Wilson v. Garbella

2017 BCSC 748 Wilson v. Garbella IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: Wilson v. Garbella, 2017 BCSC 748 Date: 20170505 Docket: E161032 Registry: Victoria Between: Sarah Ann Wilson Claimant And: Darrell Garbella Respondent Before: Master Bouck Reasons for Judgment Claimant appearing in person: S.A. Wilson Respondent appearing in person: D. Garbella Place and Date of Hearing: Victoria, B.C. March 30, 2017 Place and Date of Judgment: Victoria, B.C. May 5, 2017 Introduction [1] In this family law proceeding, the claimant seeks interim orders with respect to parenting time and support. The claimant also asks for a police enforcement clause in regards to the parenting order. The relief is sought pursuant to a notice of application filed September 14, 2016. [2] In addition to attending a judicial case conference, the parties have been before this court on applications concerning parenting and support issues on six previous occasions over the course of eleven months. The Provincial Court has also been involved with the parties, having issued at least one conduct order. [3] The parties have represented themselves on and off during the proceeding. They will likely both be self-represented when this action proceeds to trial on January 8, 2018.[1] The Evidence [4] The following is a summary of the parties' evidence. The affidavit material filed by the parties is lengthy and detailed. Most of the parties' affidavit material describes circumstances up to September 2016. [5] The parties are in their thirties[2] and were in a common-law relationship from January 2008 until November 14, 2015. They are the parents of two girls: Alannah Violet Mae Garbella, born February 3, 2011, and Lilyanna Jessica Garbella, born May 20, 2012. Ms. Wilson is the mother of Dylan Paxton, age 11, to whom Mr. Garbella stood in loco parentis during the parties' relationship. Dylan's father pays child support to Ms. Wilson but does not appear to be involved in his son's upbringing. [6] Mr. Garbella was the primary if not sole breadwinner during the relationship. Ms. Wilson says that she has always been the children's primary caregiver but this allegation is disputed by the respondent. [7] Ms. Wilson is currently working in a part-time/contract based capacity as a data entry clerk. In addition, Ms. Wilson is attending college to qualify as an executive legal administrator, with that schooling completing in October 2017. Mr. Garbella is a member of the Canadian Navy, stationed at the DND base in Esquimalt, B.C. [8] The former family home is located in Sooke, B.C. Mr. Garbella has resided in the home since the parties' separation. Alannah attends kindergarten at Sooke Elementary. Both girls attend the Tiny Lil Treasures daycare (also located in Sooke) when Mr. Garbella is at work during his parenting time. When Ms. Wilson is not available during her parenting time, the girls are cared for by their maternal grandmother. Dylan has been in Ms. Wilson's exclusive care since the spring of 2016. [9] Following their separation, the parties shared the parenting of all three children on a week on/week off basis with each party having the children in their care overnight on the Wednesday of their respective non-parenting week. Starting in April 2016, Mr. Garbella's parenting time with Dylan began to be reduced such that he now sees this child only rarely if at all. In his counterclaim, Mr. Garbella seeks an order for parenting time with Dylan. [10] In August 2016, Ms. Wilson moved her residence from Sooke to Esquimalt. Ms. Wilson says that the move was necessary for the following reasons: her tenancy in Sooke came to an end; her support network of family and friends live in the Esquimalt and Victoria area; she was unable to find proper care for Dylan, who has special needs, in the Sooke area; and the move allowed her to attend college to up-grade her employability. Ms. Wilson also suggests that the move could have made co-parenting more convenient as her new residence is near Ms. Garbella's workplace. [11] Before the move occurred, Alannah was set to start kindergarten at Sooke Elementary in September 2016. In anticipation of her move, Ms. Wilson enrolled Alannah in a school close to her Esquimalt residence. Ms. Wilson did not seek Mr. Garbella's consent for this change. Mr. Garbella brought a without notice application to prevent Alannah moving schools. That application was successful. [12] Generally speaking, the week on/week off parenting schedule is being followed but both parties say that there have been significant challenges and parental conflict, especially with respect to transition times. Earlier in the parties' separation, there were periods of time when Ms. Wilson cared for the children during Mr. Garbella's "week" at the latter's request. Ms. Wilson felt taken advantage of by this arrangement. Mr. Garbella says that Ms. Wilson was then unemployed and willingly accepted the arrangement. For her part, Ms. Wilson says that Mr. Garbella has often chosen to keep the girls in his care during Ms. Wilson's week, without her consent and typically with no advance notice of these intentions. Although an earlier order provided that the parenting transition time would occur at 3 p.m. on Sunday, that time was moved to Monday once Alannah started school. Ms. Wilson does not support this change, which she says was made by Mr. Garbella unilaterally. [13] The girls have attended counselling. Arranging and attending these counselling appointments has been a source of conflict between the parties. Neither party has brought an application for a s. 211 report. [14] In August 2016, the parties exchanged settlement proposals with respect to parenting and other issues. Despite these efforts, the parties have been unable to reach an agreement on a parenting schedule that might better suit them and benefit the girls. [15] Many text messages and emails have been exchanged, with the content of those messages illustrating the difficulty that the parties have in communicating with each other in a respectful manner. [16] Ms. Wilson says that Mr. Garbella unilaterally chose a daycare for the girls, advising Ms. Wilson of his choice after the registration was completed. Mr. Garbella says that he consulted with Ms. Wilson prior to the registration and invited her to meet the daycare providers but that invitation was declined. [17] Mr. Garbella has enrolled Lilyanna in Sooke Elementary for kindergarten starting in September 2017, apparently without Ms. Wilson's consent. [18] Mr. Garbella is critical of Ms. Wilson's decision to have the girls cared for by their maternal grandmother. [19] Between November 2015 and March 2016, Mr. Garbella paid Ms. Wilson a monthly sum of $1,022 in child support. In June 2015, Mr. Garbella paid Ms. Wilson $520.00 as child support. As a result of a court order, Mr. Garbella paid Ms. Wilson $500 child support in July 2016. Since then, Mr. Garbella's payment of child support has been inconsistent and sporadic. Mr. Garbella says that he is off-setting the cost of daycare and other child-related expenses against the supposed child support due to the claimant. [20] The parties find themselves in the Supreme Court because of their property or, more accurately, debt situation. Mr. Garbella's financial statement sworn on March 20, 2017, reports assets of $439,500 and debts of $439,321.75. Ms. Wilson's financial statement sworn on that same day discloses assets of $406,420.45 and debts of $364,061.36. The parties do not agree that all of the debt is properly characterized as family debt. [21] According to his financial statement, Mr. Garbella's income for child support purposes is $73,356. An annual income of $73,637 is reported for spousal support purposes. Ms. Wilson says that a more accurate estimation of Mr. Garbella's income is $88,000. [22] Ms. Wilson reports her total annual income for child support purposes at $24,624.00. She says that her monthly income is highly variable given the nature of her employment. Some of Ms. Wilson's income is in the form of one-time student loans and bursaries. The child support income reported on the financial statement is the total amount received to date but not the full amount due under court orders. Ms. Wilson receives a child care subsidy while she attends college. The amount received for that subsidy is unclear. [23] Mr. Garbella submits that the claimant's financial statement is inaccurate and incomplete. He seeks to impute an annual income to the claimant of $60,000. The Proceedings to date [24] As noted, the parties have been before this court and the Provincial Court on numerous occasions. Both parties have brought applications either without notice or on short notice, generally resulting in adjournments. However, determining the trail of applications and actual appearances in this proceeding has been challenging. Not all of the orders pronounced by the court have been drawn and entered. The claimant has filed multiple applications seeking the same relief.[3] Some of the parties' attendances appear to have been omitted in the electronic court record. Thus, what is described below may not be complete or entirely accurate in terms of the steps taken and orders pronounced to date. [25] Ms. Wilson filed her notice of family claim on March 11, 2016. By then, the parties had made at least one appearance in the Provincial Court. [26] Mr. Garbella filed his response on April 12, 2016.[4] [27] On May 4, 2016, the parties attended a judicial case conference, with no orders resulting. [28] On June 15, 2016, Ms. Wilson brought an application on short notice with respect to the use and ownership of the parties' two vehicles. She also sought orders on interim parenting, child support, a protection order and police enforcement clause. The property dispute concerned the use and ownership of a Dodge Caravan and a Jetta. It was alleged that Mr. Garbella had taken possession of both vehicles, leaving Ms. Wilson without any means of transportation. On June 21, 2016,[5] Mr. Garbella was ordered to deliver one family vehicle to Ms. Wilson together with all registration and insurance documents. What might be described as an interim/interim order was put in place with respect to parenting arrangements and child support pending a full hearing of the application on July 6, 2016. I seized myself of the application. [29] Personal circumstances prevented me from hearing the application on July 6th and thus, on that day, the parties consented to extending the terms of the June 21st order to August 8th. [30] The order made on June 21st had the girls in the care of the parties on a week on/week off schedule for the very short term. Mr. Garbella was ordered to pay Ms. Wilson a one-time lump sum interim child support payment of $520, on the expectation that the child support application would be adjudicated on July 6th or, as it turned out, August 8th. [31] In the meantime, Mr. Garbella brought his application, on short notice, with respect to Ms. Wilson's move to Esquimalt and that move's impact on the girls' circumstances. That application was heard by Master Harper on July 14, 2016. The court ordered that Ms. Wilson comply with s. 66 of the Family Law Act, and also prohibited the relocation of the girls from Sooke until further order of the court. [32] The parties appeared before me on August 8th at which time the following orders were pronounced: the respondent is to pay the claimant $500 per month as child support, on a without prejudice basis until further order of the court; the parenting time would continue on a week on/week off basis with parties' parenting time starting at 3 p.m. on Sunday and with each party having additional overnight parenting time on Wednesday during their respective non-designated week; the claimant's application of June 14, 2015 was adjourned generally[6]; the Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction with respect to all issues pled in the notice of family claim and counterclaim[7]; and I was no longer to be seized of the particular application. The expectation was that the child support issue would be re-visited once the parties had provided each other with more complete financial disclosure. [33] On September 2, 2016, Mr. Garbella brought a without notice application seeking enforcement of Master Harper's order. On that day, Johnston J. suspended all previous orders concerning where the children were to live and attend school. The court imposed time limits for the parties to exchange additional affidavit material, with liberty to re-set the application after September 16th. Johnston J.'s order was not entered until November 29, 2016. [34] On September 14th, Ms. Wilson filed her application which is the subject matter of these reasons. [35] The parties appeared before me on October 3rd with respect to both of their applications. After hearing some submissions, I ordered that the action be set for trial; the respondent file any intended counterclaim by a certain date; the respondent's September 2, 2016 application and the claimant's September 14, 2016 application be set on the assize list after October 31st, with a direction that each matter be allocated two hours for hearing. I again seized myself of further applications involving the parties. [36] On October 13th, Mr. Garbella filed his counterclaim.[8] [37] In compliance with the October 3rd order, Mr. Garbella attended to scheduling a trial which was to commence on April 24, 2017. [38] The next application in the proceeding was brought by Ms. Wilson on January 11, 2017, seeking to adjourn the April trial on the basis that she would lose her college position if she were to take time off. In the same notice of application, Ms. Wilson sought an order that "all large asset and liabilities be sold and dispersed between the parties". That second relief was dismissed, but the trial was ordered adjourned peremptory on Ms. Wilson. This order does not appear to have been drawn and entered. [39] Next, on February 16, 2017, Mr. Garbella filed an application seeking various remedies including a valuation of family assets; an order that Ms. Wilson pay one-half of the extraordinary expenses incurred for the girls since November 2015; an order that Ms. Wilson reply to emails within a certain time frame; and an order allowing disposal of certain family assets in order to pay debts. [40] This application came before Adair J., whose resulting order[9] is worth re-stating in full: 1 Each party is required by March 20, 2017 to swear, file, and serve an updated Financial Statement in the Form F8 of the Supreme Court Family Rules, including all attachments. 2 All communications between the parents shall be by email only, unless the parties agree in writing to some other type of communication. No text messages unless agreed to in writing. 3 The parents shall access their email accounts regularly. A parent will respond within 8 hours of a message being sent by the other parent, provided that any message sent between the hours of 10 pm and 7 am will not be required to be responded to until not later than 2 pm the following day. 4 Communications shall be concise, informative, and deal only with matters concerning the children. 5 The parents may communicate with one another other than by email in the event of an emergency concerning any of the children. 6 All email communications are to be preserved until further order of the court. 7 The parents will keep each other informed of their current email addresses, and a parent will promptly notify the other parent of any change in email address. 8 Neither parent will make any negative, insulting, derogatory, abusive, or disparaging comments about the other parent in any email communication. 9 That neither parent is permitted to place any information concerning the other parent or any of the children onto any social media outlet. [41] The order does not address all of the relief sought in the respondent's notice of application and the court's record is not clear as to whether that other relief was pursued, adjourned or dismissed. [42] By the time the parties appeared before me on March 30thth, each had filed a financial statement as ordered by Adair J. Discussion [43] It should be apparent from this recitation of the facts that these parties have been unable to achieve any long term consensus on any of the issues arising from the family breakdown. That same observation was behind the order requiring the parties to set this action for trial. The parties blame each other for their ongoing conflict, with Ms. Wilson accusing Mr. Garbella of being controlling, bullying and generally difficult to get along with, and Mr. Garbella accusing Ms. Wilson of making unilateral decisions that negatively impact the children and also being difficult to communicate with, even with the court orders in place. [44] The orders resulting from Ms. Wilson's present application will be an attempt by the court to offer rough justice for the interim period. The orders will only be in place until the parties are able to resolve their legal issues, either at trial or, one would hope, through an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. Nonetheless, the parties must also recognize that the ages of their children will mean that parenting disagreements will arise from time to time for many more years to come. It behooves the parties to find a way to work together and thus avoid constant judicial intervention. It is hoped that the orders put in place by Adair J. will assist the parties in achieving that goal. [45] In the meantime, the parties need even more structure in their dealings with each other pending resolution of their legal issues. Some of that structure is already provided for in existing court orders. [46] I will now address each category of relief sought by the claimant. Parenting Time - relief sought in item 2 of the notice of application [47] As pointed out to the parties during the course of submissions, there is already an interim parenting order as pronounced on August 8th. The only legal basis relied on by the claimant in seeking to change the earlier order is "the Family Law Act". The only specific provision that the claimant could rely on in support of her requested order is s. 216 of the FLA which provides that: Court may make interim orders 216 (1) Subject to this Act, if an application is made for an order under this Act, a court may make an interim order for the relief applied for. (2) In making an interim order respecting a family law dispute, the court, to the extent practicable, must make the interim order in accordance with any requirements or conditions of this Act that would apply if the order were not an interim order. (3) On application by a party, a court may change, suspend or terminate an interim order made under subsection (1) if satisfied that at least one of the following circumstances exists: (a) a change in circumstances has occurred since the interim order was made; (b) evidence of a substantial nature that was not available at the time the interim order was made has become available. (4) In making an order under subsection (3), the court must take into account all of the following: (a) the change in circumstances or the evidence, or both, referred to in subsection (3); (b) the length of time that has passed since the interim order was made; (c) whether the interim order was made for the purpose of having a temporary arrangement in place, with the intention that the arrangement (i) would not adversely affect the position of either party during negotiations, during family dispute resolution or at trial, and (ii) would not necessarily reflect the final arrangement between the parties; (d) whether a trial has been scheduled; (e) any potential adverse effect, on a party or a child of a party, of either making or declining to make an order under subsection (3). [48] The test for varying an interim parenting order made pursuant to the FLA was considered in B.K. v. J.B., 2015 BCSC 1481. In that case, the court found that the provisions of s. 216 provide the complete basis and framework to vary an interim order: para. 34. Furthermore, a change of circumstances under s. 216(3)(a) must be "material to the best interests of the child" or children concerned: para. 40. [49] In this case, there has arguably been a change of circumstances since the August 8th order was made in that both Alannah and Ms. Wilson are now attending school. However, I am unable to find on the evidence that this change is "material" to the best interests of the children. The school attendance was anticipated in August, 2016. The same level of conflict and lack of cooperation between the parties existed then as it does now. The parties' conflict is most pronounced over parenting time transitions. To the extent that the August 8th order left the Wednesday night transition time undefined, I will slightly modify the order to provide that the transition time is 5 p.m. on Wednesdays unless the parties otherwise agree in writing to another time. And, the return to the other parent's care after that overnight will be by Thursday morning at 8:30 a.m. While I have observed that the parties need more structure in their parenting schedule, I am reluctant to add any more terms such as the venue for these transitions as the parties still require some flexibility in choosing a place given the location of their respective residences, the unpredictability of motor vehicle traffic, and other circumstances that might arise from time to time in their respective work or the girls' school/daycare schedules. [50] In all other aspects, the order of August 8th will remain in place until trial. Decisions on the Children's' Residence, Place of School, Out of School/Daycare Programs - relief sought in items 2 through 4 [51] While this particular relief is framed in somewhat neutral language in the notice of application, Ms. Wilson's objective is to obtain an order that the two children live primarily with her, attend the school near her Esquimalt residence, and be placed in a daycare/out of school program that fits within those two circumstances. [52] I have already decided that the shared parenting arrangement will not be changed. [53] A "decision" regarding the children's school and daycare/out of school program can only be based on a consideration of the children's best interests: children: FLA, s. 37. [54] Ms. Wilson submits that the girls' best interests will be served by attending her chosen school in that they will be at the same school as their brother Dylan, and daycare costs may be reduced or avoided altogether. Ms. Wilson says that besides the maternal grandmother, other family members or friends who live in the Esquimalt/Victoria area can care for the children at no cost. [55] Mr. Garbella submits that the girls are thriving at their present daycare and school and that the Sooke area is the children's familiar home base. [56] Based on the parties' conflicting evidence with respect to the s. 37 factors, I conclude that any long term decisions regarding school and daycare should be made by the trial judge. [57] To the extent that a decision must be made by the court with respect to the girls' school and/or daycare arrangements starting in September 2017, the status quo will prevail. That status quo is having Alannah attend Sooke Elementary. But for Ms. Wilson's move to Esquimalt this past summer, that same school would no doubt have been a good choice for Lilyanna. In my view, for the interim period, Lilyanna's best interests are served by attending the same school as Alannah. Having the girls at different schools will only add to the parties' logistical challenges and thus create more conflict between them. [58] In making the order that both girls be enrolled at Sooke Elementary, I am cognizant that before and after school daycare costs will be incurred. This would appear to be unavoidable in the parties' present circumstances. As the parties are unable to agree on the choice of daycare/out of school provider, the status quo will be maintained. That is, both girls will continue to attend their present daycare/out of school care pending further order of the court or an agreement in writing between the parties. The cost of that daycare will be determined below. [59] I pause to note that these orders should not be seen as either a victory for Mr. Garbella or a loss to Ms. Wilson, as the orders are intended to be only a temporary situation until the trial. Upon hearing all of the relevant evidence, including that garnered on cross-examination of each party, the trial judge may decide that the girls' best interests are served by a different parenting, schooling or daycare arrangement. Interim Child Support and Extraordinary Expenses, including daycare - item 6 [60] The order of August 8th with respect to child support was made on a without prejudice basis and can be re-visited based on the parties' current financial disclosure. The order will most certainly be rough justice as both parties seek to impute income to the other and it is impossible to determine on the present state of the evidence whether such claims will succeed at trial. In addition, Mr. Wilson says that he is saddled with paying all of the family debt and should not be expected to pay the full amount of child support under the Guidelines. [61] Eventually, an accounting between the parties will be necessary given the inconsistent payment of support, the respondent's off-setting of daycare costs, a claim by Ms. Wilson for retroactive child support from the date of separation, and Mr. Garbella's claim for a contribution from Ms. Wilson for extraordinary expenses incurred by him since separation. As well, there is a claim outstanding for Mr. Garbella to pay child support for Dylan. All of those claims and numbers will be determined at trial, unless the parties reach an agreement in the meantime. [62] For the purposes of this interim child support order, I find that Mr. Garbella's annual income is $73,356.00 and Ms. Wilson's income is $24,624. Based on those incomes, the child support to be paid by Mr. Garbella to Ms. Wilson in a shared parenting arrangement is $726.00 per month. Mr. Garbella is to pay Ms. Wilson that sum, without any deductions, on the first of each month commencing March 1, 2017, and continuing until trial or further order of the court. I have chosen March 1st as the start date because of the disputed claims outlined in the preceding paragraph. [63] The claimant seeks an order that all extraordinary expenses, including daycare, be "split between the parties proportional to their income". [64] With respect to the girls' daycare/after school, health care and activity costs, I order that from March 1, 2017, and continuing until trial or written agreement between the parties: a. the parties shall share the costs of any daycare/before and after school program on a 75% (Mr. Garbella) and 25% (Ms. Wilson) basis, with Mr. Garbella to provide Ms. Wilson with documented proof of these costs at least 7 days before the full payment becomes due; b. neither party shall enroll either of the girls in any activity unless both parties agree in writing to the enrollment; c. unless otherwise agreed in writing, the parties shall share in the cost of the agreed upon activity on a 75% (Mr. Garbella) /25% (Ms. Wilson) basis; and d. the health-related costs for the girls, including dental work, shall be shared on the same 75%/25% basis after taking into account insurance coverage offered through either or both parties' employment or other sources. [65] Any claim for the sharing or splitting of extraordinary expenses incurred before March 1, 2017 is to be determined at trial, unless the parties reach an agreement in writing. Interim Spousal Support - item 7 [66] Although Ms. Wilson's claim for interim spousal support was raised in two earlier notices of application, this will be the first occasion when that relief was actually argued. Mr. Garbella suggests that Ms. Wilson has actually abandoned this claim. [67] Without intending to address either entitlement or quantum, I find that the issue of spousal support ought to be reserved to the trial judge. While the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines suggest that support is payable based on the incomes determined in these reasons, there are simply too many unknowns to achieve even rough justice on this particular issue. Those unknowns include whether Ms. Wilson's income reported for spousal support purposes is accurate[10] and whether the trial judge will find exceptions to the SSAG and thus reduce the amount that might otherwise be payable. Based on the parties' present financial circumstances, there appears no ability for Ms. Wilson to re-pay Ms. Garbella any support that is later found by the trial judge to be wrongfully ordered. [68] In the result, Ms. Wilson's claim for spousal support, including for the interim period, is adjourned to trial. Police Enforcement Clause [69] I decline to order police enforcement of the parenting orders as this is a tool of last resort: D.J.S. v. J.M.D., 2014 BCSC 1143 at paras. 34-38. Summary [70] In summary, pursuant to the claimant's notice of application filed September 14, 2016, it is ordered that: a. The order of the court made August 8, 2016 with respect to parenting shall remain in place pending trial except modified that the parenting transition times on Wednesday will be 5 p.m. and 8:30 a.m. on Thursday; b. Alannah Violet Mae Garbella, born May 20, 2012, and Lilyanna Jessica Garbella, born February 3, 2011, shall attend Sooke Elementary for the 2017/2018 school year subject to the order of the trial judge; c. Alannah and Lilyanna shall continue to attend Tiny Lil Treasures daycare in Sooke, B.C., pending trial, subject to any written agreement made between the parties; d. Pending trial or written agreement between the parties, the respondent shall pay to the claimant the sum of $726 in basic child support, with no deductions or set-offs, on the 1st of each month commencing March 1, 2017; e. Until trial, neither party shall enrol either Alannah or Lilyanna in any activities unless both parties agree in writing to that enrolment; f. Commencing March 1, 2017 and continuing until trial, the parties shall share the cost of daycare/before and after school care, any agreed upon activities, and any net health care costs on a 75% (Mr. Garbella) and 25% (Ms. Wilson) basis; g. The respondent shall provide the claimant with documentary proof of the daycare/before and after school care costs at least 7 days before that charge becomes due; h. Ms. Wilson's claim for spousal support, retroactive child support and a contribution by the respondent for any extraordinary expenses incurred before March 1, 2017 is adjourned to trial; and i. The balance of relief sought in the notice of application is dismissed. [71] Costs of this application will be in the cause. [72] Finally, Ms. Wilson is directed to prepare and enter this order and the order made on January 11, 2017, and Mr. Garbella is directed to do the same with respect to the order made on February 16, 2017. "C.P. Bouck" Master C.P. Bouck [1] The first scheduled trial date of April 24, 2017, was adjourned by order of the court. [2] I am estimating Ms. Wilson's age as there is no evidence before the court on that fact. Mr. Garbella is 35 years old. [3] This is an observation, not a criticism, as both parties are doing their best without legal representation. In fact, the duplicate applications were filed when the claimant was represented by counsel. [4] An amended response was filed on June 20, 2016. [5] The unentered order pronounced that day was amended on June 23, 2016. [6] As the notice of application was a duplicate of the June 15, 2015 notice of application. [7] The order was made in anticipation of the respondent filing a counterclaim. That pleading was not filed until October 13, 2016. [8] The style of cause in the counterclaim is not consistent with other pleadings in that the counterclaim includes Mr. Garbella's middle name. The trial judge may need to rectify this issue if not attended to by the respondent before then. [9] The terms are taken from the court summary sheet as the order does not appear to have been drawn and entered. [10] That income is disposed to at $48,704 and would result in only a nominal award at the high end of the range under the SSAG.