R. v. Boakye

R. v. Boakye Collection Decisions of the Court of Appeal Date 2025-02-13 Neutral citation 2025 ONCA 105 Docket numbers COA-23-CR-0849 Judges Lauwers, Peter D.; George, Jonathon C.; Gomery, Sally A. Subject Criminal Decision Content COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO CITATION: R. v. Boakye, 2025 ONCA 105 [1] DATE: 20250213 DOCKET: COA-23-CR-0849 Lauwers, George and Gomery JJ.A. BETWEEN His Majesty the King Respondent and Daasebre Boakye Appellant Paul Socka, for the appellant Stephanie A. Lewis, for the respondent Heard: February 6, 2025 On appeal from the conviction entered by Justice Brian P. O’Marra of the Superior Court of Justice on May 31, 2023, and from the sentence imposed on June 9, 2023. REASONS FOR DECISION Overview [1] The appellant was charged with several human trafficking and sexual services counts and with one count of assault and one count of assault causing bodily harm. He was convicted on the two assault counts but was acquitted of all remaining charges. He was sentenced to 10 months in jail for the assault causing bodily harm and a consecutive 4.5 months for the assault. [2] The appellant appeals his conviction and sentence. On the conviction appeal, he argues that 1) the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant’s evidence on the assault and assault causing bodily harm charges in isolation from his negative credibility findings with respect to the human trafficking charges, and 2) the trial judge’s reasons on the assault causing bodily harm charge are insufficient. On the sentence appeal, the appellant argues that the trial judge erred 1) in imposing consecutive sentences, and 2) by failing to apply the totality principle. [3] At the conclusion of oral argument we advised counsel that the appeal was dismissed and that our reasons would follow. These are our reasons. Background Facts [4] The appellant and the complainant met on Tinder, which led to a romantic relationship that lasted from July 2019 until December 2019. Shortly after the relationship began the complainant dropped out of school. She moved out of her parents’ home and into the appellant’s apartment. The complainant alleged that, during their time together, the appellant sold her sexual services and was physically and emotionally abusive. [5] With respect to the human trafficking/sexual services charges, the complainant testified that the appellant told her that he was involved with “selling girls” and that he convinced her on the night of their first meeting to meet a customer to provide sexual services. She testified that she agreed to do so because she fell in love with the appellant immediately and wanted to please him. She said that, during their relationship, the appellant posted advertisements, booked hotel rooms, drove the complainant to appointments, and communicated with clients on her behalf. According to the complainant, she turned all of her earnings over to the appellant. [6] With respect to the two assault counts, the complainant testified that the appellant would get angry at the slightest thing. He would throw things at her, push her up against the wall, and drag her around. She testified that the appellant burned her skin with cigarettes leaving scars on her arm, thigh, and wrist. [7] On December 5, 2019 the complainant reported these allegations to the police. At the time, while she did not show any bruising from the assaults, scars from the cigarette burns were visible. Photographs were taken of the scars. Decision Below [8] The trial judge acquitted the appellant of the human trafficking/sexual services charges but convicted him of assault and assault causing bodily harm. He accepted that the complainant was “very insecure and highly infatuated with [the appellant]”, and that there was an “extreme power imbalance in their relationship”. He was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant assaulted the complainant on various occasions and that on “one occasion at least” he inflicted cigarette burns on her skin. [9] The trial judge had concerns with the complainant’s testimony on the human trafficking/sexual services charges. Namely, the complainant deleted her text messages with the appellant, and her testimony contained inconsistencies, lacked certain details, and brought up new evidence for the first time at trial. As such, in the absence of corroborating evidence on the human trafficking or sexual service offences, the trial judge felt it unsafe to convict. He found, however, that the photographs showing healing scars on the complainant’s body supported her testimony that she had been burned by the appellant, and that a video the appellant had recorded of the complainant getting in a cage on his request reflected the extreme power imbalance in the relationship, which supported the complainant’s testimony that the appellant was physically abusive towards her. [10] With respect to sentence, the trial judge held that the assault and assault causing bodily harm were “separate incidents, and the assault causing bodily harm significantly more serious”. The trial judge accounted for, as aggravating factors, the domestic context of the violence, its sustained character, the power imbalance, and the victim impact; and as mitigating factors, the appellant’s mental health issues, family support, and his education and employment. Discussion Conviction Appeal [11] A trial judge’s findings of credibility and reliability are entitled to a high degree of deference, a recognition that “in our system of justice the trial judge is the fact finder and has the benefit of the intangible impact of conducting the trial”: R. v. G.F., 2021 SCC 20, 163 O.R. (3d) 480, at para. 81. As this court has recognized, “[i]t is rare for deficiencies in a trial judge’s credibility analysis, as expressed in the reasons for judgment, to warrant appellate intervention”: R. v. A.M., 2014 ONCA 769, 123 O.R. (2d) 536, at para. 17. [12] While the trial judge could have better explained why he accepted some of the complainant’s allegations beyond a reasonable doubt but not others, we reject the appellant’s submission that the trial judge improperly “siloed” his findings. [13] The trial judge was satisfied that the assault and assault causing bodily harm charges had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, in part because there was some evidence that tended to support those two allegations, namely the photographs of burn marks and video of the complainant in a cage. In the video, the appellant can be heard laughing and saying, “this is what happens when you don’t listen”. There was no such evidence in relation to the other counts. While the trial judge recognized that corroboration was not required in order to sustain a conviction, it was open to him to observe that human trafficking/sexual services offences are often supported by confirmatory evidence (i.e., posted advertisements and hotel booking confirmations), and open to him to place weight on the fact that none had been produced in this case. The trial judge was entitled to give each piece of evidence the weight he saw fit. [14] This case is distinguishable from R. v. N.P., 2022 ONCA 597, 82 C.R. (7th) 323 and R. v. Howe (2005), 192 CCC (3d) 480 (Ont. C.A.), on which the appellant relies. In N.P., the trial judge accepted the appellant’s evidence that there were two instances of sexual intercourse on the evening in question and convicted the appellant on the second instance. This court held the trial judge erred in her application of W.(D.) by failing to consider whether her corresponding rejection of the complainant’s evidence that there was only one instance gave rise to a reasonable doubt regarding the complainant’s assertion that she did not consent to what the appellant described as a second instance. In N.P., the sequence in which the intercourse occurred “was critical to the narrative of events of the evening”: at para. 30. In Howe, this court held that the trial judge, in convicting the accused, erred by failing to give effect to his implicit finding that the complainant had a motive to falsely accuse the appellant and by failing to account for his finding that the complainant had “deliberately lied on important matters”. [15] Here, the trial judge did not reject the complainant’s evidence on points critical to her narrative about the assault charges, nor did he find that she had lied on a material matter or had a motive to falsely accuse the appellant. He simply found that her evidence on those counts could not meet the threshold of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. [16] The trial judge had a reasonable doubt on the human trafficking/sexual services counts, but that did not preclude him from finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant had assaulted the complainant. He was entitled to accept some, none or all of the complainant’s evidence. There is no basis for appellate intervention. [17] We also reject the appellant’s second ground of appeal, which is that the trial judge’s reasons for conviction on the assault causing bodily harm count are insufficient. The trial judge’s reasons explain the “what” and the “why” and are responsive to the live issues in this case, which was the complainant’s credibility and the reliability of her evidence. The trial judge’s reasons could have been more thorough, but as the Supreme Court recently affirmed in R. v. T.J.F., 2024 SCC 38, 497 D.L.R. (4th) 441, at para. 49, citing R. v. R.E.M., 2008 SCC 51, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 18 and 20, a “trial judge [is] not required to ‘set out every finding or conclusion in the process of arriving at the verdict’, nor [do they] have to detail [their] finding on each piece of evidence before [them]”. [18] It is clear from the reasons that the trial judge found the appellant guilty because he accepted the complainant’s testimony, which was supported by photographic evidence that he burned her with a cigarette. It is true that despite evidence of three distinct burns, the trial judge found that the appellant burned her with a cigarette on “one occasion at least” without identifying one specific incident. The trial judge is only required to make findings that are necessary to determine the account of assault causing bodily harm. Having gone no further does not render his reasons insufficient. [19] We reject this ground of appeal. Sentence Appeal [20] As for the sentence appeal, we do not accept the appellant’s argument that there was such a close nexus between the assault and assault causing bodily harm charges that consecutive sentences were inappropriate. The decision to impose consecutive sentences was based on the trial judge’s findings that these were “separate incidents” and that “the assault causing bodily harm is significantly more serious”. Both findings were open to him. As this court held in R. v. T.C., 2024 ONCA 304, at para. 35, a “trial judge’s decision to impose consecutive as opposed to concurrent sentences is entitled to considerable deference”. [21] The trial judge is not required to expressly mention the totality principle. His reasons, when read as a whole, demonstrate an understanding of the fundamental principle of proportionality. In our view, the sentence balances the aggravating and mitigating factors present in this case; the offences were committed in the context of a domestic relationship and over an extended period of time, and the victim impact was considerable. Furthermore, while the appellant’s decision to contest his charges at trial, and post-trial decision to not express remorse, cannot be considered as aggravating, he is not entitled to the mitigating benefit that would ordinarily follow a guilty plea or other expression of remorse. [22] At the end of the day, the 14.5 month total sentence falls between the parties’ positions on sentence and is well within the acceptable range of sentences for these offences. There was no error in principle and the sentence is fit. Conclusion [23] For these reasons, the conviction appeal is dismissed. While we grant leave to appeal sentence, the sentence appeal is dismissed. “P. Lauwers J.A.” “J. George J.A.” “S. Gomery J.A.” [1] This appeal is subject to a publication ban pursuant to s. 486.4 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.