R. v. Hajivasilis

R. v. Hajivasilis Collection Decisions of the Court of Appeal Date 2013-01-21 Neutral citation 2013 ONCA 27 Docket numbers C55233 Judges O’Connor, Dennis; Doherty, David H.; Sharpe, Robert J.; Epstein, Gloria Jean; Cavarzan, John Joseph Subject Criminal Decision Content COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO CITATION: R. v. Hajivasilis, 2013 ONCA 27 DATE: 20130121 DOCKET: C55233 O’Connor A.C.J.O., Doherty, Sharpe, Epstein JJ.A. and Cavarzan J. (ad hoc) BETWEEN Her Majesty the Queen Appellant and Ioannis Hajivasilis Respondent Matthew Asma, for the appellant Ioannis Hajivasilis, acting in person Adam Little, appearing as amicus curiae Heard: October 25, 2012 On appeal from the order of Justice Cathy Mocha of the Ontario Court of Justice, dated January 23, 2012, with reasons reported at 2012 ONCJ 110, dismissing an appeal of the order of Justice of the Peace Angelo Cremisio of the Ontario Court of Justice, dated June 17, 2009, with reasons reported at 2009 ONCJ 310. Doherty J.A.: I overview [1] In Shah v. Becamon, 2009 ONCA 113, 94 O.R. (3d) 297, this court held that the graduated licence scheme set out in the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (“HTA” or the “Act”) applied only to the operation of a motor vehicle on a “highway” as defined in the HTA. The court further held that the shopping plaza parking lot where the accident occurred was not a “highway” within the definition in the HTA. No one questions the correctness of either holding. [2] In Shah, the court went on in obiter dicta, at para. 23, to hold “the entire HTA, including the graduated licence system, is limited to ‘highways’.” In this case, counsel for the Crown (the “appellant”) submits that this obiter is wrong insofar as it limits the operation of the “entire HTA” to only “highways”. Counsel contends that “highway” is a defined term in the HTA that appears in many, but not all, provisions of the HTA. He submits that the definition of “highway” cannot be read into the sections of the HTA that do not use the word “highway” or some other word that incorporates the definition of “highway”. Specifically, counsel submits that the accident reporting requirement in s. 199 makes no reference to “highway” and applies even when the accident triggering the reporting requirement occurs on property that does not fall within the meaning of “highway”. [3] Counsel appointed as amicus, however, submits that the obiter in Shah is correct. He contends that the purpose and object of the HTA is the protection of persons using public roadways and that the reach of the HTA has been limited to “highways” in various contexts by this court. In support of his argument, counsel points to the difference between the HTA and corresponding legislation in many other provinces, which, unlike the HTA, does not restrict the meaning of the word “highway” by reference to public access and use. Counsel submits that the obiter in Shah is consistent with the more limited definition of “highway” used in the HTA. [4] I agree with the position advanced by the appellant. I would hold that the obiter in Shah limiting the operation of the “entire HTA” to “highways” is wrong and should not be followed. Many provisions of the HTA are by their terms limited to “highways”. Other provisions, however, are not so limited. Nothing in the overall structure of the HTA or its purpose compels the reading of the word “highway” into sections in which it does not appear. Section 199 is one such section. I would hold that the reporting requirement in s. 199 generally applies even if the accident does not occur on a “highway” as defined in the HTA. II background [5] The prosecution alleged that Mr. Hajivasilis (the “respondent”) backed his vehicle into a car parked in a supermarket parking lot. According to the prosecution, even though there was substantial damage to the parked vehicle, the respondent drove away. He was charged with failing to report the accident as required by s. 199(1) of the HTA.[1] That section provides: Every person in charge of a motor vehicle or street car who is directly or indirectly involved in an accident shall, if the accident results in personal injuries or in damage to property apparently exceeding an amount prescribed by regulation, report the accident forthwith to the nearest police officer and furnish him or her with the information concerning the accident as may be required by the officer under subsection (3). [6] The Justice of the Peace, after noting that the accident had occurred on private property in a parking lot, raised the issue of the applicability of s. 199. He referred counsel to the then recent decision in Shah. Ultimately, the Justice of the Peace, relying on Shah, dismissed the charge and held that s. 199 did not apply to an accident that occurred on property that did not fall within the definition of “highway” in the HTA: R. v. Hajivasilis, 2009 ONCJ 310. He did not address the merits of the allegation. [7] On appeal, Mocha J., of the Ontario Court of Justice, held that the Justice of the Peace had correctly followed the obiter dicta in Shah: R. v. Hajivasilis, 2012 ONCJ 110. She did the same and dismissed the appeal, observing at para. 22 that: If the decision in Shah needs further clarification, it must occur at the Court of Appeal, not here. [8] Rouleau J.A. granted leave to appeal from that decision. As the appeal squarely raised the correctness of the obiter dicta in Shah, a five-judge panel was constituted to hear the appeal. III the statutory interpretation problem [9] The HTA defines “highway” as follows: “highway” includes a common and public highway, street, avenue, parkway, driveway, square, place, bridge, viaduct or trestle, any part of which is intended for or used by the general public for the passage of vehicles and includes the area between the lateral property lines thereof[.] [Emphasis added.] [10] The phrase “intended for or used by the general public for the passage of vehicles” limits the meaning of “highway”. If a vehicle is being driven on property to which the general public does not have access or if that access is for a limited purpose other than passage (such as parking), the property will not fall within the meaning of “highway”. Most privately owned parking lots are not “highways” as defined in the HTA: see R. v. Mansour, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 916; Gill v. Elwood, [1970] 2 O.R. 59 (C.A.); and Sked v. Henry (1991), 28 M.V.R. (2d) 234 (Ont. Gen. Div.). It is accepted that the parking lot where the respondent allegedly struck the parked vehicle does not fall within the meaning of “highway” in the HTA. [11] The word “highway” appears repeatedly in the HTA, especially in offence-creating provisions. For example, s. 32(9) prohibits a person from driving a motor vehicle “on a highway” in contravention of the terms of his or her driver’s licence. That section clearly has application only when the driving occurs on property that falls within the meaning of “highway”. A person driving without a licence on property that is not “intended for or used by the general public for the passage of vehicles” is not in violation of s. 32(9). [12] Other words used in the HTA are defined using the word “highway”. In doing so, those words arguably incorporate within their definition the limitation found in the definition of “highway”.[2] “Driver” and “roadway” are two examples. According to s. 1(1) of the HTA: “driver” means a person who drives a vehicle on a highway; … “roadway” means the part of the highway that is improved, designed or ordinarily used for vehicular traffic, but does not include the shoulder, and, where a highway includes two or more separate roadways, the term “roadway” refers to any one roadway separately and not to all of the roadways collectively[.] [13] Thus, for example, s. 48, which allows a police officer to “require the driver of a motor vehicle to stop” for a specified reason, arguably has application only on highways as defined in the HTA since, by definition, “driver” means “a person who drives a vehicle on a highway”. A person driving a motor vehicle on a private parking lot is at least arguably not a driver for the purposes of the HTA. [14] Section 199 does not use the word “highway” or any word that incorporates the word “highway” in its statutory definition. The question of statutory interpretation raised on this appeal can be put in these terms: Is s. 199 of the HTA, which does not use the word “highway”, subject to the same limitation found in the definition of “highway” such that s. 199 applies only when the accident occurs on property “intended for or used by the general public for the passage of vehicles”? [15] The obiter in Shah answers yes. I say no. IV IS SHAh BINDING? [16] In Shah, the insurer denied coverage claiming that the driver at the time of the accident was operating the vehicle alone in contravention of the terms of her graduated licence that required her to be accompanied by a licenced driver. The insurer argued that as the driver was not “authorized by law” to operate the vehicle at the time of the accident, the terms of the applicable standard contract of automobile insurance had been breached thereby taking the insurer off coverage. [17] The trial judge rejected the insurer’s argument. He held that as the accident had not occurred on a “highway” as defined in the HTA, the licensing provisions under the Act did not apply. The driver was therefore not in breach of the terms of her licence when she was operating the motor vehicle in the parking lot. [18] This court upheld the trial judge’s ruling. The court rejected arguments that the parking lot was a “highway” for the purposes of the HTA. The court also rejected the argument that the licensing provisions should, as a matter of policy, be read so that drivers were not on or off coverage depending on the exact location of an accident. In rejecting this argument the court stated, at para. 35: The legislature has struck the balance explicitly – the graduated licensing scheme applies to the operation of a motor vehicle on a “highway”. Indeed, not surprisingly, the entire HTA applies to what its title foreshadows, highways.[3] [19] No one questions the court’s analysis in Shah of the scope of the graduated licensing provisions in the HTA or their interaction with the relevant statutory condition in the applicable automobile insurance policy. The appellant does contend, however, that the last statement in the above-quoted passage, which purports in a single terse statement to describe the reach of some 200 provisions in the HTA, is not binding or even persuasive and should not be applied. [20] R. v. Henry, 2005 SCC 76, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 609, at para. 57, makes the point that lower courts are bound not only by the ratio decidendi of decisions from higher courts, but also by some obiter dicta. Binnie J. stated: The issue in each case, to return to the Halsbury question, is what did the case decide? Beyond the ratio decidendi which, as the Earl of Halsbury L.C. pointed out, is generally rooted in the facts, the legal point decided by this Court may be as narrow as the jury instruction at issue in Sellars or as broad as the Oakes test. All obiter do not have, and are not intended to have, the same weight. The weight decreases as one moves from the dispositive ratio decidendi to a wider circle of analysis which is obviously intended for guidance and which should be accepted as authoritative. Beyond that, there will be commentary, examples or exposition that are intended to be helpful and may be found to be persuasive, but are certainly not “binding” in the sense that Sellars principle in its most exaggerated form would have it. The objective of the exercise is to promote certainty in the law, not to stifle its growth and creativity. The notion that each phrase in a judgment of this Court should be treated as if enacted in a statute is not supported by the cases and is inconsistent with the basic fundamental principle that the common law develops by experience. [Emphasis added.] [21] The challenged obiter in Shah does not fall within the “wide circle of analysis” described in Henry. That obiter reaches well beyond the specific issue raised in Shah. It plays no role in the reasoning of the court necessary to decide the specific issue before it. Nor is there any analysis, beyond a reference to the title of the legislation, to any of the provisions of the HTA other than those concerned with the graduated licensing scheme. With respect, the bald assertion that no part of the HTA reaches beyond highways does not reflect a full consideration of the entirety of the Act or the implications of limiting the entire act to “highways” as defined in the Act. It is not the kind of obiter that should be regarded as authoritative: see Glanville Williams, Learning the Law, 7th ed. (London: Steven & Sons, 1963) at pp. 82-84. [22] As the obiter in Shah does not resolve the question of whether s. 199 applies to accidents that do not occur on the “highway”, it is necessary to engage in a full interpretive analysis. The obiter in Shah does not assist in that process. V the interpretation of section 199 of the HTA A. the statutory language and context [23] Professor Driedger’s oft-repeated “modern principle” of statutory interpretation begins with the words of the relevant provision, but recognizes that those words take their meaning from the context in which they are used: Elmer A. Driedger, Construction of Statutes, 2d ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983) at p. 87. Context can be multi-layered, extending outward from the provision in issue to other related statutory provisions, the statute as a whole, related statutes and the relevant Interpretation Act. Context also includes applicable legal norms and the purpose or intent of the legislation: see Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, at paras. 26-30; Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 5th ed. (Markham: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2008) at pp. 353-58. [24] Before proceeding with my application of the “modern principle” to s. 199, I note that the predecessor section to s. 199 was considered in R. v. Berg (1956), 116 C.C.C. 204 (Ont. Co. Ct.). In a thorough and careful judgment, Kinnear Co. Ct. J., after an analysis that fits easily within the “modern principle” approach to statutory interpretation, concluded that the reporting requirement applied whether the accident occurred on or off a highway. I have borrowed liberally from his reasons in my analysis of s. 199.[4] (i) Section 199 [25] I begin my examination of the statute with the language of s. 199(1). For ease of reference, I repeat the relevant part of the section: Every person in charge of a motor vehicle … who is directly or indirectly involved in an accident shall, if the accident results in personal injuries or in damage to property apparently exceeding an amount prescribed by regulation, report the accident forthwith to the nearest police officer and furnish him or her with the information concerning the accident as may be required by the officer…. [26] The officer to whom the accident is reported must prepare a report in the form provided by the Minister of Transportation and forward that report to the Registrar of Motor Vehicles: ss. 199(3)-(4). [27] A plain reading of s. 199(1) reveals no reference to the word “highway” or any word that incorporates the definition of “highway”. The reporting obligation in s. 199(1) is placed on “every person in charge of a motor vehicle”. If the legislature has defined certain terms in the definition section of legislation, but chooses to use other undefined terms in a particular section, the interpretative exercise must strive to give some meaning to the choice made by the legislature. In s. 199, the legislature chose to use the phrase, “every person in charge of a motor vehicle”, a more expansive phrase than the word “driver”. This choice suggests a reporting requirement that is not limited to persons who fall within the definition of the word “driver”, that is, persons who drive a vehicle on a “highway”. (ii) Related Provisions in the HTA [28] Expanding the context from the words of s. 199(1) to the language of related sections takes me to s. 205 of the HTA. Section 205 places certain responsibilities on the Registrar of Motor Vehicles, the official who receives the reports generated under s. 199. [29] Under s. 205, the Registrar of Motor Vehicles must: · investigate motor vehicle accidents, traffic conditions and other matters (s. 205(1)(b)); · keep records of all motor vehicle accidents in Ontario reported to him or her (s. 205(1)(c)(i)); · keep an operating record of every driver showing “all accidents in which the records of the Registrar indicate the driver has been involved” (s. 205(1)(c)(v)). · develop adequate uniform methods of accident and traffic statistics (s. 205(1)(d)); · study accident causes and trends, traffic problems and regulations (s. 205(1)(d)); and · prepare an annual report for the Minister containing recommendations for the prevention of motor vehicle accidents and the solution of traffic problems (s. 205(1)(e)). [30] None of the responsibilities of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles set out in s. 205 are limited to accidents or other traffic-related concerns on “highways”. The responsibilities relate to all accidents and related traffic conditions in the province. The broad responsibilities of the Registrar, particularly as they relate to the accident reports generated by s. 199(1) and other sections of the HTA, are consistent with an interpretation of s. 199 that requires the reporting of all motor vehicle accidents that meet the criteria specified in that section. (iii) Part XIV [31] A further broadening of the context leads next to a review of the entirety of Part XIV of the HTA, the part of the HTA containing s. 199. That Part includes various reporting requirements. A review of the four reporting requirements most closely connected to s. 199 reveals that two use the word “highway” while the other two do not. [32] Section 199.1 contains reporting requirements relating to vehicles that are irreparable or salvage, both defined terms under the HTA and its regulations: see e.g., s. 199.1(4). The reporting requirements make no reference to “highway” or any word incorporating the definition of “highway”. Section 199.1 is clearly intended to give the Registrar notice of vehicles that have been badly damaged as the use of those vehicles could pose a safety risk. That purpose is not served by a reading of s. 199.1 that would limit reporting requirements to vehicles on a “highway”. Indeed, if the vehicle reaches the “highway”, it may well be too late to worry about any requirement to report the status of the vehicle. [33] Section 202 imposes a reporting duty on Crown Attorneys and police officers. The section applies only when there is a fatal accident. The section does not use the word “highway”. A plain reading would suggest that all fatal accidents are subject to the requirements of s. 202. [34] Section 200, like s. 199, contains a provision requiring the reporting of accidents. Section 200, however, imposes duties on the person in charge of the vehicle in the accident that are more onerous than the reporting requirement in s. 199. By its terms, s. 200 applies only “[w]here an accident occurs on a highway”. Section 201, imposing another reporting requirement, is again specifically limited to the operating or driving of a vehicle “upon a highway”. Sections 200 and 201 indicate that when the legislature wanted to limit a reporting requirement to an accident or other event that occurred on a “highway”, it specifically wrote that limitation into the reporting requirement. [35] My review of the language used in the various reporting requirements in Part XIV satisfies me that if the legislature determined that the particular reporting requirement should be triggered only by events which occurred on a “highway”, it expressly said so. When it chose to impose a broader reporting requirement, it refrained from using the word “highway” or any other defined word, such as “driver”, that would restrict the reporting requirement to “highways”. The obiter in Shah would effectively erase one of the distinctions written into the various reporting requirements by the legislature. (iv) The HTA as a Whole [36] Broadening the context from Part XIV to the entirety of the HTA offers no support for reading “highway” into s. 199. Numerous provisions in the HTA, like s. 199, do not use the word “highway” or any related word. Many of those sections create duties that are intended to protect the public by regulating various activities relating to motor vehicles. Many of those duties cannot reasonably be seen as contingent upon or properly limited to circumstances in which a motor vehicle is used on a “highway”. [37] For example, there are provisions requiring the licensing, permitting or authorization of motor vehicle dealers (s. 59), driving instructors (s. 58), and persons who pick up passengers for compensation (s. 39.1). There are also provisions requiring that dealers of second-hand motor vehicles keep certain detailed records (s. 60) and that sellers of rebuilt tires clearly identify the tires as rebuilt (s. 71(3)). Moreover, there are provisions prohibiting the defacement or alteration of licence plates (s. 12), the submission of false or inaccurate documents to the Ministry (s. 9), and the possession of more than one owner’s permit referable to the same licence plate or vehicle (s. 7(15)). [38] The provisions described above, and many others in the HTA, regulate various activities associated with motor vehicles. Even though the duties imposed by these provisions are not tied directly to the operation of a vehicle on a “highway”, the provisions clearly enhance public safety in connection with the use of motor vehicles whether on the highway or elsewhere. [39] Even the provisions of the HTA dealing with the “Rules of the Road” (Part X),[5] which are clearly most closely associated with conduct on a “highway”, are not all limited to highways. For example, s. 134 authorizes a police officer, in any of the enumerated circumstances, to “direct traffic according to his or her discretion” and requires every person to obey those directions. The section says nothing about limiting this authority or duty to “highways”. Police officers will have occasion, in the interests of public safety, to direct and control traffic in a place that is not a “highway”. It would defeat the obvious purpose underlying s. 134 if it were read as being limited to a “highway”. [40] In summary, my review of the HTA as a whole demonstrates that many of the duties created by various sections of the HTA that do not use the word “highway” cannot be limited to “highways”. Viewed from the perspective of the HTA as a whole, context contraindicates reading all sections of the HTA as applicable only to “highways”. (v) Section 1.1 [41] My contextual review of the HTA brings me next to s. 1.1, which reads: The Lieutenant Governor in Council may make regulations providing that this Act or any provision of this Act or of a regulation applies to a specified place or class of place that is not a highway. [42] Section 1.1 was added to the HTA by the Safer Roads for a Safer Ontario Act, 2007, S.O. 2007, c. 13, s. 2. Mocha J. interpreted s. 1.1 as indicating that provisions of the HTA could extend to places beyond a “highway” only by the exercise of the regulation-making power in s. 1.1: at paras. 19-20. She read the section as supporting the obiter in Shah. [43] Section 1.1 does not suggest that, absent an appropriate regulation, all provisions of the HTA are limited to “highways”. The section permits the extension by regulation of the HTA, or a provision of the HTA, to places other than highways. Thus, a section that by its terms was limited to “highways” could be extended to other places by regulation without the need to amend the provision itself. Section 1.1 offers no support for the contention that absent an appropriate regulation, all provisions of the HTA are referable only to “highways”. [44] Section 1.1 does, however, provide context in a somewhat different way. The section contemplates the extension of the entire HTA or parts of it to places other than highways. This broad regulation-making power is inconsistent with the obiter in Shah that would limit the HTA to “highways”. The regulation-making power in s. 1.1 is, however, entirely consistent with an interpretation of the HTA that extends beyond highways. (vi) The Title [45] I conclude my search for context in the legislation by reference to the title of the legislation – the Highway Traffic Act.[6] In Shah, at para. 35, the court stated: Indeed, not surprisingly, the entire HTA applies to what its title foreshadows, highways. [46] The title of an enactment can assist in the interpretation of a provision within the enactment: see Temelini v. Ontario Provincial Police (Commissioner) (1999), 44 O.R. (3d) 609 (C.A.), at pp. 620-21. In my view, it places far too much weight on the title of the HTA to suggest that a word that is given a specific definition in the text of the statute effectively becomes a description of the scope of the statute because that word is used in the title. Had the legislature intended the word “highway” to define the scope of the HTA, I would have expected a specific statutory provision addressing the scope of the Act, and not merely a definition of the word “highway” applicable to the legislation. [47] I also agree with counsel for the appellant that a comparison of the English and French titles of the HTA supports his position. The French title of the HTA is “Code de la route”. The French version defines “highway” as “voie publique”. The title of the French version of the HTA considered along with the definition of “highway” in the French version suggests that the Act is not limited to “highways”. The French and English versions of a statute are equally authoritative: Legislation Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 21, Sch. F., s. 65. B. the object of the HTA [48] The modern approach to statutory interpretation looks to the purpose or object of the statute as an aid in interpreting the statute’s provisions. This approach is legislatively mandated in Ontario by s. 64 of the Legislation Act, 2006: An Act shall be interpreted as being remedial and shall be given such fair, large and liberal interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects. [49] There is no preamble to the HTA and nothing in the Act speaks directly to the objects of the HTA. Nor did counsel in their comprehensive presentations refer to any of the usual secondary sources that might assist in pinpointing the objects of the Act. In attempting to discern the object of the HTA, one is left with the circular proposition that the words of the HTA enlighten the reader as to the objects of the HTA which in turn assist the reader in giving meaning to the words in the HTA. As Rothstein J. recently cautioned in Canada v. Craig, 2012 SCC 43, 347 D.L.R. (4th) 385, at para. 30, interpreting words by reference to unexpressed legislative intention purportedly discovered through a purposive reading of those words must be avoided: see also Shell Canada Ltd. v. Canada, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 622, at para. 43. [50] Bearing that caution in mind, the case law does identify in broad terms the object of the HTA. In R. v. Raham, 2010 ONCA 206, 99 O.R. (3d) 241, at para. 33, the court refers to the HTA as “public welfare legislation designed to protect those who use the roads of the province.” Earlier, in Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario v. Bruell Float Service Ltd. (1974), 3 O.R. (2d) 108, at p. 114, aff’d on other grounds [1976] 1 S.C.R. 9, this court said: The general purpose of the Highway Traffic Act is the regulation of the use of the highways by persons on foot and in vehicles; that is not to say that certain provisions of the statute will not apply to the use of vehicles other than on a highway, but in an over-all sense the Legislature is directing itself to the regulation of vehicular traffic and not to commerce conducted in or by means of vehicles. [51] In my view, regulation to protect the public using the province’s roads is not necessarily limited to roads that fall within the meaning of “highway” in the Act. Public safety concerns might well demand regulation in respect of traffic in large private parking facilities even though those facilities are not used by the general public for “the passage of vehicles”. Similarly, public safety concerns might well demand the regulation of private parking facilities as incidental to regulations maintaining the safety of the “highway” leading into and out of that facility. [52] Insofar as s. 199 is concerned, I think it can be argued that public safety is enhanced by a general reporting requirement with respect to accidents involving injury or a certain level of property damage. Lessons learned from the reports with respect to those accidents may enhance the overall safety of the roads by identifying safety concerns that have application beyond the immediate circumstances of the particular accident. [53] When I place the language of s. 199 in the context of its related provisions, the HTA as a whole, and the object of the HTA, I see no reason to read the word “highway” into the Act. In my view, the section makes perfect sense and is consistent with the object of the HTA if it is read as written. C. other arguments [54] Amicus has made two additional arguments which do not fit exactly into the contextual analysis as I have set it out. I will briefly address both arguments. [55] First, amicus submits that an interpretation that extends s. 199 beyond accidents on “highways” leads to absurd results. For example, he suggests that the appellant’s interpretation would require persons who slam their hands in a car door while it is parked in their driveway to report that “accident” under s. 199. [56] The potential absurdity raised by amicus turns on the meaning of the word “accident” in s. 199 and not on whether the section applies to places other than “highways”. Any problems relating to the interpretation of the word “accident” arise in respect of the various reporting conditions imposed in ss. 199, 200 and 201. That interpretative problem is for another day. [57] Second, amicus submits that s. 199 should not be read as applying to private property because the reporting requirement forces persons involved in accidents to provide potentially incriminating information to the police. The potential use of any statutorily compelled statements in subsequent proceedings raises issues that have a constitutional and evidentiary dimension. Those issues are no doubt important but, in my view, have no connection to the interpretation of s. 199. If the section raises legitimate self-incrimination concerns, those concerns are not properly addressed by effectively reading down the legislation. VI conclusion [58] I would allow the appeal, set aside the order below, and direct a new trial. I would hope that in the circumstances the Crown would not proceed with that new trial. [59] I would not want to leave this case without acknowledging the efforts of both Mr. Asma, counsel for the Crown, and Mr. Little, court appointed amicus. Their written and oral arguments were first rate and of great assistance to the court. RELEASED: “DD” “JAN 21 2013” “Doherty J.A.” “I agree Dennis O’Connor A.C.J.O.” “I agree Robert J. Sharpe J.A.” “I agree G.J. Epstein J.A.” “I agree J. Cavarzan (per Doherty J.A.)” [1] The offence is actually created by s. 214 which makes it an offence to contravene a provision of the HTA. [2] I say arguably because the matter is not directly raised and I should not be taken as having considered all of the sections that use those words. [3] The court said much the same at para. 1 of the judgment: “The Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H8 (“HTA”), is a comprehensive statute regulating drivers and vehicles in Ontario. The anchor of the statute is, as its title suggests, ‘highways’. The purpose of the statute is the regulation of drivers and vehicles with a view to protecting the travelling public who use the highways.” [4] R. v. Soules, 2011 ONCA 429, 105 O.R. (3d) 561, at para. 7, notes that s. 199 refers to the obligation “to report accidents on the highway”. Soules does not suggest that the reporting obligation is limited to highways. Nor was the proper statutory interpretation of s. 199 at issue in Soules. [5] It is perhaps noteworthy that Part X is entitled “Rules of the Road” and not “Rules of the Highway”. [6] The former long title of the HTA – “An Act to Regulate Travel on Highways, and the Speed, Operation and Load of Vehicles Thereon” – was dropped soon after the HTA was enacted in 1923. In my view, it does not assist in the interpretative exercise.