R. v. Speziale
The Court allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to time served because the trial judge erred in establishing a five-year penitentiary range for the small quantity of cocaine, failed adequately to consider rehabilitation and did not respect the proportionality principle in s.718.1; a custodial sentence of five...
Source-derived case information.
- Citation
- 2011 ONCA 580
- Parties
- Respondent: Her Majesty the Queen; Appellant: Giuseppe Speziale
- Court
- Court of Appeal for Ontario
- Jurisdiction
- Canada
- Judgment Date
- 8 September 2011
- Procedural Posture
- Criminal / Appeal Against Sentence (leave to Appeal Granted by Court of Appeal)
- Outcome
- Leave to appeal granted; appeal allowed; sentence reduced to time served
- Legal Topics
- Sentencing, Possession for the Purpose of Trafficking, Rehabilitation, Proportionality, Bail Conditions, Assistance to Police
- Source Language
- en
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
Her Majesty the Queen
Respondent
Giuseppe Speziale
Appellant
Procedural Posture
Criminal / Appeal Against Sentence (leave to Appeal Granted by Court of Appeal)
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether the trial judge erred in fixing the applicable range of sentence
- 2 Whether the trial judge failed to properly consider rehabilitation as a sentencing objective
- 3 Whether the sentence breached the principle of proportionality in s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code
Ratio Decidendi
The Court allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to time served because the trial judge erred in establishing a five-year penitentiary range for the small quantity of cocaine, failed adequately to consider rehabilitation and did not respect the proportionality principle in s.718.1; a custodial sentence of five years was disproportionate to the offence and the offender's degree of responsibility, and the appropriate disposition was time served (14 months and 9 days).
Court Disposition
Leave to appeal granted; appeal allowed; sentence reduced to time served
Orders
- Leave to appeal sentence granted
- Appeal allowed
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
1 paragraphs
R. v. Speziale Collection Decisions of the Court of Appeal Date 2011-09-08 Neutral citation 2011 ONCA 580 Docket numbers C51640 Judges Laskin, John Ivan; Armstrong, Robert Patrick; LaForme, Harry Smith Subject Criminal Decision Content CITATION: R. v. Speziale, 2011 ONCA 580 DATE: 20110908 DOCKET: C51640 COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO Laskin, Armstrong and LaForme JJ.A. BETWEEN Her Majesty the Queen Respondent and Giuseppe Speziale Appellant Paul Calarco, for the appellant Niall Gilks, for the respondent Heard: December 1, 2010 An application for leave to appeal and, if leave be granted, an appeal against the sentence imposed by Justice C. Horkins of the Superior Court of Justice, on July 22, 2009. ARMSTRONG J.A.: INTRODUCTION [1] This appeal was argued before us on December 1, 2010. At the conclusion of the argument, we granted leave, allowed the appeal and reduced the appellant’s sentence to time served with written reasons to follow. Unfortunately, the delivery of those reasons has been unintentionally delayed until now. [2] The appellant was tried by a judge and jury. He was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and one count each of possession of cocaine and possession of MDMA (ecstasy). On the possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking count, he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for five years. On the simple possession of cocaine and possession of MDMA, he was sentenced to one year on each count. All three sentences were to be served concurrently. BACKGROUND (i) The Offences [3] The appellant rented an apartment on Wilson Avenue in Toronto in October 2005. He testified that shortly thereafter he moved out of the apartment and turned it over to a person called Tito, who had previously sold drugs to the appellant in the apartment. The appellant conceded at trial that Tito was likely selling drugs to other persons who attended at the apartment. [4] The trial judge, in her reasons for sentence, rejected the appellant’s evidence that he had moved out of the apartment. [5] On the night of November 4, 2005, unknown men entered the apartment and a gunfight broke out. The appellant testified that he had nothing to do with the gunfight and that he had gone to the apartment to purchase some drugs from Tito. When he approached the apartment, he was forced inside with a gun held to his head by one of the assailants who used him as a shield. According to the appellant, his hands were tied together with duct tape. [6] The appellant testified that after a number of gun shots had been fired, everyone in the apartment left. The appellant was able to free his hands from the duct tape and he exited the apartment by a balcony. The appellant later turned himself in at the police station. [7] When the police arrived at the apartment, they conducted a search. The police seized powdered cocaine and ecstasy tablets. The appellant admitted owning six and a half tablets of ecstasy and 2.77 grams of cocaine, which were found on the top shelf of the bedroom closet beside the appellant’s birth certificate and employment record. [8] The appellant denied possessing any other drugs found in the apartment. The trial judge found that the appellant was in possession of 14.87 grams of cocaine and the ecstasy pills. [9] The police also found inside the apartment a debt list, a money counting machine, a scale and four or five empty kilo bags with cocaine residue. There was a dusting of cocaine on the kitchen counter consistent with the manufacture of crack. Two thousand dollars was found on the top of a refrigerator. [10] The police also found a safe in the apartment, which contained a gun and ammunition. The appellant was charged with possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and careless storage of ammunition. The jury acquitted him on both of these charges. (ii) The Appellant [11] At the time of the offences, the appellant was 25 years old. He was a trained and licensed welder. He had a grade 9 education. He was on bail for nearly four years prior to trial. While on bail, he lived with his parents and his sister. According to his bail conditions, he was confined to his residence except for court attendances, employment and consultations with counsel. He could also leave his residence when accompanied by one of his sureties. [12] The appellant committed two breaches of his recognizance while on bail for which he received short jail terms. Also, while on bail, he was convicted of possession of a Schedule III substance (amphetamine) for which he was fined $500. [13] The appellant has a criminal record dating from September 1998 in youth court. His offences included assault with a weapon, assault, possession of property obtained by crime, possession of a prohibited weapon, possession of a Schedule II substance, possession of a Schedule III substance, failure to comply with a recognizance (x 3) and dangerous driving. Up to the time of the offences in this case, his longest custodial sentence was 45 days served intermittently for failure to comply with a recognizance and assault. [14] Prior to sentencing, the appellant provided assistance to the Toronto Police Service Organized Crime Task Force. The following agreed statement of facts was admitted at the sentencing hearing: Mr. Speziale has been assisting the Toronto Police Service Organized Crime Task Force. His involvement with this unit began upon his arrest in November 2005. As a result of information received from Mr. Speziale in February of 2006, police seized two loaded handguns, a quantity of ammunition and a significant amount of marijuana, cocaine and methamphetamine. Two persons were arrested, convicted and served time in jail relating to these charges. Mr. Speziale has contact with the officer on a regular basis and there are ongoing investigations at this time based on information provided. (iii) The Trial Judge’s Reasons [15] The trial judge was not impressed with the appellant as a witness. She rejected his evidence concerning his moving out of the apartment. She also rejected his evidence as to his lack of involvement in the illicit drug activity in his apartment. She did not accept his evidence concerning his attendance at the apartment at the time of the gunfight. The trial judge concluded that the appellant was part of a high level drug business. That said, she stated that she was sentencing the appellant for possession of 14.87 grams of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. [16] The trial judge concluded that denunciation and deterrence were of paramount importance in sentencing the appellant. She concluded that the appropriate range of sentence was five to eight years. She relied in particular on this court’s judgment in R. v. Bajada (2003), 173 C.C.C. (3d) 255 (Ont. C.A.). [17] The trial judge considered both aggravating and mitigating factors in respect of the appellant. The aggravating factors include his criminal record and the facts of the particular offences occurring as they did in the context of a gunfight in an apartment apparently used for high level drug trafficking. The list of mitigating factors included the appellant’s assistance to the police and his regular attendance at Narcotics Anonymous. [18] Counsel for the appellant at trial submitted that there were other mitigating factors, which included the possibility that he suffered from attention deficit disorder, his expression of remorse and his desire to change his life. The trial judge declined to give these factors any significant weight. Finally, the trial judge considered the prospect for rehabilitation. In this respect, she said: I recognize that one danger of imposing a lengthy jail term is that it can impair the rehabilitation and reintegration as a person as a responsible member of this community. This was referred to in R. v. Woolcock [2002] O.J. 4927 Ont. C.A. at para. 13. While I appreciate that I cannot overlook the rehabilitation factor, denunciation and deterrence are paramount. Furthermore, there is nothing particular about Mr. Speziale’s circumstances that require me to be concerned about rehabilitation. He has already trained to work as a welder and can, if he wished, return to his employment after his release from jail. [19] The trial judge agreed that she should take into consideration the appellant’s co-operation with the police and did so by imposing a sentence at the low end of the range of five to eight years. [20] The trial judge declined to give effect to the submission of trial counsel that she should take into account the appellant’s restrictive bail terms and give some credit for his time on bail. THE APPEAL [21] The appellant raises several grounds of appeal. It is not necessary to deal with all of the grounds in order to dispose of the appeal. In my view, there are three errors that justify this court’s intervention: (i) The trial judge erred in determining the appropriate range of sentence. (ii) The trial judge erred in failing to consider the element of rehabilitation in the circumstances of the appellant. (iii) The trial judge erred in failing to apply the principle of proportionality. (i) The Range of Sentence [22] The appellant was convicted in respect of 14.87 grams of cocaine and six and a half tablets of ecstasy. The focus of the trial judge’s reasons was on the cocaine. Counsel for the appellant submits that a five year sentence for possession for the purpose of trafficking of 14.87 grams of cocaine is far beyond the range that could be justified on the facts of this case. The trial judge relied in particular on this court’s decision in R. v. Bajada. The facts in Bajada are significantly different from the case at bar. In that case, the appellant was convicted of possession for the purpose of trafficking of more than one half kilogram of cocaine, which had an estimated value of $62,500. Mr. Bajada was 51 years old with a significant criminal record including conspiracy to traffic in a narcotic and two convictions for trafficking in a narcotic. He also received a three year sentence in respect of a conviction for extortion, which was also related to drug trafficking. In the result, Mr. Bajada’s sentence of eight years was reduced to six years. [23] In this case, the appellant was convicted of a very serious offence. The circumstances in the apartment on the night of the offences are troubling. However, the evidence does not establish what part the appellant played in the trafficking operation that was carried on from the apartment. The evidence does not establish that he had anything at all to do with the gunfight. To say otherwise is to speculate. Indeed he was acquitted in respect of two firearm related offences. He was not charged in connection with the gunfight. [24] This is not a case for a penitentiary term. A sentence of five years is outside the range for the amount of cocaine in issue. In my view, the appropriate sentence falls within the range of a reformatory term. (ii) Rehabilitation [25] In my view, the trial judge erred in concluding that she need not concern herself with the appellant’s rehabilitation. The appellant was 29 years old at the time of sentencing. He recognized that he had a drug problem and was regularly attending Narcotics Anonymous. He expressed remorse. He was a trained and licensed welder with prospects for future employment. It seems to me that he needed encouragement to turn his life around in order to continue on a path that he had, at least, started down. A penitentiary term of five years is unlikely to provide such encouragement. (iii) Proportionality [26] This sentence does not satisfy the fundamental principle of sentencing articulated in s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code. A sentence of five years in the penitentiary for the small amount of cocaine involved in this case is not proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the appellant. DISPOSITION [27] Leave to appeal sentence on the conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking is granted. The appeal is allowed. The sentence of five years is reduced to the time served, which was 14 months and 9 days. RELEASED: “JL” “Robert P. Armstrong J.A.” “SEP -8 2011” “I agree John Laskin J.A.” “I agree H.S. LaForme J.A.”