R. v. Lapps
The court held that the pre-trial agreement to admit the appellant's trucking logs was properly treated as an agreement under s.655 such that the trial judge could exercise discretion to refuse permission to resile; the trial judge correctly admitted Mr. Jackson's out-of-court statement applying Bradshaw due to...
Source-derived case information.
- Citation
- 2019 ONCA 1001
- Parties
- Respondent: Her Majesty the Queen; Appellant: Dale Lapps
- Court
- Court of Appeal for Ontario
- Jurisdiction
- Canada
- Judgment Date
- 18 December 2019
- Procedural Posture
- Criminal Appeal / Appeal From Conviction and Sentence (after Third Trial)
- Outcome
- Appeal dismissed; conviction and sentence upheld
- Legal Topics
- Importation of Cocaine, Possession for the Purpose of Trafficking, Agreed Statement of Facts Under S.655, Admissibility of Out of Court Statements (bradshaw), Resiling From Pre Trial Agreement, Bosley Credit for Delay
- Source Language
- en
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
Her Majesty the Queen
Respondent
Dale Lapps
Appellant
Procedural Posture
Criminal Appeal / Appeal From Conviction and Sentence (after Third Trial)
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether a pre-trial agreement to admit evidence is governed by s.655 of the Criminal Code and whether the trial judge may refuse permission to resile from that agreement
- 2 Whether the trial judge erred in admitting an out-of-court statement by Mr. Jackson under the principles in R. v. Bradshaw
- 3 Whether the trial judge erred in refusing to grant a Bosley credit for delay in sentencing
Ratio Decidendi
The court held that the pre-trial agreement to admit the appellant's trucking logs was properly treated as an agreement under s.655 such that the trial judge could exercise discretion to refuse permission to resile; the trial judge correctly admitted Mr. Jackson's out-of-court statement applying Bradshaw due to corroboration and likely substantive reliability; and the refusal to grant a Bosley credit was justified by lack of demonstrated prejudice and the appellant's lack of credibility.
Court Disposition
Appeal dismissed; conviction and sentence upheld
Orders
- Appeal dismissed
- Conviction and sentence affirmed
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
1 paragraphs
R. v. Lapps Collection Decisions of the Court of Appeal Date 2019-12-18 Neutral citation 2019 ONCA 1001 Docket numbers C66188 Judges MacPherson, James C.; Sharpe, Robert J.; Zarnett, Benjamin Subject Criminal Decision Content COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO CITATION: R. v. Lapps, 2019 ONCA 1001 DATE: 20191218 DOCKET: C66188 MacPherson, Sharpe and Zarnett JJ.A. BETWEEN Her Majesty the Queen Respondent and Dale Lapps Appellant Dale Lapps, acting in person Matthew Gourlay, appearing as duty counsel Jessica Smith Joy, for the respondent Heard: December 11, 2019 On appeal from the conviction entered by Justice Faye E. McWatt of the Superior Court of Justice, sitting with a jury, on October 11, 2018, and from the sentence imposed on January 25, 2019, with reasons reported at 2019 ONSC 132. REASONS FOR DECISION [1] At the conclusion of the hearing of the appeal we dismissed it with reasons to follow. These are those reasons. [2] The appellant was convicted of importing and possession for the purpose of trafficking cocaine, after his third trial on those charges. [3] At his first trial, the appellant had introduced his trucking logs into evidence. At his second, his counsel had also introduced the trucking logs into evidence. Before the third trial, the Crown proposed an Agreed Statement of Facts with the intention that it be filed at trial. A provision of the proposed Agreed Statement of Facts was that the appellant’s trucking logs would be admitted as evidence. Counsel for the appellant ultimately sent an email before trial agreeing that the trucking logs would be admitted as evidence as part of the Crown’s case. Two weeks later appellant’s counsel advised he wished to resile from the agreement about the trucking logs, and he brought an application to the trial judge for permission to do so. The trial judge held that permission was required and refused to give it. Appellant’s counsel signed the Agreed Statement of Facts which contained the agreement about the trucking logs, and it was filed at trial under s. 655 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. [4] The appellant argues that the trial judge erred in treating the agreement made before trial about the admission of the trucking logs as being governed by s. 655 of the Code which, he submits, only applies to agreements or admissions made at trial, not before. We do not agree that that distinction is operative in the circumstances of this case. [5] The agreement proposed by the Crown was one to be used at trial under s. 655. Once counsel agreed to it, the trial judge had a discretion to refuse permission to resile from an agreement that had been expressly made in anticipation of such use. She was entitled to reject the suggestion that the agreement had been made in haste, to take into account that there was no suggestion of a mistake or misunderstanding which led to the agreement, and to note that the appellant did not dispute that the logs were made by him and were accurate. We reject this ground of appeal. [6] We also reject the argument that the trial judge erred in admitting the out-of-court statement of Mr. Jackson. In our view the trial judge correctly applied the principles in R. v. Bradshaw, 2017 SCC 35, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 865. She considered the substantive reliability of the statement in light of evidence which corroborated it, including police surveillance of which Mr. Jackson was unaware when he made the statement. We see no error in the trial judge’s conclusion that it was unlikely that material aspects of the statement would change under cross-examination. [7] Finally, we see no error in the trial judge’s refusal to provide a “Bosley credit” in determining the sentence for the appellant (see R. v. Bosley (1992), 59 O.A.C. 161 (C.A.)). The trial judge found she could not rely on the appellant’s affidavit supporting the credit because she did not find him a credible witness, and that he did not demonstrate prejudice arising from the delay in the matter reaching final conclusion, including because he had had the opportunity to work through a significant period of that delay. [8] Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed. “J.C. MacPherson J.A.” “Robert J. Sharpe J.A.” “B. Zarnett J.A.”