R. v. Bowie

R. v. Bowie Collection Decisions of the Court of Appeal Date 2025-09-19 Neutral citation 2025 ONCA 661 Docket numbers COA-25-CR-1051, M56244 Judges Trotter, Gary T. Subject Criminal Decision Content COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO CITATION: R. v. Bowie, 2025 ONCA 661[1] DATE: 20250919 DOCKET: M56244 (COA-25-CR-1051) Trotter J.A. (Motion Judge) BETWEEN His Majesty the King Respondent and James Bowie Appellant/Applicant Matthew Wolfson, for the applicant Akshay Aurora, for the respondent Heard: September 2, 2025 by video conference REASONS FOR DECISION [1] James Bowie was convicted of criminal harassment (Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 264(3)), extortion (s. 346(1.1)), and two counts of uttering threats (s. 264.1(2)). On September 2, 2025, he was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody. He now applies for bail pending appeal. The following reasons explain why the application is dismissed. A. background [2] The appellant is a lawyer who practiced in Ottawa. This prosecution against him originates from his representation of a former client, Leanne Aubin. The appellant represented her on criminal charges. He had her enter into a retainer agreement whereby, if she was late with a payment, she would be expected to provide oral sex to the appellant. This never happened. Ms. Aubin retained different counsel and reported the appellant to the Law Society of Ontario (“LSO”). She also sued the appellant for damages. She shared her experience with the media. [3] The appellant shared his troubles with a friend, A.B., whom the appellant assisted with immigration issues. In their discussions of his own legal issues, the appellant became “unhinged”. He requested A.B.’s help to get rid of “the Leanne Aubin problem” and said “I need her gone”. He asked A.B. to source a firearm for him. She did not. [4] A.B. was deeply distressed by the situation. She attempted to distance herself from the appellant, but he persisted in contacting her. He harassed A.B. He placed two different tracking devices on her vehicle. He called A.B. at her former workplace. He followed her. He threatened her. Initially, A.B. was afraid to go to the police because she feared it might impact her immigration situation. She eventually reported the matter to the police. [5] The appellant was released on bail pending his trial. He remained on bail for two years and three months. His father was his surety. There were no allegations that the appellant breached his bail. [6] The appellant was tried in the Ontario Court of Justice. At the end of the Crown’s case, after Ms. Aubin and A.B. testified, the Crown asked that the extortion charge relating to Ms. Aubin be dismissed. The trial continued on the remaining counts. [7] The appellant testified. He denied threatening, harassing or extorting anyone. He testified that he was set up by another Ottawa lawyer. According to the appellant, this lawyer was jealous when the appellant became “famous” for his role in assisting protestors involved in the Parliament Hill protests in 2022. He was convinced that this lawyer tried to destroy his professional career. The appellant testified that this lawyer “wants to end me and has for a long time” and that he “wants to kill me.” [8] Defence counsel at trial distanced himself from this evidence and asked the trial judge to focus on whether Ms. Aubin and A.B. were trustworthy and whether the Crown had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial judge rejected the appellant’s evidence as fictional. In his reasons, he explained why he accepted the evidence of Ms. Aubin and A.B. He found the appellant guilty of all remaining counts. [9] After delivering his reasons, the trial judge inquired of counsel whether he should revoke the appellant’s bail. The Crown indicated that it did not seek to revoke the appellant’s bail, nor were any additional conditions requested. [10] The trial judge heard sentencing submissions on July 28, 2025 and reserved his decision. Once again, he raised the issue of whether the appellant’s bail should be revoked. In response, the Crown applied to revoke the appellant’s bail. The trial judge allowed the application, citing public interest considerations. The appellant remained in custody pending sentencing. [11] On September 2, 2025, the trial judge determined that the appropriate sentence was four years’ imprisonment. In his reasons,[2] he weighed the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors. In describing the seriousness of the appellant’s conduct, he said: “Mr. Bowie will also be sentenced today for his real and credible threat to kill Ms. Aubin. But for the courage of A.B., the courts may have been adjudicating a culpable homicide.” The trial judge relied heavily on the victim impact statements written by Ms. Aubin and A.B., in which they describe the devastating impact of the appellant’s actions, as well as their ongoing fear of the appellant. [12] The trial judged credited the appellant with 59 days of pre-sentence custody and imposed a sentence of 46 months. B. Bail pending appeal [13] Applications for bail pending the appeal of a conviction are governed by s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code, which provides: 679(3) In the case of an appeal referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (c), the judge of the court of appeal may order that the appellant be released pending the determination of his appeal if the appellant establishes that (a) the appeal or application for leave to appeal is not frivolous; (b) he will surrender himself into custody in accordance with the terms of the order; and (c) his detention is not necessary in the public interest. [14] The appellant is 42 years old and has no prior criminal record. He proposes that he be released on terms similar to his pre-trial release, but this time with his mother acting as surety in the stead of his father. The appellant argues that he has a strong appeal and a credible release plan, one that was successful during the long road to trial. [15] The Crown submits that bail should be refused because the appeal is frivolous. He also resists bail on the public interest ground, both on public safety and public confidence considerations. [16] The appellant is fortunate to have the continued support of his parents. However, things have changed in a fundamental way since his conviction. While the presumption of innocence is the cornerstone of pre-trial release in Canada, at the appellate stage, the presumption of innocence is at an end. In R. v. Farinacci (1993), 86 C.C.C. (3d) 32 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 37, Arbour J.A. (as she then was) said: “After a conviction, there is no presumption left, one way or the other. There is an enforceable finding of guilt.” This reality animates the criteria for release in s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code. [17] Turning to the s. 679(3)(a), I am satisfied that the appeal is not frivolous. As the Supreme Court of Canada held in R. v. Oland, 2017 SCC 17, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 250, at para. 20, the “‘not frivolous’ test” is “a very low bar”, one that should be easily met in many cases. [18] The main ground of appeal advanced for the purposes of this bail application is that the trial judge erred by relying on Ms. Aubin’s evidence following the dismissal of the extortion charge that related to her. The appellant submits that it was agreed at the outset of the trial that Ms. Aubin had made a complaint against him to the LSO. Based on this agreed fact, and in view of the dismissal of the charge as it related to Ms. Aubin, her evidence became irrelevant. Therefore, the appellant argues, it was evidence of prior discreditable conduct and inadmissible. [19] The appellant also submits that the trial judge displayed a reasonable apprehension of bias. This was reflected in the trial judge’s alleged eagerness to revoke the appellant’s bail, on his own motion, when he found the appellant guilty and when sentencing submissions were complete. However, this ground of appeal was not relied upon on this bail application. [20] The Crown submits that the dismissal of the extortion charge did not render Ms. Aubin’s evidence irrelevant. The entire case started with the appellant’s professional relationship with Ms. Aubin. It provided the foundational narrative and context for the charges against the appellant. The two counts of uttering threats related to Ms. Aubin. Defence counsel at trial did not suggest that Ms. Aubin’s evidence was rendered irrelevant. He did not ask for a mistrial. In fact, he invited the trial judge to consider the internal inconsistencies in her evidence, and to examine inconsistencies between Ms. Aubin and A.B. Moreover, the Crown contends that the trial judge did not engage in any propensity reasoning based on this evidence. His focus was on A.B.’s evidence. [21] I accept the submission of Mr. Aurora for the Crown that although the not frivolous standard is very low bar, it does not mean that the test is non-existent. Nonetheless, at the early stages of an appeal, when bail applications are typically launched, the grounds of appeal may not be as fully developed as they will be by the time it comes to argue the appeal. Consequently, I am satisfied that the principal ground of appeal advanced by the appellant passes this low threshold. But as I explain below, while not frivolous, I consider the appeal to be a weak one at this stage, and this is relevant to the other components of the analysis. [22] The Crown does not dispute that the appellant has met his onus under s. 679(3)(b) that he will surrender into custody when required to do so. The appellant’s compliance with his pre-trial bail satisfies me that he has met this threshold. [23] The “public interest” ground in s. 679(3)(c) has two components – one is concerned with public safety, while the other is focused on maintaining confidence in the administration of justice: see Oland, at paras. 23-27; Farinacci, at pp. 47-48. The Crown opposes release on both bases. [24] In terms of public safety, the appellant relies on his favourable track record while on bail pending trial. The Crown submits that the appellant’s convictions for the credible threat on Ms. Aubin’s life overshadows the proposed release plan. The Crown also relies on the victim impact statements of Ms. Aubin and A.B., both of whom express serious fear of the appellant. [25] I am not persuaded that the appellant has met his onus on the public safety component of s. 679(3)(c). As noted above, the presumption of innocence is now at an end in terms of the appellant’s criminal liability. The appellant’s testimony at trial heightens my concern on this ground. In his reasons for convicting the appellant, the trial judge reproduced passages from the appellant’s testimony in which he expressed paranoid and grandiose explanations for his predicament, ultimately claiming to be the victim in this entire affair. [26] On sentencing, the trial judge speculated that the appellant’s offending behaviour, which A.B. characterized as “unhinged”, may have been induced by mental health challenges or drug issues. There was nothing in the materials filed on this application, nor on sentencing, that indicates that these issues are being addressed. [27] I dismiss the application on the public safety arm alone. [28] The appellant’s detention is also justified on the public confidence arm of s. 679(3)(c). The framework for applying this arm was addressed in Oland. It requires a bail judge to resolve the tension between enforceability and reviewability considerations: Oland, at para. 28; R. v. G.S., 2025 ONCA 627, at paras. 17-19. [29] Reviewability considerations require an examination of the strength of the grounds of appeal, with a view to the prospect of success. As discussed earlier, the main ground of appeal – the misuse of Ms. Aubin’s evidence by the trial judge – is unlikely to succeed. This legal argument must be viewed in the context of the case as a whole. Having accepted the evidence of Ms. Aubin and A.B. for the proper purpose, the case against the appellant was overwhelming. All that the appellant could offer in response was a conspiratorial narrative, with grandiose features, that was devoid of reality, disavowed by his own trial counsel, and ultimately rejected by the trial judge. [30] Enforceability considerations must prevail in this case. The offences committed by the appellant were very grave and committed in very aggravating circumstances. I repeat the words of the trial judge when sentencing the appellant: “Mr. Bowie will also be sentenced today for his real and credible threat to kill Ms. Aubin. But for the courage of A.B., the courts may have been adjudicating a culpable homicide.” The appellant was a lawyer. He victimized two vulnerable people who came to him for help, not to be manipulated or abused. This is a serious aggravating factor, one that is reflected in the trial judge’s reasons for sentence. [31] In these circumstances, especially in light of the weak ground of appeal in an overwhelming case, public confidence in the administration of justice would be undermined by the appellant’s release pending the appeal. The public confidence arm of the analysis also supports my decision to dismiss this application. C. conclusion [32] The application is dismissed. “Gary Trotter J.A.” [1] This appeal is subject to a publication ban pursuant to s. 486.4 and s. 517 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. [2] At the hearing of this application for bail, I requested that counsel obtain a copy of the reasons for sentence. Counsel were diligent in doing so. However, at the time of writing, and without explanation, an official version was still not available. Crown counsel and counsel for the appellant agreed that I could rely upon the unofficial version of the reasons for the purposes of this bail application to avoid any further and unnecessary delay.