Doctors Nova Scotia v. Nova Scotia (Health)

Doctors Nova Scotia v. Nova Scotia (Health) Court Court of Appeal Date 2006-05-12 Citation 2006 NSCA 59 Docket CA 255020 Judge/Registrar/Adjudicator Oland, Linda L. (Honourable Justice); Cromwell, Thomas A. (Honourable Justice); Fichaud, Joel E. (Honourable Justice) (CA) Document Type Decision Relations Library Sheet - Doctors Nova Scotia v. Nova Scotia (Health) - 2006 NSCA 59 - 2006-05-12 - Library Sheet Decision Content NOVA SCOTIA COURT OF APPEAL Citation: Doctors Nova Scotia v. Nova Scotia (Health), 2006 NSCA 59 Date: 20060512 Docket: CA 255020 Registry: Halifax Between: Doctors Nova Scotia Appellant v. Her Majesty the Queen, in Right of the Province of Nova Scotia, as represented by the Minister of Health and Joanna Redden Respondents Judges: Cromwell, Oland and Fichaud, JJ.A. Appeal Heard: April 5, 2006, in Halifax, Nova Scotia Held: Appeal allowed without costs as per reasons for judgment of Fichaud, J.A.; Cromwell and Oland, JJ.A. concurring. Counsel: Cynthia Scott, for the appellant Edward Gores, Q.C., for the respondent Her Majesty the Queen Graham Steele, for the respondent Joanna Redden Reasons for judgment: [1] Ms. Redden applied under Nova Scotia’s Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act for disclosure of records with the provincial Department of Health showing named physician billings from 2000 to 2004, later revised to 2002-2004. The Supreme Court ordered disclosure. Doctors Nova Scotia, representing physicians, appeals. Doctors Nova Scotia says that the disclosure of named physicians’ individual billings would unreasonably invade the physicians’ privacy. It is common ground that the request is for personal information. There are two issues. (1) Does the requested information reveal details of “a contract to supply services to a public body” (which is deemed not to unreasonably invade privacy) under s. 20(4)(f) of the Act? (2) If not, does a consideration of the circumstances cited in s. 20(2) rebut the statutory presumption that disclosure would unreasonably invade the physicians’ privacy? Background [2] The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.N.S. 1993, c. 5, as am. (“Act”) prescribes the procedure for access to records possessed by public bodies, including provincial government departments. On July 21, 2004, the respondent Joanna Redden applied under s. 6(1) of the Act for copies of records possessed by the Department of Health showing “the total physician billing, by physician, in Nova Scotia from 2000 to the present.” Ms. Redden is on staff with the New Democratic Party. [3] Under s. 22 of the Act, the Department of Health gave notice of Ms. Redden’s request to the appellant Doctors Nova Scotia (“DNS”). DNS represents physicians in the Province, and was formerly known as the Medical Society of Nova Scotia. DNS objected to Ms. Redden’s request. DNS said the disclosure would unreasonably invade physicians’ privacy. [4] The Department of Health responded to DNS with a letter of September 17, 2004 stating: The Department of Health has received your written representation explaining that you believe the information should be partially disclosed, without names attached. Following consideration of the information, your representation, and the relevant provisions of the Act, the Department of Health has reached a decision to grant full access to the requested information. [5] DNS filed a request for a review of the Department’s decision. The review officer wrote a report dated January 28, 2005. The report notes: While DNS had no objection to the disclosure of individual MSI billings, it argued that attaching the names of the doctors to the billings was contrary to the requirements of s. 20 of the FOIPOP, a mandatory exemption which obliges a public body to refuse to disclose personal information if such disclosure constituted an unreasonable invasion of an individual’s personal privacy. The review officer concluded that the requested information revealed details of a contract to supply a service to the provincial government. By s. 20(4)(f) of the Act, such a disclosure is deemed not to unreasonably invade privacy. The review officer recommended disclosure. [6] DNS appealed to the Nova Scotia Supreme Court under s. 42(1) of the Act. Section 42(1) states that the Supreme Court “determines the matter de novo.” Justice Douglas MacLellan heard the appeal on August 8, 2005. DNS filed an affidavit of Dr. Gary Ernest, the director of DNS. Ms. Redden filed an affidavit of Lori Errington, a researcher with the NDP caucus office. [7] The chambers judge issued a decision on August 30, 2005, dismissing DNS’ appeal (2005 NSSC 244). He ruled that the disclosure was deemed not to be an unreasonable invasion of privacy by s. 20(4)(f). This provision reads: 20(4) A disclosure of personal information is not an unreasonable invasion of a third party’s personal privacy if ... (f) the disclosure reveals financial and other similar details of a contract to supply goods or services to a public body. Later I will discuss the chambers judge’s reasoning. He determined: [30] I conclude that the contract between Doctors Nova Scotia and the Department of Health is a contract for the supply of services and that the fees paid under the contract are financial details of the contract and therefore come within s. 20(4)(f) of the Act. ... [42] In light of my decision to find that the information requested is covered by s. 20(4)(f) of the Act it is not necessary for me to deal with whether the Third Party here has shown that the presumption of an unreasonable invasion of privacy has been rebutted in light of the fact that all parties agree that the information involved does contain personal information. [8] DNS appeals to this court. DNS’ factum defines the issue as follows: 119 . . . the Appellants have consented to release of the individual billing amounts on the condition that the names of physicians are severed, substituting numbers for names. 120. The only issue in this case is whether names of physicians are required to be disclosed in connection with the amount of their individual billings. Appeal Jurisdiction [9] The Act says nothing of appeals from the Supreme Court. Section 38(1) of the Judicature Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 240 states that, except where otherwise provided, an appeal lies to the Court of Appeal from any decision of the Supreme Court. Section 38(1) permits an appeal from a Supreme Court decision made under s. 42(1) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act: O’Connor v. Nova Scotia, 2001 NSCA 132, at ¶ 30; Dickie v. Nova Scotia (Department of Health), [1999] N.S.J. No. 116 (C.A.). Standard of Review [10] This is an appeal from a de novo determination by the Supreme Court, not from a judicial review of a decision by an administrative tribunal. So the pragmatic and functional approach does not determine the standard of review. Rather, the standard of review for the Court of Appeal is that which normally applies to a civil appeal from a decision of first instance by a lower court. In O’Connor, at ¶ 28 - 34, Justice Saunders summarized the principle: Accordingly, in the absence of clear statutory direction to the contrary, the standard of review under the FOIPOP Act of a lower court’s findings of fact should be the same as in other civil cases, that is obvious, palpable and overriding error. In matters of law, for example conclusions with respect to the interpretation to be given to legislation, the test is one of correctness. ... Issues [11] The issues turn on s. 20 of the Act. The pertinent wording is: Section 20 (1) The head of a public body shall refuse to disclose personal information to an applicant if the disclosure would be an unreasonable invasion of a third party’s personal privacy. (2) In determining pursuant to subsection (1) or (3) whether a disclosure of personal information constitutes an unreasonable invasion of a third party’s personal privacy, the head of a public body shall consider all the relevant circumstances, including whether (a) the disclosure is desirable for the purpose of subjecting the activities of the Government of Nova Scotia or a public body to public scrutiny; (b) the disclosure is likely to promote public health and safety or to promote the protection of the environment; (c) the personal information is relevant to a fair determination of the applicant’s rights; (d) the disclosure will assist in researching the claims, disputes or grievances of aboriginal people; (e) the third party will be exposed unfairly to financial or other harm; (f) the personal information has been supplied in confidence; (g) the personal information is likely to be inaccurate or unreliable; and (h) the disclosure may unfairly damage the reputation of any person referred to in the record requested by the applicant (3) A disclosure of personal information is presumed to be an unreasonable invasion of a third party’s personal privacy if ... (f) the personal information describes the third party’s finances, income, assets, liabilities, net worth, bank balances, financial history or activities, or creditworthiness; (4) A disclosure of personal information is not an unreasonable invasion of a third party’s personal privacy if ... (f) the disclosure reveals financial and other similar details of a contract to supply goods or services to a public body; [emphasis added] [12] In Dickie, at ¶ 4 - 18, Justice Cromwell outlined the analytical approach to s. 20. To similar effect: Re House and 144900 Canada Inc. 2000 Carswell N.S. 429 (NSSC) per Moir, J. at ¶ 6. In summary, the court should ask the following questions: 1. Do the requested records contain “personal information” of the third party, in this case the physicians? 2. If so, does s. 20(4) deem the disclosure not to be an unreasonable invasion of the physicians’ privacy? If there is deeming by s. 20(4), the information should be disclosed. Section 20(4) does not allow rebuttal. 3. If there is no deeming by s. 20(4), does s. 20(3) presume the disclosure to be an unreasonable invasion of the physicians’ privacy? If so, there is a rebuttable presumption that the information should not be disclosed. 4. If there is a presumption by s. 20(3), is the presumption rebutted by a consideration of the circumstances under s. 20(2)? If so, the information should be disclosed. If not, then s. 20(1) directs that the personal information not be disclosed. Those are the issues before a Supreme Court judge. The issue in the Court of Appeal is whether the chambers judge committed an appealable error under the standard of review respecting these four questions. [13] The first and third questions are not in contention on this appeal: (a) Paragraphs 3(1)(i)(i) and (vii) define “personal information” as including an “individual’s name” and “information about the individual’s ... financial history”. It is not disputed that the requested income information of named physicians is “personal information” of the physicians. The chambers judge made no contrary finding, and his analysis under s. 20(4)(f) assumes that the requested records included “personal information” of physicians. The answer to the first question is “yes”. (b) Ms. Redden acknowledged in her factum that, if s. 20(4)(f) does not apply, then there is a rebuttable presumption under 20(3)(f). Section 20(3)(f) states that a disclosure of personal information is presumed to be an unreasonable invasion of the third party’s privacy if the personal information describes the third party’s “income”. The chambers judge disposed of the matter under s. 20(4)(f), and did not consider s. 20(3)(f). The requested information relates to physicians’ income. I agree that, if s. 20 (4)(f) does not apply, the answer to the third question is “yes”. [14] The argument in this court focussed on the second and fourth questions. Those are the issues I will address. Contract to Supply Services to a Public Body - s. 20(4)(f) [15] The chambers judge disposed of the claim under s. 20(4)(f), which deems the disclosure not to unreasonably invade the physicians’ privacy if the disclosure reveals details “of a contract to supply . . . services to a public body”. [16] The only contract in evidence, or considered by the chambers judge, was the Agreement dated April 1, 2004 between the Medical Society of Nova Scotia (now “DNS”) and Her Majesty the Queen in right of the Province (“Contract”). The Contract provides a Fee Tariff for “Insured Medical Services”. [17] Some medical services are provided under arrangements other than fee for service under this Contract. Article 3.1 of the Contract mentions the collective agreement between PARI-MP (which represents medical residents in the Maritime Provinces) and various healthcare facilities. “Alternative Funding Programs” are defined by article 1(1) as: funding mechanisms, other than Fee- For-Service which are documented in the contracts anticipated by article 8 of this Agreement . . . Article 12.5 notes that physicians may provide insured medical services pursuant to a salaried arrangement with district health authorities. [18] Ms. Redden’s request for information relates only to services by physicians on a fee for service basis as prescribed in the Contract of April 1, 2004. No other contract is in evidence. I express no opinion whether any such other contract, be it a collective agreement involving PARI-MP or an Alternative Funding Program or a salaried arrangement, is or is not a “contract to supply services to a public body” under s. 20(4)(f). [19] Concerning the requested information under the Contract, the chambers judge began by posing the question: [25] Does Section 20(4)(f) apply to the requested information? [20] Clearly the Contract of April 1, 2004 was a “contract”, the disclosure would reveal financial details deriving from that contract, and physicians provide medical “services”. The issue under s. 20(4)(f) is whether, under the Contract, physicians provide those services “to a public body”. [21] The chambers judge noted repeatedly that physicians’ services are provided to individual patients: [26] . . . Each doctor bills individually and is paid individually for each service provided to a resident of Nova Scotia. [27] . . . I interpret the contract involved here to clearly set out the rights of doctors to bill the Province provided they provide the service to a resident of Nova Scotia . . . [28] . . . doctors are paid for services provided to a resident . . . [29] . . . The service provided by the doctors are [sic] not for the Department of Health but for residents of the Province. As Doctors Nova Scotia speaks for the doctors so does the Department of Health speak for the residents of Nova Scotia. [22] The chambers judge found that the service provided by physicians was “not for the Department of Health but for residents of the Province”. Nowhere does his decision say that physicians provided a service to the Department of Health. [23] The chambers judge then said: [30] I conclude that the contract between Doctors Nova Scotia and the Department of Health is a contract for the supply of services and that the fees paid under the contract are financial details of the contract and therefore come within Section 20(4)(f) of the Act. . . . [34] I interpret this section [20(4)(b)] to be very broad in scope and basically indicating that if a person has a financial contract with a government body to provide goods or services you should expect that it is going to become public knowledge through Freedom on Information. [24] The chambers judge arrived at his conclusion by interpreting s. 20(4)(f) as if it read: . . . the disclosure reveals financial and other similar details of a contract with a public body to supply goods or services. The chambers judge has, with respect, misread the provision. The point is not whether the Contract is signed with a public body. Under the Contract, the services must be supplied to a public body. [25] In his able submission, counsel for Ms. Redden urged the court to interpret s. 20(4)(f) “purposively”, instead of “literally”, to promote disclosure. The court is to interpret the Act. The words of the Act are to be read in their entire context, in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act and the intention of the legislature: R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45 at ¶ 33 per McLachlin, C.J.C., and authorities cited. The starting point is the “grammatical and ordinary sense of the words”. The legislature has chosen to enact that the deeming by s. 20(4)(f) applies only when the disclosure relates to details of a contract to provide “services to a public body”. Section 2 of the Act lists the statutory objects to include both promotion of public access to records and protection of privacy for personal information. The court cannot ignore the clear statutory direction simply to promote disclosure per se. It is the function of the legislature, not the court, to decide whether or not the words “services to a public body” should cease to qualify the deeming in s. 20(4)(f). [26] A review of the Contract and its enabling legislation establishes that the physicians’ services involved in this appeal, provided on a fee for service basis, are not “services to a public body” and the Contract does not “supply services to a public body”. [27] The Contract provides the mechanism for negotiating a Fee Tariff. Article 1(6) defines “Fee Tariff” as a tariff for “Insured Medical Services”. Article 1(9) defines “Insured Medical Services” as “the medical services that Insured residents are entitled to receive under the provisions of the Health Services and Insurance Act . . .” [emphasis added]. “Insured Residents” are defined by article 1(8) of the Contract as “residents of Nova Scotia as defined by the Health Services and Insurance Act . . .” [28] The Health Services and Insurance Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 197, as amended, (“HSIA”) s. 2(h)(a) defines “insured professional services” as “the services with respect to which a resident is entitled to receive insurance under the provisions of this Act and the Regulations”. “Resident” is defined by s. 1(l) as “resident of the Province as defined in the Regulations”. Various provisions [e.g. ss. 17(2)(a), (b) and (d); 27(1); 28(1); 29(1) ] state that the insured professional service is rendered “to a resident”. Nothing in the HSIA says physicians’ services are to the Province. Section 3(2), the heart of the HSIA, states: (2) Subject to this Act and the regulations, all residents of the Province are insured upon uniform terms and conditions in respect of the payment of the cost of insured professional services to the extent of the tariffs. [29] Section 13(1)(a) authorizes the Minister of Health to negotiate “compensation for insured professional services on behalf of the Province with the professional organization representing providers”. Section 13(A) authorizes the Minister of Health to “enter into an agreement with the Society [now DNS] on behalf of all duly qualified medical practitioners in the Province who provide insured medical services concerning compensation for insured medical services . . .”. These provisions that enable the Contract are subject to s. 23 of the HSIA: Nothing in this Act (a) prevents a person from choosing his own provider; (b) prevents a provider from practising as a provider outside the M.S.I. Plan; or (c) imposes an obligation upon a provider to treat a person. [30] In my view, the Contract and HSIA display the following dynamics. The Contract establishes a Tariff for “insured medical services”, and defines “insured medical services” to mean services to the patient. The Contract is authorized by the HSIA. Under that HSIA, “insured professional services” are services to the patient. The Province insures the patient for the cost of the services to the extent of the tariffs. The Act does not interfere with, or inject the Province into, the individual choices of the patient and physician to engage in the professional relationship - confirmed by s. 23. The Department and the physician (through DNS) contract to establish the tariff, and the Province as insurer pays the physician directly. But the physician provides the medical service to the patient, not to the Province. [31] The chambers judge (¶ 29 - quoted earlier) noted that “the Department of Health speak[s] for residents of Nova Scotia.” It is unclear how this proposition channelled the chambers judge’s reasoning. It appears that the chambers judge may have characterized the Department as an agent for the residents/patients. To this I have two comments. First, the HSIA does not express an agency role for the Department. The HSIA describes the Province as an insurer. Second, even if there is an implied or constructive agency (about which I express no opinion), that does not redirect the physicians’ medical services to the Province. An agency does not bestow on the agent the benefit of a service rendered to the principal. [32] Counsel for Ms. Redden says that it should not matter who “consumes” the service. Counsel cited examples of contracts with government to build roads, schools and hospitals. Another example discussed at the hearing would be a contract with government for garbage collection. Counsel says the contractor provides these services to the government. In my view, these examples differ in principle from physicians’ services. In these examples the contract with the public body is the source of the third party’s commitment to build the road, school or hospital or collect garbage. So the service may be provided to the public body though it benefits individuals. The Contract of April 1, 2004 systemizes the Province’s role as insurer, but is not the source of a physician’s commitment to provide medical service. That commitment results from the individual dealings between physician and patient, as acknowledged by s. 23 of the HSIA. [33] This was not a contract to supply medical “services to a public body”. Section 20(4)(f) does not apply. The standard of review for errors of law is correctness. With respect, the chambers judge erred in law by ruling that s. 20(4)(f) deemed this disclosure not to be an unreasonable invasion of the physicians’ privacy. Rebuttal of Presumption - s. 20(2) [34] Ms. Redden’s factum acknowledges that, if s. 20(4)(f) does not apply, then s. 20(3)(f) does apply. The requested disclosure involves personal information describing physicians’ “income”. Section 20(3)(f) presumes this to be an unreasonable invasion of the physicians’ privacy, unless rebutted under s. 20(2). I will turn to s. 20(2). [35] The chambers judge did not consider s. 20(2). There is no issue of appellate deference on that topic. [36] In Dickie, this court considered the approach to the rebuttal of the presumption. Justice Cromwell stated: 55 However, the judge's balancing of the factors was incorrect because of the error in failing to find the disputed information was personal information related to employment history. In the case of personal information related to employment history, the Act presumes that the balance is in favour of privacy because it presumes that disclosure of personal information relating to employment history is an unreasonable invasion of personal privacy. The judge held, in effect, that the citizen's right to know trumps a third party employee's right to privacy, saying that if an employee "... apparently or actually misuses the power vested in that employee as a consequence of employment, an aggrieved citizen has a right to be adequately advised of the nature and the results of an investigation into the allegation of wrongdoing.." I think the judge erred in reaching this conclusion when the explicit presumption of the Act is the opposite. The error was not in failing to do the balancing but in failing to start the balancing with the presumption in favour of privacy of this type of information. The s. 20(2) analysis is a balancing exercise, but not from a level scale. It begins with the weighted presumption under s. 20(3)(f) that the disclosure would unreasonably invade the physicians’ privacy. The question is whether the circumstances cited in s. 20(2) overcome this presumption. The proponent of rebuttal must define and establish her proposition. [37] Section 20(2) is quoted earlier (¶ 11). In the circumstances here, there is nothing in ¶ 20(2)(c) through (h) to support the rebuttal of the presumption that disclosure would unreasonably invade the physicians’ privacy. The questions are whether the presumption is rebutted by a consideration of “all the relevant circumstances” in the prefix, whether the disclosure would better subject government to public scrutiny under s. 20(2)(a) and whether the disclosure would promote public health under s. 20(2)(b). [38] Ms. Errington’s affidavit says that the requested information is public in British Columbia and Manitoba, and that in Nova Scotia incomes of civil servants, teachers and professors are publicized. Her affidavit says that the Nova Scotia government spends over half a billion dollars per annum for medical payments and grants. Ms. Redden’s factum repeats these submissions. Nothing in the evidence or Mr. Redden’s factum focuses on the listed factors in s. 20(2). The Province’s factum does cite s. 20(2)(a). [39] Physicians’ billing data is publicized in British Columbia and Manitoba under specific statutory provisions that do not exist in Nova Scotia: Financial Information Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 140 and Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 165, s. 22(4)(g); Public Sector Compensation Disclosure Act, C.C.S.M. 1996, c. P265, s. 5. In Nova Scotia, the disclosure of incomes of teachers, civil servants and professors does not involve the issues under s. 20 that determine the outcome of Ms. Redden’s request for the physicians’ billings. [40] The Province spends over half a billion dollars annually on medical services. If the question was simply “Should there be disclosure of how the government spends over half a billion dollars per annum?” I would agree. Disclosure would promote public scrutiny of the spending activities of the government in the field of public health. This would engage s. 20(2)(a) and (b). But that is not the question. DNS does not object to the disclosure of the requested information, provided only that the names of individual physicians are deleted (or replaced with numbers). Disclosure of global funding, or categories of funding, or details (other than names) of funding for physicians’ insured services is not contested. The only question is whether the names of individual physicians should be included (or replaced by numbers). If the names were deleted, the billings data, to the extent that the information would not then relate to an identifiable individual, would not be “personal information” and s. 20 would not bar disclosure. [41] The evidence contains nothing to support the conclusion that the disclosure of the names of individual physicians would better subject the government to public scrutiny or improve public health. [42] At the hearing of his appeal, counsel for Ms. Redden referred to passages in the transcript of his submissions to the chambers judge. Counsel said to the chambers judge, “I’m not going to give evidence”, but then described “hypotheticals”. An example is a hypothetical municipality that considers whether to levy a tax to replace a physician or entice a physician to locate in the community. The physician’s income would be relevant to the policy choice of the municipal council - to calculate the level of the special tax. Counsel concluded by saying to the chambers judge: “I make no claims about how close these are to actual fact situations in Nova Scotia.” [43] Counsel may hypothesize how the name of a physician might connect to a government decision. But there is no support in the evidence for this speculation. Free-wheeling conjecture does not establish a proposition to rebut the statutory presumption. In my view, the consideration of the circumstances under s. 20(2) here does not rebut the presumption under s. 20(3)(f) that the disclosure would unreasonably invade the physicians’ privacy. Conclusion [44] The disclosure of the names of individual physicians would be an unreasonable invasion of the physician’s privacy. By s. 20(1), the names of individual physicians should not be disclosed, and I would allow the appeal in that respect. The parties should bear their own costs. Fichaud, J.A. Concurred in: Cromwell, J.A. Oland, J.A.