I.K.S. v. P.S.A.

2025 BCSC 840 I.K.S. v. P.S.A.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: I.K.S. v. P.S.A., 2025 BCSC 840 Date: 20250404 Docket: E05413 Registry: Abbotsford Between: I.K.S., also known as I.K.A. Claimant And P.S.A. Respondent Before: The Honourable Justice Schultes Oral Reasons for Judgment (In Chambers) Counsel for the Claimant: D.J. Sandhu Counsel for the Respondent: G.S. Dale Place and Date of Hearing: New Westminster, B.C. March 14, 2025 Place and Date of Judgment: New Westminster, B.C. April 4, 2025 Introduction [1] The claimant in this family law matter is applying to vary the parenting arrangements in an interim order that the parties arrived at by consent in September of last year. She proposes that the shared‑parenting regime that currently exists be replaced by one in which the children live primarily with her and have parenting time with the respondent according to their wishes, with a schedule to reintroduce parenting time with the youngest child. [2] She also seeks orders that a Hear the Child report be prepared to address the children's current situation, that the respondent be required to engage in counselling to assist with his parenting, that he be fined for breaching the terms of the consent order by failing to contribute to the costs of maintaining the parties' properties, that he pay prospective child support on an interim basis (a request for support retroactive to the separation

date was abandoned during the hearing); and that she be permitted to travel with the children to Mexico for a vacation with members of her family later this month. [3] The catalyst for the proposed change to the parenting arrangements was incidents of alleged misbehaviour by the respondent in the exercise of his parenting time, which are said to have caused emotional distress to the children. He denies the bulk of these allegations and submits that the difficulties encountered by the children are largely the result of the claimant's attempts to alienate them from him. [4] There is a judicial case conference set for April 25. Although no leave was specifically sought to bring this application in advance of that JCC, there have been previous applications for consent orders and protection orders Regularizing the current parenting situation, which is contrary to the existing order, is also sufficiently urgent that leave would have been granted if it had been sought. Background [5] The parties married in 2005 and separated in March of last year. Their daughter S. is 14 years old, and their son V. is nine. [6] The claimant operates a Montessori preschool and a franchise of a math tutoring business, of which both she and the respondent are shareholders and directors. Through these corporate vehicles, she reported an income of $80,653 in her September financial statement. The

respondent works as a longshoreman and a mortgage broker, and his November financial statement lists an income of $137,000. [7] In addition to the family home in Langley, they also own an investment property, which is a condominium, in the same area. Initial Parenting Difficulties [8] The claimant relies mainly on incidents that have occurred since December to support the requested changes to the parenting arrangements, but some earlier incidents provide relevant context. [9] Following their separation, the parties initially exercised shared parenting on the basis of a so‑called nesting arrangement, in which they would alternate week‑long periods with the children in the family home while the other parent stayed elsewhere. [10] In June, the claimant obtained a protection order against the respondent. In broad terms, the allegations that led to the order involved verbal abuse by him directed at the claimant, sometimes in the presence of the children and frequently in the context of alcohol abuse by him. When it was granted, it temporarily suspended the nesting arrangement and required the claimant and the children to stay with her parents in White Rock. The respondent was still able to exercise some parenting time, although the amount was unsatisfactory to him. [11] The claimant deposes that in August the respondent was found to be intoxicated by the police while the children

were in his care at the family home, which resulted in him entering into a safety plan with the Ministry of Children and Family Development ("MCFD") after its investigation. That investigation was apparently closed in November, although there have been others. [12] The nesting arrangement was reinstated by the interim consent order in September. The claimant's position is that she agreed to this order despite her ongoing concerns about family violence and the best interests of the children because she did not want to be accused of turning the children against the respondent. [13] Other relevant terms of this consent order included the parties sharing the carrying costs of the properties and both of those properties being listed for sale. The claimant deposes that as of January the respondent stopped contributing his share of those costs, which is not contradicted. This has required her to contribute an additional $9,000 approximately to stave off foreclosure. [14] There was also a term that prohibited the parties from discussing inappropriate adult, legal, or court matters with the children, or disparaging the other parent in the children's presence. Unfortunately, that term has gone by the boards, as I will describe. [15] There was no provision requiring the payment of child support at that time. [16] The respondent has been charged criminally with several breaches of the

protection order, by having contact with the claimant contrary to its terms. In his material, he admits that the message he sent to her on September 22, for which he was arrested on October 17, was technically in breach of the existing protection order, but explains that he understood, based on the parties' negotiations leading up to the consent order, that it was a permissible form of communication under the new protection order that was to be obtained. On his counsel's advice in light of his pending criminal trial he has not commented on the other alleged breaches, but I infer that they are of a generally similar nature. [17] According to the claimant the respondent had been engaging in excessive consumption of alcohol while the children were in his care leading up to his October 17 arrest. [18] He denies any overindulgence in alcohol in their presence during that period. The MCFD investigated that incident as well. He deposes that he fully complied with the MCFD's directions in relation to it, and that no concerns about his care for the children arose. [19] He is also alleged to have spoken about the claimant in disparaging terms to the children in November, during exercises of his parenting time and in other communications. This includes referring to the claimant as a "kidnapper" and writing to S. in a birthday card that he was being kept from seeing her. He admits that he

was experiencing frustration about the parenting situation and the amount of communication that he was having with the children at the time. To better address his reactions he began seeing a counsellor on his own in September. [20] On November 29, as previously discussed by the parties, the existing protection order was replaced with one that permitted communication between them relating to the children and the businesses. [21] On that date, they also entered into a further consent order, which arose from an application by the respondent. It provided that he would have 21 days of compensatory parenting time--seven during a specified period in which their alternating weeks would be temporarily suspended, and the remaining 14 to be agreed between them, with liberty to apply if an agreement could not be reached. He explains that this was to address parenting time that the claimant had wrongfully denied to him following the consent order in September. [22] The claimant deposes that both children currently see a counsellor to assist them with issues arising from the separation. A particular concern that has arisen is that S. has engaged in some incidents of apparent self‑harm over the last year. The claimant says that in recent months the parties have respected S.'s wish to live primarily with her. However, the respondent's evidence is that until December, S. regularly expressed her

wish to live equally with both parents to him, and demonstrated an affectionate attitude towards him during their contact. He is concerned that she has been influenced by the claimant's negative views of him and inappropriately involved by the claimant in their disputes. In his November 24 affidavit, he affirmed that he would not force S. to have parenting time with him, but added that he believed that once they returned to the shared‑parenting regime that had originally been agreed to there would be no further difficulties in their relationship. [23] The claimant alleges that the respondent has been required to participate in his own counselling program at the direction of the MCFD, but he clarifies that it was actually a voluntary program that he enrolled in to strengthen his parenting skills to benefit the children. He adds that he also enrolled in a counselling program through the MCFD that he and S. were to participate in together to improve their deteriorating relationship. After attending two sessions of it, she refused to do so any further. More Recent Events [24] During the December holiday period, the respondent took the children on a trip to Whistler. On the first night he is alleged to have left the children at their accommodation to go out drinking, later coming home angry and intoxicated, eventually pushing both children in an effort to take away S.'s phone. This

led her to have a panic attack and phone the claimant, who was able to calm her down. The respondent denies that anything of this nature occurred and explains that the evening consisted of various innocuous activities with the children, such as walking to Whistler Village and purchasing pizza. [25] According to the claimant, on the second night of the trip the respondent went out to a restaurant at 11:30 p.m. to have "have a glass of wine" at a restaurant, despite S. advising him that she preferred that he not do so. Once again she phoned the claimant, who followed up by phoning the respondent. He is said to have subjected the claimant to a barrage of verbal abuse, including in the children's presence, after his return to the hotel room. This caused S. to take V. into the bathroom and cover his ears. [26] His version of events on that evening is that the children wanted to cook their own food in the kitchen of their accommodation, so he went across the street to the restaurant for a meal and a glass of wine. He was delayed there somewhat by the volume of customers. When he returned S. began to speak rudely to him. He attributes to her conversation with the claimant before he left, in which S. appeared to be advising the claimant of his activities. He says he took her phone away briefly but then returned it to her. At one point he put his arm out to keep her a reasonable

distance away from him as she was trying to retrieve her phone. He denies pushing either child though. [27] When he sent a message to the claimant asking her what she had said to S., and requesting her to leave them alone, she responded in profane terms. He agrees that he and the claimant later spoke to each other, and that he and the claimant (as well as her mother, who had joined the call on the claimant's end) were "using expletives and saying terrible things to each other" within the children's hearing. According to him, the children did not display any distress as a result. S. went to bed, and he and V. watched a movie together. [28] He was interviewed by an MCFD social worker in relation to this incident on February 17, and although he did not agree that there was any validity to the claimant's allegations, he was prepared to agree to a 30‑day restriction on consuming more alcohol than the so‑called legal limit to operate a vehicle while the children were in his care, and to refrain from arguing (with the claimant, presumably) in front of them. He says he agreed to these conditions because of the highly contentious nature of this proceeding, and his fear that otherwise the MCFD's involvement could interfere with his parenting time. [29] On an evening in early January on which the respondent was caring for him, V. called the claimant in tears asking to come home, because

the respondent had slapped him on the back while he was playing video games. He then called back and asked her not to pick him up, explaining that the respondent had told him that it would cost her $50,000 if she did so, which I assume was a reference to the legal fees that she would incur. She told V. to go to bed and said she would pick him up the next day. The respondent denies having slapped V. [30] More generally, the claimant deposes that V. had been telling her during this period that he missed her during his parenting time with the respondent, that he was often left alone with his paternal grandmother, and that overall he felt "unsafe and scared" in the respondent's care. She says that she encouraged him to continue to have parenting time in keeping with the order, but also attempted through her counsel to negotiate an equal parenting schedule that would involve shorter periods with each parent, which the respondent was not prepared to agree to. [31] The respondent maintains that V. had never expressed to him that he felt unsafe in his care. Nor had that concern ever been brought to his attention through the various MCFD investigations. He also noted that V. had actually spent very few overnights at the grandparents' home over the last few months, so being left with them for excessive periods was not a realistic concern. As to V.'s concerns about the length of the

present parenting periods, he is not necessarily opposed to implementing a 2/2/3 parenting schedule eventually, as the claimant has proposed. This would break up the periods that V. has to spend with him. His work schedule prevents that from occurring in the immediate future however. [32] To assist V. in feeling more comfortable with the respondent, the claimant asked S. to accompany him to the respondent's home for several days in mid January. S. agreed to do so, but did not return to stay with the respondent after that. [33] Parenting time for the respondent of any kind was interrupted as a result of an incident on February 4. [34] The claimant describes V. calling her in a very distressed state, advising her that he was going to be left at his grandmother's house for the second night in a row. She recorded this call and says that the respondent can be heard in the background accusing her of manipulating V.--an accusation that V. himself emphatically rejected. After that V. told her that he was not allowed to have privacy to speak to her, and that the respondent was right next to him, following which the respondent hung up the phone. She says she was concerned about V.'s safety, so she called the non‑emergency police number and was advised that if safety was a concern, she could collect him from the home. She and S. then drove to the family home, but she parked several houses

away so as not to cause a violation of the no‑contact term of the respondent's protection order. [35] S. went into the house and recorded the audio of the events on her phone. As I will discuss, there is a transcript of that recording. The claimant says that the respondent attempted to push the children outside and into his vehicle, causing S.'s jacket to be ripped. According to her, the children can be heard on the recording protesting against his actions. He then took them back in the house and locked the door. S. phoned her and asked if she could hear the yelling and swearing in the background, after which the call was cut off. The claimant then called the police for emergency assistance, resulting in an officer attending and returning the children to her care. This was done over the protests of the respondent's counsel, who had spoken to the officer by phone. [36] The respondent deposes that the problems arose when he informed V. that he would have to stay with his grandparents because of the graveyard shift he was going to be working. V. preferred to stay in the family home and play video games, and when the respondent said no to that proposition, V. called the claimant. (Based on a subsequent text exchange with the claimant, it appears that V. 's main concern was indeed that he did not want to stay with the grandparents.) He agrees that he was not prepared to give V.

privacy during the call with the claimant. He was suspicious that the claimant would advise V. to do something that would disrupt the parenting time. He also agrees that he took hold of V. to guide him back into the house when he attempted to leave, after V. disclosed to him that the claimant and S. had arrived to pick him up. In his view, V. was essentially sneaking out. [37] After he got V. back into the house, S. arrived, so he let her in. After speaking to the police and his lawyer, he attempted to guide V. to his car. S. was constantly going in and out of the house on the phone. When V. refused to leave with him, he brought him back into the house, at which point both children advised him that they would be waiting there for the police. When the police arrived, V. expressed his wish to go with the claimant, which the officer permitted. [38] Because of V.'s rudeness in demanding his phone from him, the respondent refused to return it, and he admits that he told V. that he would throw it away. He actually left it in the house, from where the claimant later retrieved it. [39] The claimant has provided transcripts of her phone call with V. and of the recording made by S. They provide a narrative that corresponds roughly to the parties' descriptions. During the call with V., they argue in an overtly hostile manner about the appropriateness of V. speaking to the claimant at that

point, and the respondent seeks to prevail upon V. to go for a workout with him. He does indeed refuse to leave the room during the call and eventually hangs it up over V.'s protests. S.'s recording captures the respondent's attempts to take one of the children's phones (in context, likely V. 's), with S. yelling "Ow," "Stop," and "Get off me". It also captures the respondent directing V. to come with him, with S. interjecting to ask him to stop. [40] The respondent expresses the overarching concern that S. was inserted into this situation by the claimant, and proceeded to record his interactions with the children without his knowledge. As a further example of this type of deliberate involvement, he cites a text exchange with the claimant in February in which S. was permitted to join an adversarial exchange between him and the claimant, to assert her own demands about the resulting arrangements. [41] The claimant explains that the children were both interviewed by MCFD about the February 4 incident later that month. The respondent quotes an official of the MCFD as informing him that there was no investigation relating to that specific date. [42] According to the claimant V. suffered from a heightened amount of anxiety following this incident, focused on the fear that the respondent would attend at his school. His family doctor referred him to a psychiatrist, who will be

providing him with a course of cognitive behavioural therapy to address this issue. The respondent points out that this referral was carried out without consulting him, and that he knows of no reason why V. would be fearful of being picked up from the school by him. V. has, however, previously threatened that he will "go to his mother" if he does not get his way. [43] More generally on this allegation of alienating behaviour by the claimant, the respondent refers to a text exchange during that same period in which the claimant defiantly insisted that it was appropriate for her to share the family's post separation financial difficulties with the children. [44] Although that was the last actual exercise of parenting time by the respondent, according to the claimant there has been additional behaviour by him that is contrary to the children's best interests and has caused them distress. After S. was suspended later in February for bringing a vape pen to school, he was uncooperative in the claimant's efforts to arrange a private meeting for him with S. to discuss her behaviour. He insisted on doing it on his own terms and in his own location. S. was not agreeable to the first location that he insisted on (his vehicle), and he did not take the opportunity to speak to her when the entire family was attending V.'s hockey game later that evening. [45] The respondent maintains that the

claimant imposed an unrealistically short time limit on his ability to discuss this issue with S., and that it was she who thwarted his efforts to speak to S. in his vehicle, after he concluded that a private setting would be preferable to the restaurant that they had previously arranged. The claimant also rejected his efforts to arrange to speak to S. before or after the hockey game, or on the following day. He wanted to concentrate on watching the actual game while it was going on. [46] The next day he called the police to V. 's school, after V. refused to go with him and asked school administrators to call the claimant. This caused significant disruption at the school. He explains that according to the consent order, it was his parenting time until 3:30 p.m., so notwithstanding the very short period between school dismissal and that time, he wished to pick V. up in accordance with it. Contrary to that order, the claimant told him that she would be doing the pickup, which led him to threaten to phone the police. When he did so, he was told that they could not assist in the absence of a police enforcement clause. After the claimant arrived and began arguing with him in front of the principal, the principal called the police, and the attending officer once again permitted V. to accompany the claimant. [47] On February 27, one of S.'s friends saw him waiting outside her school,

apparently to pick her up. The next day, he sent a message to the claimant advising that he would be picking V. up, and that he did not want "a scene" at the school. He explains that he was at S.'s school on February 27 to meet with her vice‑principal about the vape pen incident and thought he would offer her a ride home while he was there, in order to speak to her about the incident. He went to V.'s school the following day to pick him up because once again it was his scheduled parenting time under the existing order. [48] He was arrested on March 3 in relation to breaches of the protection order that were alleged to have been committed in December and January. The next day the claimant was informed by an MCFD official that a safety plan was in place for the respondent that included the terms that he remain sober around the children and not use any physical discipline towards them. Those are the same terms that he referred to, and that I have cited previously. He has also been enrolled in the 17‑week domestic violence intervention program that I previously described. [49] More broadly, the respondent denies having engaged in family violence at any time, and contends that the claimant's own verbal abuse towards him has been of an equivalent nature. For example, he refers to a profanity-laced series of text messages from her on the day of one of his alleged parenting

transgressions, as well as her penchant for discussing the acrimonious aspects of this litigation with, or in the presence of the children. The claimant accepts responsibility for the inappropriate content of some of her written communications, but attributes them to the years of various forms of abuse that she says she has had to endure from the respondent. Other Orders Being Sought [50] The trip to Mexico, which is scheduled for April 17 to 24, is to celebrate the children's maternal grandfather's 70th birthday. The respondent's position is that such a trip is not appropriate at this time. The children went to Mexico as recently as last year. The trip will likely involve missing school days, and more importantly, he believes it sends the wrong message to the children, in light of S.'s serious infraction at school and V. 's recent disrespectful behaviour towards him. [51] The claimant's position with respect to a Hear the Child report is that it is essential to obtain the children's direct accounts of the effect of the respondent's behaviour on them. She had been seeking agreement through counsel to the preparation of such a report since May of last year. In contrast, the respondent sees little value in a non‑evaluative report at this stage, since it will do no more than reflect the claimant's improper influence on their views. His position is that a full s. 211 report, which

will address the parties' respective abilities to meet the children's needs, is what is actually required. [52] The claimant's request for an order that the respondent attend counselling to assist him with his parenting seemed self‑evidently to arise from the inappropriate conduct that he is alleged to have engaged in with them. He of course denies the need for any such counselling, and points out that he has voluntarily taken the course that he learned of through MCFD to proactively enhance his skills. The material from that program that the claimant has attached to an affidavit does not shed any light on whether he was referred to it or voluntarily registered, but it is described as an "intimate‑partner violence" program that is "designed for fathers wanting to gain a deeper understanding of their relationship with their children and the mother of their children." [53] With respect to child support, the claimant notes that as of February 4 both children are living primarily with her, with S.'s situation having changed well before that. Assuming the parenting arrangements are varied to reflect that reality, she argues that table support based on the respondent's income should follow. She bases that income on the total amount in his 2023 tax return of $372,262. (That figure actually contained about $134,000 of taxable capital gains and would be more appropriate for

consideration in relation to a retroactive award in any event). [54] She rejects his contention that he is not currently in a financial position to pay child support, pointing to his significant regular employment income, the fact that he has stopped contributing to the carrying costs of the two properties, and his unwillingness to list the family home for sale again until March 10. The condo had already been listed previously at a reduced price. His allegation that she only recently agreed to list them is contradicted by his text message to her of February 27, in which he said he had told the realtor to "hold off" until he figured out what was happening on his criminal trial for the protection order breaches. She has also provided copies of the documents cancelling the previous listings of both properties, which began in October, effective December 30, and re‑listing the condo at the slightly reduced price, effective February 7. [55] She alleges that the respondent has also helped himself to funds from the Montessori preschool account, most recently a total of $20,600 on February 5 and 6. When she challenged him about this action in a text message, he replied by blaming her for the fact that he had to pay a criminal defence lawyer for the breach charges. This withdrawal resulted in the staff not being paid and a CRA remittance being missed, with a penalty being imposed for the

company's failure to remit. He had previously withdrawn $6,000 from the business account in January and also wound up a brokerage account in his name in December, keeping $8,000 from it for himself and distributing $6,000 to her. [56] As to her use of company funds, the claimant explains that the salary she draws is legitimate compensation for the extensive managerial duties that she performs for its benefit, which she has listed. [57] The respondent's position is that he is willing to revisit the issue of child support once one of the properties sells. For the time being, he has no resources from which to pay support. He says the withdrawals from the company account were required "in relation to the real property, necessities, and the ongoing legal fees in both this family law matter and the criminal matter." He points out that in addition to the salary that the claimant draws, the company bank account records shows that she has paid numerous family and personal expenses from it, which have nothing to do with the operation of the business. Since the business is family property and the proceeds in which he is entitled to share are being dissipated in this way, it is his view that in this manner he has already contributed indirectly to the payment of support. If support is ordered, he insists that it should be set off on the basis of a return to shared parenting, and the income

for support purposes should be the $130,000 per year that is set out in his November family financial statement. Discussion [58] Because there is an existing family order in place with respect to parenting, any variation is subject to s. 216(3) of the Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c. 25, which requires either that there has been a change in circumstances since the first interim order was made, or evidence of a substantial nature that was not available at the time that it was made has become available. Subsection (4) requires all of the following factors to be taken into account: (a) the change in circumstances or the evidence, or both, referred to in subsection (3); (b) the length of time that has passed since the interim order was made; (c) whether the interim order was made for the purpose of having a temporary arrangement in place, with the intention that the arrangement (i) would not adversely affect the position of either party during negotiations, during family dispute resolution or at trial, and (ii) would not necessarily reflect the final arrangement between the parties; (d) whether a trial has been scheduled; (e) any potential adverse effect, on a party or a child of a party, of either making or declining to make an order under subsection (3) [That is, from varying the existing interim order]. [59] I conclude that a variation to the September 20 consent order is

necessary in this case, not because shared parenting would necessarily be contrary to the children's best interests in the longer term, but because a situation arose since it was consented to in which one child was not having regular parenting time with the respondent and the other child was expressing concerns about the manner in which the parenting arrangements under that order were being carried out. This was followed by a complete interruption of any parenting time, which has now regrettably persisted for about two months. Moving to a situation in which greater amounts of parenting time, which I am satisfied would benefit the children, can be implemented will require some sensitivity to the effect of the current situation on the children. [60] Although each party is keen to blame the other entirely for this situation, I would say that each of them has contributed to it in their own way. Despite the respondent's protestations to the contrary, the MCFD has been sufficiently satisfied of the inappropriate involvement of alcohol in his parenting time to include abstinence in some of his subsequent safety plans, and even without alcohol as a trigger he seems to have persistent difficulties in managing his time with the children without conflict arising with them. He also seems to be hypersensitive to any suspected interference by the claimant in his parenting, and to overreact

to it. More fundamentally, on any version of events he has reacted ineffectively to insubordination by the children, whether as a result of their communications with the claimant or otherwise, and his lack of parenting skills in those situations has made the conflict with them worse. [61] That said, even keeping in mind the broad definition of "family violence" in the FLA, his physical interactions with the children seem purely incidental to his unskillful attempts at discipline, and neither those interactions nor his verbal expressions of anger towards them appear to pose any ongoing threat to their physical or emotional safety. [62] I am also satisfied that the claimant has over‑empowered the children to complain to her about him, and at times she has failed to distinguish between situations in which they are merely unhappy with his parenting and those in which their safety is actually at risk. The most significant example of this was on February 4. While the respondent's manner of dealing with the children cannot be condoned, the entire incident was unlikely to have occurred if the claimant had not been so eager to facilitate V. 's departure and to inappropriately allow S. to rush into the breach, once again involving a child in a dispute in which she should have no part. [63] Finally, both parents have failed abjectly in the primary task that is currently before them, which

is to insulate the children from their conflict with each other and communicate in a civilized manner where the children are concerned. They have also mistaken the RCMP for a family justice counsellor or a parenting coordinator, and involved them when there was no meaningful risk to the children's well being. I hope and expect they will exercise greater restraint in the future. [64] While I think the foundation for the reinstitution of parenting time needs to be the children living primarily with the claimant, to ensure that there is not an excessive amount of anxiety on their part associated with reintegrating with the respondent, I do not agree with the submissions that the parenting time should be based on their wishes. While views of children acquire progressively more weight as they mature, neither of these children has reached an age in which they are capable of balancing the long‑term benefits of a strong relationship with both parents against the transitory irritations of the moment, which are currently focused on the respondent because both children seem to have allied themselves with the claimant's views. [65] V.'s situation is a bit more straightforward to address. The legitimate concerns that have arisen under the existing order are his having to spend a seven‑day consecutive period without seeing the claimant, and his resistance to staying with his paternal

grandparents. The latter is probably something he is just going to have to put up with given the nature of the respondent's work, but as to the former even the respondent acknowledges that something other than a straight seven‑day period would benefit him. [66] Accordingly, the respondent's parenting time with V. under the interim order of September 20, 2024 will be varied to the following: · On the alternating week that would have been the respondent's seven‑day period under the existing interim order, from Friday at 3:30 p.m. to Sunday at 3:30 p.m. and Wednesday at 3:30 p.m. to Friday at 3:30 p.m., with a gap involving a return to the claimant in between. [67] S.'s parenting time presents a greater challenge, since her relationship with the respondent was not in a positive state even before the recent disruption. I am satisfied that whatever her current views may be, requiring a moderate amount of ongoing parenting time with the respondent is in her best interests, by preserving some level of relationship between them until greater professional assistance can be brought to bear to facilitate a complete reconciliation. [68] Accordingly, the respondent's parenting time with S. under the interim order of September 20 will be varied to the following: · On the alternating week that would have been the respondent's seven‑day period under the existing interim order, for at least one

day of her choosing during the periods of the respondent's parenting time with V., from 3:30 p.m. to 3:30 p.m. on the following day. S. will give the respondent directly at least 24 hours' notice of the day she has chosen each week. [69] In imposing the term, I am trying to give S. some agency in selecting an appropriate day each week, as befits her increasing maturity, while ensuring that the minimum amount of contact that I am satisfied she requires continues. [70] This parenting time will be subject to the following terms: · The respondent will not consume alcohol or any other intoxicating substance while the children are in his care, or within the preceding 12 hours; · The respondent will not discipline the children physically; · The claimant will support the children in attending for the parenting time required by this order, and remaining in the respondent's care throughout the allotted period. [71] More generally, I will add a further term to para. 12 of that order: · The parties will not speak to each other by phone in the presence of the children or within their hearing, and will not permit the children to view or participate in any of the texts or other electronic messages that are sent between them. [72] I reiterate that the application shows that both parties have breached subsection (c) of that paragraph (which required respectful communications between them, and

to refrain from disparagement in front of the children) in an egregious manner to date. If further breaches of it by either party came before me, I would consider them worthy of meaningful sanctions. [73] I emphasize that these periods are simply what I consider necessary to get the children's relationship with the respondent back on track without stressing them unduly. They do not necessarily reflect the full extent of the parenting time that would be in their best interests over time. In the event that he applies to increase them based on evidence that the children are doing well in his care, I can say, for the purposes of s. 216(4), that the present order has been made purely for the purposes of having an arrangement in place that provides some degree of contact after a two‑month gap. [74] With respect to the Hear the Child report, I agree with the respondent that such a report is currently likely simply to reflect back the children's current jaundiced views of their father, and that what is really needed is a full s. 211 report to explain how the parties' current toxic relationship with each other can be managed in the future in a way that does not harm the children further. I encourage the parties to agree to get such a report underway as soon as possible. In the interim, the claimant's application for a Hear the Child report is dismissed. [75] Rather than begin a separate

course of counselling, the program which the respondent has been referred to through MCFD seems to me to be ideally suited to helping him manage his role as a separated parent more constructively than he has been able to do so far. Therefore, I order that the respondent successfully complete the Caring Dads Group through the Inclusion Langley Society, and provide proof of his successful completion of it to the claimant through his counsel. [76] For reasons I will explain, I see no value in fining the respondent for breaching the interim order by failing to contribute to the carrying charges for the two family properties since January. In my opinion, this issue is bound up in the proper allocation of the respondent's financial obligations, particularly with respect to child support. [77] Turning to that support, these varied parenting arrangements place him in a position in which he is obligated to pay support. It was unwise of the parties to allow carrying charges on the properties to supplant this obligation, and inappropriate of the respondent to place payment of his legal fees ahead of them. Since he has stopped contributing to the carrying charges and used family property to fund his criminal and family law counsel, I can see no reason why he should not pay table support that corresponds to his current declared income. Accordingly, on an interim basis, the respondent will

pay child support to the claimant for two children on an income of $137,000 per year, which is $1,999 per month, effective April 2025. [78] Although it is beyond the scope of this application, I should say it is obvious that one or likely both of these properties needs to be sold as soon as possible, and that the parties should also consent to a mutual order prohibiting them from depleting the business bank account for anything other than the claimant's legitimate salary. It mystifies me why such an order is not in place, and hopefully these matters can be resolved at the JCC, if not sooner. [79] Finally, it is obvious that the proposed trip to Mexico is in the children's best interests, and that the concerns put forward by the respondent, assuming they are in good faith, are far outweighed by the benefits to the children of such a memorable family experience. Hopefully he can put together such an experience for them himself at some point in the future. [80] Therefore, I order that the claimant is permitted to travel to Cancun, Mexico, with the children without the consent of the respondent on April 17 to 24, 2025. In advance of travel, the claimant will provide the respondent with a travel itinerary, contact addresses, telephone numbers, and evidence of reasonable travel, medical health insurance coverage obtained for the children for the duration of the trip. [81] All of the

terms of the interim order that have not been varied remain in place. [82] I would say that the claimant has achieved substantial success in this application. I imposed more of a structure for the respondent's parenting time than she sought, but she has prevailed to at least some extent on most of the contested issues. Therefore, the claimant will receive her costs of this application in the cause. "Schultes J."