Glassen v. Glassen

2026 BCCA 99 Glassen v. Glassen COURT OF APPEAL FOR BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: Glassen v. Glassen, 2026 BCCA 99 Date: 20260310 Docket: CA50659 Between: Frank Clarence Glassen Appellant (Respondent) And Jennifer Rose Glassen also known as Jennifer Rose Mildon Respondent (Claimant) Before: The Honourable Justice Griffin The Honourable Madam Justice Horsman The Honourable Justice Fleming On appeal from: An order of the Supreme Court of British Columbia, dated April 7, 2025 (Glassen v. Glassen, 2025 BCSC 640, Victoria Docket E232723). The Appellant, appearing in person: F.C. Glassen The Respondent, appearing in person: J.R. Mildon Place and Date of Hearing: Victoria, British Columbia February 2, 2026 Place and Date of Judgment: Vancouver, British Columbia March 10, 2026 Written Reasons by: The Honourable Justice Griffin Concurred in by: The Honourable Madam Justice Horsman The Honourable Justice Fleming Summary: The appellant husband appeals from the trial judge's orders granting equal division of family property, final parenting decision-making authority to the respondent wife, and possession of the family dog to the respondent. He seeks to adduce new evidence in support of his position that the judge made errors in her findings of fact. Held: Appeal dismissed. An appeal is not a re-trial, and this Court must treat with deference a trial judge's findings of fact, application of the law to those facts, and exercise of discretion. The appellant repeats the arguments made at trial and has not demonstrated a reviewable error. Moreover, the new evidence the appellant seeks to introduce was either available pre-trial or is irrelevant to the issues on appeal. Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Griffin: [1] Mr. Glassen appeals from a judgment in a family law case that divided property and made a parenting order regarding decision-making responsibilities in respect of the parties' child. The judgment is indexed as Glassen v. Glassen, 2025 BCSC 640. [2] Mr. Glassen also seeks to introduce additional evidence on appeal that he did not introduce at trial, in support of his arguments that the judge made errors in her findings of fact. [3] Mr. Glassen has not met the standard for appellate interference with the trial judgment. He has not shown that the trial judge made an error of law. The trial judge instructed herself on the correct legal principles. The trial judge was careful and accurate in her review of the parties' circumstances, and her findings of fact are supported by evidence. [4] For the reasons that follow, I would dismiss the appeal and the application to introduce additional evidence. Background [5] The parties began living together in September 2016, married on July 7, 2018, had a child, K, born in late 2020, acquired a dog, and separated on June 27, 2022. [6] Post-separation, the respondent, who now uses the last name Mildon, moved out of the family home and rented an apartment. Mr. Glassen stayed in the family home. He paid some expenses in relation to the home, such as the mortgage payments, through his own resources in part but also through drawing on the parties' line of credit, substantially increasing that debt. The parties shared a parenting arrangement with K on a 2-2-3 schedule, which at the time of trial they agreed should continue. The parties initially shared access to the dog, but after difficulties encountered by Ms. Mildon in arranging the exchange, the dog stayed consistently with her. [7] The trial took place over six days in January 2025. [8] The judge ordered equal division of family property, taking into account family debt, including a line of credit. Since the line of credit was incurred to maintain the property that Mr. Glassen lived in post-separation, including to make mortgage payments, the judge found it equitable to also take into account some of the rent that Ms. Mildon had to pay as "occupational rent" post-separation. [9] In her division of property, the judge also made findings against Mr. Glassen's arguments that the couple owed a greater debt to his mother than already acknowledged by Ms. Mildon, or that his mother had made him the sole recipient of a gift rather than making the gift to both parties. [10] Although the parties agreed that they should both be actively involved in K's life and share parenting time equally there was substantial evidence, including from Mr. Glassen, of his significant anger toward and distrust of Ms. Mildon, and that this attitude interfered with his ability to make objectively reasonable decisions in K's best interests. [11] The judge ordered the parties to share decision-making responsibility and to consult each other about significant decisions concerning K. However, where they cannot agree after making best efforts, Ms. Mildon is entitled to make the final decision. [12] Since Ms. Mildon earned more income than Mr. Glassen, she was ordered to pay him child support. Mr. Glassen does not appeal this order. [13] The judge rejected Mr. Glassen's request for an order that the parties share time with the dog equally. Factually, she found that Mr. Glassen had acted unreasonably when Ms. Mildon had attempted to arrange exchanges of the dog in the past. She also found that the law prohibited orders for joint possession of companion animals like a dog, citing s. 97(4.2) of the Family Law Act, S.B.C 2011, c. 25 [FLA]. The judge awarded possession of the dog to Ms. Mildon. Standard of Appellate Review [14] Mr. Glassen opened his oral submissions on appeal by stating he did not challenge any of the judge's findings of fact. However, on reviewing his written factum and considering his oral submissions that is precisely what he seeks to do, in addition to challenging the judge's exercise of discretion. [15] It appears to me that Mr. Glassen misapprehends this Court's role, which is explained in the leading cases of Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, and Barendregt v. Grebliunas, 2022 SCC 22. [16] A party who loses at trial may naturally believe that the trial judge made "errors". However, mere disagreement with the result is not an error. Trial judges see the witnesses testify and examine the whole of the evidence in detail. Consequently, they have a greater appreciation for the facts and the parties' credibility than appeal courts do. For this reason, where the judge is faced with competing evidence about the facts and prefers one version over another, the appeal court must usually respect the judge's decision. [17] Trial results are meant to be final and to provide certainty for the parties going forward. Otherwise, there would be no point in having a trial. In family law cases especially, much harm could be done to families and the expense of resolving disputes would escalate if this Court readily interfered with trial decisions: see Hickey v. Hickey, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 518 at para. 12, 1999 CanLII 691. [18] An appeal court therefore does not have the role of considering all the evidence and substituting its decision for that of the trial judge. An appeal is not a re-trial. Rather, this Court must usually accept a trial judge's findings of fact and application of the law to those facts. The Court will only review an alleged error of fact if the error is palpable and overriding, meaning that it is obvious and clearly affected the result: Housen at para. 10; Hydro-Québec v. Matta, 2020 SCC 37 at para. 33. This means that in most family law cases, where the trial judge prefers one spouse's evidence over the other spouse's evidence, no appealable error will arise. [19] This Court will review an alleged error of law to see if the judge's understanding of the law was correct, but on this appeal Mr. Glassen has not identified an isolated error of law. [20] Trial judges are often called upon to exercise their discretion when the law does not dictate a specific outcome but gives the judge a choice of options, including deciding on what is the fair and just thing to do: Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 at para. 52, 1999 CanLII 699; Kish v. Sobchak Estate, 2016 BCCA 65 at para. 33. [21] Here, the trial judge's decisions regarding property division and co-parenting were discretionary decisions entitled to deference on appeal: Paletar v. Paletar, 2026 BCCA 41 at para. 24 [Paletar]; Barendregt at paras. 10, 100-101. [22] This Court will rarely interfere with a discretionary decision because, again, it is important to have finality in the trial process, especially so in family law cases. There are limited grounds upon which this Court may interfere with a trial judge's discretionary decision. Mr. Glassen's arguments appear to raise the ground that the judge failed to take into account the factors the judge was legally required to consider: see MiningWatch Canada v. Canada (Fisheries and Oceans), 2010 SCC 2 at para. 43; J.I. Properties Inc. v. PPG Architectural Coatings Canada Ltd., 2015 BCCA 472 at para. 68. Property Division Issues [23] In summary, Mr. Glassen challenges the judge's conclusions relating to property division on the basis that the judge: a) declined to give sufficient weight to what he considers to be his unequal and larger contributions to family expenses during the marriage, which he claims would have left Ms. Mildon with "surplus" funds. In this regard, he submits that the judge ought to have given more weight to: i) Ms. Mildon's repayment of her pre-existing student loans during the marriage; ii) Ms. Mildon's "free rent" by moving in with him early on while she built a physiotherapy practice; iii) the parties' tacit agreement they would equalize expenses during the marriage; b) failed to treat advances from his mother in the way he says they should have been treated, namely: i) he says an advance by his mother of $25,000 should have been treated as a gift to him solely and therefore his excluded property, rather than a gift to the parties jointly; ii) he says loans from his mother should have been treated as bearing interest, as opposed to being interest-free; c) declined to give him more credit for expenses he paid post-separation while living in the family home and wrongly made him share part of the rent that Ms. Mildon had to pay while living in a rental suite; and d) declined to order joint custody of the family dog. [24] However, the judge addressed all of the matters above in her reasons for judgment. In essence, Mr. Glassen takes the position that the judge's conclusions on the evidence and in deciding on property division should have been different. [25] Mr. Glassen has not shown that the trial judge was incorrect in her understanding of the legal principles that apply to property division or incorrectly failed to consider or give appropriate weight to relevant considerations. [26] In summary, under ss. 81(a) and (b) of the FLA, on marriage breakdown both spouses are equally entitled to an undivided half interest in family property and are equally responsible for family debt, "regardless of their respective use or contribution". Pursuant to s. 95(1)(a), a judge may order an unequal division of family property and family debt if equal division would be "significantly unfair". Factors that may be considered are set out in ss. 95(2) and (3). Unequal financial contributions during the marriage is not one of the factors expressly listed in s. 95. In Paletar this Court held that while the courts are constrained in taking this factor into account, they may do so if this factor would make equal division significantly unfair. [27] As explained in Paletar: [28] This Court recently reiterated the principles applicable to the exercise of discretion to depart from equal division where an equal division would be significantly unfair in Lamoureux BCCA at paras. 15-19, drawing from Jaszczewska v. Kostanski, 2016 BCCA 286, Banh, and Khan. The following are of particular relevance in this appeal: · The general rule of equal division is to prevail unless persuasive reasons can be shown for a different result. · The discretion to depart from equal division is "significantly constrained" and must be rooted in the factors set out in s. 95. · The term "significant unfairness" creates a "high threshold" that is more stringent than the mere "unfairness" test in the Family Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 128 (the predecessor to the FLA), and requires something objectively unjust, unreasonable, or unfair in some important or substantial sense. · The Legislature intended to limit the circumstances in which a departure from equal division of family property could be justified because of unequal contributions to its acquisition, preservation, maintenance, or improvement. · While unequal contribution has not been abolished as a factor that may be relevant to reapportionment, the circumstances in which it may be considered and relied on are much constrained, and allowing unequal contribution to become a regular consideration would undermine the legislative objectives of certainty and predictability. · The "significant unfairness" contemplated by s. 95 requires much more than differing financial contributions; and cases in which unequal contribution has resulted in a finding that equal division would be significantly unfair have involved marked, prolonged, and intentional or unexplained disparities in contribution to family burdens. [28] The presumption of equal division of family property and family debt serves an important public interest, in that it creates certainty and predictability as to what will happen on marriage breakdown. This allows many separating spouses to reach agreement and to avoid costly and emotionally destructive litigation. The give and take in a marriage is not treated like an accounting ledger where each spouse's contribution or detriment can be objectively measured and tallied when the marriage ends. Rather, contributions of different types, financial and otherwise, are understood to be the norm in a spousal relationship. [29] Despite this approach, in many cases that do end up in litigation, including the present one, a spouse will argue that they contributed more financially to the acquisition of family property, and therefore they should be given a greater share of it on separation. Mr. Glassen made this argument below, and the judge properly considered it before rejecting the argument. [30] The judge identified Mr. Glassen's many arguments regarding unequal contributions, now repeated on appeal. She considered the full circumstances of the parties during the relationship and post-separation. The judge ultimately rejected Mr. Glassen's argument that his contributions were greater and would therefore make equal division significantly unfair. The judge's findings on these points were consistent with the evidence and a proper application of the law. [31] As for the judge's findings regarding the loans and gifts from Mr. Glassen's mother, these findings were based on evidence the judge was entitled to accept and do not reveal any error. Neither Mr. Glassen nor his mother had ever treated the loan she made to the parties as bearing interest, pre-separation. Mr. Glassen's mother also signed a gift letter and conducted herself as though the gift she made was to the couple, not to Mr. Glassen alone. Mr. Glassen has not shown that the judge overlooked or misapprehended evidence on these matters. [32] Mr. Glassen has also not shown any error in the judge's consideration of the relative living expenses each party contributed post-separation. Mr. Glassen asserted that he maintained the family home by making mortgage payments post-separation, but in fact these were largely funded by a line of credit that was treated as family debt, which was divided equally. The judge therefore decided to take into account, in her equalization of property and debt, a portion of rent that Ms. Mildon was required to pay post-separation. This approach was consistent with the findings of fact made by the judge and consistent with legal authority, including Stasiewski v. Stasiewski, 2007 BCCA 205 at paras. 27-33. [33] The last topic of complaint regarding property division relates to the judge's decision to award the family dog to Ms. Mildon. [34] Mr. Glassen argues that the judge failed to consider the statutory factors enumerated in s. 97(4.1) of the FLA. The s. 97(4.1) factors apply when a judge makes an order under s. 97(1) respecting a companion animal as follows: (4.1) In determining whether to make an order under subsection (1) respecting a companion animal, the Supreme Court must consider the following factors: (a) the circumstances in which the companion animal was acquired; (b) the extent to which each spouse cared for the companion animal; (c) any history of family violence; (d) the risk of family violence; (e) a spouse's cruelty, or threat of cruelty, toward an animal; (f) the relationship that a child has with the companion animal; (g) the willingness and ability of each spouse to care for the basic needs of the companion animal; (h) any other circumstances the court considers relevant. [35] The difficulty with Mr. Glassen's argument is that he has changed his position on appeal from that taken at trial. At trial, he sought an order for joint possession and custody of the dog, and the judge correctly rejected this argument as contrary to s. 97(4.2) of the FLA, which provides: (4.2) An order respecting a companion animal must not (a) declare that the spouses jointly own the companion animal, or (b) require the spouses to share possession of the companion animal. [36] Prior to trial, the parties had attempted regular transfers of the dog between households. However, according to the trial judge's findings, difficulties arose because of Mr. Glassen's communication issues and unwillingness to cooperate with Ms. Mildon. [37] Mr. Glassen's new position on appeal is that he should have sole possession of the dog. He submits the judge erred by failing to engage in a review of the factors set out in s. 97(4.1). [38] In my view, given Mr. Glassen's position at trial and the evidence, the judge was not required to engage in a detailed analysis of the factors listed in s. 97(4.1). These factors in part relate to a party's degree of attachment to the animal, a child's attachment to the animal, and a party's ability to care for the animal. Mr. Glassen's position at trial implicitly recognized that both parties and the child were attached to the dog and that both households were appropriate for the dog. He seemed to suggest there was a need for shared custody of the dog for the child's sake, so that the dog could provide emotional support to the child when she transitioned between households. The judge considered K's relationship with the dog and found that the parenting schedule gave them sufficient time together at Ms. Mildon's house. [39] Further, had the judge referred to additional evidence, the conclusion would have been the same. Ms. Mildon's evidence was that she acquired the dog after the child was born and that she took primary responsibility for related expenses such as pet insurance, vet bills, and licensing. Mr. Glassen wrote to Ms. Mildon around the time of separation and told her that she would get the dog. [40] In my view, there is no basis for finding that the judge erred. The judge properly considered Mr. Glassen's position at trial and properly rejected it as not available on the law. There is no basis for interfering with her exercise of discretion to award possession of the dog to Ms. Mildon. [41] Mr. Glassen also advances other arguments regarding property division, but none rise above simple disagreement with the result. [42] In summary, in reaching her conclusions concerning property division, the trial judge made findings of fact that were well supported by the evidence, and she properly applied the law to those facts. Mr. Glassen has not shown that the trial judge made any error justifying appellate interference. Parenting Issues [43] As for parenting issues, the sole issue Mr. Glassen challenges on appeal is the judge's decision that if, after best efforts, the parties cannot agree on a significant decision regarding K, Ms. Mildon is entitled to make the final decision. He submits that the judge blamed him for communication difficulties that he attributes to Ms. Mildon. [44] Ms. Mildon disputes that the judge made any errors and emphasizes that Mr. Glassen appears to be trying to relitigate this issue. [45] I see no merit to Mr. Glassen's challenge to the judge's order. I agree that his arguments are simply seeking to re-try the case in this Court. [46] The judge carefully and sensitively reviewed the evidence regarding the parties' co-parenting efforts post-trial. The parties had several occasions of conflict. The judge reviewed examples of situations where Mr. Glassen's animosity towards Ms. Mildon led to him taking unreasonable positions that were not in the best interests of the child. The judge nevertheless crafted a co-parenting order that, for the most part, provides for decision making to be shared. Her conclusion that Ms. Mildon was better suited to make final decisions in relation to the child, if the parties could otherwise not agree, was a wise and prudent exercise of discretion in all the circumstances. [47] Mr. Glassen has not met the standard to justify appellate interference with the trial judge's decision on co-parenting. Argument of Alleged Bias [48] In his factum, Mr. Glassen also submits that the judge's findings, particularly those which commented negatively on his credibility, display a reasonable apprehension of bias. He suggests that the judge displayed a pro-female bias and that because the judge, Ms. Mildon, and Ms. Mildon's counsel went to the same Canadian university for a period of their education, they shared a "culture and worldview". It is not alleged they even knew each other or were at the university at the same time. [49] The meritless allegations of bias reflect very poorly on Mr. Glassen. There is nothing objectively reasonable about his allegations. The transcript of the trial and the judge's reasons reflect nothing but a respectful and careful approach. The judge's findings that disagreed with Mr. Glassen's perspectives were well-founded, and there is no basis for suggesting they are a result of bias. Additional Evidence on Appeal [50] Lastly, I will briefly address the additional evidence that Mr. Glassen wishes to introduce on appeal. It can be roughly categorized as follows: a) evidence supporting his allegations that blame Ms. Mildon for problems in the marriage pre-separation and cast him as her victim. b) evidence supporting his allegations that seek to cast suspicion on Ms. Mildon's parents based on his speculation that they could have benefited from Ms. Mildon's income while, according to him, he paid a greater share of expenses during the marriage. c) evidence regarding the parties' financial decisions and his mother's advances of money to them pre-separation. d) evidence post-trial regarding the results of the sale of the family home, as ordered by the judge. [51] In addition, Mr. Glassen made some references in his reply factum to new evidence regarding the child and her schooling post-trial, but this was not included in his application to introduce additional evidence. [52] Ms. Mildon disputes the veracity and admissibility of the additional evidence and allegations. She objects to the disparaging nature of much of the evidence as well. [53] The Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Barendregt clarified the approach that should be taken by an appellate court to a parent's attempt to adduce additional evidence on appeal that was not filed at trial. The Court noted that an appeal is not a re-trial and an attempt to introduce additional evidence on appeal is governed by the test in Palmer v. The Queen, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 759, 1979 CanLII 8. [54] The following four criteria set out in Palmer must be satisfied to admit additional evidence on appeal that was not introduced at trial: a) the evidence could not, by the exercise of due diligence, have been obtained for the trial; b) the evidence is relevant in that it bears upon a decisive or potentially decisive issue; c) the evidence is credible in the sense that it is reasonably capable of belief; and d) the evidence is such that, if believed, it could have affected the result at trial. [55] As explained in Barendregt, the Palmer test appreciates the need for finality and order in the justice system, so it will be rare for additional evidence to be admitted on appeal. This is especially so in relation to family law cases and those involving the best interests of a child. In circumstances such as this, litigation that is protracted by one party strains emotional and fiscal resources of the opposing party and creates uncertainty for the child. It also ignores the fact that variation procedures based on new evidence exist in the trial court. [56] It is clear from Mr. Glassen's factum and submissions that he misconceives the hearing in this Court as providing him with a chance to have another trial. As already stated, this Court's role is not to conduct a second trial or to allow a party to bolster their case with additional evidence that was available to them at the time of the first trial. This Court's role is to review the trial judgment for error. [57] The vast majority of Mr. Glassen's proposed additional evidence is evidence of matters that occurred pre-separation or pre-trial which, if relevant and admissible, was available to him to call at trial. He seeks to rely on evidence to reshape the facts and bolster his case on points he either lost at trial or which the trial judge found irrelevant (such as evidence of the difficulties in the parties' relationship pre-separation). Much of it is argument, inflammatory, and irrelevant and would not qualify as admissible evidence even if he had tried to introduce it at trial. [58] While ostensibly Mr. Glassen submits that evidence of problems in the marriage pre-separation supports his view that the parties' post-separation communication difficulties were Ms. Mildon's fault, this evidence is irrelevant to co-parenting the child post-separation. Many of these allegations speak to intimacies in the marriage and appear designed to denigrate Ms. Mildon and bias the court against her. He also seems to rely heavily on evidence of a pre-separation email from a family counsellor that expressed encouragement to him but is entirely based on hearsay. He has no basis to suggest that any of this would have properly been admissible at trial. [59] Ms. Mildon expressed her concern that the attitude revealed by Mr. Glassen's attempt to file this material is detrimental to co-parenting their child. There is something to this concern. [60] The judge was aware of Mr. Glassen's negativity towards Ms. Mildon, as she noted at paras. 30 and 50: [30] For his part, Mr. Glassen argues that the evidence demonstrates that Ms. [Mildon] has, both before and after separation, set up situations in order to provoke confrontation for the purpose of trying to "build her case" against him. [50] What I can and must consider, however, is Mr. Glassen's testimony at trial about his presently held views of certain past events. As I will set out below, this testimony demonstrates that Mr. Glassen presently maintains the view that Ms. [Mildon]'s actions have for a long time been significantly motivated by her desire to "build her case" against Mr. Glassen. The import of this strongly held belief is that it appears to have prevented Mr. Glassen from considering or concluding that other motivations may underlie Ms. [Mildon]'s actions, including seeking to cooperate on co-parenting and acting in K's best interests. This has, in turn, demonstrably affected Mr. Glassen's ability to cooperate with Ms. [Mildon] on decision making about K. [61] The judge was mindful of Mr. Glassen's many allegations and did not ignore them but wrote her reasons sensitively to not highlight irrelevant matters. The judge found that Mr. Glassen demonstrated a lack of credibility: [115] I do, however, find Mr. Glassen's testimony about [an alleged incident involving the child] to be concerning evidence of his intentions and interpretations now, as of the date of trial. Mr. Glassen is reinterpreting past events in not credible and unreasonable ways to cast Ms. [Mildon] in ill light. When coupled with his demonstrated fixation on believing that many things Ms. [Mildon] does are to build her case rather than make decisions in K's best interest, this weighs toward determining that Mr. Glassen has demonstrated he can not or will not work reasonably and cooperatively with Ms. [Mildon] to come to joint decisions about K. [62] As I have already noted, in my view, the judge's findings that Mr. Glassen was unreasonable and not credible, and failed to cooperate on co-parenting and in acting in K's best interests, was well supported by evidence. Mr. Glassen seems to be unaware that his attempt to adduce additional evidence on appeal simply reinforces the correctness of the trial judge's findings. [63] As for any evidence of post-trial circumstances, this is irrelevant to the issues on appeal. [64] I also do not consider that the purported new evidence would have changed the result at trial. It does not diminish the evidence the judge relied on in support of her findings regarding property division and co-parenting. [65] I would not admit any of the proposed additional evidence, as in my view, it fails to meet the Palmer test. Disposition [66] I would dismiss the application to introduce additional evidence on appeal, and I would dismiss the appeal. "The Honourable Justice Griffin" I AGREE: "The Honourable Madam Justice Horsman" I AGREE: "The Honourable Justice Fleming"