed. See Pointes at paras. 21-23. [35] "Expression" is expansively defined is s. 1 of the PPPA to mean, "any communication, whether it is made verbally or non-verbally, publicly or privately, and whether it is directed or not directed at a person or entity". The phrase "relates to a matter of public interest" as found in s. 4(1)(b) is also given a broad and liberal interpretation, consistent with the legislative purpose of ensuring that the full scope of legitimate participation in public matters is subject to the protective procedure in s. 4. See Pointes at paras. 25-26. [36] To determine whether the expression relates to a matter of public interest, the expression is assessed as a whole, with a view to determining whether some segment of the community would have a genuine interest in receiving the information on the subject. At this stage of the inquiry, it is not legally relevant whether the expression helps or hampers the public interest - there is no qualitative assessment of the expression. The question is only whether the expression pertains to a matter of public interest, defined broadly, and this burden is not onerous. See Pointes at paras. 26-28; Simán v. Eisenbrandt, 2024 BCCA 176 [Simán BCSC] at para. 35. [37] If the defendant meets the initial burden under s. 4(1), the onus shifts to the respondent under s. 4(2)(a) to show that there are grounds to believe the proceeding: (i) has substantial merit; and (ii) the applicant has no valid defence to the proceeding. [38] In determining whether there exist "grounds to believe" either of these things, the judge must be acutely aware of the limited record, the timing of the application in the litigation process, and the potential of future evidence arising. Section 4(2)(a) is not a determinative adjudication on the merits of the claim or the existence of a defence to it. The assessment under s. 4(2)(a) is a subjective one made from the application judge's perspective based on the record, as opposed to the perspective of a "reasonable trier". See Pointes at paras. 37 and 41; Hobbs v. Warner, 2021 BCCA 290 at para. 12, leave to appeal refused 2022 CanLII 32897 (SCC). [39] Section 4 contemplates that the parties will file affidavit evidence, and s. 9 of the PPPA permits limited cross-examination on those affidavits. This suggests that the parties are expected to put forward a record, commensurate with the stage of the proceeding at which the application is brought, that lends itself to the inquiry mandated under s. 4(2)(a). Thus, although the record at this stage does not allow for the ultimate adjudication of the issues, it necessarily entails an inquiry that goes beyond the pleadings to consider the record's contents. See Pointes at para. 38. [40] Section 4(2)(a) involves two inquires, one regarding the merits of the claim and the other the validity of any defences. Both inquires are conducted on the standard of "grounds to believe". This standard requires the respondent to show more than a mere suspicion but less than proof on the balance of probabilities. The grounds to believe standard thus requires only a basis in the record and the law for finding that the proceeding has substantial merit and there is no valid defence. Any basis in the record and at law is sufficient to meet this standard, as long as that basis is legally tenable and reasonably capable of belief. See Hobbs at para. 13; Simán at paras. 37-38; Rooney at para. 80. [41] In relation to s. 4(2)(a)(i), the respondent must establish grounds to believe the claim has substantial merit. Substantial merit means a real prospect of success. A real prospect of success requires a prospect of success that, while not amounting to a demonstrated likelihood of success, tends to weigh more in favour of the plaintiff. A mere possibility of success or an arguable case is not sufficient. See Hobbs at para. 13; Simán at paras. 39-40; Rooney at para. 81. [42] If the respondent meets the threshold regarding substantial merit, they must next establish, under s. 4(2)(a)(ii), that there are grounds to believe the applicant has "no valid defence" in the proceeding. At this stage, the applicant must put into play the defences they intend to present, after which the respondent must show there are grounds to believe that none of those defences has a real prospect of success. This requires a showing that there is a basis in the record and the law to support a finding that the defences do not tend to weigh more in favour of the applicant. See Pointes at para. 60; Bent v. Platnick, 2020 SCC 23 at para. 103; Hobbs at para. 14; Simán at paras. 41-42; Rooney at para. 82. [43] The final stage of the analysis is found at s. 4(2)(b), which requires weighing the public interest in allowing meritorious lawsuits to proceed against the public interest in protecting expression on matters of public interest. This weighing exercise is often the crux or core of the analysis, because it allows the court to strike an appropriate balance between the competing values at the heart of the PPPA: individual reputation and freedom of expression. Section 4(2)(b) puts the onus on the respondent to establish that the public interest in allowing the action to proceed outweighs the public interest in protecting the expression. See Pointes at paras. 61-62, 66, 81-82; Bent at para. 139; Hansman at para. 58; Hobbs at paras. 15-17; Simán at para. 43; Rooney at para. 83. [44] As a prerequisite to the weighing exercise in s. 4(2)(b), the respondent must establish the existence of some harm, whether monetary or nonmonetary, caused by the impugned expression: Pointes at paras. 68-70; Bent at para. 142; Hansman at paras. 67-68; Hobbs at para. 19; Simán at paras. 44 and 46; Rooney at para. 84. [45] General damages are presumed in defamation actions, and this alone is sufficient to constitute harm. But the magnitude of harm is important in assessing whether the harm is sufficiently serious that the public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue outweighs the public interest in protecting the expression. Presumed general damages are insufficient for this purpose. See Pointes at paras. 70-71; Bent at para. 144; Hansman at para. 67; Hobbs at para. 20; Simán at para. 44; Rooney at para. 85. [46] Where the impugned statements concern allegations of criminal misconduct, the harm arises from the nature of the allegation, and the respondent has no obligation to prove actual loss: Hobbs at para. 84; Rooney at para. 87. [47] Evidence of a causal link between the expression and the claimed harm will be important where there may be sources other than the applicant's expression that have caused the harm. However, no definitive determination of harm or causation is required. Rather, the respondent must simply provide evidence for the court to draw an inference of likelihood in respect of the existence of harm and the relevant causal link. See Pointes at paras. 71-72; Bent at para. 154; Simán at para. 46; Rooney at para. 86 [48] Once the harm has been shown to be causally related to the expression, s. 4(2)(b) requires that the respondent show that the magnitude of the harm outweighs the deleterious effects on expression and public participation: Pointes at para. 82. [49] At this stage of the process, public interest is critical to the analysis, and in assessing that interest the quality of the expression, and the motivation behind it, are relevant. Judges should be wary of the inquiry descending into a "moralistic taste test", but not all expression is created equally. The inquiry is informed by the core values underlying s. 2(b) of the Charter, such as the search for truth, participation in political decision-making, and diversity in forms of self-fulfillment and human flourishing. The closer the applicant's expression comes to such core values, the greater the public interest in protecting it. Pointes at paras. 73-77; Bent at para. 163; Hobbs at para. 23-26; Simán at para. 47; Rooney at para. 88. [50] Additional factors that may prove useful in undertaking the weighing exercise in s. 4(2)(b) include: the importance of the expression; the history of litigation between the parties; broader or collateral effects on other expressions on matters of public interest; the potential chilling effect on future expression either by a party or by others; the applicant's history of activism or advocacy in the public interest; any disproportion between the resources being used in the lawsuit and the harm caused or the expected damages award; and the possibility that the expression or the claim might provoke hostility against a group that is identifiably vulnerable or protected under s. 15 of the Charter or human rights legislation. The relevance of these factors must be tethered to the text of s. 4(2)(b) and the considerations explicitly contemplated by the legislation. See Pointes at para. 80; Rooney at para. 88. Section 4 Analysis in this Case [51] Before embarking on the s. 4 analysis, I will address the respondents' initial position that I can conclude that the test for dismissing their action under s. 4 is not met, even though they consented to Justice Riley's order, which expressly states that their claim as against the applicant "is dismissed pursuant to s. 4". [52] In written submissions provided after the hearing, the respondents tempered their initial position by submitting that, if I accept that they could establish actual malice as part of the inquiry under s. 4(2)(a)(ii), I can conclude that the balancing in s. 4(2)(b) should be weighed in the applicant's favour as a result of the consent order but at the lowest end of that scale. In making this submission, they rely on Acumen Law Corporation v. Nguyen, 2018 BCSC 961 [Acumen Law] at para. 17. [53] In her additional written submissions provided in reply, the applicant opposes the respondents' argument in this respect, certainly to the extent that their argument might suggest that I can base a "lowest end of the scale" finding on a conclusion that the s. 4 analysis supports not dismissing the action. [54] As I will explain below, I do not accept the respondents' position regarding actual malice as part of the analysis under s. 4(2)(a)(ii). Accordingly, I need not consider whether their legal position on this issue is correct. [55] With this preliminary point out of the way, I will now undertake the multistep analysis set out in s. 4 of the PPPA. Step 1: expression relating to a matter of public interest [56] The parties agree that the applicant has met her threshold burden of demonstrating on a balance of probabilities that the respondents' action arises from an expression made by her and that the expression relates to a matter of public interest. [57] I also agree with this conclusion. [58] The respondents' claim is for defamation in relation to the Article co-authored by the applicant, and thus relates to an expression made by her. [59] The Article also relates to matters of public interest. For example, it describes an unsolved homicide that was the subject of an RCMP news conference, and explores possible links between CreateAbundance, said to be a cult with a militaristic bent, and the Chinese state or CPP, as well as between CreateAbundance and Canadian politicians. The Article further states that CreateAbundance is the focus of Canada's counterterrorism force, the Integrated National Security Enforcement Team. [60] The public undoubtedly has an interest in these matters, as reflected in the fact that several other media organizations published pieces concerning the RCMP news conference, including the CBC, Global News, the CTV News, Peace Arch News and South China Morning Post. These other pieces mention the connection between Ms. Fan and CreateAbundance, and some of them include information about CreateAbundance's activities in China and Canada. Step 2: grounds to believe claim has substantial merit [61] To ascertain whether the respondents have established a real prospect of success with regard to their claim, it is necessary to consider the elements that must be met to prove defamation. [62] To establish defamation, a plaintiff must prove that the impugned words: (a) were defamatory, in that they would tend to lower the plaintiff's reputation in the eyes of a reasonable person; (b) referred to the plaintiff; and (c) were published, meaning that they were communicated to at least one person other than the plaintiff. See Grant v. Torstar Corp., 2009 SCC 61 at para. 28; Bent at para. 92. [63] Under s. 4 of the PPPA, my task is not to determine whether the impugned words are in fact defamatory, but whether they are reasonably capable of bearing a defamatory meaning: Simán v. Eisenbrandt, 2023 BCSC 379 [Simán BCSC] at para. 63, affirmed 2024 BCCA 176; Rooney at paras. 476 and 526. [64] The NCC sets out the entire Article, and then states that the Article in its natural and ordinary meaning, or by innuendo, meant and was understood to mean that the respondents were murderers and spies for the CPP, and that CreateAbundance is a cult of which the other three respondents are members. [65] Having assessed the record and the law, in my view there is a real prospect that the respondents will be able to establish that the article is defamatory. [66] Regarding the allegation that the respondents are spies, the Article's headline states that "the murder", which can only be a reference to Ms. Fan's homicide, "led to the unraveling of a CPP spy operation". The meaning of this headline must be gauged based on the natural and ordinary meaning that a reasonable person would infer from the entirety of the publication: Bondar v. Neufeld, 2024 BCSC 594 at paras. 63-67; Brown, The Law of Defamation, 2nd ed., §5:38. [67] Viewed in the context of the entire Article, with its references to connections between CreateAbundance and the Chinese state and CPP, the "CPP spy operation" could reasonably be viewed as a reference to CreateAbundance. It could also be reasonably inferred that the individual respondents are spies, given that their photos are included in the Article and they are presented as leaders, board members or important members of CreateAbundance. These inferences are bolstered by the reference at the end of the Article to CreateAbundance now being the focus of Canada's counterterrorism force. [68] The Article also makes references to CreateAbundance being a cult. For instance, it states: · "CreateAbundance International Institute was how the cult was registered in British Columbia"; · "They [the RCMP] thought it was just a cult"; · "At least one relative of Create Abundance's leader, Xinyue Zhang, was guilty of the multi-level-marketing in which the cult engaged"; · "Was the cult the brainchild of the CPP's United Front Work Department so as to enable covert operations in Canada and elsewhere?"; · "Was the cult a convenient distraction from the mining and medical ventures?" · "Its board includes cult leader [the respondent] Xinyue Zhang's husband" (i.e., the respondent Mr. Guo). [69] The term "cult" must be read in the context of the Article as a whole, which among other things states that: (a) Xinyue Zhang claims to be a body-mind-spirit guru, who is the author of the movement's "bible"; (b) a Chinese court has heard that Ms. Zhang's followers view her as a god; and (c) "Create Abundance" charges followers substantial fees, without providing receipts so as to avoid a paper trail, "yet its leaders had real estate, cars, yachts, airplanes and businesses, from New York to Kuala Lumpur to France". [70] When read in the context, the references to CreateAbundance as a cult are reasonably capable of being viewed as labelling the individual respondents as involved in a cult in more than a peripheral way, given that the Article presents them as leaders, members of the board or important members of CreateAbundance, and includes their photos. The reasonably available implication is that the individual respondents play significant roles in a cult that financially exploits its followers. [71] As for the allegation that the respondents are murderers, the impugned portions of the Article as identified by the respondents at the hearing before me are: · "How a murder in Canada led to the unraveling of a CCP spy operation"; · "Bo Fan was the victim of foul play and it had something to do with her job"; and · What did Bo Fan know about any of this and why was she murdered?" [72] The respondents say that these comments are reasonably capable of being viewed as implicitly asserting that they are murderers. [73] However, in my view a reasonable person reading the entire Article would not take this to be its meaning. The statement that Ms. Fan's homicide "had something to do with her job" is made shortly after a description of how, after being injured, she called relatives for a ride to the hospital while on the side of the road near a CreateAbundance compound where she had worked. But the Article does not suggest that any of the individual respondents were in the compound at that time or were involved in the homicide. [74] Furthermore, the statement that Ms. Fan's homicide "had something to do with her job" is immediately followed by a comment from RCMP spokesman Sgt. Jang that, "there still much we need to learn about Ms. Fan and her history". Taken together, these statements could leave a reasonable reader with the impression that the precise "something" that connected the homicide to Ms. Fan's work for CreateAbundance was unknown, and might go no further than the real possibility that she suffered her injuries at the CreateAbundance compound. [75] However, the remainder of the article, with its focus on CreateAbundance as a cult with a militaristic bent and connections to the Chinese State or CPP, currently being investigated by Canada's counterterrorism force, colours the meaning of these earlier statements, as does the final sentence in the Article: "What did Bo Fan know about any of this and why was she murdered?" Viewed in context, this question is reasonably capable of being viewed as insinuating that people associated with CreateAbundance may have murdered Ms. Fan for reasons connected to its activities in Canada. [76] A statement that a person is suspected of having committed a crime "may, and usually will, itself be defamatory even if it does not carry the further imputation of guilt": Grassi v. WIC Radio, 2000 BCSC 185 at para. 38; Mann v. International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 2012 BCSC 181 at para. 73; Simán BCSC at paras. 52-55; St. Pierre v. Pacific Newspaper Group Inc., 2006 BCSC 241 at para. 12. [77] There is no specific mention of any of the individual respondents as potential suspects in Ms. Fan's murder, which distinguishes this case from others where the allegation that a plaintiff is suspected of committing a crime has been held to be defamatory. But the respondent Ms. Zhang is said to be the leader of the CreateAbundance cult. The respondent Dr. Li is said to be a member of CreateAbundance, and a board member or CEO of biopharmaceutical and mining companies into which CreateAbundance is alleged to have reached its "tentacles". And the respondent Mr. Guo is identified as Ms. Zhang's husband and said also to be a board member of the biopharmaceutical company. The photos of all three individual respondents are included in the Article. [78] In the circumstances, I have concluded that the Article is reasonably capable of bearing the defamatory meaning that CreateAbundance and the individual respondents are or should be suspects in Ms. Fan's homicide, and may have been involved in carrying out that crime. [79] One of the applicant's main arguments that the respondents cannot establish grounds to believe the defamation claim has substantial merit is that, in reproducing the entire Article, the NCC uses bold and underlining to emphasize certain portions. The applicant says the NCC should be strictly read as confining the impugned parts of the Article to these portions only, which she argues cannot meet the substantial merit test in s. 4(2)(a)(i). [80] The applicant did not make this argument in either her response to civil claim ("RCC") or her notice of application. Rather, it was raised for the first time in submissions before me. In any event, the respondents have a reasonable argument that their complaint is not restricted to the portions of the Article that are bolded and underlined in the NCC. [81] For one thing, the NCC does not state that the defamation is restricted to these emphasized portions. For another, the NCC expressly states that one of the Article's defamatory meanings is that the respondents are murderers, yet the emphasized portions of the NCC make no mention of the homicide. [82] Furthermore, the emphasized portions of the Article in the NCC assert that CreateAbundance is a spy operation and a cult, which as I have already determined provide a basis, in both the record and at law, sufficient to establish that the respondents have a real prospect of success in their claim that the Article is defamatory. In oral submissions, the applicant's counsel essentially conceded this point. [83] For these reasons, I reject the applicant's argument that, in ascertaining whether the respondents' action has substantial merit, the impugned words must be restricted to the bolded and underlined parts of the NCC. But even were I to accept that argument, the bolded and underlined parts are reasonably capable of a defamatory meaning. [84] The applicant's alternative argument is that the NCC is fatally deficient because it reproduces the entire Article without stating the exact words said to be defamatory, leaving her to ascertain which portions are allegedly actionable. [85] The main case cited in support of this argument is Gong v. O'Neill, 2022 BCSC 2119. In Gong, the self-represented plaintiff filed a disjointed and confusing notice of civil claim against a Residential Tenancy Branch arbitrator that complained of "defamation" in additional to multiple other allegations such as perjury, falsification of documents and criminal conspiracy. As noted by the chambers judge, the plaintiff appeared to be alleging that some defamatory statements were made either during the hearings or in one or more of the arbitrator's four decisions, but failed to provide any particulars, whether with respect to the words published, the manner of publication, the time and place of publication, or the persons to whom the publication was made. [86] In contrast to Gong, the NCC pleads the words relied upon, in the form of the Article's text, as opposed to making a general assertion of defamation. The NCC also specifies the defamatory meanings attributed to those words: in particular, that the respondents are spies, murderers, dishonest and run a cult. In the RCC, the applicant does not purport to be unable to respond to the alleged defamatory meanings. [87] I appreciate that pleadings in defamation cases are exceptionally important and exacting, and face enhanced judicial scrutiny: Weaver v. Corcoran, 2017 BCCA 160 at paras. 64-65. But courts have more recently applied greater flexibility in analyzing defamation pleadings, at least in the early stages of a proceeding: Rooney at para. 205. The case before me is not one where the plaintiffs are on a fishing expedition or have proceeded in bad faith by not specifying particular phrases within the publication in question. [88] Here, the s. 4 application was brought just days after the applicant filed her RCC. The action is therefore in its early stages. There is no reason to believe that, were it to proceed, the respondents could not provide further particulars or amend the NCC so as to specify which words within the Article - the entirety of which is already set out in the NCC - are defamatory. Indeed, in their written and oral submissions on the application before me, the respondents specified the exact phrases alleged to be defamatory. [89] This case therefore bears some resemblance to Rooney. There, some of the applicants argued that the respondent was restricted to his pleading in terms of examples of defamatory publications, and in attempting to meet his onus under s. 4(2)(a) was prohibited from relying on other examples that became apparent as a result of disclosures made during the evidentiary process on the application itself. In making this argument, the applicants relied on s. 6 of the PPPA, as does the applicant here, which absent leave of the court prevents a respondent from amending their pleadings to prevent or avoid a dismissal order under s. 4. See Rooney at paras. 213-214. [90] The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, noting that the underlying purpose of s. 4 is to screen out lawsuits that are often brought tactically or to silence opposing viewpoints, whereas the applicants' submission was divorced from this purpose and would instead transform the PPPA into a strategic tool that would insulate defendants from any consequence of wrongdoing disclosed during the course of the PPPA application. The respondent's reliance on the new information did not change the theory of his case or the basic nature of his claim, but rather particularized it. An amendment to his pleadings was therefore not required, although the Court of Appeal also noted that s. 6 grants a measure of discretion to a judge to allow amendments in appropriate circumstances. See Rooney at paras. 215-221. [91] The case at bar is different from Rooney in that the respondents do not seek to rely on information obtained from the applicant during the evidentiary process associated with the s. 4 application. However, in my view the broader reasoning in Rooney nonetheless applies. The respondents' reliance at the hearing before me on specific passages in the Article in attempting to meet their burden under s. 4(2)(a)(i) does not change the theory of their case or the basic nature of their claim, but rather particularizes it. That particularization simply isolates specific passages in the Article, the entirety of which is quoted in the NCC and an understanding of which is necessary to contextualize the meaning reasonably attributable to those passages. [92] The applicant has not suggested that this particularization has caused her any prejudice. I have therefore concluded that I can consider it in assessing whether the respondents have met their onus under s. 4(2)(a)(i). Requiring an amendment under s. 6 would likely result in additional expense and delay in the proceedings, in circumstances where there would probably be a strong if not insurmountable case for granting leave to amend. Step 3: grounds to believe applicant has no valid defence [93] In this part of the analysis, the applicant must put into play the defences she intends to present, after which the respondents must show that there are grounds to believe that none of those defences has a real prospect of success. [94] In her RCC, the applicant pleads the defences of justification, responsible communication on a matter of public interest and fair comment. [95] In her oral submissions, the applicant indicated that the defence of justification was not her key argument, and she devoted little space or time to fleshing it out in written and oral submissions. This is not surprising, at this early stage of proceedings, where the only sworn evidence on the point comes from the respondent, Dr. Li, who denies that CreateAbundance or the other respondents were involved in the murder of Ms. Fan, are spies for the CCP, or are a cult or cult members. Based on the limited record before me, I am therefore satisfied that there is a real prospect that the defence of justification would not succeed. [96] In her submissions, the applicant focused much more on the defences of responsible communication on a matter of public interest and fair comment. I will address each of these defences in turn. Responsible Communication on a Matter of Public Interest [97] Grant at para. 126 holds that this defence will apply where the defamatory publication was made on a matter of public interest and the publisher was diligent in trying to verify the allegation having regard to the following factors: (a) the seriousness of the allegation; (b) the public importance of the matter; (c) the urgency of the matter; (d) the status and reliability of the source; (e) whether the plaintiff's side of the story was sought and accurately reported; (f) whether inclusion of the defamatory statement was justifiable; (g) whether the defamatory statement's public interest lay in the fact that it was made rather than its truth ("reportage"); and (h) any other relevant considerations. [98] Not all of the factors listed will have equal value in assessing the defence of responsible communication in a given case: Grant at para. 123. [99] In terms of "any other relevant considerations", the tone of an article may or may not be relevant to responsibility. Distortion or sensationalism in the manner of presentation will undercut the extent to which the defendant can plausibly claim to have been communicating responsibly in the public interest, but the defence of responsible communication ought not to hold writers to a standard of stylistic blandness. Critical tone does not disqualify the defendant from relying on the defence. See Grant at para. 123. [100] In assessing the strength of the defence of responsible communication, a starting point is that the broad thrust of the publication as a whole must be considered, and not the isolated defamatory language. This perspective is consistent with the justifications underlying the defence, which include the encouragement of public debate and discourse on matters of public importance, and protecting the cut and thrust of discussion necessary to discover the truth. The fair balance between freedom of expression and the reputations of individuals must account for the public interest in receiving the communication as a whole, and not simply the defamatory words in isolation. See Simán at para. 121. [101] Looking at the record in this case, I have already found that the subject matter of the Article is a matter of public interest. The first requirement of the defence of responsible communication is therefore met. [102] The question becomes, are there grounds to believe there is no real prospect that the applicant will successfully establish its second requirement, namely, that she was diligent in trying to verify the allegations? In addressing this question, I have considered the factors set out in Grant, and will discuss those factors that I view to be of greatest importance on the record before me. [103] Starting with the seriousness of the allegation, the degree of diligence needed to verify an allegation increases in proportion to its seriousness: Grant at para. 111; Simán at para. 124. In this case, the allegations are reasonably capable of bearing serious meanings, including being a "spy" on behalf of a foreign state, running or helping to run an exploitative cult and possible complicity in a homicide. [104] Militating in the opposite direction is that the matters in the Article are potentially of considerable public importance, relating to surreptitious meddling in Canada by the Chinese government or the CCP, taking improper financial advantage of individuals and possibly committing or covering up a murder. See Grant at para. 112; Simán at para. 124. [105] Significant public importance often goes hand-in-hand with urgency: Grant at paras. 112-113. But this is not the case here, there being no particular urgency associated with the matters covered by the Article, which unlike most of the articles published by other news organizations was released many months after the RCMP news conference. [106] In arguing that they have met their onus under s. 4(2)(a)(ii) in relation to this defence, the respondents place significant emphasis on what they say is the applicant's failure to put the thrust of the Article to them for their response prior to publication. [107] As noted in Grant at para. 116, obtaining and accurately reporting the plaintiff's side of the story is perhaps the core factor in determining whether the defence of responsible communication has been made out, because it is inherently unfair to publish defamatory allegations of fact without giving the target an opportunity to respond. Failure to do so also heightens the risk of inaccuracy, since the target of the allegations may be able to offer relevant information beyond a bare denial. [108] A plaintiff who fails to respond to the defendant's requests for input or explanation may have a difficult time relying on this factor: Armstrong v. Corus Entertainment Inc., 2018 ONCA 689 at paras. 44-48. But a plaintiff may have more success where the defendant simply leaves voicemail messages asking to speak to someone from the plaintiff organization, and while stating they are a journalist working on a story fails to provide any information about the nature of the story or the allegations: Paderewski v. Skorski, 2017 ONSC 6594 at paras. 132-134, affirmed 2022 ONSC 1550 (Div. Ct.). [109] Levant v. DeMelle, 2022 ONCA 79 at para. 44, leave refused 2023 CanLII 69890 (SCC) suggests that, to provide the plaintiff with a meaningful opportunity to respond, what is required is for the journalist to convey the gist of the proposed publication, sufficient to allow the plaintiff to understand what is going to be said about it, and thus to provide the necessary context for the plaintiff's response. The actual words of the proposed defamatory allegations need not, however, be put to the plaintiff. [110] Here, the applicant made several attempts to contact a representative of CreateAbundance. As set out in her affidavit, she received no response when she: (a) knocked on the door of what she understood to be the CreateAbundance clubhouse on multiple occasions in the months prior to publication; (b) attempted to reach out to the Salt Spring Island Mineral Springs Resort, a CreateAbundance property at which individuals had been seen marching in military-style uniforms; (c) emailed a person she believed to be a high-ranking representative of CreateAbundance, asking to speak about the organization for a story she was writing, and offering to keep the communications confidential; (d) contacted multiple organization members for comments through their social media accounts such as Instagram; (e) knocked on the door of the respondent Mr. Guo's residence; (f) rang the intercom of the residence of the respondent Ms. Zhang; and (g) texted the respondent Dr. Li on November 20, 2020, using what she understood to be his personal phone number, and emailed him on January 29, 2021, using what she understood to be his personal email. [111] There is no suggestion that any of these communications conveyed to the recipients the gist of the proposed publication, sufficient to allow any of the respondents to understand what was going to be said about them, except perhaps for the text and email sent to Dr. Li. [112] The text the applicant sent to Dr. Li stated: Hello Gongbo My name is Ina Mitchell. The reason I am reaching out to you is that I am working on an investigative report with a couple of other journalists about Create Abundance/GT and the murder of Bo Fan. Our report will include your involvement in the organization and some of its subsidiaries. I have a number of questions I would like to ask you and to also give you the opportunity for fair comment. Please contact me by Nov. 27 2020 by text or email: [email address provided]. Regards Ina Mitchell, Journalist [113] The email the applicant sent to Dr. Li stated: Hello Gongbo I reached out to you a number of months [sic] to let you know that I have been working on an investigative report on Create Abundance and the murder of Bo Fan along with some other journalists. This report will comment on your involvement in Create Abundance and some of its subsidiary brands. Please reply to this email because we are going to press soon and I would like to give you the opportunity to respond. Ina Mitchell Documentary Film + Investigative Journalism [phone number provided] [114] The respondents argue that these communications directed to Dr. Li, who the evidence shows was an employee of CreateAbundance, failed to set out the thrust of the Article in any meaningful way, especially given the seriousness of the allegations being made. [115] Based on the record before me, there is greater than a real prospect that the respondents would succeed on this argument at a trial. There is no mention in the text or email of CreateAbundance being a cult or spying for the Chinese state or CPP. The inference that the organization or its leaders may have had some involvement in the murder is also left unstated. [116] However, in my view the respondents arguably overstate the extent to which the text and email to Dr. Li fell short of the mark. The applicant's mention of a story regarding CreateAbundance and the murder, and that she wished to give CreateAbundance the opportunity for fair comment and to respond prior to publication, may well have raised a suspicion in a reasonable person that the impending publication might impact their reputation or that of CreateAbundance. [117] The respondents further argue that the applicant failed to exercise due diligence in her reporting insofar as the Article stated without qualification: It got complicated, fast, in June 2020 when the Integrated Homicide Investigation Team (IHIT) held a news conference, appealing for clues. Bo Fan was the victim of foul play and it had something to do with her job. "There's still much we need to learn about Ms. Fan and her history," said Sgt. Frank Jang, spokesman of the RCMP-affiliated IHIT. [emphasis added] [118] I agree with the respondents that the reference to "foul play" can only mean an unlawful homicide. I also agree that the comment "and it had something to do with her job" is a statement of fact that goes beyond what was indicated by the RCMP spokesperson at the news conference. In particular, while at the news conference Sgt. Jang stated that Ms. Fan was associated to CreateAbundance and that this association "is huge for us", he went on to say: Let me be clear today we are not making any links with this organization, and Ms. Fan's homicide. There is no information that we have uncovered to make that kind of link. [119] Many if not all of the other news articles addressing Ms. Fan's homicide paraphrased this comment from Sgt. Jang. The Article's failure to do so is a relevant factor in assessing the validity of the defence of responsible communication, in particular given the factual assertion that Ms. Fan's homicide had something to do with her job with CreateAbundance and the implication that, as an exploitative cult and spy operation, CreateAbundance may well have had something to hide. [120] In my view, the applicant's failure to include Sgt. Jang's comment that the RCMP was not making any links between Ms. Fan's homicide and CreateAbundance, together with her failure to provide the respondents with a meaningful opportunity to respond to the allegations in the Article prior to publication, meet the threshold of establishing a real prospect that the defence of responsible communication will not succeed at trial. [121] I have considered all of the relevant factors set out in Grant at para. 126 in coming to this conclusion, but should make clear that other aspects of the respondents' arguments addressing the Grant factors struck me as weak. [122] For instance, the respondents point to the applicant's history of reporting on Chinese influence in Canada as weighing strongly against the validity of the defence of responsible communication. In support of this submission, they cite several other articles attached to the applicant's affidavit, as well as other journalistic pieces referenced in their own materials. [123] However, the respondents have provided no basis upon which I could find that the applicant has revealed bias or, as the respondents put it, "tunnel vision", in her reporting in this area. The respondents' materials simply reference a documentary the applicant directed and an article she wrote, without reproducing any content. And they have not pointed to any aspects of the other articles included in the applicant's affidavit as indicative of tunnel vision. [124] In coming to this conclusion, I reject any suggestion that being passionate about a subject, or even devoting one's professional life to it, is without more indicative of bias and thus a lack of due diligence sufficient to preclude reliance on the defence of responsible communication. Moreover, as stated in Grant at para. 123, the law should not encourage the fiction that fairness and responsibility lie in disavowing or concealing one's point of view. [125] The respondents also argue that the applicant conducted "minimal research" into the statements made in the Article. They emphasize three particular areas, none of which I find to be particularly compelling. [126] First, the respondents argue that the Article references a Chinese court decision as a key source for the statement that CreateAbundance is a cult of which Ms. Zhang was the leader, when there is no evidence that this decision was referring to the same organization or to Ms. Zhang. This argument is based on differences in names. The Chinese decision as translated refers to "Creative Abundance", "Create Abundance", "Creating Abundance", "Creation Abundance" and "Creation and Abundance", apparently interchangeably, but not to "CreateAbundance". Plus, the decision refers to the organization's leader as "Zhang Xinyue", whereas in her legal filings the respondent is named "Dazhun Xinyue Zhang". [127] I do not find this argument to hold much weight because there is substantial similarity between the names, and also because the applicant relied not only on the Chinese decision but also on reporting done by other media organizations. In particular, the South China Morning Post article provides a reasonable basis to conclude that the leader referred to in the Chinese decision and the respondent Ms. Zhang are the same person, including by linking the book and blog published by "Teacher Xinyue" to the activities of CreateAbundance in British Columbia. I also note that the respondents made this argument only in submissions, and filed no evidence asserting that the Chinese decision is referring to an unrelated organization with a different leader. [128] Second, I find to be quite weak the respondents' argument that they have shown grounds to believe the applicant carried out insufficient research regarding whether Canada's counterterrorism force is focusing on CreateAbundance, as the Article states, simply because her affidavit goes no further than stating that this information comes from her co-author Mr. McGregor, who previously worked in military intelligence and law enforcement in Canada, and her own "extensive research". The respondents could have cross-examined the applicant to provide a basis to attack the applicant's assertions in this regard, but they chose not to do so. [129] Finally, the respondents attack as insufficiently researched a statement in the Article referencing "the tentacles" of a society called The Global Spiritual Association ("TGSA") - said to be a rebranding of CreateAbundance - reaching into mining and pharmaceutical ventures in Canada. Once again, the respondents could have cross-examined the applicant on this point but elected not to do so. The Article appears to set out the basis for the "tentacles" reference, which in one instance includes overlap in the people serving as directors, something that Dr. Li does not deny in his affidavit. And while Dr. Li says that TGSA has no affiliation with CreateAbundance, they share two directors and the same delivery and mailing address. [130] Before leaving this aspect of the respondent's argument, I note that in her affidavit the applicant says the Article was thoroughly fact-checked by herself and her two co-authors and used multiple sources. She read other articles on the same topic, which are attached to her affidavit, and she contributed research and video for one of those articles. She reviewed the respondent Ms. Zhang's social media accounts, which she says were consistent with CreateAbundance's means of marketing itself alongside wealth and militaristic imagery. She obtained information from Mr. McGregor. She spoke to other RCMP and intelligence experts who cannot be named. She searched corporate records for CreateAbundance and TGSA. She reviewed portions of the leaked Panama papers. She located photographs connecting CreateAbundance or those associated with it to Canadian politicians. She also spoke to individuals with information about CreateAbundance's Salt Spring Island Mineral Springs Resort. [131] While the respondents take issue with the accuracy of the Article, they do not suggest that the reliability or status of any of the sources I have just mentioned was unworthy of belief or of dubious trustworthiness. [132] The respondents further argue that there are grounds to believe they will be able to establish malice on the applicant's part based on her failure to include Sgt. Jang's comment that there was no information to support a link between CreateAbundance and Ms. Fan's homicide, together with her history of reporting on Chinese influence in Canada. [133] The defence of responsible communication will not apply if malice is present, since a defendant who has maliciously published defamatory allegations has by definition not acted responsibly: Grant at para. 125. [134] The four bases under which a finding of malice can be found are: (a) knowledge that the statement was false; (b) reckless indifference as to its truth; (c) the dominant purpose of injuring the plaintiff because of spite or animosity; or (d) some other dominant purpose that is improper or indirect, or also, if the occasion is privileged, for a dominant purpose not related to the occasion. Hansman at para. 115; Hobbs at para. 29; Rooney at paras. 115 and 117; [135] Proof of malice may be intrinsic, in that it is drawn from the language of the assertion itself, or it may be extrinsic, in that it arises from the circumstances surrounding the publication of the comment. A finding of subjective honest belief negates the possibility of finding malice. See Hansman at para. 115. [136] In my view, based on the record, and recognizing that it is not my role to engage in a deep dive of the evidence at this point, I find that the respondents have not established that a real prospect of proving malice on the applicant's part. [137] After suffering the injuries that caused her death, Ms. Fan called for assistance while near a CreateAbundance compound. In the news release, Sgt. Jang said that information about Ms. Fan's association to CreateAbundance was "huge" for the RCMP. While the Article did not include Sgt. Jang's comment that the RCMP was not making any links between CreateAbundance and Ms. Fan's homicide, the failure to do so does not in these circumstances establish a real prospect of success in proving knowledge of falsity or recklessness indifference to it. [138] The respondents argue that this failure does not stand alone in assessing the strength of their malice argument, but must be viewed together with the applicant's "thinly researched" article, her failure to provide adequate notice to the respondents regarding the contents of the forthcoming Article, and her history of writing about Chinese influence in Canada. I have considered all of these factors together. But as described above, several of these other complaints appear overstated. I am therefore unable to find that the respondents have shown a real prospect of success in establishing malice at trial. [139] As a last point, the applicant did not suggest that the doctrine of reportage might weigh in her favour in assessing the defence of responsible communication. However, I note that the factors capable of supporting a claim of due diligence where reportage is engaged, recently discussed in Simán at paras. 92-116, appear not to align in her favour. In particular, while the Chinese decision is said to have concluded that CreateAbundance is a cult, the Article does not indicate, whether expressly or implicitly, that the truth of this assertion has not yet been verified, nor does it set out both sides of the dispute. Rather, the Article asserts that CreateAbundance is in fact a cult. Fair Comment [140] The defence of fair comment has the following five elements: (a) the comment must be on a matter of public interest; (b) the comment must be based on fact; (c) although the comment can include inferences of fact, it must be recognizable as comment; (d) the comment must satisfy the objective test that a person could honestly express the opinion on the proved facts; and (e) even if the above elements are met, the defence can be defeated if the plaintiff proves that the defendant was actuated by express malice. See Hansman at para. 96; Rooney at para. 106. [141] In this context, "comment" includes a deduction, inference, conclusion, criticism, judgment, remark or observation that is generally incapable of proof. Words that appear to be statements of fact may, in substance, be properly construed as comment, especially in the editorial context. What is comment and what is fact must be determined from the perspective of a reasonable reader. The notion of "comment" is generously interpreted and thus constitutes a low threshold. See WIC Radio Ltd. v. Simpson, 2008 SCC 40 at paras. 26-27, 30; Rooney at para. 108. [142] To show that a comment is based on fact, a factual basis must be explicitly or implicitly indicated, or the facts must be so notorious as to be already understood by the audience. If the factual foundation is unstated, unknown or turns out to be false, then the defence is unavailable. See Hansman at para. 99. [143] Yet the facts need not support the comment in the sense of confirming its truth. While the expression must relate to the facts on which it is based, the comment need not be a reasonable or proportionate response. The purpose of this element is not to measure the fairness of the expression, but to ensure the reader is aware of the basis for the comment so as to enable them to make up their own mind as to its merit. See Hansman at para. 100. [144] When invoked at trial, the defendant must prove the initial four elements of the fair comment defence, at which point the onus switches to the plaintiff to defeat the defence by establishing malice. However, on an application under s. 4 of the PPPA, the onus is on the respondent to show grounds to believe either that the applicant cannot establish one or more of the initial four elements or that the applicant was actuated by malice: Hansman at para. 97. [145] In my view, the respondents have established a real prospect that the fair comment defence will not apply because several of the key impugned parts of the Article may reasonably be viewed by a reader as statements of fact, as opposed to comments. In this respect, I have in mind, in particular, the statements that CreateAbundance is a cult and a CPP spy operation, and that Ms. Fan's death was the result of foul play that had something to do with her job. [146] Having so concluded, I need not consider whether the respondents have established a real prospect that the other elements of the defence of fair comment could not be established at trial. However, I have already concluded in relation to the first stage of the s. 4 inquiry that the impugned parts of the Article address a matter of public interest, and in considering defence of responsible communication I have determined that the respondents have not shown a real prospect of proving malice. Step 4: the weighing stage [147] In approaching the weighing exercise under s. 4(2)(b), I reiterate that I am engaging in this analysis only to assist in my determination as to whether the applicant should receive full indemnity costs and damages under ss. 7 and 8 of the PPPA. [148] I am satisfied that the individual respondents have provided evidence from which it can be inferred that they likely experienced some harm to their reputation arising from the impugned expressions in the Article. Those impugned expressions suggest that as leaders of CreateAbundance they are involved in an exploitative cult, and may well be involved in a "spy operation" and the murder of Ms. Fan. [149] However, I do not agree with the respondents that the record provides a strong basis to conclude they have experienced substantial harm in this regard. [150] I say this for several reasons. [151] First, the Article does not state that any of the individual respondents was involved in Ms. Fan's homicide. Rather, it implies that they may have been involved in the homicide because it was the result of "foul play" and had "something to do with her work", and they are associated with her employer, CreateAbundance. This allegation is less serious than is an allegation that someone has actually participated in a homicide as a perpetrator, and is also arguably less serious than an allegation that police in fact view a person as a suspect in a homicide. [152] Second, I do not accept the respondents' bald assertion that the Article accuses them of committing the criminal offences in s. 20(3) and 20.2(1) of the Foreign Interference and Security of Information Act, RSC 1985, c. O-5. These provisions make it a crime to, at the direction of or for the benefit of a foreign entity: (a) induce or attempt to induce, by intimidation, threats or violence, a person to do anything (s. 20(3); or (b) commit an indictable offence (s. 20.2(1)). Although the Article calls CreateAbundance a "spy operation", this phrase is not defined, and the Article read as a whole appears to use it to connote surreptitious and harmful Chinese state or CPP involvement in Canadian business or perhaps politics, as opposed to the commission of these two criminal offences. At most, the Article can be read as implying that one or more of the respondents may have been involved in these espionage-related offences in relation to Ms. Fan's unlawful homicide. [153] Third, only Dr. Li has filed affidavit evidence addressing damages arising from the Article. And in that respect, his statement about losing the support of friends and colleagues as a result of the Article lacks any detail, aside from a reference to friends and/or colleagues who initially expressed an interest in investing in his mining company Carlincore Resources Ltd. ("Carlincore"), but who later withdrew without giving a specific reason. I am unable to give these bare assertions any real weight: Hansman at para. 67. I am also leery of accepting Dr. Li's bare claim regarding adverse fallout from the Article, given his belief that an attempted break-in at his residence was a "retaliation" arising from the statements in the Article. This belief is based solely on the fact that he did not experience any attempted break-ins prior to the Article's publication. [154] Fourth, the corporate respondent CreateAbundance has not provided any evidence upon which a trier of fact might reasonably infer that it has suffered substantial damage from the impugned expression in the Article: Levant at para. 49. The mere assertion that, following publication of the Article there was a decline in the number of tourists visiting the Salt Spring Island Mineral Springs Resort, without any supporting documentation indicating a causal connection or the amount of lost revenue, does not suggest a real prospect of significant recovery. [155] The same point applies with even greater force to the alleged loss of property by Carlincore, which is mentioned in the Article. Furthermore, Carlincore is not a plaintiff in this action, which makes it difficult to understand how its alleged losses could be recoverable in the litigation given the rule in Foss v. Harbottle. I also note that Dr. Li's affidavit states that CreateAbundance is not involved in mining and is not connected to Carlincore. In other words, there is no suggestion that any adverse impact on Carlincore has caused harm to CreateAbundance. [156] Fifth, I find that the numerous other articles published about Ms. Fan's homicide and CreateAbundance, and in the case of the South China Morning Post about the Chinese court case and CreateAbundance's operations in Canada, none of which the respondents suggest is defamatory, had likely already blemished their reputations to at least some extent: Pointes at para. 72; Levant at paras. 52-53. [157] Ultimately, I am not satisfied that the harm that I can infer was likely causally related to the impugned expression in the Article outweighs the deleterious effects on expression and public participation that would have arisen had the action been permitted to continue. The subject matter of the Article relates to core values underlying s. 2(b) of the Charter, including an unsolved homicide that has received public attention, and possible involvement in Canadian business and politics by an organization allegedly connected to a foreign government. In my view, the public has a significant interest in protecting such expression. [158] The expression at stake is thus important, and I also have some concern that, had the lawsuit proceeded against the applicant, it might have had a potential chilling effect on future expression by her or other journalists who are interested in reporting on this and related topics. [159] Furthermore, as explained already in discussing malice, I have no concern that the applicant was motivated by improper purposes in writing the impugned parts of the Article, or that the sentiments expressed in those parts are removed from the core interests protected by s. 2(b) of the Charter. [160] I therefore find that the respondents have not established that the harm likely to be or that has been suffered by them as a result of the impugned expression is sufficiently serious that the public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue, had the consent order not been made by Justice Riley, would outweigh the public interest in protecting that expression. Damages Application [161] The applicant seeks damages against the respondents pursuant to s. 8 of the PPPA, which states: On an application for a dismissal order under section 4, the court may, on its own motion or on application by the applicant, award the damages it considers appropriate against a respondent if it finds that the respondent brought the proceeding in bad faith or for an improper purpose. [162] Justice Brongers summarized some of the guiding principles that apply to an application for damages under s. 8 in Todsen v. Morse, 2022 BCSC 1341 at para. 198: a) s. 8 of the Act represents an effort to separate out a subset of SLAPP cases which go beyond simply reflecting an effort to limit expression and include active efforts to intimidate or to inflict harm on the defendant; b) if the court is satisfied on the record before it that an action has been brought in bad faith or for an improper motive, such as punishing, silencing or intimidating the defendant rather than any legitimate pursuit of a legal remedy, an additional remedy should be available for this improper conduct; c) medical evidence is not necessary to support a claim for s. 8 damages and, in certain cases, it may be presumed that damages will arise from the use of a SLAPP lawsuit; d) that said, damages will not naturally flow in every case where the action is dismissed; e) whether an award of damages is warranted should also take into account the presumption set out at s. 7 of the Act that costs will be awarded on a full indemnity basis; and f) s. 8 of the Act does not empower the Court to award punitive damages. See also Reynolds v. Deep Water Recovery Ltd., 2024 BCSC 1922 [Reynolds (Damages)]at para. 7; Cheesman v. Dobrer, 2025 BCSC 1428 at para. 143. [163] In this case, I am not satisfied that the respondents brought the proceeding in bad faith or for an improper purpose. [164] This is not a case where the respondents, after filing and serving their lawsuit, vigorously pursued it in an effort to harass or harm the applicant. Rather, they consented to the dismissal of their action against the applicant with little delay once she filed her application under s. 4 of the PPPA. [165] In addition, the respondents' consent to this dismissal does not support the inference that the proceeding was brought in bad faith or for an improper purpose. It was only on receiving the applicant's application materials that the respondents obtained more substantial information as to her defences. Plus, her application if contested raised the prospect of a fairly lengthy proceeding involving more than one court appearance. It was reasonable for the respondents to, at this point, make the strategic decision to consent to the dismissal, and I accept Dr. Li's affidavit evidence on this point. The consent dismissal therefore does not reflect bad faith or an improper purpose. [166] Moreover, the impugned expression in the Article made serious allegations against the respondents. Bringing legal proceedings as a response does not, without more, suggest bad faith or an improper motive such as punishing, silencing or intimidating the defendants rather than the legitimate pursuit of a legal remedy. [167] I also accept that the respondents' submission that they did not serve their lawsuit on the applicant in an attempt to pre-empt publication of her book The Mosaic Effect. There is no evidence to suggest the respondents knew about this forthcoming book prior to its existence being revealed to them in an open-source investigation report they obtained on March 31, 2023 as a first step towards serving the applicant with the NCC. And the title of the book and description on the publisher's website did not indicate that it had anything to do with the respondents. [168] The open-source investigation report also indicated that The Mosaic Effect was to be published on May 9, 2023. Were service of the lawsuit motivated by a desire to block publication, I would have expected the NCC to be served before this date. Instead, the NCC was served over three months later, on August 29, 2023. While the book ended up not being published until September 12, 2023, there is no reason to believe the respondents had advance notice of the actual publication date. [169] As a final point supporting my conclusion that damages are not justified, the evidence does not indicate that any of the respondents has a history of using litigation or the threat of litigation to silence critics. Application to Dismiss Action Against Non-Defaulting Defendants [170] The applicant's s. 4 application seeks not only dismissal of the action against her, but also its dismissal against the other non-defaulting defendants, none of whom have been served with the NCC. [171] The respondents oppose me granting this relief. [172] Consideration of this issue requires some context with respect to how it arose. This procedural background is also relevant to other matters addressed later in these reasons, including the issue of costs Procedural Background [173] On November 10, 2021, the respondents filed the NCC against the defendants, seeking damages for defamation alleged to have been caused by the Article. At that time, the respondents did not have contact information for any of its co-authors; i.e., the applicant and Messrs. McGregor and Mr. Mackin. [174] Based on legal assistance obtained under the Hague Convention, on July 16, 2022, the respondents served the NCC on Direct News and MJP Media in India. But similar efforts to serve the four individual defendants in India were unsuccessful. [175] The respondents obtained default judgment against Direct News and MJP Media on February 15, 2023. [176] On March 31, 2023, the respondents obtained the open-source investigation report that provided possible contact information for the applicant. [177] On July 17, 2023, the respondents obtained an order granting renewal of the NCC, so that they could serve it on the applicant. She was served on August 29, 2023. Her Canadian co-authors and co-defendants Messrs. McGregor and Mr. Mackin have not been served with the NCC. [178] The applicant filed her RCC on October 3, 2023. [179] On October 17, 2023, the applicant filed her notice of application seeking an order "dismissing the entire action or altering [sic] the action as it pertains to this Defendant" pursuant to s. 4 of the PPPA. I infer that this description of the relief sought contained a typographical error, and that the applicant was seeking to dismiss the action as against all of the defendants, or alternatively against her alone. Her application also sought full indemnity costs pursuant to s. 7 of the PPPA. [180] On November 14, 2023, the respondents filed their response to the applicant's s. 4 application, in which they consented to an order dismissing the action against the applicant, but opposed its dismissal against the other defendants. The respondents' express refusal to consent to the dismissal of the application against the other defendants indicates that they understood the applicant to be seeking this relief as part of her application. Notably, the applicant's notice of application asserted little if any legal basis for obtaining this distinct relief, and did not address the issues of standing or jurisdiction. [181] In their response, the respondents also opposed an order for full indemnity costs, on the basis that they had made reasonable efforts to avoid wasting the court time that would be required to have the costs matter heard. [182] The application was set to be heard on January 25, 2024. [183] On January 23, 2024, the applicant's counsel advised counsel for the respondents for the first time that at the hearing of the application he would be asking the court on its own motion to order damages against the respondents under s. 8 of the PPPA. He provided respondent's counsel with six cases on the issue of damages. This issue was not mentioned in the notice of application. [184] On January 24, 2024, applicant's counsel told counsel for the respondents for the first time that his client was taking the position that, if the action was dismissed against her, that dismissal order would in effect apply to the other defendants as well, including the defendants against whom the respondents had already obtained default judgment. [185] By taking this position, the applicant put respondents' counsel in a conflict of interest, because it raised the possibility that he had given his clients bad advice in connection with their decision to consent to the action being dismissed against her. Respondents' counsel rightly reported this development to his insurer, which led to the appointment of repair counsel. [186] Later that same day, counsel for the respondents advised the applicant's counsel that he did not have instructions to dismiss as against all the defendants, and had reported himself to the Lawyers Indemnity Fund because of the resulting conflict of interest. Respondents' counsel advised that repair counsel was unavailable to attend or respond at the hearing of the application the next day, and asked applicant's counsel to agree to an adjournment. [187] Applicant's counsel did not consent to an adjournment. Because repair counsel was unavailable, counsel for the respondents appeared to make the adjournment request himself. Given his conflict of interest, respondents' counsel was unable to say anything about the reason for the request except that a potential conflict prevented him from speaking to the application and that repair counsel had been retained. The adjournment was granted with costs to the applicant. [188] On February 18, 2024, counsel for the applicant agreed that dismissal against her did not operate to dismiss the action against all of the defendants, but confirmed that in her application she was seeking a dismissal under s. 4 against all of the non-defaulting defendants. Applicant's counsel added that if there were to be any assessment of damages against the defaulting defendants she was entitled to receive notice as a party of record and a person whose interests may be affected. This latter point had not been raised previously. [189] On February 27, 2024, counsel for the parties appeared before Justice Riley, who made the consent orders described in the introduction to these reasons. In essence, the consent orders provided a framework for the contested matters to be argued at a later date. That framework included a requirement that the applicant file: (a) a separate notice of application for her claim for damages; (b) a separate notice of application for her request for notice of any assessment of damages against the defaulting defendants; and (c) written submissions addressing the issues of standing and jurisdiction regarding her request that the action be dismissed against the non-defaulting defendants. The framework also permitted the respondents to file further affidavit material in relation to the applicant's request for full indemnity costs. [190] August 12, 2024 was set for the hearing of these contested matters, but it was adjourned because no judge was available. The same thing happened twice more, after which the hearing took place before me over three days in October 2025. Discussion [191] In my view, the issue of whether the action should be dismissed against the non-defaulting defendants is moot by reason of the position ultimately taken by the respondents with respect to their ability to revive and pursue the action against those defendants. [192] In his initial written submissions before me, respondent's counsel strongly opposed dismissal of the action against the non-defaulting defendants, but also suggested that, given the time delay to date, his clients would likely be unable to serve the non-defaulting defendants even if they wished to do so, and that he did not anticipate receiving such instructions. [193] I asked respondents' counsel to provide further written submissions focusing on whether in the circumstances his clients would be able to renew the NCC to permit service on the non-defaulting defendants. [194] Those further written submissions were provided on November 13, 2025. In them, the respondents point out that they applied under Rule 3-2(1) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules, B.C. Reg. 168/2009, to renew the NCC so that they could serve the applicant, and that this period of renewal expired on March 13, 2024. [195] Rule 3-2(2) permits a further renewal for up to another 12 months, but only where the plaintiff applies to do so during the initial renewal period. There is no question that the respondents did not apply for a further renewal prior to expiry of the initial renewal period. [196] The respondents note that case law indicates that a further renewal may be permitted even after the expiry of the initial renewal period: Mussell v. Cronhelm, 1994 CanLII 1714 (BC CA) at paras. 20-33. But they argue that none of the factors relevant to granting such an extension outside of the initial period, which they list with appropriate citations, would favour doing so here, and state that they foresee "no possibility" of a court finding otherwise and that their case against the non-defaulting defendants is thus "unable to be revived and pursued". [197] In their additional written submissions, the respondents further assert that, given their consent to dismissing the action against the applicant, it would in any event be "illogical" for them to take a contrary position with the non-defaulting defendants. [198] Applying the relevant factors to the circumstances of this case, and based on the record before me, it appears at least highly unlikely that the respondents would be permitted to further extend the NCC for the purpose of serving the non-defaulting defendants. [199] Twenty-two months have now passed since the initial renewal period expired. The respondents expressly concede that their failure to seek a further renewal prior to that expiry is not the result of inadvertence, unlike in the only two cases provided to me in which a notice of claim was further renewed after expiry of the initial renewal period. Moreover, caselaw holds that prejudice to the non-defaulting defendants is assumed from the passage of time. And the failure to effect service during the initial renewal period is not attributable to the non-defaulting defendants. [200] Indeed, were the respondents to file an application for a further renewal of the NCC in the future, thus taking a different position from the one they have taken in their additional written submissions, the attempt could well be viewed as an abuse of process. [201] I say this because, in filing the application under Rule 3-2(2), the respondents would be taking a position diametrically opposed to the one they have advanced before me. In doing so, they would arguably be creating an injustice to the applicant insofar as that position is advanced to show that she faces no risk of her interests being adversely impacted by the respondents pursuing their action against the non-defaulting defendants in the future. In these circumstances, a future application brought under Rule 3-2(2) would likely amount to an abuse of process by violating principles such as judicial economy, consistency, finality and the integrity of the administration of justice: Mirage Trading Corporation v. Ghahroud, 2024 BCSC 1552 at para. 39. [202] I do not agree with the applicant that the respondents' additional written submissions "appear to be focused on the low probability" that they would succeed on an application for a further renewal of the NCC. The respondents do not say there is a low probability of this happening. They say that there is no possibility of it happening. Furthermore, the respondents convincingly: (a) distinguish the two cases they have located in which a further renewal has been granted after expiry of the initial renewal period; and (b) explain why the relevant factors militate against a further renewal in this case. [203] I appreciate the applicant's point that, if the respondents have no intention to seek a further renewal of the NCC for the purpose of serving the non-defaulting defendants, then an order dismissing the action against the non-defaulting defendants cannot cause them any harm. But the same reasoning applies in reverse. That is, if the respondents do not intend to and likely cannot obtain a further renewal of the NCC in order to serve the non-defaulting defendants, than the applicant's interests are not jeopardized if the action against those defendants is not dismissed. [204] I nonetheless agree with the applicant's submissions on two other points that are relevant to the issue of whether the application for dismissal against the non-defaulting defendants should be granted. [205] First, I accept the applicant's position that the wording of s. 4 is broad enough to allow a defendant to seek to dismiss a proceeding not only against themselves but also against other defendants who have not been served or who have been served but chosen not to participate in the s. 4 application. This latter result occurred in Indigenous Tourism Association of Canada v. Canada Broadcasting Corporation, 2022 BCSC 2030 at paras. 2, 38, 61, 75, 76 and 113, although the issue was not expressly addressed by the court. By contrast, the wording in s. 137.1(4) of Ontario's Courts of Justice Act appears to restrict an applicant to seeking the dismissal of the proceeding against themselves. [206] Second, I agree with the applicant that dismissal of the action against her alone would not, by itself, preclude the non-defaulting defendants from bringing a third-party claim against her were they to be served with a further renewed NCC. The proposition of law relied on by the respondents in arguing to the contrary, based on Sylte v. Jackson Bros. Logging Co., 1988 CanLII 2876 (BC SC), has been rejected in subsequent cases; see, e.g., Tucker v. Asleson, 1991 CanLII 8258 (BC SC), affirmed in part, 1993 CanLII 2782 (BC CA); Owners, Strata Plan KAS3204 v. Navigator Development Corporation, 2020 BCSC 1954 at paras. 26-35. [207] That said, there is no evidence before me to suggest that the non-defaulting defendants, if served, would be motivated to bring a third-party claim against the applicant. Given the context, I expect that on being served they would be much more likely to bring their own application under s. 4 of the PPPA. [208] In any event, I have found that it appears at least highly unlikely that the action against the non-defaulting defendants could or would be revived and pursued by the respondents. The applicant's application for an order dismissing the action against those defendants pursuant to s. 4 of the PPPA is therefore adjourned generally. [209] Out of an abundance of caution, I am nonetheless ordering that if, contrary to their position taken before me, the respondents in the future apply to further renew the NCC for the purpose of serving any of the non-defaulting defendants: (a) they must include in their application materials a copy of these reasons for judgment and my associated order; (b) they must serve their application materials on the applicant in accordance with the requirements of Rule 8-1(7); (c) the applicant will be permitted to file a response in accordance with Rule 8-1(9) and (10); and (d) the applicant has leave to bring back on her application to dismiss the action against the non-defaulting defendants. [210] The terms of my order set out in the preceding paragraph are imposed based on the exercise of my discretion as described in the next section of these reasons. Application for Notice of Assessment of Damages Against Defaulting Defendants [211] As noted, on February 15, 2023, the respondents obtained default judgment against the defendants Direct News and MJP Media. [212] Having obtained default judgment, the respondents are now at liberty to apply to have their damages assessed under Rule 3-8(5). [213] The applicant seeks a declaration that she be given notice of any such application, because the defaulting defendants might end up seeking contribution or indemnity from her. She therefore wants to participate in the assessment of damages against them so that she can provide an adversarial response as to the proper quantum. [214] The applicant bases this request for declarative relief on two arguments, both of which engage the wording in Rule 8-1(7) dealing with the service of application materials. Rule 8-1(7) states: (7) The applicant must serve the following, in accordance with subrule (8), on each of the parties of record and on every other person, other than a party, who may be affected by the orders sought: (a) a copy of the filed notice of application; (b) a copy of each of the filed affidavits and documents, referred to in the notice of application under subrule (4) (d), that has not already been served on that person; (c) if the application is brought under Rule 9-7, any notice that the applicant is required to give under Rule 9-7(9). [emphasis added] [215] The applicant's first argument is that she must receive notice of any future application to assess damages against the defaulting defendants because she is a "party of record" within the meaning of Rule 8-1(7). In this respect, the applicant points out that she filed a RCC in response to the respondents' NCC, which makes her a party of record under Rule 1-1(1), the relevant part of which states: "party of record", in relation to a proceeding, means a person who has filed a pleading, petition or response to petition in the proceeding [emphasis added] [216] In my view, however, the applicant will no longer be a party of record once the respondents' action against her is dismissed and her associated applications decided, because at that point the action against her will be at an end. The applicant will therefore no longer be entitled to notice on the basis that she is a party of record, as held in the case relied on by the respondents: Laxton v. Coglon, 2008 BCSC 772 at paras. 22-26. The applicant has provided no reply submissions suggesting that Laxton does not apply here. [217] The applicant's second, alternative argument is that she is entitled to notice of any application brought by the respondents to assess damages against the defaulting defendants because she is a "person, other than a party, who may be affected by the order sought" within the meaning of Rule 8-1(7) (applicant's emphasis). [218] As explained, the applicant says she "may be affected" by the order for damages because the defaulting defendants may thereafter make a claim against her for contribution or indemnity, given that she is a co-author of the Article and the NCC alleges that the various defendants are effectively jointly and severally liable for the Article. [219] The applicant argues that, in this possible future claim by the defaulting defendants, she would be precluded from challenging the assessment of damages based on the doctrines of issue estoppel, res judicata or abuse of process, and that as a result she is entitled to participate in that assessment to provide an adversarial response as to quantum. In support of her position, the applicant notes that a defendant whose defence has been struck may nonetheless be allowed to participate in assessing damages in some circumstances, and that she should have that same opportunity. [220] I agree with the applicant - as do the respondents - that a party in default may nonetheless be permitted to attend at a hearing at which damages are assessed. [221] Granted, Rule 8-1(7) states that, in addition to parties of record, application materials must be served on "every other person, other than a party, who may be affected by the orders sought" (emphasis added). A "party" is a person named as a party in the style of proceeding: Rule 1-1(1). Rule 8-1(7) thus operates so that a party who is not also a party of record need not be served, even though they may be affected by the order: Main Acquisitions Consultants Inc. v. Prior Properties Inc., 2022 BCCA 102 at paras. 22-30. [222] However, courts have a residual discretion to order that a defendant against whom default judgment has been entered, and who is therefore a party but not a party of record, receive notice of an assessment of damages: Marshall v. McCormick, 2018 BCSC 1398 at paras. 30-36; M.T.B. v. L.B.V., 2024 BCCA 159 at para. 30. The applicant appears to rely on this residual discretion in support of her argument in the case at bar. [223] I do not, however, agree that the applicant has an interest in the assessment of damages against the defaulting defendants sufficient to justify me exercising my residual discretion to declare that she is entitled to notice of the assessment so that she can participate in that assessment by taking a position adverse in interest to the respondents. [224] I have come to this conclusion primarily because, in my view, the risk that the defaulting defendants will at some point in the future bring an action against the applicant for contribution or indemnity is extremely if not vanishingly low. [225] I say this for four reasons. [226] First, there is no evidence before me to suggest that either of the defaulting defendants might be motivated to make a claim for contribution or indemnity against the applicant. [227] Second, were the defaulting defendants to learn of an order for damages, and decide to take protective steps in response, their most likely strategy would be to apply pursuant to Rule 3(11) to set aside that order, or more probably to set aside both it and the default judgment, to permit them to file an application to dismiss the action against them under s. 4 of the PPPA. The availability of Rule 3(11) to permit the court to set aside an order assessing damages under the Miracle Feeds test was recently decided in 1163499 B.C. Ltd. v. Yao, 2025 BCCA 443 at paras. 51-66. [228] If the defaulting defendants' application under Rule 3-11 was successful, the order for damages would be set aside, and thus no longer present the risk of contribution or indemnity that the applicant says requires her to participate in the application to assess damages. [229] Third, the defaulting defendants may take no steps at all in response to a damages order, for instance because they are judgment proof. [230] Fourth, any action for contribution or indemnity brought by the defaulting defendants may well encounter a limitation problem. [231] This potential limitation problem arises because the defaulting defendants' action against the applicant for contribution or indemnity would be prohibited if, on being served with the NCC, they either knew or reasonably ought to have known that such a claim could be made against her. This is because a separate action for contribution or indemnity is barred on the later of two years after the day on which the claimant was served with pleadings or the day on which the claimant knew or ought to have known that a claim may be made: ss. 6(1) and 16, Limitation Act, SBC 2012, c. 13; The Owners, Strata Plan EPS 677 v. ASPAC Development Ltd., 2025 BCSC 694 at paras. 29-44; Dhanda v. Gill, 2019 BCSC 1500 at paras. 35-38. [232] I reject the applicant's unequivocal assertion, made without any elaboration other than citing ss. 16 and 21 of the Limitation Act, that the defaulting defendants' limitation period has not lapsed. Subsections 21(1) and 21(2)(c) of the Limitation Act combine to create an ultimate limitation period that bars a claim for contribution or indemnity 15 years after the claimant was served with pleadings, but only where the two-year limitation period in ss. 6(1) and 16 has not otherwise expired because the claimant neither knew nor ought to have known that a claim may be made: Dhanda at para. 38. [233] Although not necessary to my conclusion on this notice issue, I also cannot accept the applicant's submission that, if she ends up facing an action for contribution or indemnity brought by the defaulting defendants, she will be barred at law from challenging the assessment of damages based on issue estoppel, res judicata or abuse of process. [234] Absent any supporting case law or analysis - and none was proffered - it seems to me that the only way these legal doctrines could bar the applicant from challenging the quantum of damages for which a defaulting defendant claimed contribution or indemnity would be if she received notice of the assessment of damages and either appeared on that application to challenge the plaintiffs' claim for damages or chose not to appear. By contrast, if I rule that applicant is not entitled to notice of the assessment of damages, I fail to see how any of these legal doctrines could be engaged. In other words, the applicant's argument based on issue estoppel, res judicata or abuse of process is unconvincing because it assumes that the issue in dispute will be decided in her favour. [235] What the applicant is asking me to do, in effect, is to permit her to take an adversarial role in a proceeding that has been dismissed against her, but is continuing against the defaulting defendants, based on the prospect that she might at some point in the future face a claim for contribution or indemnity from those defendants in which she is barred from contesting the quantum. But as explained, it is highly unlikely that the defaulting defendants would choose or successfully be able to bring an action against her for contribution or indemnity. And she has provided no authority to support her argument that, if they did bring such an action, she would be barred from contesting the quantum of damages based on issue estoppel, res judicata or abuse of process. [236] In these circumstances, I decline to exercise my discretion to make a declaration that the applicant be given notice of any application that the respondents might bring for an assessment of damages against the defaulting defendants so that she can provide an adversarial response as the proper quantum. Costs [237] The applicant seeks costs against the respondents on a full indemnity basis pursuant to s. 7(1) of the PPPA. The respondents oppose full indemnity costs, and to the extent they have been successful on the contested matters seek their costs from her. Legal Principles [238] Section 7 of the PPPA states: 7 (1) If the court makes a dismissal order under section 4, the applicant is entitled to costs on the application and in the proceeding, assessed as costs on a full indemnity basis unless the court considers that assessment inappropriate in the circumstances. (2) If, on an application for a dismissal order under section 4, the court does not dismiss the proceeding, the respondent is not entitled to costs on that application unless the court considers it appropriate in the circumstances. [239] Section 7 operates so that the application judge starts from the premise that the successful defendant should receive costs on both the application and in the proceeding on a full indemnity basis. This presumption is a strong deterrent to SLAPPs and encourages defendants to seek the quick termination of that kind of litigation by way of a s. 4 application: Hobbs at paras. 102-104; Mawhinney v. Stewart, 2023 BCCA 484 at para. 13. [240] However, s. 7 provides that costs on a full indemnity basis will not be ordered where the application judge considers that assessment to be "inappropriate in the circumstances". Determining whether full indemnity costs are inappropriate in the circumstances is a matter for the application judge's discretion. Accordingly, while s. 7 creates a starting point for the analysis, it does not mandate a particular result, and the costs award must be fair and reasonable, having regard to all the relevant factors, including any determinations made as part of the s. 4 analysis, any findings regarding the motivation of the parties, and the manner in which the parties have conducted the proceedings. See Hobbs at paras. 102-103; Mawhinney at paras. 15, 44-46, 49. [241] In determining how to exercise the discretion, the judge will be guided by considerations that guide the exercise of discretion for costs in other civil proceedings. For example, the presence or absence of factors that might drive an award of costs on a higher scale in regular civil litigation may be relevant in determining whether full indemnity costs are inappropriate in the circumstances. See Hobbs at paras. 102-103; Mawhinney at paras. 15 and 44. [242] Also relevant is that successful s. 4 applications fall along a continuum, ranging from those that dismiss lawsuits that have strong indicia of a true SLAPP, to those where the competing interests of reputation and public expression are finely balanced. In the former cases, a full indemnity award may well be appropriate, because that starting point is intended to disincentivize such litigation. Conversely, when the proceeding bears little resemblance to a SLAPP, but the public interest in protecting the expression leads to dismissal of action under s. 4, it might well not be fair and reasonable to award full indemnity costs. See Hobbs at para. 104; Mawhinney at paras. 16 and 43. [243] The four indicia of a SLAPP that an application judge may consider as part of the open-ended inquiry into the appropriateness of indemnity costs are as follows: (a) whether the plaintiff has a history of using litigation or the threat of litigation to silence critics; (b) whether there is a financial or power imbalance that strongly favours the plaintiff; (c) whether the action was animated by a punitive or retributive purpose; and (d) whether the plaintiff suffered or is likely to suffer only minimal or nominal damages as a result of the defendant's conduct. Mawhinney at paras. 16, 27 and 41; Reynolds v. Deep Water Recovery Ltd., 2024 BCSC 1921 [Reynolds (Costs)] at paras. 21-22. [244] Yet full indemnity costs under s. 7(1) are not restricted to actions that have been judicially determined to constitute or closely resemble a SLAPP. Rather, if the action has been dismissed under s. 4, then full indemnity is the default position. In deciding whether full indemnity would be inappropriate in the circumstances, a court may thus consider the hallmark indicia of a SLAPP, but is not mandated to do so, and there are other relevant factors that may come into play, including the conduct of the parties in the litigation. See Mawhinney at paras. 41-49. Discussion [245] Before applying the legal principles to the record before me, I note that the respondents have asked me to consider settlement offers they made in connection with the PPPA proceedings, which they say are admissible on the issues of damages and costs. I have not found it necessary to consider these offers in addressing the issue of damages, and therefore need not determine whether they are properly admissible for that purpose. [246] I have, however, considered two of the respondents' settlement offers in determining the issue of costs under s. 7, because as noted the case law holds that in making that determination the judge will be guided by considerations applicable to exercising the discretion to award costs in other civil proceedings. Indeed, in several cases courts have referred to settlement offers in addressing the issue of costs under the PPPA: see, e.g., Mawhinney at paras. 52-53. [247] The only settlement discussions I have considered are the offers made by respondents' counsel on November 7, 2023 and August 28, 2024, because they alone are compliant with Rule 9-1(1)(c): Roach v. Dutra, 2010 BCCA 264 at para. 52; Chernichen v. Mundy, 2023 BCSC 187 at para. 10. [248] I will now address whether full indemnity costs should be awarded on the s. 4 application and in this proceeding. [249] I will begin the discussion by reviewing some of the factors I have considered. I will then determine what costs should be awarded in relation to the applicant's s. 4 application to dismiss the action against herself and the proceeding more generally apart from the issues litigated before me. After that, I will decide the appropriate costs for the issues litigated before me, namely, the applicant's claim for damages under s. 8 and her requests to dismiss the action against the non-defaulting defendants and for notice of any application the respondents might bring to assess damages against the defaulting defendants. [250] Starting with the indicia of a SLAPP, as explained in addressing the issue of damages, there is no evidence to suggest the respondents have a history of using litigation or the threat of litigation to silence critics. [251] I have also determined that there are grounds to believe that the respondents' claim has substantial merit and that there are no valid defences. Plus, as I have held in relation to the issue of damages, the respondents' decision to consent to an order dismissing their claim against the applicant does not justify the inference that the claim was animated by a punitive or retributive purpose or to intimidate the applicant. [252] Given these conclusions, I also reject the applicant's argument that the respondents' decision to file no affidavit evidence in their response to her PPPA application bolsters the presumption of full indemnity costs because it denied her the opportunity to cross-examine one or more of the respondents and thus establish the veracity of her reporting. [253] Although not necessary to my rejection of this argument, it is further undermined by the fact that, with leave of the court, Dr. Li later filed an affidavit that, among other things, addresses the veracity of the impugned expression. Section 9(5) of the PPPA provides an applicant with the right to cross-examine on an affidavit: Reynolds v. Deep Water Recovery Ltd., 2023 BCSC 600 at para. 65. The applicant chose not to exercise this right, despite the existence of case law indicating that the merits of the plaintiff's claim and the defendant's defences may be relevant to the issue of costs: see, e.g., Mawhinney v. Stewart, 2023 BCSC 419 [Mawhinney BCSC] at paras. 5(b) and 6; Mawhinney at para. 56. [254] I am not suggesting that the applicant should be faulted for not seeking to cross-examine Dr. Li. After all, the onus under s. 4(2) is on the respondent, and pursuant to s. 7(1) full indemnity costs are presumed. I am merely pointing out a weakness in the applicant's claim that the respondents' initial failure to file an affidavit is somehow reflective of a SLAPP or otherwise improper. [255] The applicant has not suggested that there is a financial or power imbalance that strongly favours the respondents in this case. I have nonetheless considered this factor. I have no evidence as to the applicant's financial resources. Nor do I have any direct or focused evidence as to the resources of CreateAbundance or the individual respondents. However, I am prepared to infer that the respondents are probably in a stronger financial position given their number and some of the information in the application record. For example, CreateAbundance owns a resort on Salt Spring Island. On the other hand, given the relative paucity of relevant evidence I do not ascribe significant weight to this factor. [256] Another factor I have considered is that the applicant was not left facing a defamation action for many months or even years after being served, in circumstances where the ensuing delay assisted the respondents in silencing her as a critic. Contrast Mawhinney BCSC at para. 8; Mawhinney at para. 57. Rather, the applicant filed her PPPA application about six weeks after being served, and approximately three weeks later the respondents offered to discontinue the proceeding against her and pay costs of $2,000. Despite this offer being declined, a week later the respondents filed a response in which they consented to the action against the applicant being dismissed under s. 4. The period of time during which the applicant knew about the lawsuit, but did not know whether it would be dismissed under s. 4, was thus about 10 weeks in total. [257] I nonetheless accept that being served with the NCC in this matter caused the applicant significant stress and anxiety, as outlined in one of her affidavits, insofar as the action attacked her professionalism as a journalist and legitimately caused her to worry about the real prospect of an adverse impact on her overall career. I also infer that she has had to devote substantial time to this litigation. However, the applicant's claims of actual negative impact on her career lack sufficient specificity to permit me to conclude they have crystallized or will likely do so. [258] Also relevant to the s. 7 assessment is that there is no indication that the respondent took unnecessary steps in the proceedings once the applicant was served with the NCC, with a view to increasing her legal costs and thwarting her defence. Contrast Mawhinney BCSC at paras. 9-14. [259] Rather, as noted the respondents consented to an order dismissing their action against the applicant. The respondents also made a further offer to settle on October 7, 2024, available until October 25, 2024, pursuant to which they agreed to pay the applicant $20,000 with respect to costs and to discontinue their action against the other non-defaulting defendants. [260] Yet I do not believe that it was unreasonable for the applicant not to have accepted the respondents' offers while they were available. The November 8, 2023 offer did not provide the applicant with full indemnity costs for the application and the proceeding to that point, something to which she was presumptively entitled. And the October 7, 2024 offer would have required her to, among other things, refer to the respondents in any future publications using only aliases. This requirement strikes me as significantly and understandably unpalatable to a journalist who is writing on a matter of public interest. [261] Nor do I accept that the applicant can be faulted for not giving the respondents advance notice of the s. 4 application, or that the respondents were somehow taken by surprise by this development. A plaintiff who is represented by counsel and sues for defamation regarding a matter of obvious public interest should know that the defendant may file a s. 4 application in response. [262] I have also taken into account that the respondents' have likely suffered some harm as a result of the defamatory statements although, as noted in my discussion at the weighing stage of the s. 4 analysis, the harm is not as great as they suggest, and a portion of it likely resulted from preceding articles in the press. See Mawhinney BCSC at paras. 5(c) and 7; Mawhinney at para. 56. [263] I also do not agree with the respondents that the applicant's conduct throughout the proceedings was aimed at having her day in court at everyone else's expense, with the highest associated legal costs, and that she has used this litigation for the improper purpose of creating content for her future publications. This submission attributes to the applicant a state of mind that I am not prepared to infer existed. [264] I nonetheless accept that, during the litigation, the applicant raised or substantially elaborated upon several contentious issues only after the respondents had filed their response consenting to dismissing the action against her under s. 4 of the PPPA. See the procedural review at paragraphs 177 to 190 above. This resulted in inefficiencies that I infer increased litigation costs for all parties of record. [265] I am not saying that the applicant's counsel acted unprofessionally, or that she acted improperly. But the approach I have described is a factor to consider in assessing costs under s. 7 of the PPPA. That said, the resulting litigation inefficiencies do not appear to have impacted the costs relating to the applicant's application to dismiss the action against her under s. 4 of the Act, or the costs she incurred in the proceeding more generally up to the point where she filed this s. 4 application. In my view, this factor is thus more relevant in assessing the costs associated with litigating the other parts of the proceeding. [266] Having taken the relevant factors into account, in my view this case is close to the line, but I am not prepared to depart from the presumption that the applicant should receive her costs on a full indemnity basis with respect to her application to dismiss the claim against her under s. 4 of the PPPA. Accordingly, even though the respondents' lawsuit does not bear the strong indicia of a SLAPP, I am unable to find that full indemnity costs would be inappropriate in relation to the applicant's successful application under s. 4. And I come to the same conclusion regarding the presumption that she should receive full indemnity costs for the proceeding more generally, subject to my addressing the issue of costs regarding the matters discussed in the remainder of these reasons. [267] The first of those matters relates to the applicant's unsuccessful application for damages under s. 8 of the PPPA. The questions for determination are whether the presumption of full indemnity costs applies to this claim for damages, and if so whether that presumption has been rebutted. [268] At the hearing of the application, I raised with the parties the issue as to whether the presumption of full indemnity costs in s. 7(1) of the PPPA extends to encompass the costs of an unsuccessful claim for damages under s. 8 of the PPPA. Having considered the parties' additional written submissions on this point, I am satisfied that the presumption also applies to the costs of a failed attempt to obtain s. 8 damages. [269] For one thing, the language in s. 7 makes clear that the presumption applies not only to the costs on the application under s. 4, but also to the costs "in the proceeding". There can be no doubt that the s. 8 claim for damages is part of "the proceeding". [270] In addition, the wording in ss. 7 and 8, read together, indicates that a claim for damages can only be made on an application for dismissal under s. 4. This suggests that an application for damages is in a sense brought as part of or very closely linked with the application to dismiss. [271] Furthermore, the case law indicates that the decision whether to award damages should take into account the presumption that costs will be awarded on a full indemnity basis, because that costs award may go some way towards addressing harm to the defendant arising from the action. This approach seems most consistent with the view that the inquiries under s. 4 and s. 8 are part of the same proceeding, if not also part of the same application. [272] Finally, none of the PPPA cases in which a claim for s. 8 damages has been refused, which appears to be all of them, suggests that the presumption of full indemnity costs does not extend to costs associated with litigating the issue of damages: see, e.g., Eeckhout v. Toews, 2025 BCSC 1818 at paras. 73-77. And where full indemnity costs have been awarded, there is no suggestion that the award has excluded those costs associated with the damages claim. While these PPPA cases do not expressly address the issue as to whether the presumption of full indemnity costs extends to an unsuccessful claim for damages, I accept the reasoning on this point in Cilevitz v. Bergman, 2023 ONSC 1892 at para. 16. [273] I therefore find that the presumption of full indemnity costs in s. 7(1) of the PPPA extends to an applicant's unsuccessful claim for damages under s. 8 of the Act. And for the same reasons, I conclude that this presumption has not been rebutted in the case at bar, because it would not be inappropriate to award full indemnity costs for the portion of the application dealing with the damages issue. [274] This brings me to consider whether the presumption of full indemnity costs should apply with respect to the part of the applicant's s. 4 application in which she sought to dismiss the action against the non-defaulting defendants. [275] As noted, s. 7(2) states that if, "on an application for a dismissal order under section 4, the court does not dismiss the proceeding", the respondent is not entitled to costs on that application unless the court considers it appropriate in the circumstances. [276] Strictly speaking, in adjourning generally the applicant's application to dismiss the action against the non-defaulting defendants, I "[did] not dismiss the proceeding" against those defendants. However, assuming for the sake of argument that s. 7(2) is engaged, in my view it would not only be inappropriate to award the respondents their costs, but the applicant should be awarded her costs, for the following four reasons. [277] First, while I did not dismiss the proceeding against the non-defaulting defendants, I did not dismiss the applicant's application on its merits. [278] Second, it was not inappropriate for the applicant to seek to have the proceeding dismissed against the non-defaulting defendants. As noted, the wording in s. 4 is broad enough to permit her to do so. Moreover, I cannot say that her concern that one of the non-defaulting defendants might bring a third-party action against her was unreasonable. [279] Third, a key plank in the respondents' argument that the action against the non-defaulting defendants should not be dismissed was that the applicant could not in law be subject to a claim for contribution or indemnity if the action was dismissed against her. I have already explained that this contention is wrong, having been rejected by a number of courts in this province. [280] Fourth, and of particular importance, the only reason that I adjourned this part of the applicant's s. 4 application is that in the respondents' additional written submissions they for the first time unequivocally took the position that: (a) there is no possibility that they could further renew the NCC for the purpose of serving the non-defaulting defendants; and (b) given their initial decision not to contest dismissing the action against the applicant, it would be illogical for them to take a contrary position regarding the non-defaulting defendants. Had the respondents taken and communicated this position sooner, there would have been no need to argue this part of the applicant's s. 4 application. [281] Granted, in her responding additional written submissions the applicant continued to push for dismissal of the action against the non-defaulting defendants. It might therefore be suggested that she would have maintained this claim for relief even had the respondents made their position known in a timelier way. However, there is some force to her argument that, if the respondents are of the view that they could not and would not further renew the NCC, then there could be no downside to them agreeing to dismissal of the action against the non-defaulting defendants. In this regard, I am particularly influenced by the respondents' concession that, given their decision not to contest dismissing the action against the applicant, it would be illogical for them to take a contrary position regarding the non-defaulting defendants. [282] The applicant should therefore receive her costs in relation to this part of the proceeding. However, in my view it would be inappropriate to require the respondents to pay those costs on a full indemnity basis. I have come to this conclusion because, as described earlier in these reasons, the applicant's litigation conduct created inefficiencies that increased the cost for all parties of record. [283] I recognize that this conduct related to several parts of the litigation, and not just the application to dismiss the action against the non-defaulting defendants. But attempting to discount the applicant's costs recovery on this basis for each affected part of the litigation would risk overcompensating the respondents and thus creating unfairness for the applicant, and might also result in undue complexity. The most straightforward and fairest way to take account of the costs fallout arising from the applicant's litigation conduct is to limit her to Scale B costs in this discrete area. I would have come to the conclusion even were I to have treated this part of the proceeding as coming within the presumption in s. 7(1) of the PPPA; i.e., full indemnity costs would be inappropriate. [284] As a last point, I appreciate that the applicant raised the issue of dismissing the action against the other defendants in her initial notice of application, unlike for example the issue of s. 8 damages. But that notice of application provided no legal basis for seeking to dismiss against the other defendants, in particular on the issues of standing and jurisdiction, and the applicant's eventually-abandoned position that the action should be dismissed even against the defaulting defendants caused particular difficulties for the respondents. [285] I will next consider the issue of costs regarding the applicant's application for a declaration that she be given notice of any application that the respondents bring to assess damages against the defaulting defendants. [286] Contrary to the respondents' argument in their additional written submissions, I view this application as part of the PPPA proceeding, and therefore subject to the presumption of full indemnity costs under s. 7(1) of that Act. [287] The respondents argue that Levant at paras. 87-90 stands for the proposition that costs unrelated to the s. 4 application to dismiss the proceeding should be excluded from the scope of full indemnity costs. However, to accept this proposition would be to ignore the plain wording of s. 7(1), which makes the presumption applicable not only to the costs of the s. 4 application but also to the costs of "the proceeding". [288] Furthermore, Levant does not stand for the proposition for which the respondents cite it. Rather, in Levant the Court of Appeal for Ontario held that fees charged to the applicant by a solicitor in the United Kingdom should be excluded from the costs award because the applicable tariff restricted the recovery of fees to persons who, unlike the solicitor in the United Kingdom, were authorized to practice law in Ontario. [289] The respondents rely as well on Reynolds (Costs). They say this case supports the conclusion that it would be inappropriate to require a respondent to pay costs for aspects of the litigation unrelated to the PPPA, and that where successful on those unrelated aspects of the litigation a respondent should receive their costs on Scale B of the tariff. [290] In Reynolds, the applicant was the defendant by counterclaim, and sought to dismiss that counterclaim pursuant to s. 4 of the PPPA. Justice Morley dismissed only the parts of the counterclaim that he held constituted expression made in the public interest, and refused to dismiss other parts that he determined did not involve such expression. To implement this result, Justice Morley struck out, or "pruned", some paragraphs of the counterclaim, and dismissed one of its claims for relief, but did not dismiss the counterclaim entirely. The respondent was thus successful in defending the parts of the counterclaim that were not about expression at all, and was awarded its costs in the cause for this part of the application: Reynolds v. Deep Water Recovery Ltd., 2024 BCSC 570 at paras. 1-9, 69, 153-154; Reynolds (Costs) at paras. 40-45. [291] By contrast, in the case at bar the entire proceeding, against all of the defendants, relates to expression made in the public interest. That expression is the Article of which the applicant is a co-author. The applicant's application for a declaration that she be given notice of any assessment of damages against the defaulting defendants is best viewed as an attempt to avoid any possibility of being saddled with liability through indemnity or contribution arising from her own expression made in the public interest. Unlike in Reynolds, this sought-after relief is logically connected to the applicant's expression made in the public interest and to the policy concerns animating the PPPA. This claim for relief is thus attributable to the PPPA proceeding, forms part of "the proceeding" as that term is used in s. 7(1) of the PPPA, and engages the presumption of full indemnity costs. [292] Yet this conclusion is not determinative on the issue of whether full indemnity costs should be awarded. [293] The applicant was unsuccessful on her application for a declaration that she be given notice of any application brought by the respondents for the assessment of damages against the defaulting defendants. [294] Plus, the respondents were fully justified in defending their right to seek an assessment of damages without the involvement of the applicant as an adversary. This is not a situation, for example, where they opposed the sought-after relief as part of a SLAPP. [295] Furthermore, the nature of the applicant's application for notice differs from her unsuccessful claim for damages under s. 8 of the PPPA, in that the s. 8 analysis takes into account the presumption in s. 7(1) that costs will be awarded on a full indemnity basis: see paragraph 162(e) above. [296] Accordingly, I have concluded that it would be inappropriate to require that the respondents pay full indemnity costs, or indeed any costs at all, in relation to the applicant's application for notice of any assessment of damages. Rather, in my view a fair and reasonable result is that the respondents have their costs of this application for notice at Scale B under the tariff. Conclusion [297] The applicant's application for damages under s. 8 of the PPPA is dismissed. [298] The applicant's application to dismiss the respondents' action against the non-defaulting defendants under s. 4 of the PPPA is adjourned generally. However, if the respondents in the future bring an application to further renew the NCC for the purpose of serving any of the non-defaulting defendants: (a) they must include in their application materials a copy of these reasons for judgment and my associated order; (b) they must serve their application materials on the applicant in accordance with the requirements of Rule 8-1(7); (c) the applicant will be permitted to file a response in accordance with Rule 8-1(9) and (10); and (d) the applicant has leave to bring back on her application to dismiss the action against the non-defaulting defendants. [299] The applicant's application for a declaration that she should receive notice of any application that the respondents bring for an assessment of damages against the defaulting defendants is dismissed. [300] The applicant shall have her costs on a full indemnity basis for her application for a dismissal of the respondents' action against her under s. 4 of the PPPA, and of this proceeding more generally, apart from the following two exceptions: (a) the applicant will receive her costs at Scale B with respect to her application under s. 4 to dismiss the action against the non-defaulting defendants; and (b) the respondents will receive their costs at Scale B with respect to the applicant's application for a declaration that she should receive notice of any application that the respondents bring for an assessment of damages against the defaulting defendants. "D. Layton J."