Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans) v. Haché

Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans) v. Haché Court (s) Database Federal Court of Appeal Decisions Date 2005-12-09 Neutral citation 2005 FCA 418 File numbers A-646-04 Notes Digest Decision Content Date: 20051209 Docket: A-646-04 Citation:2005 FCA 418 CORAM: CHIEF JUSTICE RICHARD DÉCARY J.A. NADON J.A. BETWEEN: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans and the Minister of Human Resources Development Canada, Appellant and Aurélien Haché, Lucien Chiasson, Sylvie Chiasson, Armand Fiset, Jeannot Guignard, Héliodore Aucoin, Gildard Haché, Guy Haché, Rhéal Haché, Robert F. Haché, Greg Hinkley, Vincent Jones, Solange Lanteigne, Jean-Pierre LeBouthillier, Rhéal H. Mallet, André Mazerolle, Eddy Mazerolle, Albanie Noël, Alphée Noël, Serge C. Noël, Gilles Noël, Joseph A. Noël, Lévi Noël, Lorenzo Noël, Martin Noël, Mathurin Noël, Nicolas Noël, Onésime Noël, Paul Noël, Raymond Noël, Renald Noël, Robert Ross, Bruno Roussel, Jean-Camille Noël, Valmi Roussel, Donat Vienneau, Fernand Vienneau, Rhéal Vienneau, Mathias Roussel, Serge Blanchard, Robert Boucher, Elide Bulger, Jean-Gilles Chiason, Roméo G. Cormier, Bernard Duguay, Thomas Duguay, Donald Duguay, Edgar Ferron, Wilbert Godin, Aurèle Godin, Valois Goupil, Euclide Guignard, Florent Guignard, Jacques E. Haché, Jean-Pierre Haché, Robert G. Haché, Donald R. Haché, Ulysse Haché, Gaëtan H. Haché, Gabriel Jean, Jean-Victor Larocque, Dassisse Mallet, Delphis Mallet, Albert A. Noël, Gilles A. Noël, Domitien Paulin, Sylvain Paulin, Alma Robichaud, Administrator of the Estate of Jean-Pierre Robichaud, Sylva Haché, Mario Savoie, Les Pêcheries Jimmy L. Ltée, Eric Gionet, Administrator of Allain O. Gionet Trust, Les Produits Belle-Baie Ltée., Oliva Roussel, E. Gagnon et Fils Ltée., Bernard Arsenault, Gérard Cassivi, Jacques Collin, Raymond Collin, Robert Collin, Marc Couture, Les Crustacées de Gaspé Ltée., CIE 2973-1288 Québec Inc., CIE 2973- 0819 Québec Inc., Bruno Duguay, Charles-Aimé Duguay, Alban Hautcoeur, Fernand Hautcoeur, Jean-Claude Hautcoeur, Robert Huard, Christian Lelièvre, Elphège Lelièvre, Jean-Élie Lelièvre, Jules Lelièvre, Jean-Marc Marcoux, Douglas McInnis, Roger Pinel, Jean Marc Sweeney, Michel Turbide, Réal Turbide, Pêcheries Denise Quinn Syvrais Inc., Steven Roussy, Geneviève Allain, Francis Parisé, Martial LeBlanc, Daniel Desbois, Rolland Anglehart, Jacques Langis, Jean-Pierre Huard, Claude Gionet, Carol Duguay, Denis Duguay, Paul Chevarie, Thérèse Vigneau, Administrator of the Estate of Benoît Poirier, Denis Éloquin, Claude Poirier, Henry-Fred Poirier, Robert Thériault, Raynald Vigneau Respondents Hearing held at Fredericton, New Brunswick, on November 11, 2005. Judgement delivered at Ottawa, Ontario, on December 9, 2005. REASONS FOR JUDGMENT: NADON J.A. CONCURRED IN BY: CHIEF JUSTICE RICHARD DÉCARY J.A. Date: 20051209 Docket: A-646-04 Citation:2005 FCA 418 CORAM: CHIEF JUSTICE RICHARD DÉCARY J.A. NADON J.A. BETWEEN: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans and the Minister of Human Resources Development Canada, Appellant and Aurélien Haché, Lucien Chiasson, Sylvie Chiasson, Armand Fiset, Jeannot Guignard, Héliodore Aucoin, Gildard Haché, Guy Haché, Rhéal Haché, Robert F. Haché, Greg Hinkley, Vincent Jones, Solange Lanteigne, Jean-Pierre LeBouthillier, Rhéal H. Mallet, André Mazerolle, Eddy Mazerolle, Albanie Noël, Alphée Noël, Serge C. Noël, Gilles Noël, Joseph A. Noël, Lévi Noël, Lorenzo Noël, Martin Noël, Mathurin Noël, Nicolas Noël, Onésime Noël, Paul Noël, Raymond Noël, Renald Noël, Robert Ross, Bruno Roussel, Jean-Camille Noël, Valmi Roussel, Donat Vienneau, Fernand Vienneau, Rhéal Vienneau, Mathias Roussel, Serge Blanchard, Robert Boucher, Elide Bulger, Jean-Gilles Chiason, Roméo G. Cormier, Bernard Duguay, Thomas Duguay, Donald Duguay, Edgar Ferron, Wilbert Godin, Aurèle Godin, Valois Goupil, Euclide Guignard, Florent Guignard, Jacques E. Haché, Jean-Pierre Haché, Robert G. Haché, Donald R. Haché, Ulysse Haché, Gaëtan H. Haché, Gabriel Jean, Jean-Victor Larocque, Dassisse Mallet, Delphis Mallet, Albert A. Noël, Gilles A. Noël, Domitien Paulin, Sylvain Paulin, Alma Robichaud, Administrator of the Estate of Jean-Pierre Robichaud, Sylva Haché, Mario Savoie, Les Pêcheries Jimmy L. Ltée, Eric Gionet, Administrator of Allain O. Gionet Trust, Les Produits Belle-Baie Ltée., Oliva Roussel, E. Gagnon et Fils Ltée., Bernard Arsenault, Gérard Cassivi, Jacques Collin, Raymond Collin, Robert Collin, Marc Couture, Les Crustacées de Gaspé Ltée., CIE 2973-1288 Québec Inc., CIE 2973- 0819 Québec Inc., Bruno Duguay, Charles-Aimé Duguay, Alban Hautcoeur, Fernand Hautcoeur, Jean-Claude Hautcoeur, Robert Huard, Christian Lelièvre, Elphège Lelièvre, Jean-Élie Lelièvre, Jules Lelièvre, Jean-Marc Marcoux, Douglas McInnis, Roger Pinel, Jean Marc Sweeney, Michel Turbide, Réal Turbide, Pêcheries Denise Quinn Syvrais Inc., Steven Roussy, Geneviève Allain, Francis Parisé, Martial LeBlanc, Daniel Desbois, Rolland Anglehart, Jacques Langis, Jean-Pierre Huard, Claude Gionet, Carol Duguay, Denis Duguay, Paul Chevarie, Thérèse Vigneau, Administrator of the Estate of Benoît Poirier, Denis Éloquin, Claude Poirier, Henry-Fred Poirier, Robert Thériault, Raynald Vigneau Respondents REASONS FOR JUDGMENT NADON J.A. [1] This is an appeal from a decision by Mr. Justice Hugessen of the Federal Court, dated November 25, 2004, amended December 1, 2004, dismissing the appellant's motion for summary judgment to have the respondents' action dismissed. [2] In their action, filed on December 21, 2001, the respondents-all snow crab fishermen-are claiming $9,139,132.54 from the appellant, the amount that they allege to have paid into the Fonds de Solidarité de l'Industrie de Crabe des Neiges ["Snow Crab Industry Solidarity Fund'] (the Fund) from 1997 to 2001. [3] I will briefly summarize the facts so that readers can fully grasp the issue before us. [4] After a memorandum of agreement was signed in February 1996 between the representatives of the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans and various associations representing snow crab fishermen, all holding commercial fishing licences in accordance with the Fisheries Act, R.S.C. 1993, c. F-14, as amended (the Act), it was agreed that the Fund would be created in order to finance job-creation projects for those working onshore in crab processing plants, and for certain fishing boat crew members, who became unemployed. This job-creation program could also enable those workers to accumulate enough weeks of insurable employment to make them eligible to receive employment insurance benefits. [5] This memorandum was subject to the following condition: a partnership between the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans and the 130 crab fishermen from Area 12 once such an agreement became legally possible after amending the Act. [6] For several years, the Minister had wanted to create a partnership to manage fisheries which would include not only the fishermen, but also the persons working onshore in various fish processing plants. The purpose of this partnership would be to apportion the responsibilities among those stakeholders in fishing industry management and to create long-term jobs. [7] Accordingly, expecting the creation of such a partnership, the snow crab fishermen voluntarily agreed to help workers in the fishing industry. [8] Pursuant to an agreement between the Minister's representatives and those from the fishermen's associations, the fishermen's gross revenues would be paid in part into the Fund and would be used to finance the implementation of job-creation projects. From 1997 to 2001, the Fund was set up as follows: In the spring of each year, the Minister's representatives issued a guideline providing that 20% of each fishermen's traditional quota would be withheld and transferred to the Partnership. On each fishermen's payment of an amount calculated on the basis of the fishermen's total quota per pound, the Partnership advised the Minister of the payment made by the fishermen. The amount was then transferred to the Fund and the Minister's representatives released to the fishermen the 20% of the quota that had been withheld. [9] The Fonds de Solidarité de l'Industrie de Crabe des Neiges, a non-profit corporation, was incorporated on May 22, 1997, while the Partnariat du Crabe des Neiges Inc. ["Snow Crab Industry Partnership Inc"] was incorporated on May 10, 1999, at the Minister's request. That Partnership did not own or operate fishing boats and it was not engaged in fishing activities within the meaning of the Act. [10] On October 3, 1996, following up on the discussions and agreements between his representatives and the fishermen's associations, the Minister tabled for first reading before the House of Commons Bill C-62 of 1996, which was intended, inter alia, to authorize and improve the "fishery management agreements" which had been signed by the Minister. Subsections 17(1) to 17(4) of the Bill would have authorized the Minister to enter into fishery management agreements and, specifically, subsection 17(2) stated that: 17(2) An agreement may establish . . . (d) the obligations, responsibilities and funding arrangements with respect to management of the fishery. 17. (2) L'accord peut prévoir [...] [...] d) Les obligations, responsabilités et mesures de financement liées à la gestion de cette pêche. [11] Unfortunately, Bill C-62 died on the order paper when Parliament was dissolved on April 27, 1997. The fishermen nevertheless continued to pay the required amounts to the Partnership until 2001. [12] After information was received from the Auditor General of Canada in 2000, to the effect that there were serious doubts regarding the validity of levying fees on the fishermen which did not appear to be authorized by the Act, some of the respondents began to dispute their obligation to pay into the Fund. Specifically, they filed an application for judicial review before the Federal Court, asking it to set aside the Minister's decision imposing a levy on the holders of traditional snow crab fishing licences for the 2001 fishing season. According to those respondents, this measure was beyond the scope of the Minister's authority. [13] On July 17, 2001, Rouleau J. of the Federal Court determined that the Minister's decision was null and void with respect to transferring 20% of the fishing quota to the Partnership, since it was ultra vires the powers conferred to him under the Act. [14] Following that decision, the respondents filed their action against the appellant in Federal Court, requesting the repayment of the amounts they had paid into the Fund. [15] On February 14, 2002, the appellant filed a defence asking that the respondents' action be dismissed, alleging inter alia, that it had not received any money [TRANSLATION] "on the basis alleged in the statement of claim" and that it was not in any way liable to the respondents for the repayment of the amounts claimed. [16] On June 7, 2002, the respondents filed a motion for summary judgment to obtain a judgment ordering the appellant to pay them $9,139,132.54, the amount that they claim to have paid into the Fund from 1997 to 2001. According to the respondents, a summary judgment was in order based on the absence of serious issues between the parties. [17] On June 24, 2002, Tremblay-Lamer J. allowed the respondents' motion in part. According to Tremblay-Lamer J., since the appellant's defence was not so doubtful that it did not deserve to be considered on the merits by the trier of fact, she could not order the appellant to repay the amount claimed by the respondents. Furthermore, relying on the evidence by the affidavit of Aurélien Haché, one of the respondents, and specifically Exhibit I of that affidavit, a copy of the documentation regarding the payments made by the respondents into the Fund, the Judge stated that she was satisfied that the respondents had paid $9,139,132.54. At paragraphs 30 and 31 of her reasons, Tremblay-Lamer J. determined as follows: [30] In conclusion, applying the principles relevant to summary judgment, this is not a case where the Defendants' defence is so doubtful that it does not deserve consideration by the trier of fact. [31] However, on the issue of quantum, I am satisfied based on the evidence submitted by the Plaintiffs that they have paid $9,139,132.54. The uncontradicted evidence of Aurélien Haché and the particulars furnished in Exhibit I provide sufficient evidence to grant summary judgment on this issue. [18] Tremblay-Lamer J. therefore made the following order: THIS COURT ORDERS THAT: The motion for summary judgment is denied except on the issue of quantum which is set at $9,139,132.54. Costs in the cause. [19] It should be noted that the decision by Tremblay-Lamer J. was not appealed. [20] In August 2004, after two years of legal proceedings between the parties-and I will spare the reader the details-the appellant in turn filed a motion for summary judgment for, inter alia, the outright dismissal of the claims of 57 respondents, on the grounds that they had not made any payments into the Fund, and the partial dismissal of the claims of 47 of the respondents, on the grounds that they had not made all of their alleged payments into the Fund and, moreover, that for some years, the payments had been made by business corporations. Under those circumstances, the appellant contended that those respondents could not have suffered the damages that they were claiming. [21] In a decision that he made dated November 25, 2004, and that he amended the following December 1, Hugessen J. dismissed the appellant's motion as follows: Inter alia, to correct some clerical errors in the order dated November 25, 2004, the words "which received the payments in question" are withdrawn and the order will now read as follows: I am not prepared to grant the defendant summary judgment as requested. Like Madam Justice Tremblay-Lamer, I think there is a triable issue (a serious question). Moreover, in my opinion her judgment is res judicata in respect of the payments made by or on behalf of the plaintiffs in the total amount of $9,139,132.54 and this question is no longer arguable in this case. The fact that in certain cases the payments were made for the benefit of certain plaintiffs by corporations to which they were related can have no impact on their right to claim from the Crown. On the other hand, the defendant has withdrawn the part of its motion seeking an order to show cause as a result of the plaintiffs' refusal to answer certain questions. However, I think the systematic attitude of refusal and obstruction demonstrated by the plaintiffs for close to two years has been such that they have lost the right to claim an order for costs on this motion. The motion is dismissed without costs. [Emphasis added.] [22] In the opinion of Hugessen J., the respondents' claims should not be dismissed, because there was a serious question to be tried. Moreover, according to Hugessen J., there was res judicata in regard to the payment of $9,139,132.54 made by the respondents into the Fund. Accordingly, that issue could no longer be tried. [23] The appellant submits that Hugessen J. erred in determining that there was res judicata in regard to the question of the payment made by the respondents into the Fund. Specifically, the appellant puts forward the following arguments: First, she submits that the evidence before Tremblay-Lamer J. was incomplete and [TRANSLATION] "in many respects incorrect". [24] With respect to the first part of this argument, Tremblay-Lamer J. decided the motion before her in light of the evidence submitted by the parties, as she was required to do. In my opinion, whether that evidence was complete or not is irrelevant to the issue before us in this appeal. In my view, therefore, this argument is unfounded. [25] I am of the same opinion with respect to the second part of the appellant's argument, namely that the evidence offered by the respondents before Tremblay-Lamer J. was "incorrect". If this is the appellant's position, she is entitled to file a motion under subsection 399(2) of the Federal Court Rules, 1998, which provides that an order may be set aside or varied by reason of a matter that arose or was discovered subsequent to the making of the order or where the order was obtained by fraud. [26] I obviously need not state my position on the issue of whether or not such a motion would succeed. [27] Second, the appellant submits that Tremblay-Lamer J. could not have made the determination as Hugessen J. decided, since it clear, upon reviewing her reasons, that she did not have any intention of deciding the damages to which the respondents may have been entitled. In support of this argument, the appellant refers us to paragraphs 16, 22, 25 and 29 of Tremblay-Lamer J.'s decision, which I reproduce here: [16] On the contrary, the Defendants' affidavit evidence tends to demonstrate that the Plaintiffs benefited from the Partnership in that the additional quota allocated to the Plaintiffs in return for the payments towards the [Fund], provided the Plaintiffs with additional revenues that offset the costs of the payments they made towards the [Fund]. Each of the fishermen were guaranteed an average gross revenue of $500,000 per year for five years for a total of $2.5 million. . . . [22] Although it is true that in the present case, the Plaintiffs bore the burden of the payments, these payments were not made to the Government, nor were they made for or on behalf of the Government. Also, it is not possible to determine whether the Plaintiffs have suffered a loss in this summary judgment proceeding, the reason being that it appears that they have received something in exchange for their contribution to the [Fund]. Only a full trial will yield the evidence necessary to make such a determination. . . . [25] Chipman J.A. then concluded, at para. 61, that the payment of dockside monitoring fees was not sufficient proof of damages. He stated that "[t]he burden of proving damages rests with the respondents and it was for them to show, if they could, that they did not receive value equal to the monies paid by them." In the case at bar, the Plaintiffs have not presented such proof. . . . [29] The third element of the tort, i.e.: that damage to the Plaintiffs resulted from the Minister's actions, has also not been established. The Plaintiffs have paid fees, but the evidence suggests that they have received some value for the money paid (i.e., they were allocated 100 percent of the snow crab resource, in lieu of seeing part of the resource go to non-traditional fishers). [Emphasis added.] [28] For the purposes of this discussion, it would be worthwhile to refer to paragraphs 12 to 15 of Tremblay-Lamer J.'s judgment: [12] Based on the decision in Aucoin, supra, I am satisfied that the Defendants acted beyond their jurisdiction. The evidence clearly shows that the partnership agreement was conditional on the enactment of Bill C-62. This Bill died on the order paper when Parliament dissolved on April 27, 1997. Notwithstanding this, the parties to the agreement went ahead as planned. [13] However, does the fact that the Defendants acted beyond their jurisdiction automatically entitle the Plaintiffs to restitution for the amounts paid into the [Fund]? [14] In light of the conflicting evidence on key aspects of the dispute I am not satisfied that this is an issue that can be resolved by way of summary judgment. [15] For instance, the Plaintiffs' affidavit evidence suggests that in order to ensure that each of the Plaintiffs paid into the [Fund] the Minister "held back" approximately 20 percent of the quota of crab traditionally allocated to the Plaintiffs. This quota was released once the Minister had confirmation that the individual Plaintiffs had paid into the [Fund]. [29] Contrary to the appellant's submission, the paragraphs she refers us to in Tremblay-Lamer J.'s judgment, in my opinion, only confirm the position adopted by Hugessen J. Those paragraphs give a brief overview of the reasons why Tremblay-Lamer J. could not find that there were no serious issues between the parties. While acknowledging that the respondents had paid $9,139,132.54 into the Fund, the Judge was not persuaded that the respondents were necessarily entitled to repayment of that amount. For example, at paragraph 22 of her reasons, she presumes, in the course of discussing the defence filed by the appellant, that the respondents did in fact contribute to the Fund. She continues her discussion, referring to the appellant's arguments to the effect that the respondents had not suffered a loss, "the reason being that it appears that they have received something in exchange for their contribution to the [Fund]". [30] At paragraph 12 of her reasons, the Judge states that in her opinion the appellant acted ultra viresthe scope of her power, given that Bill C-62, which was supposed to confer the necessary authority to the Minister to form the partnership, died on the order paper when Parliament was dissolved on April 27, 1997. At paragraph 13 of her reasons, the Judge asks herself whether the respondents were automatically entitled to restitution for the amounts paid into the Fund because the Minister had acted beyond the scope of his jurisdiction. At paragraph 14, she determines that the issue cannot be resolved by way of summary judgment. [31] At paragraphs 15 and 16, Tremblay-Lamer J. gives an explanation in support of her determination in paragraph 14. At paragraph 15, she refers to the respondents' evidence to the effect that each of them had to pay into the Fund in order to release 20% of the quota held back by the Minister to ensure the respondents' payment. Then, at paragraph 16, Tremblay-Lamer J. summarizes part of the appellant's defence to the effect that the respondents had received consideration for the payments into the Fund and, accordingly, had not suffered any damages. [32] This discussion by the Judge is easier to understand after reading paragraphs 39, 41, 42, 43, 44 and 46 of the appellant's defence, which reads as follows: [TRANSLATION] [39] With respect to paragraph 37 of the statement of claim, the defendant denies that the plaintiffs suffered damages after the Minister's decision to issue a co-management allocation to a legal entity, and that to the contrary the plaintiffs benefited, inter alia, thereby receiving priority access to the resource. . . . [41] With respect to paragraph 39 of the Statement of Claim, the defendant denies that she was unjustly enriched and states that the defendant did not in any way receive or benefit from this money. Further, the plaintiffs will be unjustly enriched if their contributions to the Fund is repaid to them, after benefiting, from 1997 to 2001, from higher allocations and priority access to the resource which were conferred to them in consideration of the contributions. [42] The defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 40 of the Statement of Claim. The defendant states that the plaintiffs wanted to help the plant workers and the crew members involved in snow crab fishing. Their initiative to create a Fund was supported by the MFO, who gave them a sharing formula that set an annual income of $500,000 per annum for a five-year period as long as the TAC was high enough. [43] The costs related to the co-management approach and to the Fund was included in this $500,000. Even though the tool on which the parties had agreed, and which was used to help collect money for the Fund, was found by the Court to be illegal, it remains that the money was paid to legal entities and not to the MFO. At all material times, the money was used for the purposes for which it had been collected, i.e. to help plant workers and crew members involved in crab fishing. [44] The defendant states that it is unfair that the plaintiffs, after benefiting from the advantages of this co-management approach for four years, are asking to be compensated for an initiative that they themselves implemented and for which they received additional allocations for their contributions to it. . . . [46] With respect to the Statement of Claim in general, the defendant did not receive any money from the plaintiffs on the basis alleged in the Statement of Claim and denies all liability toward the plaintiffs for the repayment of the requested amounts. [Emphasis added.] [33] It appears from these paragraphs that the appellant's defence is that, despite their contribution to the Fund, the respondents did not suffer any damages because they benefited, from 1997 to 2001, from higher fishing allocations and from priority access to the resource granted to them in consideration of their contributions to the Fund. [34] Based on a careful review of all of Tremblay-Lamer J.'s reasons, I have no difficulty finding that when she refers to the need to proceed with a full review of the respondents' damages, she is not contemplating the issue of the payment made by the respondents into the Fund. [35] Finally, the appellant submits that Tremblay-Lamer J. only wanted to decide the issue of quantum, and not the issue of who paid this money into the Fund. According to the appellant, Tremblay-Lamer J.'s decision is [TRANSLATION] "clear and unequivocal" on that point. [36] According to the appellant, Tremblay-Lamer J.'s order must be interpreted as setting a "ceiling" for the amounts that could ultimately be recovered by the respondents. With respect for the contrary view, I cannot understand how we could limit the scope of that order as the appellant suggests. To attain that objective, in my opinion, the order would have to be rewritten. Tremblay-Lamer's determination is, in my opinion, perfectly clear: the respondents paid $9,139,132.54 into the Fund. Incidentally, what purpose would be served by Tremblay-Lamer J. deciding that $9,139,132.54 had been paid into the Fund without deciding the issue of who had paid that money? [37] Accordingly, Hugessen J. was correct in finding that there was res judicata regarding the issue of whether the payments into the Fund had been made by the respondents. Like Hugessen J., it is my opinion that this issue has been decided and that it can no longer be debated. [38] I therefore find that Hugessen J. did not err in dismissing the appellant's motion for summary judgment. [39] For these reasons, I would dismiss the appeal with costs. "M. Nadon" J.A. "I concur. J. Richard C.J." "I concur. Robert Décary J.A." Certified true translation Kelley A. Harvey, BCL, LLB FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: A-646-04 (APPEAL OF AN ORDER BY HUGESSEN J. OF THE FEDERAL COURT, DATED NOVEMBER 25, 2004 (AND AMENDED DECEMBER 1st, 2004) IN DOCKET T-2263-01) STYLE OF CAUSE: The Queen v. A. Haché et al. PLACE OF HEARING: Fredericton, New Brunswick DATE OF HEARING: November 11, 2005 REASONS FOR JUDGMENT: NADON J.A. CONCURRED IN BY: CHIEF JUSTICE RICHARD DÉCARY J.A. DATE OF REASONS: December 9, 2005 APPEARANCES Michel Doucet Christian Doucet FOR THE APPELLANT Danys Delaquis FOR THE RESPONDENTS SOLICITORS OF RECORD Patterson Palmer Moncton, New Brunswick FOR THE APPELLANT Gilbert McGloan Gillis Saint John, New Brunswick FOR THE RESPONDENTS Date: 20051209 Docket: A-646-04 Ottawa, Ontario, December 9, 2005 CORAM: CHIEF JUSTICE RICHARD DÉCARY J.A. NADON J.A. BETWEEN: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans and the Minister of Human Resources Development Canada, Appellant and Aurélien Haché, Lucien Chiasson, Sylvie Chiasson, Armand Fiset, Jeannot Guignard, Héliodore Aucoin, Gildard Haché, Guy Haché, Rhéal Haché, Robert F. Haché, Greg Hinkley, Vincent Jones, Solange Lanteigne, Jean-Pierre LeBouthillier, Rhéal H. Mallet, André Mazerolle, Eddy Mazerolle, Albanie Noël, Alphée Noël, Serge C. Noël, Gilles Noël, Joseph A. Noël, Lévi Noël, Lorenzo Noël, Martin Noël, Mathurin Noël, Nicolas Noël, Onésime Noël, Paul Noël, Raymond Noël, Renald Noël, Robert Ross, Bruno Roussel, Jean-Camille Noël, Valmi Roussel, Donat Vienneau, Fernand Vienneau, Rhéal Vienneau, Mathias Roussel, Serge Blanchard, Robert Boucher, Elide Bulger, Jean-Gilles Chiason, Roméo G. Cormier, Bernard Duguay, Thomas Duguay, Donald Duguay, Edgar Ferron, Wilbert Godin, Aurèle Godin, Valois Goupil, Euclide Guignard, Florent Guignard, Jacques E. Haché, Jean-Pierre Haché, Robert G. Haché, Donald R. Haché, Ulysse Haché, Gaëtan H. Haché, Gabriel Jean, Jean-Victor Larocque, Dassisse Mallet, Delphis Mallet, Albert A. Noël, Gilles A. Noël, Domitien Paulin, Sylvain Paulin, Alma Robichaud, Administrator of the Estate of Jean-Pierre Robichaud, Sylva Haché, Mario Savoie, Les Pêcheries Jimmy L. Ltée, Eric Gionet, Administrator of Allain O. Gionet Trust, Les Produits Belle-Baie Ltée., Oliva Roussel, E. Gagnon et Fils Ltée., Bernard Arsenault, Gérard Cassivi, Jacques Collin, Raymond Collin, Robert Collin, Marc Couture, Les Crustacées de Gaspé Ltée., CIE 2973-1288 Québec Inc., CIE 2973- 0819 Québec Inc., Bruno Duguay, Charles-Aimé Duguay, Alban Hautcoeur, Fernand Hautcoeur, Jean-Claude Hautcoeur, Robert Huard, Christian Lelièvre, Elphège Lelièvre, Jean-Élie Lelièvre, Jules Lelièvre, Jean-Marc Marcoux, Douglas McInnis, Roger Pinel, Jean Marc Sweeney, Michel Turbide, Réal Turbide, Pêcheries Denise Quinn Syvrais Inc., Steven Roussy, Geneviève Allain, Francis Parisé, Martial LeBlanc, Daniel Desbois, Rolland Anglehart, Jacques Langis, Jean-Pierre Huard, Claude Gionet, Carol Duguay, Denis Duguay, Paul Chevarie, Thérèse Vigneau, Administrator of the Estate of Benoît Poirier, Denis Éloquin, Claude Poirier, Henry-Fred Poirier, Robert Thériault, Raynald Vigneau Respondents JUDGMENT The appeal is dismissed with costs. "J. Richard" Chief Justice Certified true translation Kelley A. Harvey, BCL, LLB