Canada Judgment

Refugee Appeal Division

TB9-10684

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Research organized from the available case record

01

Holding and result

The RAD confirmed the RPD decision because on independent review the appellants did not establish a serious possibility of persecution in the proposed IFAs and those IFAs were reasonable given the appellants' personal circumstances; the principal appellant's unexplained omission of the alleged 2017 attack undermined credibility on that incident but did not require overturning other findings; no new evidence was filed to trigger an oral hearing.

Court disposition

Appeal dismissed; RPD decision confirmed

Orders

  • Appeal dismissed and decision of the Refugee Protection Division confirmed pursuant to section 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
  • No oral hearing ordered due to absence of new evidence

02

Material facts

Parties

XXXX XXXX

Appellant Principal Counsel: Ugochukwu Udogu

XXXX XXXX XXXX

Appellant Minor Counsel: Ugochukwu Udogu

Amounts and remedies

  • Number of Appellants: 3

03

Procedural history

  1. Posture

    Refugee Protection Appeal (refugee Appeal Division) / Decision on Appeal From Refugee Protection Division Decision

04

Questions and positions

Legal issues

Party arguments

Applicant
Appellants argued the RPD erred in making an adverse credibility finding, misapplied the first prong of the IFA test, failed to consider oral and documentary evidence, and reached an unreasonable conclusion that proposed IFAs were safe and reasonable.
Respondent
The RPD and RAD argued the RPD correctly assessed credibility, applied the appropriate legal test for IFA, concluded on a balance of probabilities that proposed IFAs are safe and reasonable, and that no new evidence was filed so no oral hearing was warranted.

05

Court’s reasoning

  1. 01

    Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, [2016] 4 FCR 157, 2016 FCA 93

    Standard of review for RAD determinations is correctness; RAD must conduct independent assessment

  2. 02

    Amadi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1166

    First prong of IFA: decision‑maker must be satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, there is no serious possibility of persecution in the proposed IFA

  3. 03

    Ranganathan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2000 CanLII 16789 (FCA); Argote et al v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 128

    Onus to show IFA unreasonable is high and must be supported by objective evidence

  4. 04

    Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, s.110(4) and RAD practice as cited in decision

    RAD has no jurisdiction to hold an oral hearing absent new evidence; new evidence is prerequisite to oral hearing under IRPA regime

  5. 05

    Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1126

    Jurisprudential Guides (Nigeria JG) may be used as guidance but members must make independent factual determinations

06

Ratio, limits and disposition

Ratio decidendi

The RAD confirmed the RPD decision because on independent review the appellants did not establish a serious possibility of persecution in the proposed IFAs and those IFAs were reasonable given the appellants' personal circumstances; the principal appellant's unexplained omission of the alleged 2017 attack undermined credibility on that incident but did not require overturning other findings; no new evidence was filed to trigger an oral hearing.

Obiter and limits

  • Observation that indigeneship may affect employment access but would not create undue hardship for relocation to large cities
  • Comment that state protection need not be analyzed where IFA is determinative
  • Reference that economic and accommodation difficulties identified did not amount to undue hardship given urban opportunities and claimant's language and skills
  • Mention that gender guidelines and national documentation package were considered as contextual guidance

Court disposition

Appeal dismissed; RPD decision confirmed

  • Appeal dismissed and decision of the Refugee Protection Division confirmed pursuant to section 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
  • No oral hearing ordered due to absence of new evidence

Source and reliance status

Refugee Appeal Division · 31 January 2020

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Judgment text

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Refugee Appeal Division

Judgment· 31 January 2020

TB9-10684

RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB9-10684 TB9-10685 / TB9-10686 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Persons who are the subject of the appeal

XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX Personnes en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, ON Appel instruit / entendu à Date of decision January 31, 2020 Date de la décision Panel Ravi Seyan Tribunal Counsel for the persons who are the subject of the appeal Ugochukwu Udogu Conseil des personnes en cause Designated representative

XXXX XXXX Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre Reasons for decision Background [1] XXXX XXXX (the principal appellant) and her two minor children are appealing the decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD), which denies their claim for refugee protection. [2] Her children are XXXX XXXX XXXX (her daughter) and XXXX XXXX XXXX (her son). They are the minor appellants and she is their designated representative. [3] The appellants are asking the Refugee Appeal Division (the RAD) to set aside the decision of the RPD and substitute that they are Convention refugees or persons in need of protection, or alternatively, to refer the matter back to the RPD. [4] The appellants are citizens of Nigeria. Determination [5] I confirm the determination of the RPD that the Appellants are not Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection. [6] The determinative issue is internal flight alternative (IFA). Allegations [7] The principal appellant is married to a Muslim man. She is a Southern Igbo Christian and he is a Northern Idoma Muslim. Both his family and hers opposed their union and they were unable to have a traditional marriage ceremony. [8] In 2009, the husband converted to Christianity. Afterward, he was asked to deny his conversion by members of his former mosque. His business suffered as his Muslim customers stopped attending. [9] In

XXXX 2017, the principal appellant and her husband were attacked by Muslim youths. [10] In XXXX 2018, they travelled north to see if they could make peace with his family. They were not allowed to enter the family compound and remained in a hotel. Around the same time, there were some deadly attacks by herdsmen in the area. [11] The husband spoke to a lawyer friend, who advised they should leave Nigeria. The family travelled to the United States (USA), where the husband fell ill with XXXX. He was hospitalized. [12] The appellants traveled to Canada without him and made refugee claims. [13] The principal appellant stated that she last heard from her husband when he was discharged from the hospital in the USA. She has not heard from him since. [14] The appellants allege that they cannot return to Nigeria, where their lives are in danger. The RPD decision [15] The RPD found that the appellants had viable IFAs: Abuja, Port Harcourt and Ibadan. The RPD found that they would be safe from the agents of persecution and that relocation to the IFAs was reasonable. 1 [16] The RPD also found that the XXXX 2017 attack by Muslim youths did not happen, as the appellants left it out of their Basis of Claim forms. It did not accept the explanation for this omission, which was that the principal appellant wanted to talk about this incident at the hearing. The RPD did not think that this

credibility finding was determinative. 2 The appellants' arguments [17] The appellants are submitting no new evidence and are not requesting an oral hearing3. [18] They allege the following: (i) The RPD erred in its credibility finding; (ii) The RPD did not apply the correct test for the first prong of the IFA analysis and its conclusion is incorrect; and (iii) The RPD's finding that the IFAs are reasonable is incorrect.4 [19] Furthermore, the RPD ignored both documentary evidence and testimony. Role of the RAD [20] The appellants have laid out the standard of review for the RAD. I agree; it is correctness.5 I am required to conduct my own independent assessment and not defer to the RPD except in limited circumstance, which do not arise in this case. No new evidence; no oral hearing [21] The appellants have not filed any new evidence; and they are not requesting an oral hearing. New evidence is a pre-requisite for an oral hearing. As no new evidence has been submitted, I have no jurisdiction to hold an oral hearing.6 The principal appellant is not credible with respect to the March 2017 attack [22] There is no dispute that the appellants did not include the XXXX 2017 attack by Muslim youths in their Basis of Claim forms.7 [23] The principal appellant first mentions this incident in her oral testimony, when she is being questioned by her counsel.8 The RPD member asked the

appellant if she had put this incident in her narrative and she stated that she had not.9 She testified that she wanted to express it at the hearing.10 [24] The RPD did not accept this explanation. It relied on the instructions that are part of the Basis of Claim form, which say to include everything that is important to the claim.11 It made a negative inference from this omission, which it called "significant".12 [25] In my independent assessment of the evidence, which includes a review of the audio-recording of the RPD hearing, I find that the RPD made the correct assessment with respect to this omission. [26] The Basis of Claim form has clear instructions for the section "why you are claiming refugee protection". It says in bold and capital letters: "Include everything that is important for your claim."13 [27] This is a significant detail. It is the first and only time that the threats become real. In other words, the principal appellant and her husband were not just threatened verbally, but they were assaulted. This amplifies the intentions the agents of persecution. Now they have shown the appellants to the extent to which they are willing to go. [28] I do not find that this incident happened as alleged by the principal appellant. [29] Nor do I find this omission to be minor as argued by the appellants.14 [30] I agree that the narrative is not meant to be "an encyclopedic

recitation of evidence".15 I am not expecting a blow by blow recitation of the attack, but I do find it is reasonable to include it in the narrative. It is an example of the alleged persecution that the appellants fear and therefore ought to have been included in their basis of claim. [31] The appellants argue that this credibility finding is acting in a capricious manner and without regard for the totality of the evidence. [32] I disagree. The RPD and I have independently weighed the appellant's explanation and found it lacking. Neither the RPD nor I have made a blanket or general credibility finding based on this omission alone. [33] The omission, while significant, does not discount the remainder of the appellants' evidence. The RPD stated that the determinative issue was IFA. [34] The omission, for reasons explained above, is not minor. Nor is it an elaborative detail. It is an incident of itself, not a detail with respect to an incident. [35] I find that the principal appellant embellished at the hearing by adding this attack to her claim. I do not believe that she and her husband were attacked by Muslim youths from his former mosque in XXXX 2017. [36] Nonetheless I, like the RPD, accept the remainder of her allegations as credible. No serious possibility of persecution in the proposed IFAs [37] The first part of the IFA test is that the decision-maker must be satisfied,

on a balance of probabilities, that there is no serious possibility of the appellants being persecuted in the proposed IFA. 16 [38] The RPD found that there was no serious possibility of persecution in its proposed IFAs: Port Harcourt, Ibadan and Abuja. It applied the Jurisprudential Guide for Nigeria (the Nigeria JG)17, where a single female claimant is fleeing nonstate actors of persecution. It found that the appellants' case was similar.18 The RPD found that the appellants had not established that the agents of persecution had made efforts to locate them. 19 [39] The appellants raise the following with respect to the RPD's conclusion about the first prong of the IFA test: (i) The RPD erred because it failed to take into consideration the oral evidence and objective documentation which confirms that the appellants face a serious possibility of persecution in the IFA. 20 The RPD merely summarizes the principal appellant's oral testimony in its decision21 and restricts his finding to the northern part of Nigeria. Furthermore, it did not consider her oral testimony that the agents of persecution would find her in the proposed IFAs22. The RPD relied on the fact that the proposed IFAs are safe because they are large metropolitan areas.23 The finding is unreasonable because it requires the appellants to live in hiding.24 The RPD engaged in speculation and microscopic analysis with

respect to the motivation of the agents of persecution.25 Furthermore, the RPD was fixated by the lack of documentary proof with respect to the threats.26 The appellants then cite items 12.7 and 12.8 o f the national documentation package (NDP).27 The persecution is compounded by the lack of state protection. 28 (ii) The RPD erred in its application of the Nigeria JG. The facts of the JG are not similar to the appellants' circumstances. The JG concerned a single female facing nonstate agents of persecution. The principal appellant is a single mother as her husband has deserted her.29 The RPD did not err in its application of the Nigeria JG [40] The JG for Nigeria has been challenged in Federal Court by the Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers (CARL). 30 The Federal Court ruled that the Nigeria JG do not impact the independence of tribunal members or impinge on their jurisdiction to make findings of fact. The language of the Nigeria JG allows members to make their own factual determinations.31 The Nigeria JG clearly states that each case must be decided on its particular facts. [41] The RPD member did not adopt the reasons of the JG. It considered its applicability to the appellants and found some similarities, namely, that the agents of persecution were nonstate actors and that the country conditions on file were similar.32 [42] The RPD then went on to consider the personal

circumstances of the appellants and made findings that the agents of persecution were not motivated to pursue the appellants. [43] The application of the Nigeria JG is not an error on part of the RPD, which made an independent assessment regarding IFA. I will now go on to make my findings with respect to the first prong of the IFA. The proposed IFAs are safe for the appellants [44] The appellants raise a number of issues with respect to the RPD's finding that the IFA is safe. [45] The appellants fear the husband's family, the principal appellant's family and Muslims in Lagos state.33 [46] The principal appellant testified that none of three proposed IFAs were safe from the agents of persecution. Port Harcourt would not be safe because her husband's younger brother lived there.34 Abuja is a mostly Muslim city and close to her husband's hometown.35 Ibadan is not safe because her husband had lived in Ibadan. 36 The appellants argued that they would be found in those cities.37 [47] The RPD was aware of this testimony. It refers to it in paragraph 28 of its decision. 38 Despite this evidence, it found the IFAs to be safe. The RPD considered the oral testimony of the appellants. Early in the hearing, it raises Lagos as a possible IFA39 and then substitutes Abuja, when it realizes that the appellants have lived in Lagos for some time. [48] It is important to note that the RPD found

the appellants to be credible with the exception of the XXXX 2017 assault. The RPD believed that the principal appellant's husband had converted from Islam to Christianity and that this had caused problems for the appellants. They were unable to have traditional wedding rites as they desired. Their business suffered. [49] The appellants' evidence is clear: in XXXX 2018, the appellants travelled to the ancestral home of the husband/ father, where they were denied entry to the family compound. In XXXX 2018, they fled Nigeria. [50] The appellants have offered no evidence that the agents of persecution are attempting to locate them since XXXX 2018. The RPD did not ignore the appellants' evidence. It listened and made findings that the agents of persecution are not motivated to find the appellants. [51] That is the correct conclusion by the RPD. [52] My own analysis is that the agents of persecution are not interested in the appellants, who have proffered no evidence to show that the agents of persecution (the husband's family; the family of the principal appellant and Muslim youths) are pursuing the appellants as alleged. [53] Appellants have the opportunity to file new evidence that has arisen after rejection by the RPD pursuant to 110(4) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection (IRPA)40 and evidence that arises post-perfection pursuant to Rule 29. The appellants are aware of

this, as they state that they will not be filing new evidence. [54] This leads me to conclude that the appellants have not heard from or about the agents of persecution since their departure from Nigeria. Therefore, the agents of persecution are not interested in the appellants. They are not interested in the appellants' whereabouts or even their absence from Nigeria. Furthermore, the principal appellant did not provide any evidence with respect to how the agents of persecution would locate her (for example, through housing registers, school admissions etc.). Nor did she provide any evidence that they had the capacity to locate her other than her assertion that they would find her. [55] The appellants have argued that the analysis by RPD is microscopic and speculative. I disagree. The RPD did its job. It assessed the evidence that was provided by the claimants. [56] It is not speculative or microscopic to find that the agents of persecution are not motivated to pursue the appellants (as argued by the appellants). Rather, it is speculative and microscopic to say that the agents of persecution will continue to pursue the appellants based on the evidence that they have provided. [57] The RPD is not fixated by the lack of documentary proof of the threats. It believed the allegations put forward by the appellants (all except one). It made no negative inference based on the lack of

documents. It also considered the documents that the appellants had provided in support of their claim, particularly a letter from XXXX XXXX.41 [58] In XXXX 2018, the appellants travelled to XXXX State, where the husband is from. The appellants wanted to make peace with his family, but they were not allowed to enter the compound. At the same time, there were attacks from Fulani herdsmen.42 The RPD noted that there were no threats from the husband's kinfolk. They did not want to reconcile. While this is unfortunate, it is not persecution. [59] The appellants are not targets of the interethnic/ interreligious violence that troubles the northern regions of Nigeria. Nor are any of the proposed IFAs in the north. [60] It is clear from the RPD's questioning and decision that it tailored its IFA findings to the profile of the appellants. The RPD member asked how the agents of persecution would locate the appellants as the principal appellant is not a high-profile person.43 This is a correct assessment of the evidence. The principal appellant is not politically, socially or religiously active. She is not a member of an organization that has the attention of the media or the public. [61] The principal appellant testified that the Muslim youths would locate her through posters, social media and/ or phone calls. The RPD asked if she had any evidence of such attempts and she stated that

she had been out of the country.44 This is not an adequate explanation. The efforts of the agents to locate her are an important part of the evidence of her claim. [62] I therefore conclude that the agents of persecution are not motivated in locating the appellants. [63] The appellants argue that the RPD member relied solely on the fact that the proposed IFAs are large cities to make the finding that the appellants would be safe. This is clearly not the case. The RPD member also considered evidence of pursuit and the profile of the principal appellant, as have I. [64] Nor does the RPD's IFAs require the appellants to live in hiding as alleged, simply because the RPD made the finding that the agents of persecution are not in pursuit of the appellants. I have also arrived at the same conclusion in my independent assessment of the evidence. [65] The appellants have submitted that there is no state protection in Nigeria and that the RPD decision is incorrect, because it does not make a finding on state protection. I disagree. Both the RPD and I have concluded that IFA is the determinative issue. State protection is not necessary to assess, because the persecutors do not have the means or motivation to find the appellants in the IFA. [66] In summary, the RPD applied the correct test for the first prong of its IFA analysis. It also arrived at the correct conclusion, namely that the

proposed IFAs are safe from the agents of persecution. I have arrived at the same conclusion after an independent review of the evidence. The proposed IFAs are reasonable for the appellants [67] The second part of the IFA test is that: conditions in the proposed IFA must be such that it would not be unreasonable, upon consideration of all the circumstances, including consideration of a claimant's personal circumstances, for the claimant to seek refuge there.45 [68] The onus on the appellants to show that the IFA is unreasonable is a high one46 . Furthermore, the appellants must establish on objective evidence that the IFA is unreasonable.47 An IFA must be realistic and attainable. The appellants must not face great physical danger or undue hardship either en route to or in the IFA. [69] The RPD found that the IFAs proposed were reasonable for the circumstances of the appellants. It examined education and employment, accommodation, transportation and travel, and language, religion and indigeneship. [70] The appellants have raised the following issues that make the IFA unreasonable: the appellants have never lived in any of the proposed cities; they have no relatives there; Port Harcourt is an expensive city and the appellants lack financial resources. [71] The RPD considered these arguments and arrived at the correct conclusion. The personal circumstances of the appellants [72]

The principal appellant is an ethnic Igbo. She is fluent in English and Igbo. Her highest level of education is high school. She has a diploma in XXXX and has experience in XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. 48 From 2008 until 2017, she sold XXXX. I do not know if she is working here in Canada. She has travelled to the US and to Canada. [73] The status of her relationship with her husband is not clear. She testified at the RPD hearing that she had not heard from her husband since he had been discharged from the United States.49 In her affidavit, she stated that she still has not spoken to her husband after inquiries in Nigeria and the US.50 These inquiries are not in evidence before me. [74] The appellants' memorandum of arguments refers to the principal appellant as a "married woman with children whose husband had deserted."51 [75] For the purpose of my analysis of the second prong of the IFA, I accept that the husband has deserted her and that she is now a young mother with two school-aged children. [76] I will use the Nigeria JG as a roadmap for my decision, when I analyze the personal circumstances of the appellants. However, I will be considering the latest national documentation package (NDP) for Nigeria, dated November 201952. Furthermore, I am also considering the Gender Guidelines53. Education and employment [77] The principal appellant is 32 years old. She completed high school and

has a diploma in XXXX. [78] The average school life expectancy in Nigeria is 9 years for males and 8 years for females.54 Her command of the English language, her work experience (varied with gaps) and her above-average education mitigates against undue hardship. [79] Unemployment is high, 16.5% in 2017. In 2010, 70% of the population was below the poverty line. 75% of the population have registered cell phones and 25% use the internet.55 As the principal appellant has work experience in graphic design and computers, this may assist her in obtaining employment. [80] 65% of women and 86% of men between the ages of 15 and 49 are employed. Employment among women appears to be on the rise. Women dominate employment in service and sales sectors. Furthermore, women in urban areas, divorced, separated and single women and educated women are more likely to be employed. The same document also indicates that accessing employment for women in Abuja, Lagos, Ibadan or Port Harcourt may be "very difficult" and compounded by indigeneship.56 I will address indigeneship separately. [81] These three factors militate against lack of employment for the principal appellant is a separated woman with above-average education relocating to an urban area. [82] There is discrimination against women in employment. Women can open bank accounts but may have greater difficulty in obtaining loans and credit.

They may be unable to obtain tax deductions rebates as heads of households. While there may be social services in theory, women relocating from another state are usually not entitled to these services. There are no shelters or transit homes to assist in relocation.57 [83] Relocation to one of the IFAs will be difficult, but does not rise to the level of undue hardship. The RPD made the correct finding with respect to education and employment. After an independent review of the evidence, I have arrived at the same conclusion. Accommodation [84] The Research Directorate for the Immigration and Refugee Board has written a report on women who are their own households in Abuja, Lagos, Ibadan and Port Harcourt. Almost 22% of urban households are headed by women.58 86% of urban areas have electricity.59 [85] Single mothers, such as the principal appellant, may have greater hardship in relocating, which can be ameliorated by the presence of a network of contacts. 60 A professor reports that women can find housing in Abuja, Lagos, Ibadan and Port Harcourt though there may be discrimination.61 [86] I find that the principal appellant has contacts in Nigeria. This is the route she took to make inquiries about the whereabouts of her husband. [87] Nigeria has a lack of adequate housing. There may be prejudice against women who are trying to obtain accommodation. Landlords may believe that

they are unable to pay rent or that their behaviour should be policed. Some women take a man with them to pose as their husband.62 [88] Finding accommodation may be difficult and expensive. The principal appellant testified that rent is high. This is corroborated by the documentary evidence.63 This difficulty does not rise to the level of undue hardship. [89] The RPD made the correct finding with respect to accommodation. After an independent review of the evidence, I have arrived at the same conclusion. Transportation and travel [90] The appellants have raised no issues with respect to travel and transportation to the proposed IFAs. [91] The proposed IFAs are accessible by many roads.64 Abuja and Port Harcourt all have international airports65. Ibadan has a domestic one. 66 Nigeria stipulates freedom of movement for its citizens, though in reality there may be curfews (in areas of ethnoreligious conflict) and police checkpoints.67 [92] There is no evidence before me that establishes that single women or women with children face undue hardship while traveling or are unable to travel at all. [93] The RPD made the correct finding. I have arrived at the same finding through an independent review of the evidence. Language, Religion and Indigeneship [94] English is the official language of Nigeria. 68 English is used for most governmental administrative functions, education,

business and mass media.69 [95] The principal appellant is fluent, which should assist her when she is relocating. It is not clear if the minor appellants speak English. I think it is safe to say that they do, since they are living in an English-speaking part of Canada. [96] She is also fluent in Igbo. None of the proposed IFAs is located the Ibo-speaking part of the country. However, Ibo along with Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba are the three major ethno-linguistic groups. With the exception of Abuja, Ibadan and Port Harcourt are in the south where the dominant languages are Ibo and Yoruba.70 [97] There is no undue hardship with respect to language in my independent assessment of the evidence. The RPD arrived at the correct conclusion. [98] Similarly, there is no undue hardship with respect to religion. . Slightly over 50% of the population is Muslim, about 45% a form of Christianity.71 The appellants are Christians and the IFAs are large urban centres in the south, which is predominantly a Christian region. Abuja is in the north, but it is large metropolis as it is in the federal capital territory.72 [99] Nigerians distinguish between indigenes (natives) and nonindigenes (settlers). Indigenes are individuals whose fathers were born in the area. Indigenes may discriminate against nonindigenes in some areas and control power and resources in some areas. Indigeneship may also influence

access to employment.73 [100] States prefer to employ indigenes as civil servants and may have quotas.74 The principal appellant has not indicated that she wishes employment as a civil servant. While indigeneship may impact access to land, it does not influence access to housing except in the northern Hausa-Fulani areas. Universities may also have an indigeneship quota.75 [101] Nonindigenes are entitled to access health care and primary and secondary education. However, societal norms discourage this.76 This means that the principal appellant will be able to enrol the minor appellants in school. [102] Internal migration is reported as common in Nigeria and 10 - 45% of every state is made up of migrants. All large cities have large migrant populations from other parts of the country. Financial resources may be more important than indigeneship when relocating to large cities. [103] The population of Ibadan is 3.4 million, Abuja 3 million and Port Harcourt 2.8 million.77 [104] In Abuja, nonindigenes are dominant and there is no requirement to establish indigeneship when accessing public services. Both Abuja and Port Harcourt are linguistically diverse.78 [105] There is no undue hardship with respect to indigeneship in my independent assessment of the evidence. The RPD arrived at the correct conclusion. Summary [106] After careful consideration of the evidence, both oral and

documentary, I find that the RPD made correct findings with respect to both prongs of the IFA test. It considered the appellants' personal circumstances in its assessment and did not impose North American standards as alleged by the appellants.79 I have arrived at the same conclusions, namely that the IFAs proposed are safe and reasonable. I have considered the Gender Guidelines. Conlusion [107] The RAD dismisses the appeal and confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellants are neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection, pursuant to section 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). (signed) "R. Seyan" R. Seyan January 31, 2020 Date 1 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Decision, p. 6 - 14, paras. 12 - 42. 2 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Decision, p. 5 - 6, paras. 6 - 10. 3 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, Written Statement, p. 42. 4 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, Appellants' Memorandum, p. 45. 5Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, [2016] 4 FCR 157, 2016 FCA 93. 6 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, Written Statement, p. 42. 7 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 2, Basis of Claim Narrative, p. 26 - 28. 8 Audio of the RPD hearing at 46 minutes. 9 Audio of the RPD hearing at 49 minutes. 10 Audio of the RPD hearing at 50 - 51 minutes. 11 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Decision, p. 5, para. 9. 12 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD

Decision, p. 6, para. 10. 13 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 2, Basis of Claim Form, p 17. 14 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, Memorandum of Arguments, p. 47 - 48, paras. 14 - 22. 15 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, Memorandum of Arguments, p. 47, para. 14. 16 Amadi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1166, para. 43. 17 Jurisprudential Guide - Decision TB7-19851, Guide identified by the Chairperson pursuant to paragraph 159(1)(h) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, Effective date July 6, 2018. 18 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Decision, p. 7, paras. 15 - 18. 19 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Decision, p. 8, paras. 19 - 20. 20 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, Memorandum of Arguments, p. 50, para. 28. 21 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, Memorandum of Arguments, p. 52, para. 32. 22 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, Memorandum of Arguments, p. 52, para. 34. 23 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, Memorandum of Arguments, p. 54, para. 36. 24 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, Memorandum of Arguments, p. 52, para. 37. 25 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, Memorandum of Arguments, p. 54, para. 38. 26 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, Memorandum of Arguments, p. 55, para. 39. 27 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, Memorandum of Arguments,, pp. 55 - 56, paras. 41 - 42. 28 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, Memorandum of Arguments, pp. 57 - 59, paras. 44 - 51. 29 Exhibit P-2,

Appellants' Record, Memorandum of Arguments, p. 50, para 29. 30 Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1126. 31 Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1126 at para 119. 32 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Decision, p. 7, para. 16. 33 Audio of the RPD hearing at 20 minutes. 34 Audio of the RPD hearing at 28 minutes. 35 Audio of the RPD hearing at 30 minutes. 36 Audio of the RPD hearing at 31 minutes. 37 Audio of the RPD hearing at 32 minutes. 38 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Decision, p. 10, para. 28. 39 Audio of the RPD hearing at 18 minutes. 40 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), SC 2001, c 27, as amended, at ss. 110(4). 41 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Decision, p. 9, para. 24. 42 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Appellants' Documents, C10, p. 168. 43 Audio of the RPD hearing at 32 minutes. 44 Audio of the RPD hearing at 33 - 34 minutes. 45 Amadi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1166, para. 43. 46 Ranganathan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2000 CanLII 16789 (FCA), [2001] 2 FC 164, [2000] FCJ No 2118 (FCA) at para 15. 47 Argote et al v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 128 at para 12, [2009] FCJ No 153 (QL) 48 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Refugee Intake Forms, p. 67, 71; Audio of the RPD

hearing at 10 - 14 minutes. 49 Audio of the RPD hearing at 7 minutes. 50 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, Affidavit, p. 23, para. 18. 51 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, Memorandum of Argument, p. 50, para. 29. 52 National Documentation Package (NDP) for Nigeria (29 November 2019). 53 The Chairperson's Guideline 4: Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution: Update, Guidelines continued in effect by the Chairperson on June 28, 2002, under the authority found in section 159(1)(h) of the IRPA; 54 National Documentation Package (NDP) for Nigeria (29 November 2019), item 1.6. 55 Ibid, item 1.6. 56 Ibid, Item 5.9. 57 Ibid, Item 5.9. 58 Ibid, Item 5.9. 59 Ibid, Item 1.6. 60 Ibid, Item 5.9. 61 Ibid, Item 5.9. 62 Ibid, Item 5.9. 63 Ibid, Item 5.9. 64 Ibid, item 1.19, 2.3 65 Ibid, item 1.19, 3.1.1. 66 Ibid, item 1.19, 3.1.2. 67 Ibid, item 1.19, 3.2.1 and item 1.8. 68 Ibid, item 1.8. 69 Ibid, item 1.4, 1.4.1. 70 Ibid, item 1.4, 1.4.1. 71 Ibid, item 1.7. 72 Ibid, item 1.7. 73 Ibid, item 13.1. 74 Ibid, item 13.1 75 Ibid, Item 13.1. 76 Ibid, Item 13.1. 77 Ibid, Item 1.6. 78 Ibid, Item 13.1. 79 Exhibit P-2, Appellant Record, Affidavit, p. 22, para. 12. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB9-10684 TB9-10685 / TB9-10686 RAD.25.02 (April 04, 2019) Disponible en français 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (April 04, 2019) Disponible en français

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Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93

Case cited

Amadi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1166

Case cited

Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1126

Case cited

Ranganathan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2000 CanLII 16789 (FCA)

Case cited

Argote et al v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 128

Case cited

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, ss. 110(4), 111(1)(a), 159(1)(h)

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