TB9-33104

RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB9-33104 TB9-33105 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Persons who are the subject of the appeal

XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personnes en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, ON Appel instruit / entendu à Date of decision December 23, 2020 Date de la décision Panel Paul Muldoon Tribunal Counsel for the persons who are the subject of the appeal Richard Odeleye Conseil des personnes en cause Designated representative

XXXX XXXX XXXX Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre

REASONS FOR DECISION

OVERVIEW [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX (Principal Appellant) and XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX (Minor Appellant) are citizens of Nigeria who are appealing a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD), dated November 1, 2019, dismissing their claims for protection. The Appellants submit that the RPD erred in assessing their claims, and they ask the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) to allow their appeals and determine that they are Convention refugees or persons in need of protection, pursuant to sections 96 and 97(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) or to send the matter back to the RPD for redetermination.

DETERMINATION [2] The determinative issues in this appeal are credibility and whether the Principal Appellant has a subjective fear of persecution and, in the alternative, the availability of a viable internal flight alternative (IFA). I have assessed the RPD's credibility findings, and, for the reasons that follow, I have found that the RPD did not err in its credibility findings or with respect to the availability of an IFA. [3] I considered this appeal in light of the Chairperson's Guideline 4: Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution (Guideline 4).1 Guideline 4 provides guiding principles for adjudicators in deciding cases involving women fearing gender-related persecution by addressing the particular challenges they may face in presenting their cases before the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB).

BACKGROUND [4] The Principal Appellant fears her husband's family who wants her son to undergo traditional customs and have her daughter circumcised. The problems started after the birth of the Principal Appellant's daughter in XXXX. The Principal Appellant's father-in-law (EIA) and his kinsmen sought to have her circumcised nine months after she was born. After EIA died, his younger brother (EA) sought to further the family demands. In 2015, the Principal Appellant and her family moved to another part of Lagos. In 2016, the family traveled to Dubai and Canada. In Canada, the Principal Appellant gave birth to her son. Upon their return, the Principal Appellant's husband's family tried to abduct the daughter to circumcise her and perform traditional rituals on the son. After another attempted kidnapping in XXXX 2017, the Appellants moved to Abuja. When the Principal Appellant heard that her husband's family knew where they were, they fled to the U.S. on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2018 and then travelled to Canada on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2018 to claim protection.

ROLE OF THE RAD [5] My role is to look at all of the evidence and decide if the RPD made the correct decision.2 In doing so, I have carried out my own independent analysis of the RPD record, including the RPD's reasons and decision, to determine whether the RPD erred.

NEW EVIDENCE [6] The Appellants did not make a request for new evidence. Because there is no new evidence in this appeal, I have no jurisdiction to hold a hearing.

ANALYSIS [7] The RPD found that the determinative issues are credibility and the availability of a viable IFA. More particularly, the RPD found that the Principal Appellant was not a credible witness and lacked a subjective fear of persecution from her husband's family and that there is a variable IFA in Port Harcourt. [8] The Appellant states that the RPD erred: (i) in its credibility analysis by its incorrect assessment or omitting certain evidence and failure to adhere to the presumption of truth of sworn testimony and finding a lack of subjective fear of persecution; (ii) in finding the Appellants' failure to claim in the U.S. was evidence of a lack of subjective fear of persecution; (iii) breaching the rules of procedural fairness in the Chairperson's Guideline 4; and (iv) in its IFA analysis. Did the RPD err in its credibility assessment and finding that the Appellants lacked a subjective fear of persecution? [9] The RPD found that the Principal Appellant lacked a fear of persecution because she stated that her fear began in XXXX XXXX when she gave birth to her daughter. She did not leave Nigeria for three years when she traveled to Canada, and the three-year delay is evidence of the lack of subjective fear of persecution.3 [10] The RPD stated that the Appellants then travelled to Canada for a five-month vacation and then returned to Nigeria for three years. The RPD found

that the Principal Appellant's reason for not seeking protection during that five-month stay in Canada was not reasonable. The Principal Appellant stated that she relied on the advice of a friend that the only way to come to Canada is through a student visa and that she did not seek the advice of a lawyer. The RPD found that the Appellant did not have documentation to establish that she applied twice for Canadian study visas when she returned to Nigeria. [11] The Appellants state that the RPD omitted evidence with respect to this finding. The Appellants state that the RPD did not inquire as to why they continued to live in Nigeria after the persecution started in 2013. Instead, the RPD asked the Principal Appellant why she did not stay in Canada after giving birth to her son in Canada in XXXX. The Principal Appellant explained that a friend told her that she needed an express entry or a student visa in order to stay in Canada. The Principal Appellant attempted to attain the visa more than one time. The Appellants state that the RPD did not explore this issue any further. [12] I do not find that the Appellants' submissions that the RPD "omitted evidence" as having any merit. From the transcript, it is apparent that the RPD focussed its questioning, for almost five pages of the transcript, on the timeline as to when the problem started with the Principal Appellants'

father-in-law.4 The questioning identifies the start of the problem in XXXX of XXXX with the birth of the Principal Appellant's child. The RPD then asks a series of questions first with respect to a five-month vacation in Canada and then with respect to the Principal Appellant travelling back to Nigeria. The RPD did not "omit" any evidence. Rather than focusing on why the Appellants stayed in Nigeria, the RPD, instead, focused on why the Principal Appellant did not claim protection in Canada during her five-month stay despite her fear, and then returned to Nigeria. [13] The Basis of Claim (BOC) form describes in considerable detail the challenges the Principal Appellant and her family were facing from 2013 to 2015. In its decision, the RPD found that the Principal Appellant did not adduce any evidence to explain why she stayed in Nigeria for three years despite the threats and assaults from her father-in-law and family.5 As far as I understand, in the Appellants' submissions, the Appellants note that the RPD did not inquire as to why the Appellants did not leave Nigeria while enduring the threats for three years. I agree with the Principal Appellant that it would have preferred that the RPD made additional inquiries in this regard. I also note that the Principal Appellant's Counsel did not ask any questions with this issue at the hearing and made no submissions at the end of

the hearing with respect to this issue. I find that the RPD did not err in finding a lack of subjective fear during the time from when the threats started in 2013, through to her time leaving for Canada and staying in Canada for five months without claiming for protection. [14] I also find that the RPD did not err in finding the Principal Appellant's explanation for not seeking protection in Canada unreasonable. The Principal Appellant had been in fear of persecution for over three years at this time and then travelled to Canada for five months. The Principal Appellant admitted she made no formal inquires as to whether she could claim protection with governmental officials or a lawyer during her stay in Canada. The Principal Appellant stated that she did not make the inquiries because she was here for a vacation.6 Instead, she spoke to a family friend who said that she can only apply through a student visa or express entry.7 I agree with the RPD that this response is not reasonable in light of the fear of persecution the Principal Appellant had endured for over three years. The Principal Appellant has over XXXX years of education, including a university degree. She speaks English and has travelled abroad. I find that her response that she was in Canada for a vacation without seriously exploring the possibility of claiming protection as not being credible and demonstrates a lack

of subjective fear. [15] The RPD also found that the Principal Appellant's failure to file student visa applications when she returned to Nigeria demonstrated her lack of subjective fear because of the lack of effort to flee Nigeria. The RPD found that she stayed in Nigeria for two years despite the threats against her and her daughter. [16] The Appellants submit that the RPD ignored the evidence submitted by way of post-hearing submissions that there were documents establishing that the Principal Appellant's student visa applications were rejected. [17] I agree with the Appellants that the RPD erred stating that the Principal Appellant did not attempt to attain the visas while the documentary evidence shows that she, in fact, did so.8 The RPD erred in drawing a negative inference by not submitting documents to establish that the Principal Appellant applied for student visas when, in fact, the evidence establishes that she did so. [18] I agree with the Appellants' submissions that the RPD erred in not considering the documents showing that the Principal Appellant did apply for student visas in Canada, and I find that the RPD erred in drawing a negative inference from the Principal Appellant's failure to file student visa applications with respect to her lack of subjective fear. However, I find that this error does not disturb the overall finding that the Appellants had not

established a subjective fear of persecution. Documentary Evidence [19] The Appellants state that the RPD erred in failing to apply the presumption of truthfulness of sworn testimony, including requiring corroborative evidence when there were no contradictions or omissions in the Principal Appellant's testimony. The Appellants submit that the RPD resorted to conjecture, suspicion and speculation in a number of instances, as for example, when the RPD wanted the Appellants to produce the birth certificates of EIA and EA to establish that they are related. The Appellants also state that the RPD "cast an aspersion" on the affidavits submitted into evidence asking why the Principal Appellant did not obtain a document from the court confirming that the notary public was authentic. [20] The Appellants submitted a number of documents in support of their appeal. They submitted a letter from a private school,9 dated XXXX XXXX XXXX 2017, affidavits from the Principal Appellant's husband (AOA),10 her mother (OIS),11 an uncle (SO),12 her friend (KO)13 and a letter from a cousin (AM).14 The latter two documents, for the most part, relate information given to them from the Principal Appellant, and I give them low probative value to substantiate the Appellants' allegations. The affidavits from the Principal Appellant's husband, mother and aunt relate that the husband's relatives want to

perform traditional rituals on the Principal Appellant's children. The mother's affidavit is vague stating in much of the affidavit that she is "aware" of the matters at hand. She stated that her daughter's in-laws visited her apartment but little details. With respect to general statements as to how influential his relatives are, the Principal Appellant's husband provides little information as to the connections, influence, and power of the relatives. In my overall assessment of these supporting documents, I find that they provide very limited information to support the key elements of the Appellants' narrative. Moreover, I give them low weight with respect to the Principal Appellant's credibility. I rely on the decision in Gebetas15 indicating that the lack of credibility can affect all relevant evidence submitted by an appellant, including documentary evidence. Did the RPD err with respect to its findings on failure to claim in the U.S.? [21] The RPD found that the Appellants arrived in the U.S. in XXXX 2018 and travelled to Canada to seek protection in XXXX 2018. The RPD found that the Principal Appellant made no effort to claim protection in the U.S. during this time. It found that her explanation that she could not find a lawyer to pursue a claim was not credible because there was not documentary evidence to substantiate the Principal Appellant's testimony. The RPD did

not find a U.S. lawyer's business card submitted to the RPD at the hearing to be credible. It also stated that the Appellants have not provided any evidence establishing that the U.S. has changed its laws to prevent refugee claimants from successfully applying for protection. [22] The Appellants state that the RPD erred when it stated that the U.S. would have not issued multi-entry visas if it did not want to accept refugees. The Appellants state that they did not seek refugee status because the U.S. was not accepting refugees, and there is a difference between issuing multi-entry visas and accepting refugees. The Appellants state that, contrary to the RPD's findings, the U.S. was not accepting refugees, although there may not have been any changes to U.S. law. The Appellants' explanation as to why they failed to claim in the U.S. was reasonable in that they could not afford a lawyer, and the lawyer they did consult was advised their claim would not be successful. [23] The Appellants state that the RPD did not question the Principal Appellant about the card, yet, in its decision, it found the card not to be credible. This finding was not put to the Principal Appellant and given an opportunity to respond. The Appellants state that, if the Principal Appellant brought a letter from a lawyer, the RPD would have found that letter not to be credible also. Second, a business card,

contrary to the RPD's finding, does not have to contain a registration number for the lawyer. Third, the RPD could have searched the internet and found the website for the lawyer. [24] I find that the RPD erred in finding that the Appellants' month stay in the U.S. before seeking protection in Canada is an indication of the lack of subjective fear. The Principal Appellant's explanation that they stayed with a relative in the U.S., could not afford a lawyer, and hearing about an unfavourable asylum climate in the U.S. is a reasonable explanation. Moreover, the Appellants had valid visas to be in the U.S. and were not in that country for a particularly long time. Did the RPD err by breaching the rules of procedural fairness in the Chairperson's Guideline 4: Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution? [25] The Appellants submit that the RPD failed to assess the Appellants' claim in light of Guideline 4 in that the RPD failed to acknowledge it and meaningfully apply it. The Appellants state that the RPD was not sensitive to the risk the Principal Appellant faces if she returns to Nigeria and focussed on credibility issues that arose for inconsequential matters. [26] Guideline 4 outlines the particular problems women may face in providing evidence at refugee protection hearings. While the RPD did not specifically formally name Guideline 4, it did recognize the

challenge of claimants in presenting evidence in light of the cultural factors and the stressful environment with respect to a hearing.16 At any rate, the mere failure to mention Guideline 4 does not necessary mean that the Guideline was not considered and appropriately applied. [27] The Appellants repeatedly state that Guideline 4 was not applied; however, they do not give any specific instances or examples. They do not state what the RPD did or did not do to stray from the Guideline or how the decision indicates a lack of consideration of Guideline 4. I have, however, conducted an independent review of the transcript, and I find that the RPD complied with Guideline 4. I found that the RPD was sensitive to the stressful environment of the hearing room, offered to take breaks, and took breaks for the benefit of the Principal Appellant. The RPD acted respectfully throughout the hearing. I have also considered Guideline 4 as to whether there were any challenges that she faced in explaining why she did not claim protection in Canada. Based on my review, I find that the RPD did not breach any rule of procedural fairness by failing to apply Guideline 4. Summary of the Credibility Findings [28] I find that the RPD did not err in finding that the Principal Appellant was not credible and has not established that she had subjective fear of persecution from the alleged agents of

persecution. The Principal Appellant did not provide reasonable explanations for her failure to claim while in Canada. She was in Canada for five months and did not seriously explore the possibilities for claiming protection, and, instead, she stated that she was in Canada on vacation. The Appellant then returns to Nigeria in 2016 and stays there until 2018 at which time she left for the U.S. I find that the RPD erred in drawing a negative inference from the Principal Appellant's failure to claim in the U.S. However, I find that her failure to claim in Canada17 and then her return to Nigeria undermines the root of her narrative that she fears persecution from her husband's family. Although lack of credibility is determinative of this appeal, I have also decided to assess the correctness of the RPD's alternative finding that the Appellants have a viable IFA. IFA Analysis: Preliminary Issue Appellants' Submissions on Preliminary Issue Pertaining to the RPD's Findings [29] The Appellants submit that the RPD erred in several respects in its analysis under both prongs of the test for whether the Appellants possess an IFA in Port Harcourt. However, the Appellants raise a preliminary issue with respect to the RPD's credibility and IFA findings. [30] The Appellants submit that, should the RAD find the RPD's credibility determination to be erroneous, it should further find that its

findings on IFA are in error. The Appellants submit that it is incongruent to find that the Appellants are not credible and reject the claim and then proceed with the IFA analysis and still reject the claim on the alternative finding of the IFA, thus rejecting the claim twice. Because the lack of credibility goes to the root of a claimant's claim so much so that, once the RPD finds that a claimant is not credible, then it is still superfluous to claim that the claimant has an IFA. The RPD cannot reject the claim on the basis that the claimant has no subjective fear of persecution and then ask them to live in another part of the country (meaning the fear of persecution is well founded since they have to live elsewhere). The Appellants rely on the Giraldo Cortes18 and Cisklya19 cases in support of this proposition. There is no Legal Impediment for the RPD to undertake an IFA Analysis [31] I disagree with the Appellants' submissions. First, from a legal analysis perspective, a finding "in the alternative," as it was done in the RPD's decision, suggests that there is a finding on first ground, and if that finding is incorrect, then the alternative, second finding is employed. "In the alternative" suggests that the findings are independent of each other and both are determinative of the appeal. Hence, the alternative finding may assume, for example, that a claimant's credibility has

not been impugned, yet there is an alternative ground to reject the claim independent of any other ground. [32] Second, I would prefer to rely on more recent Federal Court jurisprudence as in the Danelia20 and Rusznyak21 cases that do not accept this line of reasoning. I also rely on the reasoning in the Furman-Younis22 case where the Court stated: [17] I do not agree with the holding in Cortes (Litigation Guardian) v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 329 329, [2011] FCJ no 427 that a determination as to the Board's credibility findings being flawed automatically leads to the conclusion that the application must be allowed. There is no basis to conclude that the Board's credibility finding "tainted its entire decision" in this instance (for similar reasoning see Pena v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 746, [2011] FCJ no 964 at para 30). Therefore, in my view, an assessment as to the reasonableness of the state protection analysis must also be undertaken. [33] I find that the RPD did not err in making findings in the alternative. The RPD did not err in undertaking and making findings with respect to an IFA analysis, and I have conducted the IFA analysis independent of my findings on credibility. Did the RPD err in its IFA Analysis? [34] In order to determine whether a viable IFA exists, I must consider whether the legal test for

an IFA has been met. The test for assessing an IFA is well established.23 It has two prongs. First, it must be satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that there is no serious possibility of the claimant being persecuted in the part of the country to which it finds an IFA exists and/or the claimant would not be personally subject to a risk to life, or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, or a danger of torture, believed on substantial grounds to exist, in the IFA. [35] The second prong is that the conditions in the part of the country considered to be an IFA must be such that it would not be unreasonable in all of the circumstances, including those particular to the Appellants, for them to seek refuge there. [36] Under the test, both prongs must be met once an IFA has been identified. At that point, the burden of proof is on the appellant to establish that there is no IFA. In assessing an IFA, the appellant's circumstances and profile must be taken into consideration. For the second prong, the appellant must overcome a very high threshold to demonstrate that the IFA location is unreasonable by providing evidence that the appellant's life and safety would be jeopardized by relocating to the proposed location.24 [37] The Federal Court of Appeal has stated: We read the decision of Linden J.A. for this Court as setting up a very high threshold for the

unreasonableness test. It requires nothing less than the existence of conditions which would jeopardize the life and safety of a claimant in travelling or temporarily relocating to a safe area. In addition, it requires actual and concrete evidence of such conditions. The absence of relatives in a safe place, whether taken alone or in conjunction with other factors, can only amount to such condition if it meets that threshold, that is to say if it establishes that, as a result, a claimant's life or safety would be jeopardized. This is in sharp contrast with undue hardship resulting from loss of employment, loss of status, reduction in quality of life, loss of aspirations, loss of beloved ones and frustration of one's wishes and expectations.25 First Prong of the Test: Is there a Serious Possibility of Persecution in Port Harcourt? [38] The RPD found that the Appellants had a viable IFA in Port Harcourt. The RPD found that there is no serious possibility of persecution in Port Harcourt. The RPD found that the agent of persecution, the Principal Appellant's father-in-law, EIA, has died. The RPD found that there is no evidence that the Principal Appellant's uncle or relatives live in Port Harcourt, and none of their names were provided in evidence, and it was a matter of speculation that the cousins have any interest in pursuing the Appellants. The RPD found that both the Principal

Appellant and her husband do not support traditional rituals or female circumcision. [39] The RPD gave the affidavits of the Principal Appellant's mother and husband little weight because they did not name the agent of persecution and did not have identification attached. A lawyer's letter confirming the authenticity of the husband's affidavit was also not given weight because the letter was not mentioned in the BOC and had no identification, and the Principal Appellant was not aware of the letter. The RPD then found the affidavits and supporting documents were fraudulent to bolster the Appellants' claim.26 [40] The Appellants submit that the RPD found that the Appellants were not credible because they did not provide corroborative evidence to support each part of their claim, in particular, birth certificates for the Principal Appellant's father-in-law and his brother and identity documents. The Appellants state that the RPD also erred when it found the affidavits of the Principal Appellant's mother and husband not to be authentic, even though her husband's affidavit was sworn before a notary public. [41] The Appellants submit that the Appellants' oral and documentary evidence shows that the agents of persecution have demonstrated the ability to track the Appellants in places where they have gone in hiding and show willingness, motivation and determination to search for the

Appellants. Findings on the First Prong: There is no Serious Possibility of Persecution in Port Harcourt [42] The RPD did not err in finding that there is no serious possibility of persecution in Port Harcourt. First, when both parents oppose female genital mutilation (FGM), the documentary evidence in the National Documentation Package (NDP) states that the decision with respect to the FGM rests with the parents.27 The documentation states that, in Lagos State, parents have enough ability and freedom to refuse FGM regardless of state of origin.28 Moreover, there may be the opportunity for state protection.29 [43] Second, the Appellants have not provided evidence to establish that the Principal Appellant's relatives have the means and influence to track the Appellants in Port Harcourt. EIA died a number of years ago.30 EA, EIA's brother, is now pursuing the Appellants, although the Principal Appellant was vague about EA's influence and interest. For example, she did not know what he did for a living.31 The Principal Appellant stated that she had relatives in Port Harcourt, and when further asked, the Principal Appellant said that a distant cousin was living in Port Harcourt,32 and she was afraid that they may find them. However, there is no evidence that the cousins are interested in the Appellants. I find that the Principal Appellant was speculating, considering that Port

Harcourt has a population of well over two million people. The Principal Appellant stated that her husband still resides in Nigeria, and no harm has come to him.33 The Principal Appellant has also not demonstrated that the agents of persecution have the means or the influence to find them while in Port Harcourt. [44] The Appellants state that the documentary evidence establishes that there is a serious possibility of persecution in Port Harcourt. However, the Appellants do not provide any specificity as to what the documents establish and what facts they wish to rely upon to establish that there is a serious possibility of persecution in Port Harcourt. The affidavit from the Principal Appellant's husband outlines the influence of EIA, but it says little about EA, only that he will use all of his "connections and power" to fulfill EIA's wishes, without elaboration of the nature or extent of his connections and powers.34 In his second affidavit,35 the Principal Appellant's husband said that EA told him that his wife and child cannot escape his wrath and vowed to not give up his search for them. However, the affiant did not outline what influence EA possesses, his power and ability to track the Appellants and what connections he has in Port Harcourt. Hence, the affidavits from the Principal Appellant's husband have little probative value that EA has the power and connections to

pursue the Appellants in Port Harcourt. [45] The affidavits from her mother (OIS)36 and an uncle (SO)37 do not speak directly to the influence, power or ability of EA to track the Appellants to Port Harcourt. This is the same weakness with respect to the Principal Appellant's friend (KO)38 and a letter from a cousin (AM).39 These latter two documents most repeat what was told to them by the Principal Appellant. [46] I find that there is no serious possibility that the Appellants will be persecuted in Port Harcourt or would be personally subject to a risk to their lives, or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, or a danger of torture in Port Harcourt. Prong 2: Is it Reasonable in all the Circumstances for the Appellants to seek Refuge in Port Harcourt? [47] The RPD found that the Principal Appellant is a university graduate, fluent in English and Yoruba, and she operated her own XXXX business in Nigeria. It also found that she is still married to her husband and in a matrimonial relationship with him. The RPD found there was no evidence that she would be unable to find work in Port Harcourt in light of her education and background or that her daughter would have any issue in entering school in Port Harcourt. [48] The Appellants submit that the RPD did not take into consideration the profile of the Appellants, and it was not sensitive to the age, gender, level

of education, ethnicity, religion, financial circumstances and their ability to find employment and accommodation. [49] The Appellants submit that the RPD failed to take into consideration that the Appellants would not be able to live freely and openly; they would not be able to look for a job and would have to change their addresses on their driver's licences, cell phones and car registration. [50] The Appellants submit that it would be difficult for the Principal Appellant to find a job, and the government reserves all positions for indigenes. The Appellants state that country documents support the view that the Nigerian government will persecute the Appellants if they were to return to Nigeria because they are Yorubas, and they are not from Port Harcourt. The Appellants state that indigeneship is important and that, even though English is the official language, the vast majority of Nigerians do not speak English. The Appellants state that people fight and kill each other in that it is a big issue to relocate to an area where you are not indigene. [51] The Appellants also submit that the RPD did not consider the country documentation that shows the challenges a single woman with a family have in securing employment and accommodation in Port Harcourt. Single women may be challenged because single women are more vulnerable to crime. [52] The Appellants submit that the RPD did

not consider the XXXX report in its IFA analysis and how the Principal Appellant's XXXX conditions may impact her ability to relocate to Port Harcourt. The Appellants state that the RPD made no attempt to engage with the central issue of whether the IFA is reasonable for the Appellants. Is it Unreasonable for the Appellants to Relocate to Port Harcourt? [53] Under the second prong of the IFA test, the conditions in the part of the country considered to be an IFA must be such that it would not be unreasonable in all of the circumstances, including those particular to the claim, for the claimant to seek refuge there. [54] While I find that the RPD did not err in concluding that the conditions in Port Harcourt were not such that it would be unreasonable to seek refuge in Port Harcourt, I find that it did not outline all of the bases for its findings. I have independently reviewed the evidence in a holistic manner, and I find it is not unreasonable for the Appellants, when considering all of their particular circumstances, to relocate to Port Harcourt. Education and Employment [55] The Appellants state that it would be difficult for the Principal Appellant to find employment as a single woman. I disagree. The Principal Appellant has XXXX XXXX XXXX years of education, including a university degree and a diploma in XXXX training. She is proficient both in Yoruba and English and has

travelled internationally. She testified that she had run her own business. According to the narrative in her XXXX report,40 she held a government position as an XXXX XXXX for about a year and then ran her own XXXX business in 2016. Hence, the Principal Appellant would stand in far better position than most women in Port Harcourt in search of employment. [56] The Appellants submit that the RPD failed to consider country documentation demonstrating the challenges involved for single women when seeking employment in Port Harcourt. I find that the submissions are misleading. The Principal Appellant and her husband remain in a matrimonial relationship. There is no evidence as to why that relationship would change if she relocates to Nigeria. The Principal Appellant gave no evidence why her husband could not relocate to Port Harcourt or that, if he does not move to Port Harcourt, he would not financially support his family in Port Harcourt. She states that he had a good IT position in Lagos but gives no detail why he could not find alternative employment in Port Harcourt. The documentary evidence suggests that finding employment may be difficult, but there are employment opportunities, especially for a professional couple with university education and work experience. I find that the IFA should not be undertaken assuming that the Principal Appellant and, as such, the country

conditions evidence with respect to that situation do not apply in this case. Further, I find that, given the profile of the Principal Appellant and her husband, they would not have a more difficult time in obtaining employment in Port Harcourt than other Nigerians, and, hence, it would not be unreasonable for the Appellants to relocate to Port Harcourt. [57] I disagree with the Appellants' submission that they would be unable to live free and, as such, unable to search for a job. There is no evidence that they would have to remain in hiding, as I have found that there is no serious risk of persecution in Port Harcourt. The suggestion that they may have to change their addresses on the driver's licences, cell phones and car registration, if they feel such actions are necessary, does not make relocation to Port Harcourt objectively unreasonable. Accommodation [58] The Appellants do not focus their submissions on finding accommodation in Port Harcourt. The country documentation does state that the housing in Port Harcourt is expensive;41 however, given the profile of the Principal Appellant and her husband, she does stand in an equal or better position than most Nigerians to find adequate accommodation in Port Harcourt. The Principal Appellant and her husband have not provided evidence that they could not afford housing in Port Harcourt. Moreover, while single women are

particularly challenged to find accommodation, I have already found that the Principal Appellant and her husband as a family unit do not share the same barriers a single woman would share. Cost of Living in Port Harcourt and Access to Social Services [59] The Principal Appellant did not specifically state that they could not afford to live in Port Harcourt or access social services, except stating that there were difficulties to gain employment for single women. The country documentation states that, in general, medical and mental health care facilities are concentrated in the large cities, such as Port Harcourt. The Principal Appellant and her husband travelled to the U.S. and relocated within Nigeria, suggesting that they have a certain resourcefulness. Moreover, the Principal Appellant had the resources to travel to and stay in Canada for five months, travel back to Nigeria, and then travel back to the U.S., stay there for five months prior to relocating to Canada. I find it would not be unreasonable for the Appellants to relocate to Port Harcourt due to the cost of living or access to social services. Language [60] The Appellants state that the vast majority of people in Port Harcourt do not speak English. I do not agree with the Appellants' submissions. I do not find language is a barrier for the Appellants to relocate to Port Harcourt. Both the Principal Appellant and her

husband speak English and Yoruba. The Appellants would be able to function in English, as it is the official language of the country and used for most governmental administrative functions, including education and business. Although there may be some challenges, the country documentation does suggest that language would not make it objectively unreasonable for the Appellants to relocate to Port Harcourt.42 Religion, Transportation and Travel [61] The Appellants did not state that they would have challenges with respect to religion or travel. The Principal Appellant and her husband are Christians, and there appears to be no impediment for them to practice their religion in Port Harcourt.43 Port Harcourt has an airport, and there does not seem to be any impediment for the Appellants to travel through the areas where their alleged agents of persecution reside.44 [62] The Appellants state that indigeneship is very significant in that "people fight and kill each other" where one relocates to an area where you are not an indigene. I disagree with this statement. The Appellants did not point to any country documentation to support this statement. The country documentation suggests that indigeneship status is less important in big cities such as Port Harcourt because of the large number of people relocating to the city. [63] The general statements made by the Appellants about high

crime rates in large cities are certainly of concern; however, the onus is on the Appellants to demonstrate that those crime rates make the situation, in their circumstances, unreasonable. There is insufficient evidence to make such a finding. Principal Appellant's XXXX Report [64] The Appellants state that the RPD did not consider the XXXX report45 and how her XXXX conditions may impact her ability to relocate to Port Harcourt. The RPD did not provide an assessment of the XXXX report other than stating that various documents had no probative value to support her claim.46 [65] In my independent assessment, I find that the report by XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, a XXXX, dated XXXX XXXX XXXX 2019, does not lead me to the conclusion that it would be objectively unreasonable for the Appellants to relocate to Port Harcourt. [66] In the XXXX report, XXXX XXXX XXXX states that the Principal Appellant was diagnosed with XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXandXXXX XXXXand referred to her from XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. However, the diagnosis from XXXX XXXX XXXX is not included in the report. Hence, the basis for the finding of this diagnosis was not disclosed. The report states that the referral to her was to explore her XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXandXXXX XXXX since her migration to Canada and to make treatment recommendations. XXXX XXXX XXXX conducted a single interview with the Principal Appellant and was presented with the

Principal Appellant's refugee protection claim documents. [67] XXXX XXXX XXXX conducted three tests, a XXXX XXXX Inventory and a XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX disorder checklist, both are questionnaires where the Principal Appellant scores show she is suffering from XXXX XXXX and highly likely suffering from XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. The report states that the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX checklist shows that she has significant symptoms. XXXX XXXX XXXX states that the tests support the physician's diagnoses. [68] XXXX XXXX XXXX recommends XXXX XXXX of XXXX XXXX-oriented XXXX. She also recommends up to XXXX XXXX for ongoing XXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX and communication with other treatment providers and preparation of a progress report. [69] The Appellants provide no explanation or basis for the view that the Principal Appellant's XXXX conditions would make it unreasonable for her to relocate to Port Harcourt. [70] I note that the report neither provides support for the truth of the Appellant's narrative nor provides a basis to find that it is unreasonable for her to relocate to Port Harcourt. XXXX XXXX XXXX report does not independently establish that the Principal Appellant's symptoms result from the experience she is alleging in Nigeria that form the foundation for her claim for protection. While the Principal Appellant may be suffering from certain XXXX conditions, there is no basis for finding

what were the events that precipitated those symptoms. The report notes that the Principal Appellant's brother was fatally injured in a motor vehicle accident in Nigeria and that the death was devastating to the family. [71] XXXX XXXX XXXX report recommends XXXX sessions of XXXX and then an evaluation as to the progress with respect to the Principal Appellant's conditions. The report was written well over a year ago, and there is no evidence that the recommendations were acted upon and whether her conditions have improved. [72] The report states that, considering "the ongoing threats to the safety and well-being of her family, it is safe to conclude" that the Principal Appellant would not stop suffering from XXXX and the XXXX of XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. This statement presumes that the threats are credible, that such threats are the sources of the Principal Appellant's XXXX conditions and that recommended treatments would be ineffective. There is also no comment in the report or any other evidence regarding how the XXXX conditions noted in the report would impede the Principal Appellant's ability to relocate to Port Harcourt. The Principal Appellant has not submitted evidence that she would be unable to receive appropriate treatment for her XXXX conditions in Port Harcourt. The IFA and the Minor Appellant [73] The Appellants have not made any submissions focused on whether there

are any particular challenges or barriers that would make it unreasonable for the Minor Appellant to relocate to Port Harcourt. For example, there are no evidence to establish that the Minor Appellant has psychological or health issues where treatment would not be available in Port Harcourt. There are no submissions that the Minor Appellant would be prevented from attending school. I find that, on a balance of probabilities, it would not be unreasonable for the Minor Appellant to relocate to Port Harcourt. Overall Findings with respect to the IFA [74] In summary, based upon the Principal Appellant's circumstances, including age, gender, education, work experience, language capabilities, and religion, I find there are no serious social, cultural, familial or economic barriers to the Appellants relocating to Port Harcourt. The proposed IFA city is not unreasonable in their circumstances. [75] I have also undertaken my assessment in light of Guideline 4 where I am to consider religious, economic, social and cultural factors, any other relevant factor to assess the reasonableness of the IFA for a woman fearing gender-related persecution. I have reviewed all of these factors in light of Guideline 4, and my finding remains that it would not be unreasonable for the Appellants to relocate to Port Harcourt. [76] I find that the Appellants have a viable IFA in Port Harcourt. I am

satisfied that there is no serious possibility of persecution in Port Harcourt, and the Appellants would not, on a balance of probabilities, be personally subject to a risk to their lives, or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, or a danger of torture, in Port Harcourt. I also find that the conditions in Port Harcourt are such that it would not be unreasonable in the circumstances, including those particular to the Appellants, for the Appellant to seek refuge there.

CONCLUSION [77] I dismiss the appeal and confirm the decision of the RPD that the Appellants are neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection. (signed) Paul Muldoon Paul Muldoon December 23, 2020 Date 1 Effective November 13, 1996. 2 M.C.I. v. Huruglica, Bujar (F.C.A., no. A-470-14), Gauthier, Webb, Near, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 93; Rozas Del Solar, Paola v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2645-17), Diner, November 14, 2018, 2018 FC 1145. 3 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD's Reasons, at para. 13. 4 Transcript of the RPD Hearing (October 9, 2019), at p. 19; lines 23-28, at p. 20; lines 5-49; at p. 21, lines 8-48; at p. 22, lines 5-49; at p. 23, lines 6-15; and Audio Recording of the RPD Hearing (October 9, 2019), from 00:30:12 to 00:42:02. 5 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD's Reasons, at para. 13. 6 Transcript of the RPD Hearing (October 9, 2019), at p. 21, lines 42-48; and p. 22, lines 33-36. 7 Transcript of the RPD Hearing (October 9, 2019), at p. 21, lines 18-22. 8 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp. 174-179, Exhibit 9, at pp. 1-6. 9 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 126, Exhibit 6, at p. 2. 10 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp. 131-133, Exhibit 6, at pp. 7-9; and pp. 188-189, Exhibit 9, at pp. 16-17. 11 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp. 134-135, Exhibit 6, at pp. 10-11. 12 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp. 136-137, Exhibit 6, at pp. 12-13. 13 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at

pp. 165-166, Exhibit 8, at pp. 8-9. 14 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp. 161-162, Exhibit 8, at pp. 4-5. 15 Gebetas, Ergun v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-11313-12), Shore, December 10, 2013, 2013 FC 1241, at para. 29. 16 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD's Reasons, at para. 6. 17 See: Osinowo, Kayode Afeez v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2056-17), Diner, March 12, 2018, 2018 FC 284, para. 21. 18 Giraldo Cortes, Gloria Stephanie v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4735-10), Campbell, March 17, 2011, 2011 FC 329. 19 Csiklya, Jeno v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6282-18), Ahmed, October 9, 2019, 2019 FC 1276. 20 Danelia, Lali v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3324-13), Manson, July 16, 2014, 2014 FC 707, para. 29. 21 Rusznyak, Dezso v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-13104-12), Russell, March 14, 2014, 2014 FC 255, at paras. 47 and 57. 22 Furman-Yunis, Irit v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7021-11), Near, June 7, 2012, 2012 FC 714, at para. 17. 23 Rasaratnam, Sivaganthan v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-232-91), Mahoney, Stone, Linden, December 5, 1991; [1992] 1 F.C. 706 (C.A.), at 710; and Thirunavukkarasu, Sathiyanathan v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-81-92), Heald, Linden, Holland, November 10, 1993; [1994] 1 F.C. 589 (C.A.); (1993), 22 Imm. L.R. (2d) 241 (F.C.A.). 24 Ranganathan, Sumathy v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-191-03), von Finckenstein, November 20, 2003, 2003 FC 1367. 25 M.C.I. v. Ranganathan, Rohini (F.C.A., no. A-348-99), Létourneau, Sexton,

Malone, December 21, 2000; [2001] 2 F.C. 164 (C.A.), at paras. 15-16, citing Thirunavukkarasu v. M.E.I., [1994] 1 F.C. 589 (C.A.); (1993), 22 Imm. L.R. (2d) 241 (F.C.A.). 26 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD's Reasons, at para. 44. 27 NDP for Nigeria (November 30, 2020), item 5.28, IRB, Response to Information Request (RIR) NGA105628.E, "Prevalence of female genital mutilation (FGM), including ethnic groups in which FGM is prevalent, particularly in Lagos States and within Edo ethnic group; consequences for refusal; availability of state protection; the ability of a family...", September 13, 2016, section 4. 28 NDP for Nigeria (November 30, 2020), item 5.28 (ibid.), section 4. 29 NDP for Nigeria (November 30, 2020), item 5.12, IRB, RIR NGA106183.E, "Whether parents can refuse female genital mutilation (FGM) of their daughter; state protection available (2016-October 2018)", October 29, 2018, section 3. 30 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 130, Exhibit 6, at p. 1. 31 Transcript of the RPD Hearing (October 9, 2019), at p. 48, lines 35-37. 32 Transcript of the RPD Hearing (October 9, 2019), at p. 49, lines 30-45; at p. 66, lines 25-49. 33 Transcript of the RPD Hearing (October 9, 2019), at p. 50, lines 12-18. 34 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp. 131-133, Exhibit 6, at pp. 7-9. 35 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp. 188-189, Exhibit 9, at pp. 16-17. 36 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp.

134-135, Exhibit 6, at pp. 10-11. 37 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp. 136-137, Exhibit 6, at pp. 12-13. 38 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp. 165-166, Exhibit 8, at pp. 8-9. 39 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp. 161-162, Exhibit 8, at pp. 4-5. 40 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 148, Exhibit 7. 41 NDP for Nigeria (November 30, 2020), item 12.6, IRB, RIR NGA104679.E, "Treatment of Christians who relocate from northern parts of Nigeria by people in Port Harcourt [River State]; whether they face linguistic, economic and social difficulties (2012-November 2013)", section 2. 42 NDP for Nigeria (November 30, 2020), item 12.6 (ibid.), section 7. 43 NDP for Nigeria (November 30, 2020), item 12.6 (ibid.), section 1. 44 NDP for Nigeria (November 30, 2020), item 1.6, United States, Central Intelligence Agency, "Nigeria: The World Factbook", November 18, 2020. 45 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp. 145-154, Exhibit 7. 46 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD's Reasons, at para. 44. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB9-33104 TB9-33105 RAD.25.02 (January 2020) Disponible en français 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (January 2020) Disponible en français