D.P.P. v. J.P.

2025 BCSC 373 D.P.P. v. J.P.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: D.P.P. v. J.P., 2025 BCSC 373 Date: 20250212 Docket: E70341 Registry: New Westminster Between: D.P.P. Claimant And J.P. Respondent Before: Associate Judge Nielsen Oral Reasons for Judgment In Chambers Counsel for the Claimant: S.S. Atwal Counsel for the Respondent: C. Cheong Place and Dates of Hearing: New Westminster, B.C. February 7 and 12, 2025 Place and Date of Judgment: New Westminster, B.C. February 12, 2025 [1] THE COURT: This is an application by the claimant for parenting time with her children, Child A who is 15 years old and Child B who is nine years old. The claimant is currently being effectively denied any parenting time with either child. [2] The claimant is seeking interim parenting time on a progressive schedule, with unsupervised parenting time every weekend from 11:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. on each Saturday and Sunday from now until March 14, and then overnight parenting from March 22 to April 27, 2025, every Saturday from 4:00 p.m. until Sunday at 4:00 p.m., and then from May 2, 2025, until June 29, 2025, for roughly eight weeks, with overnight parenting time every alternate weekend from Friday at 4:00 p.m. until Sunday 4:00 p.m. And every other week when not exercising overnight parenting time, the claimant is seeking to exercise parenting time from Wednesday at 4:00 p.m. or after school until Friday at 8:00

a.m. or school drop-off. Then, following that, basically equal parenting on a week‑on/week‑off basis. [3] The claimant is also seeking an interim order pursuant to s. 51 of the Family Law Act that both parties have joint and shared custody of the children, and an interim order pursuant to s. 42(2) of the Family Law Act that the claimant and the respondent shall share the parental responsibilities as set out in s. 41 of the Family Law Act on an equal and shared basis during their parenting time. [4] By way of background, the claimant and respondent were married in Fiji on April 15, 2009. They separated on February 1, 2023. When the claimant advised she wished to end the marriage, the respondent threatened to commit suicide. The claimant alleges this suicidal ideation was expressed in front of the children, causing them significant trauma. The respondent was subsequently taken to the psychiatric ward at Surrey Memorial Hospital for observation and, prior to his release, the hospital spoke with the claimant concerning whether she needed protection. The claimant advised she did not, as she felt it would further traumatize the children. [5] There is an allegation by the respondent that the relationship ended because of the claimant's alleged infidelity. The respondent alleges their daughter discovered the alleged infidelity by way of text messages on the claimant's cellphone. The

respondent further alleges the claimant threatened their daughter not to reveal the texts. [6] The claimant denies any infidelity or threats towards their daughter or otherwise. The claimant attests she wanted out of the marriage and separated as a result on February 1, 2023. [7] She indicates she did have a brief relationship approximately four months long, but that took place after the separation of the parties. [8] Once separated, the claimant filed her notice of family claim but had significant difficulty serving the respondent, as he was apparently actively avoiding service. [9] The parties owned a family home in Surrey, British Columbia, and upon separation the respondent asked the claimant to leave the family home and threatened her with a protection order. Fearful of creating a scene in front of the children, the claimant left the family home and resided with a friend for two weeks before renting her own place. [10] The respondent unilaterally moved to Abbotsford with the children to live with his parents. The children were enrolled in an Abbotsford school. Unfortunately for the claimant, she did not have a Class 5 driver's licence, so had no ability to see her children once they left the Surrey area, and the respondent was unwilling to drive the children to the Surrey area to see her. At this time, the respondent provided the claimant with a separation agreement he

drafted for the claimant's signature. [11] The claimant wanted legal advice before signing. The respondent then advised if she would not sign the separation agreement, he would bring an application for a protection order, which he did. The application was commenced but abandoned when the claimant retained counsel. [12] The family home was sold in January of 2024, and the proceeds have been distributed. [13] The claimant works as a secretary at the B.C. Cancer Agency and has limited financial means. As the respondent refused to drive the children to Surrey to see the claimant, she began the process of getting her driver's licence, and apparently, she has since achieved that goal. [14] Since September 2023, the claimant has had overnight parenting time on November 11 and 12, 2023, and March 15 through 17, 2024. The claimant has not had any parenting time since, and since June 2024, the respondent has not permitted any communication with the children, despite her attempts to do so. Her calls were blocked by the respondent. [15] Sometime in June, the respondent again unilaterally relocated with the children to Delta, British Columbia, and again changed their schools without consulting with the claimant. [16] In September of 2024, the claimant's mother had come from Fiji to assist the claimant. The respondent agreed to allow parenting time, but only if it was supervised by the

respondent's new partner, Ms. R.H. The claimant reluctantly agreed with the respondent's plan, being to meet at the Scottsdale mall on September 7, 2024. The claimant and her mother had to take a cab to the Scottsdale mall as the claimant did not have her driver's licence at that time. The respondent had agreed to unblock the claimant's phone number for the purpose of the visitation. [17] According to the claimant, when she first saw the children at the mall, both children refused to hug her, while maintaining eye contact with Ms. R.H. Ms. R.H. also advised the claimant's mother, the children's grandmother, that she was not permitted to hug the children. [18] Immediately after meeting the children, the youngest child, while again maintaining eye contact with Ms. R.H., stated he had a stomach ache. Ms. R.H. then instructed both children that they would therefore have to go home, and they walked away, leaving the claimant and her mother standing there without any parenting time whatsoever. [19] The claimant attests that as the children walked away with Ms. R.H., Child B waved to them behind his back. She further attested the children and Ms. R.H. continued shopping at the mall after leaving the claimant and her mother. [20] In a final attempt to see the children, the claimant went into a store where Ms. R.H. and the children were and asked again if she could see them. Ms. R.H.

refused and threatened to call security on her. The claimant observed Ms. R.H. approach a mall security guard. [21] The claimant attests that after the heartbreaking experience at the mall, she instructed counsel to obtain an exemption from the JCC program so she could get an order for parenting time. However, due to scheduling conflicts and the respondent reaching out to allegedly settle all matters, the application was delayed, and then took some time to set. [22] In December 2024, the claimant again attempted to see the children by attending Child B's Christmas concert. There were two sittings for the concert, one at 1:00 p.m. and the other at 6:00 p.m. The claimant hoped to attend the 6:00 p.m. concert, given her work schedule, but was told by the respondent that he and Ms. Hanssens had already obtained the two 6:00 p.m. seats, and therefore only the 1:00 p.m. showing was available. [23] The claimant changed her work schedule in order to attend the 1:00 p.m. show. However, when the claimant arrived for the 1:00 p.m. show, she was advised by the principal that the respondent and Ms. H. were now attending the 1:00 p.m. show. During the show, Ms. H. sat beside the claimant and spoke of her alleged happy life. After the concert, the respondent and Ms. H. prevented the claimant from approaching her son to congratulate him, which left the claimant very upset. [24] Since

September, the claimant began to purchase her son, Child B, lunch at school. The respondent, through his lawyer, advised not to do so, as he was simply bringing the lunches home and throwing them out. Concerned, the claimant contacted Child B's teacher regarding the lunches, and she was advised by the teacher in an email; "Yes, he is very excited getting a hot lunch and he is eating it and always asks if he got a hot lunch. He is very happy when I say yes." [25] The respondent attests that, at present, following the teacher's emails, the respondent now observes Child B throw his lunch away when he returns home from school. Out of concern regarding the wasting of food, the respondent has asked the claimant to stop arranging school lunches for Child B. [26] The claimant has produced a copy of Ms. H.'s, Only Fans website which allegedly offers sexual content in exchange for money. The claimant attests that on Ms. H.'s website, Ms. H. agrees to send nude pictures of herself to whoever subscribes to her Only Fans website and sends her money. Ms. H. attests she does not provide her address to people who subscribe to her website, and that the website depicts only tasteful photos of her in lingerie, not nude. She further attests that the children have not been exposed to her website, nor has she made any money of significance from the website. [27] In July of 2024, Ms. H. advised the

respondent that Child B had said to her that the claimant had showered with Child B during his parenting time with the claimant in November of 2023. As a result, the MCFD began an investigation. The claimant was interviewed on July 18, 2024. The claimant denies the allegation and believes it to have been made for the sole purpose of preventing parenting time by the claimant with her children. The claimant eventually received a letter from the MCFD dated September 24, 2024, advising that they were closing their file. The letter stated in part: Based on the results of my assessment, Child B and Child A are not in need of protection as reported and there is no need for further Ministry involvement to occur. [28] When the court makes orders for parenting time, it is to consider the best interests of the children only, as per s. 37(1) of the Family Law Act. Section 37(2) provides: (2) To determine what is in the best interests of a child, all of the child's needs and circumstances must be considered, including the following: (a) the child's health and emotional well-being; (b) the child's views, unless it would be inappropriate to consider them; (c) the nature and strength of the relationships between the child and significant persons in the child's life; (d) the history of the child's care; (e) the child's need for stability, given the child's age and stage of development; (f) the

ability of each person who is a guardian or seeks guardianship of the child, or who has or seeks parental responsibilities, parenting time or contact with the child, to exercise the person's responsibilities; (g) the impact of any family violence on the child's safety, security or well-being, whether the family violence is directed toward the child or another family member; (h) whether the actions of a person responsible for family violence indicate that the person may be impaired in the person's ability to care for the child and meet the child's needs; (i) the appropriateness of an arrangement that would require the child's guardians to cooperate on issues affecting the child, including whether requiring cooperation would increase any risks to the safety, security or well-being of the child or other family members; [and finally] (j) any civil or criminal proceeding relevant to the child's safety, security or well-being. [29] Until February 1, 2023, both parties were equally involved in the children's lives. There is no suggestion in the materials filed that, prior to separation, the parties were anything but loving and caring parents. The evidence since separation is illustrative of the difficulties the claimant has had obtaining any parenting time and, even when agreed, as with the Scottsdale mall occasion and the Christmas concert, her parenting time was effectively

sabotaged. [30] The respondent alleges that the children do not want to spend any time with the claimant. He further submits that while he is not opposed to parenting time, there must be counselling with a s. 211 report prior to any unsupervised parenting time, as that would be in the children's best interests. In this regard, the respondent indicates the children have expressed psychological difficulties when parenting time with the claimant is suggested. I have not been directed to any medical opinions or evidence in this regard from independent third-party professionals. [31] The respondent submits that the claimant is resistant to psychological intervention or treatment for the children. The claimant denies that she is averse to any medical treatment and submits she has never been included in any discussions in this regard. On the contrary, the claimant submits that the respondent's suicidal ideation incident in February of 2023 is illustrative of the seriousness of mental illness. [32] Given the history of the respondent acting unilaterally in regards to parenting decisions involving the children, including unilaterally moving to Abbotsford and later to Delta, I accept the claimant's evidence in this regard. [33] I do not have an application for a s. 211 report before me and I note the comments of Justice Hori in B.D.K. v. D.M.W., 2024 BCSC 2385, where he stated at paras.

23 and 24: [23] The court has a broad discretion in deciding whether or not to order a report pursuant to s. 211 of the [Family Law Act]. The threshold for exercising the discretion in favour of ordering a report is low. However, as held in S.M.C. v. C.B., 2020 BCSC 994, at para. 33, the court should not order a s. 211 report if the purpose for the report is an attempt to create parenting controversies where none exist. [24] In this case, I find that the evidence does not support the respondents' concern about the claimant's mental health or about his willingness or ability to satisfy the needs of the child. In that regard, I find that the respondents' application for a s. 211 report is an attempt to create parenting controversies where none exist. [34] I agree with those observations in the context of this case. The respondent does not have a history of consulting with the claimant in regard to parenting matters. Even when the claimant attempted to bring some joy into her son's life by arranging for hot school lunches, a practice which, according to Child B's teacher, Child B enjoyed and looked forward to, that effort mysteriously and subsequently ended with the lunches being thrown away. [35] In my view, the immediate best interests of the children are served through generous unsupervised parenting time with their mother. The orders sought in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the

notice of application are granted. [36] Order 4 is adjourned generally and is subject to further order of the court or agreement of the parties. And Orders Number 5 and 6 are also granted. [37] Do you have any submissions on costs? [38] CNSL S. ATWAL: Yes, Your Honour, I'll be asking, given the success the claimant has, costs be awarded against the respondent, please. [39] THE COURT: Mr. Cheong? [40] CNSL C. CHEONG: No, Your Honour. [41] THE COURT: Okay. Well, then costs will follow the event. The claimant is entitled to the costs of the application in any event of the cause. "Nielsen A.J."