Grewal v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)

Grewal v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) Court (s) Database Federal Court Decisions Date 2026-04-08 Neutral citation 2026 FC 455 File numbers IMM-15245-24 Decision Content Date: 20260408 Docket: IMM-15245-24 Citation: 2026 FC 455 Vancouver, British Columbia, April 8, 2026 PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Gleeson BETWEEN:

KULDEEP KAUR GREWAL Applicant and

THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP

AND IMMIGRATION Respondent

JUDGMENT AND REASONS I. Overview [1] The Applicant, Kuldeep Kaur Grewal, is a citizen of India. In a decision dated July 15, 2024, a Senior Immigration Officer [Officer] refused her Pre-Removal Risk Assessment [PRRA] application, finding she was essentially alleging the same risks that had been previously assessed and rejected by both the Refugee Protection Division [RPD] and the Refugee Appeal Division [RAD]. [2] The Applicant seeks judicial review of the PRRA decision under subsection 72(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA], arguing that the Officer (1) unreasonably relied upon the RPD’s and RAD’s determinations, thereby fettering their discretion, and (2) failed to consider the evidence she placed before them, including her PRRA submissions and country condition evidence. [3] For the reasons that follow, the application for judicial review is dismissed. II. Background [4] The Applicant first entered Canada in December 2010 on a visitor visa. The Applicant was authorized to remain in Canada until January 2012, but overstayed. Her application for a restoration of status and visitor record was refused in May 2012. The Applicant, however, continued to remain in Canada, without status. In June 2013, she married her second husband, a Canadian citizen. A spousal sponsorship application for permanent residence from within Canada was refused in

August 2015. The Applicant and her second husband separated in January 2016. [5] The Applicant submitted a claim for refugee protection in October 2015. In her Basis of Claim [BOC] narrative, the Applicant reported she was the victim of abuse in both of her marriages. She also stated that, after she married her second husband in June 2013, her sons and daughter from her first marriage severed all ties with her, telling her they would not welcome her back if she were to return to India. She asserted that as a victim of domestic violence and a widow from her first marriage, with no property in India, no source of income or persons to support her, she would not be able to live safely in India. [6] The RPD refused the Applicant’s refugee claim in February 2016, but due to concerns with the quality of translation, the RAD remitted the matter to the RPD for a de novo hearing. In the second hearing before the RPD, the Applicant raised new allegations, citing a fear of abuse from her children, impaired by alcohol and drug addiction, if she were to return to India and reporting that following the death of her first husband she was threatened, and in one instance assaulted, by her children. [7] The RPD again dismissed the Applicant’s refugee claim in October 2017, finding numerous credibility and subjective fear issues affected the Applicant’s general credibility and went to the core of

her claim. These issues included (1) the Applicant’s “significant omission” of the allegations against her children in her BOC, (2) her contradictory and evolving narrative, and (3) the significant delay in making a refugee claim and remaining without status for a significant period of time. [8] The RAD confirmed the RPD’s conclusions in June 2019, finding the RPD’s credibility assessment was correct and that the Applicant had not established with sufficient credibility that her children would be a threat to her, based on their alcohol and drug addiction, should she return to India, nor that she would be at risk as a widowed woman, without family support, and victim of domestic abuse. [9] The Applicant submitted a PRRA application in July 2023, again citing a fear of abuse from her children if she were to return to India and raising two new allegations: (1) she had reported the abuse at the hands of her children to the police on several occasions, but was not offered protection due to her sons’ involvement with drug gangs, and (2) her sons had threatened to kill her should she return to India because of her second marriage. III. Decision Under Review [10] In rejecting the Applicant’s PRRA application, the Officer first noted that the “applicant submits the same fear of return as she did in her RPD and RAD submissions,” acknowledged that her counsel had provided a narrative and

country condition evidence of a general nature, concluded there “is no new evidence submitted,” and stated all submissions and information from the RPD and RAD proceedings were to be considered in assessing the application. [11] The Officer then outlined the Applicant’s immigration history, detailed the contents of her BOC narrative and provided an overview of the RPD’s and RAD’s reasons, highlighting the inconsistencies identified by the RPD that underpinned the finding that the claim was not credible. [12] In considering the Applicant’s new allegation against her sons – namely, that they had threatened to kill her – the Officer found that the allegation did not overcome the RPD’s and RAD’s findings on credibility and subjective fear. The Officer also noted that the submissions of the Applicant’s counsel regarding the timing of threats from her children were vague, and questioned why the Applicant had waited until 2023 to disclose her new allegation, as her sons’ threats related to her second marriage in 2013. [13] The Officer found the Applicant had failed to establish the allegations of her refugee claim and that she faced a forward-facing risk in India. The Officer concluded the Applicant faced no more than a mere possibility of persecution under section 96 of the IRPA, and that she would not likely be subjected to a risk of torture, or a risk to life or cruel and unusual

treatment or punishment under section 97 of IRPA. IV. Issues and Standard of Review [14] The only issue that arises in this matter is whether the Officer committed an error warranting the Court’s intervention in refusing the Applicant’s PRRA. There is no dispute between the Parties that the Officer’s decision is reviewable on the presumptive standard of reasonableness. [15] A reasonable decision is “one that is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker” (Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 at para 85 [Vavilov]; Mason v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 SCC 21 at para 8). The party challenging a decision has the burden of demonstrating to a reviewing court “sufficiently serious shortcomings in the decision such that it cannot be said to exhibit the requisite degree of justification, intelligibility and transparency” (Vavilov at para 100). V. Analysis [16] The Applicant argues that the Officer did not provide cogent reasons in support of the refusal decision, failed to consider her evidence and submissions addressing the danger and risks she faced in India, and unreasonably concluded she had provided little evidence linking the general country conditions in India to her personal circumstances. [17] Relying on Law Society of

British Columbia v Trinity Western University, 2018 SCC 32 at para 277 [Trinity Western], the Applicant also submits the Officer fettered and abused their discretion by “heavily and unreasonably” relying on the RPD’s and RAD’s decisions, and failing to conduct an independent credibility analysis. [18] In written submissions, the Applicant also raises bias concerns; however, these arguments were not pursued in oral submissions, and counsel for the Applicant confirmed that the Applicant was abandoning the argument. I have therefore not addressed this issue. [19] As explained below, the Applicant has not met her burden of establishing that the PRRA decision is unreasonable. [20] The role of a PRRA officer in considering a PRRA where a prior claim for protection has been rejected is set out at section 113 of the IRPA: Consideration of application Examen de la demande 113. Consideration of an application for protection shall be as follows: 113. Il est disposé de la demande comme il suit: (a) an applicant whose claim to refugee protection has been rejected may present only new evidence that arose after the rejection or was not reasonably available, or that the applicant could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection; a) le demandeur d’asile débouté ne peut présenter que des éléments de preuve survenus depuis le rejet ou

qui n’étaient alors pas normalement accessibles ou, s’ils l’étaient, qu’il n’était pas raisonnable, dans les circonstances, de s’attendre à ce qu’il les ait présentés au moment du rejet; […] […] [21] Section 113 limits an applicant to presenting only new evidence to a PRRA officer following the rejection of a claim for refugee protection. As the jurisprudence of this Court establishes, a PRRA application is not an appeal or reconsideration of the decisions of the RPD or the RAD rejecting an applicant’s claim for refugee protection (Raza v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 385 para 12 [Raza]). In addition, it is well established that a PRRA officer must show deference to the RPD’s and RAD’s determinations, unless there is new evidence that, if before the RPD or the RAD, might have affected the outcome of the RPD and RAD decisions (Raza at para 13; Singh v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 1022 at para 50). [22] In this instance, and contrary to the Applicant’s submissions, the Officer did assess the risks alleged by the Applicant in support of the PRRA if she were to return to India, including the “new” allegations that her sons had threatened to kill her and that state protection was not available to her. In addressing the new allegation that her sons had threatened to kill the Applicant, the Officer noted that (1) the Applicant’s PRRA submissions were

vague as to the date the alleged threat had occurred, (2) she stated in submissions her “entire family found out about [her] relationship [with her second husband] when they got married in 2013,” and (3) the threat was made because her second marriage “dishonored the family name and humiliated [her children].” Having considered the Applicant’s second marriage had taken place well before the RPD and RAD decisions rendered in 2017 and 2019 and the absence of any explanation for why she only disclosed the new allegation in submitting her PRRA application in 2023, the Officer then reasonably concluded “there is little evidence provided to refute and overcome the RPD and RAD’s findings on the applicant’s credibility and subjective fear.” [23] This finding was consistent with the evidence and therefore reasonably available to the Officer, and is justified by way of a logical and coherent analysis. The Officer also reasonably considered the country condition evidence presented by the Applicant, but found that the evidence was of a general nature and did not provide sufficient evidence of a personalized risk to the Applicant. In doing so, the Officer’s reasons were responsive to the Applicant’s submissions and evidence, and adequately reflected the impact of the decision on her rights and interests (Vavilov at paras 128, 133). [24] The suggestion that the Officer was required to

undertake an independent credibility assessment of the Applicant’s alleged risks is without merit, as is the argument that the Officer erred in reviewing the RPD and RAD decisions and adopting the credibility findings of those expert decision-makers. Justice Henry Brown’s conclusion in Ebongole v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 493 is of direct application here: [31] The Applicant further submits the Officer simply deferred to the findings of the RAD and RPD. There is no merit in this submission. First of all, the RPD and RAD decisions are entitled to deference by the PRRA Officer because they form the background of the case against which the Officer is looking for new or unassessed evidence of risk. PRRA Officers are not obliged to reformulate the findings of either panel, and may choose to adopt them as their own. Once adopted they become the reasons of the PRRA Officer and must be assessed as such. [25] In concluding, having considered and engaged with the “new” allegations raised by the Applicant and concluding these were not sufficient to overcome the RPD and RAD’s prior findings, the Officer’s deference to the RPD and RAD decisions was not an improper fettering or abuse of their discretion. Rather, the Officer engaged in a consideration of the PRRA application in accordance with the mandate prescribed at section 113 of the IRPA and the jurisprudence of this

Court and the Court of Appeal. The Applicant’s reliance on Trinity Western in this context is both misplaced and of no assistance. VI. Conclusion [26] The application for judicial review is dismissed. [27] Neither Party has proposed a question of general importance for certification, and I agree that none arise. JUDGMENT IN IMM-15245-24 THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that: This application for judicial review is dismissed. No question is certified. “Patrick Gleeson” Judge

FEDERAL COURT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: IMM-15245-24 STYLE OF CAUSE: KULDEEP KAUR GREWAL v THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION PLACE OF HEARING: Vancouver, British Columbia DATE OF HEARING: April 2, 2026 JUDGMENT AND REASONS: GLEESON J. DATED: APRIL 8, 2026 APPEARANCES: Shruti Sharma For The Applicant Josef Beug For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD: Badh and Rejminiak LLP Surrey, British Columbia For The Applicant Attorney General of Canada Vancouver, British Columbia For The Respondent