R. v. Lanteigne
Read as a whole the trial judge's charge adequately addressed identification and did not reverse the Crown's burden of proof; there was no error in principle in sentencing; accordingly both appeals are dismissed.
Source-derived case information.
- Citation
- C29492
- Parties
- Respondent: Her Majesty the Queen; Appellant: Denis Lanteigne
- Court
- Court of Appeal for Ontario
- Jurisdiction
- Canada
- Judgment Date
- 12 July 1999
- Procedural Posture
- Criminal / Appeal From Conviction and Sentence
- Outcome
- Appeal dismissed in full.
- Legal Topics
- Identification Evidence, Burden of Proof, Jury Charge, Appeal Against Conviction, Sentence Review
- Source Language
- en
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
Her Majesty the Queen
Respondent
Denis Lanteigne
Appellant
Procedural Posture
Criminal / Appeal From Conviction and Sentence
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether the trial judge's jury charge on identification was adequate
- 2 Whether the trial judge reversed the burden of proof
- 3 Whether the defence position was adequately outlined in the charge
Ratio Decidendi
Read as a whole the trial judge's charge adequately addressed identification and did not reverse the Crown's burden of proof; there was no error in principle in sentencing; accordingly both appeals are dismissed.
Court Disposition
Appeal dismissed in full.
Orders
- Leave to appeal sentence granted
- Appeal against sentence dismissed
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
1 paragraphs
R. v. Lanteigne Collection Decisions of the Court of Appeal Date 1999-07-12 Docket numbers C29492 Judges Osborne, Coulter Arthur Anthony; Weiler, Karen Merle Magnuson; Feldman, Kathryn N. Subject Criminal Decision Content DATE: 19990712 DOCKET: C29492 COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO RE: HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN (Respondent) v. DENIS LANTEIGNE (Appellant) BEFORE: OSBORNE A.C.J.O., WEILER and FELDMAN JJ.A. COUNSEL: Christopher Hicks for the appellant Christine Tier for the respondent HEARD: July 5, 1999 On appeal from the order of the Honourable Justice Lofchik dated January 16, 1998. ENDORSEMENT [1] The sole issue at trial was identification - that is whether the appellant was the person who, without the complainant’s consent, was in bed with her at the time and place referred to in the indictment. In his charge, the trial judge made it clear to the jury how important the identification issue was. In addition, he directed the jury to be cautious about the complainant’s identification of the appellant and he directed the jury on the critical difference between credibility and reliability as it related to the complainant’s identification evidence. In our view, when the charge is read as whole, as it should be, the charge on identification was sufficient. [2] We are further of the view that the charge adequately outlined the defence position on the issue of identification which was, needless to say, central to the defence at trial. [3] The appellant also argues that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof when he said in his charge: Ultimately, you must decide whether the matters raised by Defence Counsel are sufficient to cast doubt on the identification evidence put forward by the Crown or whether such identification evidence is reliable enough to satisfy you beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the person who attacked T.M. in her apartment. [4] We are satisfied that when the charge is read as a whole, the jury would have understood that the Crown bore the burden of proof and that the Crown had to establish the appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in order to discharge that burden. That translates, in the circumstances of this case, to the Crown being required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it was the appellant who was in bed with the complainant. We see no merit in this ground of appeal. [5] We should add that defence counsel at trial did not object to the charge on identification or with respect to the sufficiency of the charge as it relates to the position taken by the defence at trial. [6] In our opinion, the jury was adequately instructed to decide the case only on the evidence at trial. This ground of appeal cannot succeed. [7] For these reasons, the appeal against conviction is dismissed. [8] With respect to sentence, it is our opinion that having in mind the circumstances of the offence, the appellant’s significant criminal record and the duration of pre-trial custody, the sentence imposed falls within a reasonable range of fit sentences. The trial judge did not err in principle in imposing the sentence that he did. Thus, leave is granted and the appeal against the sentence is dismissed, as is the appeal from conviction.