Hakimzadehasl v. Silk Road Tours Ltd.

2024 BCSC 2134 Hakimzadehasl v. Silk Road Tours Ltd.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: Hakimzadehasl v. Silk Road Tours Ltd., 2024 BCSC 2134 Date: 20241125 Docket: S2012360 Registry: Vancouver Between: Hamed Hakimzadehasl Plaintiff And Silk Road Tours Ltd. and Hossein Lotfi Defendants Before: The Honourable Justice Ahmad Reasons for Judgment Counsel for the Plaintiff: M. Bertoldi A. Ameri Counsel for the Defendants: F. Qamar Place and Date of Summary Trial: Vancouver, B.C. March 12, 2024 Further Written Submissions of the Plaintiff April 9, 2024 No Further Written Submission filed on behalf of the Defendants Place and Date of Judgment: Vancouver, B.C. November 25, 2024 Table of Contents I. Introduction.. 3 II. Background Facts and Evidence. 4 III. Issues. 9 IV. Legal Framework.. 9 A. Is this Matter Suitable for Determination by way of Summary Trial?. 9 B. Was Silk Road or Mr. Lotfi Authorized to Provide Immigration Services?. 10 V. Discussion and Analysis. 12 A. Was Silk Road Authorized Under the IRPA to Provide the Services?. 12 B. Did Silk Road or Mr. Lotfi Commit a "Deceptive Act" or "Unconscionable Act or Practice" Under the BPCPA?. 21 C. Did Silk Road or Mr. Lotfi Breach the Contract?. 21 D. Is the Plaintiff Entitled to Judgment Against Mr. Lotfi for $4,000?. 21 E. Conclusion on Suitability for Determination by way of Summary Trial 22 VI. Costs. 22 I. Introduction [1] In 2019, the plaintiff, Hamed

Hakimzadehasl, took steps to immigrate with his family and move his business to Canada. On May 20, 2019, he entered into a written contract titled, "Request for Canadian Work Permit and Permanent Residency" with the defendant, Silk Road Tours Ltd. ("Silk Road") pursuant to which Silk Road agreed to provide certain services to assist him to do so (the "Contract"). The plaintiff paid Silk Road for those services. [2] The defendant, Hossein Lotfi, is the director of Silk Road. [3] On this summary trial application, Mr. Hakimzadehasl alleges that neither Silk Road nor Mr. Lotfi were authorized under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 [IRPA] to provide the services they did. He argues that the implications of that unauthorized conduct are two-fold: (a) the Contract is void for illegality; and (b) holding Silk Road out as being authorized amounted to a "deceptive act" and an "unconscionable act or practice" as contemplated by the Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act, S.B.C. 2004, c. 2 [BPCPA]. Alternatively, Mr. Hakimzadehasl argues that if Silk Road was authorized to provide the services it did, it breached the Contract by failing to produce any work product of value. [4] In any case, Mr. Hakimzadehasl claims that he is entitled to the return of the monies paid to Silk Road as its fee for the immigration services [5] The plaintiff also seeks

judgment against Silk Road in respect of a $4,000 loan of Canadian funds it made to Silk Road in two installments of $3,000 and $1,000 on March 2 and 3, 2020. Mr. Lotfi does not dispute that Mr. Hakimzadehasl loaned him $4,000 or that he owes that amount to Mr. Hakimzadehasl. [6] However, the defendants deny that Mr. Hakimzadehasl is entitled to a return of monies paid for the services provided under the Contract. First, they argue that, pursuant to the terms of the Contract, Mr. Lotfi did not have any involvement in his personal capacity. Second, Silk Road says that it was lawfully authorized to perform the services it did and, specifically, that the provision of the services did not contravene the IRPA, nor did its representation that it was able to provide such services contravene the BPCPA. Finally, Silk Road says that it did, in fact, provide services in accordance with the terms of the Contract. [7] However, the defendants argue that, notwithstanding its position on this application, Mr. Hakimzadehasl has failed to provide any specific evidence of the services he says the defendants provided and, moreover, his evidence in respect of that matter conflicts with that of Mr. Lotfi in key ways. On both bases, the defendants say that this matter is not suitable for determination by way of summary trial. II. Background Facts and Evidence [8] The only evidence filed on this

application consists of the affidavit evidence of Mr. Hakimzadehasl and Mr. Lotfi. I summarize their evidence below. The Parties [9] The plaintiff is a businessperson who owns a hygiene products company in Iran. As noted, in 2019, he made inquires into immigrating to Canada with his family and met with Mr. Lotfi to do so. [10] Mr. Lotfi is the director of Silk Road, as well as its related company, Silk Road Canada Inc. ("Silk Road Canada"). Mr. Lotfi deposes that: Both these companies provide immigration and business-related services to foreign nationals wishing to immigrate to Canada, either on a temporary or permanent basis. [11] Mr. Lotfi deposes that for both Silk Road and Silk Road Canada, he limits his role to business development activities and introduces and connects clients with "professional immigration consultants and lawyers for their immigration needs". Specifically with respect to Silk Road, in respect of "immigration needs", he deposes that his role is limited to "referral and translation". The Contract [12] There is no dispute that the parties met on May 19 or 20, 2019 in West Vancouver to discuss Mr. Hakimzadehasl's proposed immigration to Canada. [13] According to Mr. Hakimzadehasl, during that meeting, Mr. Lotfi explained the immigration process to him, including the "Provincial nominee program" as well as the "Federal option". The plaintiff deposes that on

the date after their initial meeting, Mr. Lotfi advised him that Mr. Hakimzadehasl would have a stronger case if he applied under both the provincial and federal programs. [14] The plaintiff deposes that "[Mr. Lotfi] did not disclose to [him] that he was not licensed, but he created the impression that he was fully authorized to act on [his] behalf in [his] immigration file". [15] Mr. Lotfi disputes the substance of the initial conversations with Mr. Hakimzadehasl. He says that he advised Mr. Hakimzadehasl that Silk Road could assist him "with the formation of his business and that it could refer him to trained legal professionals for his immigration needs". He also says he confirmed that his role would be limited to that of a business consultant. Mr. Lotfi deposes that Mr. Hakimzadehasl advised that he wanted to proceed with both a federal and provincial application, in response to which Mr. Lotfi advised that Silk Road could refer him to trained legal professionals who could advise him with both applications. [16] Mr. Hakimzadehasl deposes that he paid $63,000 for the work to be performed under the Contract, made up of Canadian and Iranian funds. Mr. Lotfi does not dispute that some monies were paid under the Contract. However, he says of the $49,778.35 that Silk Road invoiced to the plaintiff, a majority remains unpaid. Contract Terms [17] The Court was provided with a copy

of the Contract in English, translated from Farsi. As set out in the preamble to the Contract: a) Mr. Hakimzadehasl retained Silk Road, referred to as "Business Consultant", as "[his] representative for services which will result in [his] and [his] dependent's Permanent Residency in Canada"; and b) Silk Road agreed to provide "their services for residency and its follow-ups through their Immigration Consultant [Personnel] or their Immigration firm Silk Road Canada Ltd.". [18] Among others, the Contract contains Silk Road's agreement: a) Under "Canadian Visa", to provide "[a]ssistance in obtaining a Canadian Visitor Visa" for Mr. Hakimzadehasl and his spouse, to receive and submit documents including "Biometric documents and fees", and to receive and submit "the passport to the Canadian embassy for visa"; b) To organize a Vancouver tour "for work experience and obtaining certification"; c) Under "Applicant's field related Training Course Services", to register Mr. Hakimzadehasl for a Canadian English Language Proficiency Index Program ("CELPIP") Canada training course; d) To take steps required to "establish a branch of owner's active business in BC and create jobs based on the commercial plan", including preparing a business plan based on Mr. Hakimzadehasl's economical activities in Iran, obtaining a business license, and choosing a business location; e) Under "Work Permit", to

assess Mr. Hakimzadehasl's work, education, personal history and experience, and to prepare and submit the Canadian Permanent Residency forms and follow-ups until a final decision is made; and f) Under "Permanent Residency Visa", to "[take] proper steps to get Canadian Permanent Residency for the [plaintiff] and [his] dependents (under age 21) by an experienced Canadian lawyer and [open] a personal and business account". [19] The Contract required Silk Road to make a "second attempt" if the Embassy did not issue a work permit after a job offer was made and a Labour Market Impact Assessment("LIMA") was issued. It also provided that, if, after the second attempt, "the embassy still does not issue the visa, the contract will be considered to be terminated". Services Provided [20] In his affidavit, Mr. Hakimzadehasl describes the work that he says Silk Road did in one paragraph: The Defendants did not provide the Services other than taking me on a trip to the Sunshine Coast. In Squamish, Mr. Lotfi met with some doctors on a different file and he took some photographs of me in front of some offices. He told me that photographs like that would help me in my application. On our Sunshine Coast trip, we visited a restaurant where Mr. Lotfi advised me that he would ask the restaurant owner to send my spouse an invitation letter for work. [21] Mr. Lotfi describes a considerably broader

scope of services provided to Mr. Hakimzadehasl. He deposes that: a) He arranged a 4-day business exploratory trip for Mr. Hakimzadehasl; b) He referred Mr. Hakimzadehasl to legal professionals to assist with Mr. Hakimzadehasl's applications and, specifically: (i) he referred Mr. Hakimzadehasl to and paid the fees of Sarah McInnes, an immigration lawyer and member of the Nova Scotia Law Society, to prepare and submit the federal application, and (ii) he referred Mr. Hakimzadehasl to Dong Kai Li, an immigration consultant, in respect of the provincial application; c) He hired a professional to incorporate Rojin Dental Products Inc. ("Rojin Dental Products") and paid for the cost of the incorporation; d) He referred Mr. Hakimzadehasl to MNP LLP to conduct a third-party verification of Mr. Hakimzadehasl's net worth "as requested by the immigration experts"; e) He contacted different commercial realtors to explore and spot a location for a production line for Mr. Hakimzadehasl's business; f) He hired Immigrowth and two other consultants to develop a business and financial plan for Rojin Dental Products; g) He signed Mr. Hakimzadehasl up for the CELPIP course and English testing; and h) Silk Road looked into getting Mr. Hakimzadehasl a business licence in Vancouver using a virtual office address. [22] Mr. Lotfi hired Saodat Khadjieva as an "Operations and Business development

member" to go step-by-step through the process with Mr. Hakimzadehasl. He deposes that Mr. Khadjieva later became an immigration consultant registered with the College of Immigration and Citizenship Registry (the "College"). He does not depose when Mr. Khadjieva became registered with the College. Mr. Hakimzadehasl's evidence makes no reference to Mr. Khadjieva. [23] On or around September 6, 2019, Mr. Hakimzadehasl entered into a "Use of Representation" form with Mr. Li. [24] On or around September 8, 2019, Mr. Li submitted a registration application for Mr. Hakimzadehasl with the BC Provincial Nominee Program ("BC PNP"). After the registration was rejected, on or around April 12, 2020, Mr. Hakimzadehasl entered into a second "Use of Representation" form with Mr. Li in respect of the provincial application. However, no further application was made. [25] On or around January 6, 2020, Ms. McInnes wrote to the Consulate General of Canada in relation to an application for a C-12 work permit for Mr. Hakimzadehasl. By letter dated February 24, 2020, the Government of Canada advised Mr. Hakimzadehasl that this application was refused. III. Issues [26] In this context, and given the position of the parties, the following issues must be determined: a) Is this matter suitable for determination by way of summary trial; b) If so: i. Were Silk Road or Mr. Lotfi authorized under the IRPA to

provide the services they did; ii. Did Silk Road or Mr. Lotfi commit a "deceptive act" or "unconscionable act or practice" under the BPCPA; iii. Did Silk Road or Mr. Lotfi breach the Contract; c) What remedies, if any, are available to the plaintiff in respect of the above claims; and d) Is Mr. Hakimzadehasl entitled to judgment against Mr. Lotfi for the $4,000 loan? IV. Legal Framework A. Is this Matter Suitable for Determination by way of Summary Trial? [27] Rule 9-7(2)(a) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules, B.C. Reg. 168/2009 [Rules], permits a party to an action, to which a response to civil claim has been filed, to apply to the court for judgment either on an issue or generally. [28] Pursuant to Rule 9‑7(15)(a) of the Rules, on the hearing of a summary trial application, the court may grant judgment in favour of any party, either on an issue or generally, unless: (i) the court is unable, on the whole of the evidence before the court on the application, to find the facts necessary to decide the issues of fact or law, or (ii) the court is of the opinion that it would be unjust to decide the issues on the application. [Emphasis added.] [29] A number of factors inform the analysis of whether a summary trial is unjust: Gichuru v. Pallai, 2013 BCCA 60 [Gichuru] at paras. 30-31, citing Inspiration Management Ltd. v. McDermid St. Lawrence Ltd., 36 B.C.L.R. (2d) 202 [Inspiration

Management], and others. The factors include: the amount involved, the complexity of the matter, its urgency, any prejudice likely to arise by reason of delay, the cost of taking the case forward in relation to the amount involved, the course of the proceeding, whether credibility is a crucial factor in determining the dispute, and whether the application would result in litigating in slices. [30] On an application for summary trial, a party is obliged to "put its best foot forward" and take every reasonable step to put itself in the best position possible to prove its claim or defence, regardless of which party has brought the application: Gichuru at para. 32; Rahman v. Windermere Valley Property Management Ltd., 2021 BCSC 118 at para.

10. B. Was Silk Road or Mr. Lotfi Authorized to Provide Immigration Services? [31] Section 91(1) of the IRPA provides: Subject to this section, no person shall knowingly, directly or indirectly, represent or advise a person for consideration -- or offer to do so -- in connection with the submission of an expression of interest under subsection 10.1(3) or a proceeding or application under this Act. [32] However, pursuant to s. 91(2), a person does not contravene subsection (1) if they are a lawyer or notary, any other member in good standing of a law society of a province or the Chambre des notaires du Québec, including a paralegal, or a member in good standing of the College of Immigration and Citizenship Consultants, continued or established under the College of Immigration and Citizenship Consultants Act, S.C. 2019, c. 29, s. 292. [33] As noted by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in R. v. Codina #6, 2017 ONSC 7648, [Codina [ONSC]] aff'd 2020 ONCA 848 [Codina [ONCA]], s. 91(1) arose out of Bill C-35, also known as the "Cracking Down on Crooked Consultants Act", that came into force on June 30, 2011. As its informal title suggests, Bill C-35 was introduced to "better protect potential immigration applicants by cracking down on dishonest or fraudulent immigration consultants": Codina [ONSC] at para. 29. [34] As the Provincial Court of this Province recently observed in R.

v. Chang, 2023 BCPC 302 at para. 248, in Codina [ONSC], Justice Molloy noted that, among other things, the earlier version of the statute did not cover situations where an individual contacted a consultant prior to initiating a proceeding or application, but that: In July of 2011, s. 91(1) was amended to cover all stages in connection with a proceeding or application under the Act, including before a proceeding has been commenced or an application has been made. The words "directly or indirectly" were added to the prohibition to target "ghost consultants", people who acted as intermediaries behind the scenes: Codina #6, at paras. 29-32. [35] To assist the public's understanding of what was covered, Canada Immigration published Operational Bulletin 317, dated June 30, 2011, and Operational Bulletin 317-B, dated July 29, 2011 (the "Bulletin"), the latter of which slightly modified the former in a manner that has no bearing on this application. The Bulletin lists examples of activities for which a person had to be authorized and those activities for which they did not. "Directing someone to an immigration representative" is included as one example of a service for which a person does not have to be authorized. [36] On the other hand, "[e]xplaining and [providing] advice on someone's immigration options", "[p]roviding guidance to a client on how to select the best immigration

stream and completing the appropriate forms", "[r]epresenting someone in an immigration application or proceeding", and "[a]dvertising that they can provide immigration advice" are all included as examples of services for which authorization is required. [37] While the examples provided in the Bulletin have been characterized as "merely guidelines" that do not have the force of law, they do "provide some guidance as to what was contemplated by government authorities as being prohibited by the legislation": Codina [ONSC] at para. 34; Chang at para.

249. V. Discussion and Analysis A. Was Silk Road Authorized Under the IRPA to Provide the Services? [38] Given the issues raised by Mr. Hakimzadehasl, the primary issue to be determined on this summary trial application is whether Silk Road or Mr. Lotfi were authorized under the IRPA to enter into the Contract and provide the services they did. [39] As a starting point, although there is an issue with respect to amount, there is no dispute that Mr. Hakimzadehasl paid Silk Road for the services it provided under the Contract, that is, that Silk Road received consideration for those services. Accordingly, on this analysis, the questions to be determined are: a) Did Silk Road, directly or indirectly, "advise" Mr. Hakimzadehasl "in connection with a proceeding or application under the IRPA"; b) Did Silk Road, directly or indirectly, "represent" Mr. Hakimzadehasl "in connection with a proceeding or application under the IRPA"; c) Did Silk Road "offer" to advise or represent Mr. Hakimzadehasl "in connection with a proceeding or application under the IRPA"; and d) If the answer to any of the above is "yes", did Silk Road come within the categories of people listed in s. 91(2) of the IRPA who are authorized to represent or advise a person in connection with an application under that Act? [40] For this matter to be suitable for determination by way of summary trial, I must be able to find the facts necessary, on the evidence before me, to determine the answers to those questions. I now turn to my consideration of whether those facts are available.

1. Did the Defendants, directly or indirectly, "advise" Mr. Hakimzadehasl in connection with an application under the IRPA? [41] Regarding the prohibition against advising, in Codina [ONSC], the trial judge accepted that there is an "important" distinction between the giving of information (which is general in nature) and the giving of advice: Codina [ONSC] at paras. 43 and 45. Referring to the decision in Trillium Motor World Ltd. v. Cassels Brock & Blackwell, 2013 ONSC 1789, the Court accepted that: [11] . . . One must differentiate between legal information and legal advice. Legal information consists of providing answers regarding the law generally, the options available, and the relevant legal procedures that might pertain. For example, information provided by CBB to CADA about the federal bankruptcy process and the CCAA and how it would affect the dealers is legal information, not legal advice. [12] Legal advice, on the other hand, is advice that is given with respect to the client's legal rights and duties and is given on the understanding that it may well be followed. It depends on the individual circumstances of the recipient and consists of a much more personalized opinion on the way the law would apply in a particular case or about the particular decision that should be made in the circumstances. Legal advice involves the interpretation of legal principles "to guide

future conduct or to assess past conduct." In short, legal advice is particularized advice that is directed to the client's legal rights or duties and in essence says "here is what I think you should do" as opposed to "here is some information about the CCAA and the federal bankruptcy process." [Emphasis added.] [42] The Court of Appeal in Codina [ONCA] accepted that distinction, which it summarized as follows: [95] The trial judge drew a distinction between providing information about the operation of the IRPA, a person's rights under that Act and programs available under the Act, and giving a particularized recommendation as to the steps or representations a specific person should take or make in relation to proceedings or applications under the IRPA. Only the latter constituted advice for the purposes of s. 91: R. v. Codina No. 6, at paras. 42-48 [Emphasis added.] [43] In this case, Mr. Hakimzadehasl's sole reference to advice relates to what Mr. Lotfi told him in their first meeting about the provincial and federal immigration processes. Specifically, he deposes that Mr. Lotfi "advised" him that he would have a stronger case if he applied for immigration under both the provincial and federal programs. In other words, more than just providing him with information that both the provincial and federal options existed, Mr. Hakimzadehasl says that Mr. Lotfi provided him with

advice with respect to which option to follow. [44] However, that evidence conflicts with that of Mr. Lotfi who deposes that Mr. Hakimzadehasl advised him that he wanted to proceed with both federal and provincial applications. Mr. Lotfi says that, in response, he advised Mr. Hakimzadehasl that Silk Road could refer him to trained legal professionals who could advise him with both applications. In other words, he maintains he did not provide any advice to Mr. Hakimzadehasl regarding the specific immigration process to follow. [45] The plaintiff's version of their initial meeting supports the position that Silk Road may have offered advice in contravention of s. 91(1) of the IRPA. Mr. Lotfi's version of that conversation supports the opposite conclusion. If his version is accepted, arguably, on hearing Mr. Hakimzadehasl's preference, he did nothing more than direct Mr. Hakimzadehasl to the authorized representatives he eventually retained. As contemplated by the Bulletin, such direction is not prohibited by s. 91(1). [46] However, other than the two deponents' own evidence, there is no other evidence to definitively support or disaffirm either version. Without any such evidence, on this summary trial application, I am unable to conclude which version to accept. I cannot conclude that Silk Road advised Mr. Hakimzadehasl regarding the immigration process to follow. [47] The

question remains: Is there any other basis on which to conclude that Silk Road advised Mr. Hakimzadehasl in connection with his application? [48] Nothing on Mr. Hakimzadehasl's evidence leads to that conclusion. In fact, by Mr. Hakimzadehasl's evidence, other than taking him on a trip to Squamish, Silk Road did not perform any services in respect of his application for immigration. On that evidence alone, it is impossible to conclude that Silk Road provided any advice at all. [49] However, Mr. Lotfi provides evidence of the services that he says Silk Road did provide. Notwithstanding Mr. Hakimzadehasl's evidence to the contrary, that some services were provided is supported by the documentary evidence. The question is whether, on the evidence before me, I can conclude that any of those services amounted to giving advice. [50] With respect to the actual immigration processes, the documentary evidence, including the BC PNP application, the use of representation forms, and written communications with the Consultant General of Canada, well supports Silk Road's position that it retained authorized persons in respect of the provincial and federal immigration programs: Mr. Li in respect of the provincial program and Ms. McInnes in respect of the federal program. While there is no evidence confirming that they, and not Silk Road, provided advice to Mr. Hakimzadehasl in respect of those

applications, the retainer agreement between Silk Road and McInnes Cooper provides some indication that this is the case. It provides, among other things, that: "McInnes Cooper will intake and review file, assess options for work permit and permanent residence in Canada and provide opinion to client regarding recommendation " [Emphasis added.] [51] However, other than that indirect evidence, there is no direct evidence that Ms. McInnes (or Mr. Li) did, in fact, advise Mr. Hakimzadehasl in respect of the applications. More significantly, for the purpose of this application, there is no direct evidence as to whether Silk Road or Mr. Lotfi directly or indirectly provided any such advice. [52] In particular, there is no or limited evidence regarding, among other things: a) Who analyzed Mr. Hakimzadehasl's particular situation and provided the advice and recommendations regarding the applications under the federal and provincial processes; b) Specifically, did Mr. Lotfi, or anyone else on behalf of Silk Road, advise Mr. Hakimzadehasl regarding the application processes; c) What was the nature of the relationship between each of Mr. Li and McInnes Cooper and Silk Road or Mr. Lotfi? In particular: i. Did Mr. Lotfi limit his involvement to directing Mr. Hakimzadehasl to Mr. Li or Ms. McInnes; or ii. If Mr. Lotfi, or anyone on behalf of Silk Road, advised Mr. Hakimzadehasl in connection

with the immigration applications, did he do so as the agent of Mr. Li or Ms. McInnes; and d) If Silk Road advised Mr. Hakimzadehasl in respect of the applications, who on behalf of Silk Road did so: Mr. Lotfi, Mr. Khadjieva, or someone else? [53] The same paucity of evidence exists with respect to the advice that may have been given to Mr. Hakimzadehasl regarding the business consulting services that Mr. Lotfi provided, either directly or indirectly through the third parties to whom he referred, or whom he retained, for Mr. Hakimzadehasl. Although it is clear that those services were provided, there is no evidence in the affidavits filed as to who advised Mr. Hakimzadehasl that he should engage the service providers he did. [54] Moreover, it is not clear from the evidence, if or how the business consulting services were provided "in connection with an application under the IRPA". The clearest evidence in that regard is the application made to the Consulate General of Canada, which was expressly based, in part, on the relationship between Mr. Hakimzadehasl's newly incorporated entity and Mr. Hakimzadehasl's Iranian company. The evidence with respect to the application in the provincial program--a reference in the initial rejection letter from the BC PNP to the "Entrepreneur Immigration Program Guide"--is even less clear. [55] With no direct evidence of the specific program

under which each of the federal and provincial applications were made, and no evidence of how the business consulting services may have related to those applications, it is impossible to determine if, or to what extent, the business consulting services were provided "in connection with an application under the IRPA" so as to trigger s. 91(1). If they were required for the application process, there is no evidence to suggest that they would not have been performed in the absence of that application. [56] Without, at a minimum, evidence of those matters, it is impossible to find the facts necessary to determine if Mr. Lotfi, or anyone else on behalf of Silk Road, provided advice to Mr. Hakimzadehasl in connection with his immigration applications.

2. Did the Defendants, directly or indirectly, "represent" Mr. Hakimzadehasl in connection with an application under the IRPA? [57] As set out above, there can be no dispute that Mr. Li and Ms. McInnes were Mr. Hakimzadehasl's representatives in respect of the applications under the provincial and federal programs, respectively: Mr. Li was expressly appointed as Mr. Hakimzadehasl's representative with two "Use of Representative" forms and submitted the BC PNP registration on Mr. Hakimzadehasl's behalf. Ms. McInnes communicated with the Consulate General of Canada requesting a C-12 work permit on behalf of Mr. Hakimzadehasl's related company. [58] However, while the term "representation" includes the making of a formal application or submission, it is not limited to those services. As the Court concludes in Codina [ONSC] at paras. 49-52, " a person can "represent" or "act on behalf of" another person at any stage of an immigration matter. There does not need to be a formal filing or appearance". [Emphasis added.] [59] Referring to the decision in Codina [ONSC], the Court in Chang concluded that, notwithstanding that Ms. Chang had retained authorized persons, namely a lawyer and a registered immigration consultant to review applications for permanent residency before they were filed, she nonetheless "represented" individuals in respect of those applications. In that case, on the basis of the evidence before the Court (which was heard over 38 days), the Court concluded that Ms. Chang had significant involvement in the applications for permanent residency, "from their initiation, through their preparation and filing, and continuing with her involvement in the preparation of the applicants" for interviews: Chang at para.

255. It held: [256] I find that Ms. Chang's involvement clearly counts as activity which falls within the scope of the definition of "represent". This was not a matter of Ms. Chang simply directing the applicants to an immigration representative. Ms. Chang hired the representatives to review the applications once they had been completed, but controlled every other aspect of the application process. Ms. Chang's representation of the applicants was done directly through her own actions, and indirectly through the actions of UCII employees acting under her direction. [60] In this case, I accept that Mr. Li's and Ms. McInnes' involvement in the immigration application process does not preclude a finding that Silk Road also represented Mr. Hakimzadehasl in that process and, more generally, "in connection with an application under the IRPA". However, unlike that situation in Chang, there is no evidence before the Court regarding what involvement Silk Road or Mr. Lotfi may have had. For example: a) What steps were required leading up to Mr. Li's and Ms. McInnes' review and submission of the immigration applications; b) What role or input, if any, did Mr. Lotfi or Silk Road have in completing those steps; and c) What communications did Mr. Lotfi, or anyone else on behalf of Silk Road, have, if any, with Mr. Li or Ms. McInnes leading up the review and submission of the immigration

applications? [61] Without that evidence, I am unable to find the facts necessary to conclude that, notwithstanding the involvement of Mr. Li and Ms. McInnes, Mr. Lotfi or Silk Road nonetheless "represented" Mr. Hakimzadehasl in respect of the final aspect of the application process. [62] The same is true with respect to other possible aspects of the application process, including Silk Road's involvement as the "business consultant". In respect of that role, Mr. Lotfi's evidence seems to confirm that he or Silk Road represented Mr. Hakimzadehasl to explore possible locations for Mr. Hakimzadehasl's business, to sign him up for English language courses and testing, and to look into the possibility of obtaining a business licence. Less certain is whether the conduct in retaining third parties to perform other of the business consulting services including the incorporation of Mr. Hakimzadehasl's company in British Columbia, verification of Mr. Hakimzadehasl's net worth "as requested by the immigration experts", or the development of the business concept and plan, is a "representation" for the purposes of s. 91(1) or simply providing direction. [63] However, I do not have to decide on that point. As noted above, there is no direct evidence on which to determine if, or to what extent, the business consulting services were provided "in connection with an application under the IRPA".

Without that evidence, I am unable to find the facts necessary to conclude which, if any, of the "business consultant" services were provided in connection with the application process under the IRPA so as to trigger s. 91(1). [64] Finally, under the terms of the Contract, Mr. Hakimzadehasl gave his consent to Silk Road to "share information provided by [Mr. Hakimzadehasl] with Canadian Government Authorities in relation to Immigration". While that term appears to contemplate that Silk Road could represent Mr. Hakimzadehasl in respect of immigration matters, there is no evidence regarding whether Silk Road did, in fact, share information with the government on Mr. Hakimzadehasl's behalf. Without that evidence, I am unable to find the facts necessary to determine that matter.

3. Did the Defendants "offer" to advise or represent Mr. Hakimzadehasl in connection with an application under the IRPA? [65] Finally, regardless of whether Silk Road did, in fact, advise or represent him in connection with his application, Mr. Hakimzadehasl claims that it "offered" to do so. He says that an offer, by itself, is enough to conclude on this summary trial application that the Contract was illegal. [66] In that regard, he points to the terms of the Contract in which Silk Road seemingly purports to offer services which relate to the immigration process. They include, in particular: a) The preamble where Mr. Hakimzadehasl appoints Silk Road as his representative for "services which will result in my and my dependent's Permanent Residency in Canada"; and b) Silk Road's agreement to, among other things: provide " assistance in obtaining Canadian Visitor Visa", " prepar[e] and submi[t] the Canadian Permanent Residency forms and [follow-up] until the final decision is made "; and " tak[e] proper steps in order to get Canadian Permanent Residency for [Mr. Hakimzadehasl] by an experienced Canadian lawyer". [67] By themselves, those provisions do, on their face, appear to amount to an offer to provide services in respect of Mr. Hakimzadehasl's intended immigration to Canada. However, as Silk Road argues, the preamble also contemplates that it would "[provide] their services

for residency and its follow-ups through their Immigration Consultant [Personnel] or their Immigration firm Silk Road Canada Ltd.". [68] Mr. Lotfi also deposes that, prior to entering into the Contract, he advised Mr. Hakimzadehasl that Silk Road would "refer him to trained legal professionals for his immigration matters" and that he hired Mr. Khadjieva, who "later" became a registered immigration consultant, to go step-by-step through the process with Mr. Hakimzadehasl. [69] The plaintiff's evidence contradicts that evidence. He denies noticing that the Contract contained a reference to any corporations. He also denies that Mr. Lotfi explained any company's role or his relationship to a company that would provide services to him. He did not make any mention of Mr. Khadjieva's involvement in his matter. [70] Given the Contract's express language, I accept that Mr. Hakimzadehasl was, or should have been aware, that the services for "residency and its follow-ups" would be provided through Silk Road's immigration consultant personnel or Silk Road Canada. I also accept, as Mr. Lotfi deposes, that Silk Road hired Mr. Khadjieva, a registered immigration consultant, as full-time personnel. [71] While I have not decided the point, it may be that Mr. Khadjieva's employment is enough to bring Silk Road's offer for services within the limits of s. 91(2). However, there is no evidence to

disclose when Silk Road hired Mr. Khadjieva or, more significantly, when he became a registered immigration consultant. Indeed, on Mr. Lotfi's evidence (i.e. that Mr. Khadjieva "later" became a registered immigration consultant), it is not at all clear that Mr. Khadjieva was duly authorized to perform the services contemplated by the Contract at the time the Contract was entered into. [72] Without that evidence, I am unable to find at least some of the facts that are necessary to decide this point. B. Did Silk Road or Mr. Lotfi Commit a "Deceptive Act" or "Unconscionable Act or Practice" Under the BPCPA? [73] Mr. Hakimzadehasl argues that by holding itself out as being authorized to provide the services under the Contract, Silk Road conducted a "deceptive act" and an "unconscionable act or practice" in contravention of the BPCPA. As I am unable to find the facts necessary to decide whether Silk Road was authorized, it follows that I am unable to determine this issue as well. C. Did Silk Road or Mr. Lotfi Breach the Contract? [74] Having concluded that I do not have the evidence before me necessary to determine the extent of the services rendered by Silk Road or Mr. Lotfi, I cannot determine whether they are in breach of the Contract. D. Is the Plaintiff Entitled to Judgment Against Mr. Lotfi for $4,000? [75] In addition to the services provided under the Contract, Mr.

Hakimzadehasl deposes that he provided a loan of $4,000 in two instalments of $3,000 and $1,000 on March 2 and 3, 2020. Mr. Lotfi does not dispute that the $4,000 loan was made or that it remains owing. [76] Accordingly, judgment of $4,000 is granted in favour of Mr. Hakimzadehasl against Mr. Lotfi. E. Conclusion on Suitability for Determination by way of Summary Trial [77] As I have concluded above, with the exception of the judgment sought against Mr. Lotfi in respect of the $4,000 loan, I am unable on the evidence before me to find the facts necessary to determine the remaining issues in dispute on this summary trial application. [78] In coming to that conclusion, I acknowledge the importance of summary trial procedures in ensuring access to justice, by "favouring proportionality and fair access to the affordable, timely, and just adjudication of claims": Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7 at paras. 1-5. I am also mindful that notwithstanding my conclusion, I am not required to remit this case to the trial list if I find that it may be possible for the Court to find the facts necessary to give judgment by employing any of the procedures allowed by Rule 9-7(12), including cross-examinations on affidavits: Inspiration Management at paras. 57 and 64. [79] Especially given the amount involved, it may well be appropriate to have this matter determined summarily, but only after

further steps have been taken to ascertain the facts necessary to determine the issues. Such steps may include, for example, oral discovery or cross-examination on affidavits (for which an application must be made). Accordingly, with the exception of the claim made in respect of the $4,000 loan, Mr. Hakimzadehasl's application for judgment pursuant to Rule 9-7 is dismissed, with leave to any of the parties to re-apply. VI. Costs [80] In assessing costs, I have considered that the main issue in dispute was Mr. Hakimzadehasl's claim regarding the defendants' authorization under the IRPA and his attempt to obtain relief under the summary trial process. Despite the $4,000 judgment against Mr. Lotfi, I am satisfied that the defendants were substantially successful on this hearing. [81] Given their substantial success, costs of the summary trial application are awarded to the defendants. "Ahmad J."