J.L.T. v. H.L.S.

2024 BCSC 1420 J.L.T. v. H.L.S.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: J.L.T. v. H.L.S., 2024 BCSC 1420 Date: 20240806 Docket: E222884 Registry: Vancouver Between: J.L.T. Claimant And H.L.S. Respondent Corrected Judgment: The text of the judgment was corrected at paragraphs 68, 150 and 151 on August 28, 2024. Further Corrected Judgment: The text of the judgment was corrected at Appendix A and Appendix B on September 5, 2024. Before: The Honourable Justice Kent Reasons for Judgment Counsel for the Claimant: C. Heit The Respondent, appearing in person: H.L.S. Place and Dates of Trial: Vancouver, B.C. April 29-30, May 1-3, 2024 and June 18-19, 2024 Place and Date of Judgment: Vancouver, B.C. August 6, 2024 Table of Contents Overview.. 3 Divorce Order.. 5 Separation Date. 5 Parenting Issues. 5 Guardianship. 5 Parenting Time. 6 Parental Responsibilities and Decision-Making Authority. 11 Income Determination and Child Support. 18 General Principles. 18 Parties' Income Evidence. 20 Income Determination. 26 Hardship and Other Adjustments. 29 Section 7 Special or Extraordinary Expenses. 35 Spousal Support. 39 Family Debt and Family Property. 45 Conduct Orders. 50 Summary and Conclusion.. 53 Appendix A.. 62 Appendix B.. 65 Overview [1] These are Reasons for Judgment following the trial of a family law case. The issues in dispute are governed by one or both of the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.)

("DA") and the Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c. 25 ("FLA"). [2] I have anonymized the names of the parties in these Reasons for Judgment in order to protect the privacy interests of the children involved. [3] The claimant (the "Mother") was born in Vancouver. The respondent (the "Father") was born in Frankfurt, Germany. Both are currently 42 years old. [4] The parties met in April 2015 in Vancouver after the Father had moved from Germany to Canada on a work/travel visa. They began cohabiting one month later and were married in Vancouver on November 14, 2015. [5] There are two children of the marriage: · a son, "L.P.W.S.", born in Germany on May 9, 2016; and, · a daughter, "A.E.S.", born in Vancouver on March 27, 2019. [6] L.P.W.S. has just turned eight years old. He has attention deficit hyperactivity disorder ("ADHD"), and has also been diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder ("autism"), and expression & receptive late language delay. [7] The Father works in the field of information technology ("IT"). The Mother has a variety of disabilities which make employment difficult, including dyslexia, ADHD, dyscalculia (math/numbers challenges) and anxiety. She has not worked on a full-time basis since February 2013 and whatever employment she has secured in the past has generally been at a minimum wage in an accommodating environment. She receives generous financial support from the

maternal grandfather. [8] The parties do not agree on the date of their separation. The Father claims this occurred in January 2020, whereas the Mother claims that it occurred in January 2021. [9] The Father has not paid any child support since separation. He invokes "hardship" and says he can only afford modest support payments. [10] The parties have thus far worked out an informal parenting arrangement whereby, · the Mother has the children from Monday after school to Friday at school drop-off; and, · the Father has the children from Friday after school to Monday at school drop-off. [11] Both parties wish for and consent to the granting of a divorce order. They also agree that they will have joint guardianship of the children pursuant to s. 39 of the FLA. [12] The matters to be determined are as follows: 1. the divorce order (DA); 2. the parties' separation date (FLA); 3. parenting issues, including guardianship, parental responsibilities and decision-making authority, parenting time, and travel with the children (DA, FLA); 4. child support on a retroactive and prospective basis, including s. 7 special and extraordinary expenses (quantum, DA); 5. retroactive and prospective spousal support (entitlement, quantum, DA); 6. division of family property and debt (FLA); and, 7. various conduct orders (FLA). Divorce Order [13] I am satisfied that all of the conditions necessary for a

divorce order exist in this case. Accordingly, I issue an order for divorce effective on the 31st day following the day on which these Reasons for Judgment are released. Separation Date [14] While living together, the relationship between the Mother and Father was occasionally volatile. Both accuse the other of "family violence" in the form of verbal, psychological, financial and, in the case of the Father, even "litigation" abuse. [15] Both parties acknowledged at least two instances of physical abuse. The children were home on both occasions. The first occurred on January 5, 2020 when the Father pushed the Mother down the stairs at the family home. In the ensuing one year period, the Mother moved out but later returned and the parties continued living together as a family. [16] The second incident occurred on January 30, 2021. On that occasion the Father struck the Mother in the face. The daughter was not quite two years old at the time, however the incident occurred in front of the son. The police were called and an assault charge was laid (later replaced by a peace bond). The Mother left the home after this incident and the parties have neither reconciled nor lived together since that time. [17] I find that the date of separation for the purposes of this litigation was January 30, 2021. Parenting Issues Guardianship [18] Section 39(1) provides that, following separation,

each parent of a child is the guardian of the latter, although s. 39(2) of the FLA authorizes the court to order otherwise if that is considered to be in the best interests of the child. [19] In this case, the parents are consenting to joint guardianship and have, for the most part, essentially agreed on 90% of the details of an acceptable parenting regime. In such circumstances it is in the best interest of the children that both the Mother and Father each remain their guardian and I issue an order to that effect. Parenting Time [20] In making a parenting order, both the DA and the FLA make it mandatory to take into consideration only the best interests of the children with particular emphasis on ensuring their physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being. Both acts specify various factors that must be considered including discrete matters that must be addressed in relation to family violence. [21] Both acts also provide that in determining what is in the best interests of the children, the court must not consider the past conduct of either parent unless it is relevant to the issues of parenting time or decision-making responsibility. [22] One difference between the two acts is that the FLA specifically provides that the court should not presume that any particular parenting arrangement is in the best interests of the children, including any

presumption respecting equal allocation between the parents of parenting time, parental responsibilities and/or decision-making authority. [23] Section 16(6) of the DA does, on the other hand, make it mandatory for the court to "give effect to the principle that a child should have as much time with each spouse as is consistent with the best interests of the child". From a practical perspective, however, the difference in the legislative language is of little practical import; it is always the best interest of the children that dictates the outcome in disputes respecting parenting arrangements. [24] The court will usually give considerable weight to any agreement that the parents may have reached regarding parenting arrangements for their children. I have no hesitation in doing so in this particular case as well. The parents have worked out practical arrangements in accordance with their preferences and I am satisfied that whatever verbal or physical abuse may have occurred in the past while the parties were cohabiting is not likely to re-occur in front of the children and poses no rise of harm to them. [25] That is not to say that the parents will not have disagreements in the future regarding parenting arrangements. However, that should generally subside once the court has finalized the matters that currently remain in dispute. As well, the court expects the parties to

remember that continuous exposure to parental conflict can be very harmful for children whereas the modelling of cooperative and respectful parental communication usually promotes the children's emotional and psychological well being in the long run. [26] As noted, the parents have followed a shared parenting schedule since separation. Based on their evidence at trial, the only areas of dispute regarding the schedule that is in place are as follows: · whether the Mother might be permitted to take L.P.W.S. to his "Watermelon Group" or other autism events up to a maximum of two weekend days per month, even if the event conflicts with the Father's regular parenting time; · whether the Father should be responsible both for picking up the children at the Mother's home for the start of his parenting time and also for dropping them off at the Mother's home at the end of his parenting time (as the Mother wishes) or whether any such picking up/dropping off should be shared (as the Father wishes); · on the days when there is no school, the children exchanges should occur at 10 a.m. and 3 p.m. (as the Mother wishes) or at 2 p.m. on each such day (as the Father wishes); and, · if a statutory holiday or a teacher's professional day falls on a Monday, the children must nevertheless be returned at the designated time on Monday (as the Mother wishes) or they should stay an extra night with the

Father who will bring them to school or daycare as needed on the Tuesday (as the Father wishes). [27] The Mother proposes an extremely detailed parenting schedule comprising some five pages of text. She is of the opinion that unless every single detail is nailed down with specificity, additional conflict between the parties will ensue. [28] The Father, on the other hand, proposes a less complicated schedule, one I am inclined to endorse in principle because of its simplicity. [29] I must emphasize that any parenting schedule imposed by the court is subject to variation as the parties may from time to time agree, whether on an ad hoc basis for particular occasions or more generally as a permanent change to the "regular" schedule. It is only right that the two people in the world who know their children best and who love them dearly should be the ones to decide a parenting schedule that best fits their respective calendars. [30] L.P.W.S. is highly autistic and benefits from familiarity with a fixed schedule. He attends South Meridian Elementary School ("South Meridian") where he has at least one support worker with him for the entire school day who supports him with his learning, behaviour, needs and general well-being. He receives some after school counseling at home from the Watermelon Group. He also participates in some weekend activities put on by the Watermelon Group which

are specifically designed for autistic children and which, notwithstanding the drawback of driving back and forth between Victoria Drive in Vancouver and their homes in Surrey, both parents now appear to support. [31] During final argument, the Father advised the court that he had no objection to the Mother being permitted to take L.P.W.S. to his Watermelon Group or other autism events up to a maximum of two weekend days per month, even if the event conflicts with his regular parenting time. The court therefore includes this provision in its parenting time order. [32] I acknowledge there has been some conflict in the past with respect to delay and other issues at transitions. It is for this reason the Mother says that an extremely detailed parenting order is required, one which would see the Father responsible not only for picking up the children at the start of his parenting time but also, when necessary, returning them to her home at the conclusion of his parenting time. [33] The simple fact of the matter is that these two parents will be involved in the ongoing parenting of their children for the next 15 years or more and it is a practical necessity for them to overcome the stresses and strains of a dissolved marriage and develop mechanics for cooperative, if not amiable, transitions and communications for the benefit of the children. They are both highly intelligent people

who are perfectly capable of accomplishing this if they set past disappointments aside and get on with the task at hand. Both parties should benefit from a court order that provides formal structure for the parenting time regime, albeit one which can be varied by consent. [34] In the result, the court makes the following order regarding parenting time: 1. The children will have parenting time with the Mother from Monday after school until Friday morning at school drop-off; 2. The children will have parenting time with the Father from Friday after school until Monday morning at school drop-off; 3. On Monday mornings, the Father will be responsible for dropping off the children at school; 4. On Monday afternoons the Mother will be responsible for picking up the children at school; 5. On Friday mornings, the Mother will be responsible for dropping off the children at school; 6. On Friday afternoons the father will be responsible for picking up the children from school; 7. This schedule will also apply for all statutory holidays or professional development days (or any other days off school) which may fall on a Monday or Friday. It will also apply during spring break and winter break from school. On all such Mondays the Father will be responsible for dropping off the children at the Mother's home at 10 a.m., and on all such Fridays the Mother will be responsible for dropping off

the children at the Father's home at 3 p.m.; 8. For the summer school holidays, each parent is entitled to two uninterrupted alternating periods of 14 days each. Starting in 2024, the Mother will have the first two week period, the Father will have the second, the Mother will have the third and the Father will have the fourth, following which the regular parenting schedule set out above will resume. The schedule will be reversed in the year 2025 and thereafter will rotate annually; 9. On Christmas Eve and Christmas Day, one parent will have parenting time with the children from 12 p.m. on December 24 until 12 p.m. on December 25 and the other parent will have parenting time with the children from 12 p.m. on December 25 through to 12 p.m. on December 26. In 2025 the first scheduled parenting time will be with the Mother and the second with the Father, and the schedule will also rotate annually. Each parent will be responsible for picking up the children from the other parent's care at the start of their respective parenting time; 10. The Mother is permitted to take L.P.W.S. to his Watermelon Group events or other autism events up to the maximum of two weekend days per month, even if the even conflicts with his regular parenting time with his Father. The Mother must provide the Father with no less than 72 hours notice of any such events and she will be responsible for picking the

son up from the Father's care and promptly returning him to that care after the conclusion of the event(s); 11. This schedule is subject to change by written consent of both parties whether on an ad hoc basis for particular times/events or more generally as a permanent change to the schedule set above. Parental Responsibilities and Decision-Making Authority [35] Section 2(1) of the DA defines "decision-making responsibility" as follows: Definitions 2. (1) In this Act, decision-making responsibility means the responsibility for making significant decisions about a child's well-being, including in respect of (a) health; (b) education; (c) culture, language, religion and spirituality; and (d) significant extra-curricular activities; [36] Section 7.1 of the DA provides: Best interests of child 7.1 A person to whom parenting time or decision-making responsibility has been allocated in respect of a child of the marriage or who has contact with that child under a contact order shall exercise that time, responsibility or contact in a manner that is consistent with the best interests of the child. [37] Sections 16.2(2) and 16.3 of the DA provide: Day-to-day decisions 16.2(2) Unless the court orders otherwise, a person to whom parenting time is allocated under paragraph 16.1(4)(a) has exclusive authority to make, during that time, day-to-day decisions affecting the child. Allocation of

decision-making responsibility 16.3 Decision-making responsibility in respect of a child, or any aspect of that responsibility, may be allocated to either spouse, to both spouses, to a person described in paragraph 16.1(1)(b), or to any combination of those persons [38] The following provisions of the FLA provide for the allocation and exercise of "parental responsibilities" which are defined a little more specifically than in the DA: Parenting arrangements 40(2) Unless an agreement or order allocates parental responsibilities differently, each child's guardian may exercise all parental responsibilities with respect to the child in consultation with the child's other guardians, unless consultation would be unreasonable or inappropriate in the circumstances. (3) Parental responsibilities may be allocated under an agreement or order such that they may be exercised by (a)one or more guardians only, or (b)each guardian acting separately or all guardians acting together. Parental responsibilities 41 For the purposes of this Part, parental responsibilities with respect to a child are as follows: (a) making day-to-day decisions affecting the child and having day-to-day care, control and supervision of the child; (b) making decisions respecting where the child will reside; (c) making decisions respecting with whom the child will live and associate; (d) making decisions respecting the

child's education and participation in extracurricular activities, including the nature, extent and location; (e) making decisions respecting the child's cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage, including, if the child is an Indigenous child, the child's Indigenous identity; (f) subject to section 17 of the Infants Act, giving, refusing or withdrawing consent to medical, dental and other health-related treatments for the child; (g) applying for a passport, licence, permit, benefit, privilege or other thing for the child; (h)giving, refusing or withdrawing consent for the child, if consent is required; (i) receiving and responding to any notice that a parent or guardian is entitled or required by law to receive; (j) requesting and receiving from third parties health, education or other information respecting the child; (k) subject to any applicable provincial legislation, (i) starting, defending, compromising or settling any proceeding relating to the child, and (ii) identifying, advancing and protecting the child's legal and financial interests; (l) exercising any other responsibilities reasonably necessary to nurture the child's development. Parenting time 42(2) During parenting time, a guardian may exercise, subject to an agreement or order that provides otherwise, the parental responsibility of making day-to-day decisions affecting the child and

having day-to-day care, control and supervision of the child. Exercise of parental responsibilities 43(1) A child's guardian must exercise parental responsibilities in the best interests of the child. (2) If a guardian is temporarily unable to exercise any of the parental responsibilities described in section 41 (a), (c), (d), (f) to (j) or (l) [parental responsibilities], the child's guardian, in writing, may authorize a person to exercise, in the best interests of the child, one or more of those responsibilities on that guardian's behalf while the guardian is unable to do so. [39] The Mother submits that the Father has on numerous occasions put his interests ahead of those of the children, either putting them in harms way or jeopardizing important educational and therapeutic opportunities for them. She argues the ongoing conflict and disagreements between the parties are undeniable, as was made clear during the Mother's cross-examination by the Father at trial, and that she should be allocated sole authority to exercise the parental responsibilities contemplated by ss. 41(d), (f), (g), (h), and (l) of the FLA. [40] The Mother testified that, following separation, on several occasions the Father threatened that if she pursued child support, he would unilaterally relocate with the children to Germany and, if pursued further, he would move to a country such as Thailand which is

not a signatory to the Hague Convention. It is for this reason that she says she wishes to have sole possession and authority regarding passports and international travel. [41] The Father claims that the Mother is erratic and evasive regarding medical matters, has delayed vaccinations for the children and is generally distrustful of medical practitioners. He points to an instance where the son's former autism support team parted company with the Mother, failed to secure the services of a pediatrician or pediatric urologist and the like. He requests that he be allocated sole decision-making authority on medical and educational matters "to ensure the children receive timely and appropriate care". [42] With respect to travel, the Father says the allegations regarding potential abduction of the children to Germany or Thailand are utterly baseless, although he does want to ensure that the children have contact with their German/European family and heritage, something which would clearly be in their best interests. [43] I conclude that, as so often occurs in family law litigation, the parties have overstated their respective concerns regarding the ability of each to properly exercise and make appropriate decisions respecting parental responsibilities. I am satisfied both parents love their children dearly and in their own way will do their best to protect and appropriately promote

their children's physical, psychological and emotional development, security and well-being. [44] I will deal with the Father's obligation regarding child support later in these Reasons, but suffice it to say I do not accept any suggestion that child abduction is a realistic risk in this case. [45] It is perhaps worthwhile to reproduce here the sensible observations of Justice Goepel in K.D.P. v. A.R.K., 2011 BCSC 1085: [1] No parents are perfect. All have flaws of one kind or another. If families stay together, except in those rare circumstances in which a child is found to be in need of protection, the state and the courts allow imperfect parents to raise their children as best they can. The children, in most cases, are no worse for wear for the experience. [2] If families separate, however, and issues of custody and access arise, in the guise of determining the best interests of the child, a parent's flaws of character and conduct are put under a microscope. In such circumstances, care must be taken not to lose sight of the strengths that a party brings to the challenge of raising a child. [46] The evidence in this case satisfies me that notwithstanding each party's flaws, both parents provide environments, activities and parenting skills to the children that are for the most part positive and appropriate. [47] Nevertheless, I do agree that it would be sensible in this case

for certain parental responsibilities to be preliminarily assigned to a particular parent as a potential dispute resolution mechanism. Since it is the Mother who has been, and will likely continue to be, the "heavy lifter" when it comes to the school week and other commitments or appointments during the work week, it is sensible for such preliminary authority to be allocated to her in the event of disagreement, albeit with a mechanism for court intervention where appropriate. [48] I agree that it is clearly in the children's best interest to learn some German and/or French language and to have meaningful contact with the Father's family in Europe. In order to facilitate the latter, I will make the Mother responsible for ensuring that the children at all times have current Canadian passports and, if regulations allow and the Father wishes, an appropriate German or European passport to facilitate travel in Europe. [49] These passports must remain in the possession and control of the Mother except where they are required by the Father for any agreed upon sojourning in Europe. For all such sojourning, the Father must provide to the Mother a detailed itinerary including the address(es) where the children will be staying and the names and some basic information about the persons with whom they will be associating. As well, during all such international travel, the Father must make

arrangements for the children to have private Zoom or similar other video-conferencing with the Mother for at least 15 minutes at a mutually convenient time every second day of the travel. [50] In addition to the above, unless the Mother agrees otherwise, the Father will not have any international travel with the children for a period of one year following these Reasons for Judgment. My purpose in imposing this restriction is to allow the parties to get comfortable with the parenting regime imposed by the court and also to permit assurance to the Mother that the Father will comply with his child support obligations without abduction occurring. [51] I therefore make the following order: 1. During their respective parenting time, each of the Mother and the Father will be solely responsible for the following matters: a. having day-to-day care, control and supervision of the children and making all necessary day-to-day decisions affecting them; b. making decisions respecting where the children will reside and with whom the children will associate, provided that both parties will notify the other beforehand of any proposed change of address where the children will reside or stay and of any other adults living in their residence who will be sharing living space with the children; c. making emergency health decisions for the children with the other parent is not available for

immediate consultation; d. receiving and responding to any notice that a parent or guardian is entitled or required by law to receive; e. giving, refusing or withdrawing consent for the children in relation to any activities proposed to be undertaken during their parenting time 2. Both parents must discuss and try to agree on any of the following significant decisions that may have to be made concerning the children; g. decisions respecting the children's cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage; h. decisions respecting the children's education and participation in extracurricular activities, including the nature, extent, location and cost thereof; i. subject to s. 17 of the Infants Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 223, giving, refusing or withdrawing consent to medical dental and other health‑related treatments for the children; j. applying for a passport, license, permit, benefit, privilege or other similar matter for the children; k. giving, refusing or withdrawing any required consent for the children on matters other than activities during each parent's parenting time; l. subject to any applicable provincial legislation, i. starting, defending, compromising or settling any proceeding relating to the children; and, ii. identifying, advancing and protecting the children's slip legal and financial interests.

3. In the event that, despite their best efforts and the involvement of any parenting counsellor they may have retained, the parents are unable to reach agreement on any of the significant matters listed above, then the Mother will be entitled to make those decisions and the Father will have the right to apply to this court, if he so wishes, for a determination of the matter in the best interests of the children; 4. The Mother is to ensure the children at all times have current Canadian passports and, if regulations allow and the Father wishes, an appropriate German or European passport to facilitate travel in Europe. These passports must remain in the possession and control of the Mother except where they are required by the Father for any agreed upon sojourning in Europe. For all such sojourning, the Father must provide to the Mother a detailed itinerary including the address(es) where the children will be residing/sleeping and the names of the persons with whom they will generally be associating. During all such international travel, the Father must make arrangements for the children to have private Zoom or other video-conferencing with the Mother for at least 15 minutes at a mutually convenient time every second day of the travel. Income Determination and Child Support General Principles [52] As noted earlier, the Father has thus far refused to pay any child support to the

Mother. His stated rationale is that his income has been and remains relatively modest and he simply could not and cannot afford to pay the amount of support the Mother has been demanding. He also insists that the significant financial support being provided to the Mother by the maternal grandparents must be taken into account when determining the appropriate quantum of child support. [53] It is possible, although rather unlikely since the Father has had the benefit of legal counsel at certain times following separation, that the Father misapprehends the fundamental legal principles applicable to all child support matters, including the following: 1. a parent-child relationship is a fiduciary relationship of presumed dependency and the obligation of both parents to provide financial support for the child automatically arises at birth; 2. parents have a joint and ongoing legal obligation to provide financial support for their children in a way that is commensurate to their income; 3. this obligation and the children's concomitant right to support exists independently of any statute or court order; 4. child support is the right of the child, not of the parents seeking the support on the child's behalf; 5. the child's right to receive child support survives the breakdown of the parents' relationship and cannot be bargained away by the parents; 6. both parents must put their

children's interests ahead of their own in negotiating and litigating child support issues; 7. the amount of child support is determined in accordance with the Guidelines, and the goals, principles and provisions of these Guidelines govern all child support applications; 8. one such objective of the Guidelines is to establish a fair standard of support for children that ensures that they continue to benefit from the financial means of both spouses after separation; 9. while children should be shielded from the economic consequences of their parent's relationship breakdown, the child support regime contemplates that the family as a whole -- including the children -- will share the rising and falling fortunes of their parents, just as they would have before the separation; 10. support payments are based on earning capacity, and not just on what a parent actually earns -- as a result, parents have a legal obligation to earn as much as they are reasonably capable of earning so that the children receive an appropriate level of support; 11. a parent does not fulfil their obligation to their children if they do not increase child support payments when their income increases significantly; and 12. because child support is tied to income and income tends to fluctuate, a child support order or agreement reflects a snapshot in time and is never final. See e.g. D.B.S. v. S.R.G., 2006 SCC

37 at paras. 37-54; Kerr v. Baranow, 2011 SCC 10 at paras. 207-208; Michel v. Graydon, 2020 SCC 24 at paras. 10-17; Colucci v. Colucci, 2021 SCC 24 at paras. 28, 33-34. [54] The Mother seeks an award of retroactive child support as of the date of separation. The court exercises discretion in determining whether such a retroactive award is appropriate and, if so, how far back it should extend. The case law referred to above discusses and affirms four factors which guide the court's discretion in that regard: · the recipient's delay in seeking retroactive support; · the payors conduct, including its blameworthiness; · the circumstances of the child; and, · any hardship that might be entailed by a retroactive award. [55] In this case, the Father's persistent refusal to volunteer at least some child support is clearly blameworthy conduct. So too were his coercive threats to abduct the children should the Mother claim child support, even if he had no actual intention of doing so. [56] I will discuss the other three factors referred to above later in these Reasons. First I turn to a determination of the parties' respective incomes for child support purposes. Parties' Income Evidence [57] The parties' Line 150 (or Line 15,000) incomes in the four years before separation were as follows: Year Mother Father 2017 $0 $0 2018 $0 $61,756.82 2019 $0 $32,069.26 (employment) $16,860 (EI

benefits) $48,929.26 (total) 2020 $0 $71,169.18 (employment) $562 (EI benefits) $71,731.18 (total) [58] The parties Line 15,000 incomes since separation were as follows: Year Mother Father 2021 $0 $44,535.21 (employment) $9,520 (EI benefits) $15,136.67 (RRSP) $10,778.03 (severance pay) $79,969.91 (total) 2022 $6,047.74 (social assistance) $28,648.72 (employment) $19,873.00 (EI benefits) $48,521.72 (total) 2023 $12,935 (social assistance) $2,664.92 ("business income") $15,599.92 (total) $89,307.42 (employment) [59] Based on the parties having a shared parenting arrangement since separation and their Line 15,000 incomes, retroactive child support arguably payable by the Father to the Mother for the years 2021 through 2023 would be calculated under s. 9 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175 [Guidelines] on simply a "straight set-off basis" as follows: Year Guideline Income Support Payable Set off Amount Total Owing 2021 Father: $64,833 Mother: $0 Father: $1,006 Mother: $0 $1,006 (11 months) $11,066 2022 Father: $48,522 Mother: $6,048 Father: $759 Mother: $0 $759 $9,108 2023 Father: $89,307 Mother: $15,663 Father: $1,378 Mother: $205 $1,173 $14,076 [60] Up until late October 2023, the Mother had been out of the workforce for over a decade. While she has a Bachelor's Degree in Fine Arts and two Certificates in Film Studies and Fine Arts, her learning disabilities and

other health issues have made it very challenging for her to obtain and retain employment. Her work history, such as it is, has being confined to menial labour jobs paying minimum wage. These included part-time and short full-time stints at retail outlets such as the GAP and Winners, photocopying and cleaning at her Father's law firm, and telemarketing. [61] In the past, the Mother has also tried to earn money by displaying her artwork in coffee shops, auctions and online, mostly without success. In the past few years she has also attempted to be a "live streamer" on apps such as Only Fans, KIK and Meet Me but her earnings have been nominal (approximately $4,100 in four years). [62] Since October 2023 she has also earned some money driving for Uber Eats, but as an independent contractor, her out-of-pocket expenses, such as gas and parking, has resulted in minimal net remuneration. [63] Since separation the Mother has had (and now will continue to have) the children in her care for the majority of weekdays and, as indicated earlier, has the lion's share of the responsibilities for medical and autism-related appointments, dropping off and picking up the children at school (which to date involved multiple drop-offs/pickups at different times of the day at different schools), and the like. Conventional before or after-school care for L.P.W.S. is not possible as a result of his

autism, let alone the exorbitant costs of such care, and the Mother is the one caring for the children before and after school for the most part. [64] The guideline income charts set out above do not include or attribute to the Mother any of the quite significant financial assistance she has been receiving from her parents. This includes: 1. During the marriage: a. €300/month for some of the time the parties lived in Germany after they got married; b. following their return to Vancouver from Germany (with L.P.W.S.), the couple lived rent-free in the basement of the maternal grandparents' home and the latter also provided the Mother with $1,000/month for other basic necessities; and, c. rent subsidy after the parties moved into the former family home.

2. From the date of separation to May 2023, the Mother and the children resided in the "carriage home" (the apartment above the garage) at her parents' home; 3. From the date of separation to September 2022, $1,000/month was given to the Mother for basic necessities. In October 2022, the Mother started receiving income assistance from the government which she continues to receive at this time ($910/month); 4. Starting in June 2023, the Mother and the children have been residing in a 3 bedroom mobile home purchased by the maternal grandfather ($250,000) and for which he continues to pay interest of $1,500/month on his line of credit for both the purchase price of home and related renovations ($40,000) along with the $1,100/month "pad rental" fee (which includes water sewage and electricity, but not natural gas for which the grandparents also pay); and, 5. Payment of various other costs including the Mother's Ozempic prescription ($231), school fees for the daughter's preschool/Montessori ($250 - $300/month), and significant vehicle repairs maintenance (for a Ford Escape which was also gifted by the grandparents). [65] The simple fact of the matter is that the Mother has for various reasons been unable to work (the Father would uncharitably say "unwilling") and, in the absence of any child support from the Father, has had most of her basic living expenses provided/paid for by the

maternal grandparents. [66] During his testimony, the grandfather stated, and I accept it is likely, that the grandparents "will always be there to help with financial support". However, he states he "would like to see [the Mother] having a job she can manage" even if only part-time ("because working is a good thing") and he is hopeful that the Mother may at some point in time be able to start paying some of the "running costs". He noted that if a retroactive support payment was actually made by the Father, he would probably "talk [to the Mother] about some repayment". [67] It should also be noted that, on behalf of L.P.W.S., the Mother does receive a $6,000 annual grant from the government to help with the son's autism-related therapies/interventions and other related requirements. [68] For his part, the Father does not have any university degree but did receive an IT Specialist Certificate following a two-and-a-half-year apprenticeship training program in Germany. He is experienced in the IT sector, having held positions as an IT consultant, and as a Senior Analyst IT Support, and he is currently employed in a full-time IT position. [69] However, the Father states that he is currently unable to work because of a variety of mental and physical health conditions including stress and depression from the divorce litigation and prolonged separation from his family and friends in

Germany, high blood pressure, insomnia, fatigue and nausea. He exhausted the available sick pay benefits with BC Hydro in January 2024 and has been receiving long-term disability benefits since that time in the bi-weekly amount of approximately $2,314 to the date of trial (approximately $60,164 on an annualised basis). During final argument, he stated that he hoped to return to work on a part-time basis in the not too distant future. [70] Also in final argument, the Father stated rather ominously that a return to work was something he, hope[d] to do if the court comes to a fair agreement that considers the interest in financial means of everyone involved, without pushing me into bankruptcy. The bankruptcy and risk of homelessness would obviously have a severe impact on my mental health and also not be in the best interest of the children either. [71] The Father did not tender any properly admissible expert evidence regarding his claimed mental and physical health conditions. He did, however, produce at trial an "Attending Physicians Statement" dated March 18, 2024 and signed by his doctor in White Rock supporting his claim for long-term disability benefits. That document described certain clinical findings (flat affect, anxious/extremely stressed and keeps talking about litigation, depressed), and which diagnosed general anxiety disorder and depression. The recited history of

medications includes treatments for blood pressure, antidepressants and herpes. With respect to the "return to work plan" the doctor noted that the Father "has cognitive and mental limitations that affect his ability to perform his work duties", noting that "he is willing to work but he is unable to" because he is "not mentally fit". [72] During the course of final argument, the Father also presented the court with a "Absence Claim-Functional Assessment Form" which had been completed by his physician on June 11, 2024 at the request of the LTD plan administrator, Sun Life Insurance. That report indicates that the Father is medically able to perform full duties but only on a part-time basis "at this time". Assuming his limitations were "accommodated", the physician indicated that the Father was able to work four hours a day, four days a week., noting: He needs reduced hours and home-based days of work. He prefers more days to work from home if possible (less stress, less anxiety, less noise). [73] Not surprisingly, counsel for the Mother objected to these reports being received as properly admissible expert evidence. It must be said, however, this sort of undisciplined document production which is noncompliant with both the rules of procedure and evidence is commonplace in family law cases involving self‑represented litigants. There is no suggestion that these medical reports are

anything but genuine and they do tend to corroborate the plaintiff's self-reported symptomology at trial. I intend to give them appropriate weight. [74] The Father also testified at trial, and further pointed out in final argument, that his 2023 employment income ($89,000) was "extraordinarily high due to a one-time bonus ("gainsharing") that no longer exists and which was only available by him working full time throughout the year", something he says he is "no longer capable of". That bonus was approximately $5,000, however the Father produced at trial BC Hydro documents confirming that "starting in fiscal 2023/24 unionized employees will no longer receive gainsharing as negotiated in the last round of collective bargaining". Income Determination [75] I accept the above evidence and find as a of fact that the Father has appropriately been receiving long-term disability benefits since February 2024. [76] However, since the main cause of the Father's anxiety and depression has been this family law litigation, something which hopefully now comes to an end with these Reasons for Judgment, it is reasonable to expect that the Father will be able to resume full-time employment with BC Hydro in the not too distant future. In the circumstances, I find it appropriate to impute LTD benefits until the end of 2024 by which time a resumption of full-time earnings at BC Hydro can be

expected. Without including any "gainsharing" bonus, that income will likely be $85,000 or even a little higher. [77] For the purposes of child support determinations for any 2024 retroactive period to the date of trial and for the balance of 2024 thereafter, and for ease of calculation, I will simply use the annualized value of the LTD benefits ($60,164) as the Father's 2024 income, which is subject to a tax-gross up. [78] Counsel for the Mother acknowledges that the latter's current income is limited to social assistance and a small amount of money earned from part-time work but also presented a prospective support formula which imputes to the Mother an annual guideline income amount of $18,380 based on the minimum wage in BC (which on June 1, 2024 increased from $16.75 an hour to $17.40 an hour). That total reflects imputed work of three days/week (12 days/month) at seven hours/day at minimum wage for the period January 1 to August 31, 2024 increasing to working 25 hours/week at minimum wage for the period September 1 to December 31, 2024 ($7,035 + $4,385 + $6,960 = $18,380). [79] Counsel then suggests that if the Mother's Line 15,000 income is lower than or equal to $21,315 for the period commencing July 1, 2025, then that amount should be imputed to her for child support purposes (25 hours/wk × 49 wk/yr x $17.40/hour). [80] Implicit in the above submissions is the

assumption that the Mother can only work a limited number of hours a week because of a combination of the Mother's various challenges and the need for continual supervision of the children (particularly L.P.W.S.) while she has them in her care. [81] The calculation also does not import/impute any economic value based on the financial and other support provided to the Mother by the grandparents. That amount, it will be recalled, is quite significant essentially a minimum of $1,000 a month since separation to September 2022 and anywhere between $1,100-$2,500 a month since June 2023 (if monthly interest charges are added to the pad rental fee of approximately $1,100/month the grandfather himself attributes a $2,500/month rental value to the mobile home in which the Mother resides). [82] In that regard, counsel for the Mother invokes Bak v. Dobell, 2007 ONCA 304 and other caselaw which suggests that ongoing financial gifts by grandparents ought not be imputed as guideline income available for support purposes, particularly where they are provided to support a person struggling with disabilities and do not result in an enhanced lifestyle beyond a basic standard of living. That caselaw is very helpfully reviewed in the recent decision of De Cotiis v. De Cotiis, 2023 BCSC 1436 at paras. 96-104 and I will not repeat it here. [83] The harsh reality is that the Mother does indeed have

significant disabilities and confronts possibly insurmountable challenges in obtaining long-term employment, even low‑paying, menial jobs. Her efforts to generate income through artistic endeavours or even self-employment as an Uber Eats driver are unlikely to generate any significant net income. Her reliance on social assistance and ongoing financial support from her parents will likely continue. [84] I reject the Father's submissions that the Mother has "tried to hide" her income from Only Fans which he alleges to have been "well-paying" involving "several thousand dollars with only minimal hours of work". The amounts received were very small and she has since discontinued that line of "work", doubtless in part because of her Father's disapproval. [85] Similarly, I reject the Father's speculation, made without any admissible evidence to support it, that Uber Eats drivers in the Vancouver area typically make "$25-$30 per hour with tips, $30,000-$55,000 yearly". While this type of self-employment theoretically represents a viable source of income for a person in the Mother's position, the actual income received has been very small because of gas/parking costs she is required to absorb, poor performance reviews which have seen her "locked out" on occasion, a motor vehicle accident and downtime because of necessary repairs, and the like. I find it unlikely the Mother will be able

to generate from Uber Eats net income that exceeds the imputed income already conceded by her counsel for child support calculation purposes in this case. [86] As well, I accept counsel's submissions that the financial support provided by the grandparents should not be used to impute higher income to the Mother for child basic support "straight set-off" purposes. The situation in this case has considerable similarities with Bak v. Dobell referred to above inasmuch as the financial support so generously provided by the grandparents assists only with the "bare necessities" of life for a person struggling with various challenges and who "enjoys" only a very modest standard of living. [87] I do agree with the Father, however, that the financial support provided by the grandparents may be taken into account when assessing the s. 9(c) Guideline factors. I will address that subject shortly. [88] I consider it appropriate to impute an annual income to the Mother, not just prospectively, as counsel proposes, but also retroactively to the date of separation. The child support obligations described earlier in these Reasons apply as much to her as they do the Father, and she has been "underemployed" during that period. [89] Using the same formula suggested by counsel, the appropriate annual amount of imputed income in calendar years 2021-2023 is $17,235 (21hr/wk x 49 wks x 16.75 per hour).

For 2021, her income will be $15,799 which is prorated income for 11 months based on the same calculation starting February 1, 2021. [90] Having regard to all the above, the earlier tables for calculating retroactive child support on a "straight set-off" basis from 2021 through 2023 and child support for 2024 would be as follows: Year Guidelines Income Support Payable Set-Off Amount # of Months Total Owing 2021 Respondent: $64,833 Claimant: $15,799 Respondent: $1,006 Claimant: $210 $796 11 (Feb - Dec) $8,756 2022 Respondent: $48,522 Claimant: $17,235 Respondent: $759 Claimant: $258 $501 12 $6,012 2023 Respondent: $89,307 Claimant: $17,235 Respondent: $1,378 Claimant: $258 $1,120 12 $13,440 2024 Respondent: $73,688 (grossed up LTD) Claimant: $18,380 Respondent: $1,143 Claimant: $295 $848 6 (Jan - June) $5,088 Hardship and Other Adjustments [91] While it is very common in shared parenting cases for the parties (and the court) to simply stop the child support analysis with a straight set-off of the sort displayed in the table above, s. 9 of the Guidelines does make it mandatory for the court to potentially adjust those set-off amounts, either upwards or downwards, taking into account: · the increased costs of shared custody arrangements; and · the conditions, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse and any child for whom support is sort. [92] While s. 10 of the

Guidelines specifically addresses the concept of "undue hardship" in "single payor" cases governed by ss. 3 and 4 of the Guidelines, case law such as Contino v. Leonelli-Contino, 2005 SCC 63 and its progeny suggests that in shared parenting cases, hardship can, and usually is, included as part of any s.9(c) analysis/determination. [93] Section 10 of the Guidelines imposes a two-stage framework for analysis: (1) first, a finding must be made that undue hardship exists and (2) thereafter a comparison of the household standards of living of the two parents must be made. Section 10(3) of the Guidelines provides that undue hardship relief "must be denied" if the payor's household has a higher standard of living than the household of the recipient parent. [94] Schedule II of the Guidelines prescribes one possible formula that may be used for the household standards of living test. It allows for economic contributions of others to a parent's household to be taken into account. [95] The concept of "hardship" can be difficult to define. Section 10(2) of the Guidelines provides for various circumstances which "may" amount to "undue hardship" but none of those considerations apply in this case. The case law has also held that such hardship must be "exceptional", "excessive", or "disproportionate" in all of the circumstances (Van Gool v. Van Gool, 1998 CanLII 5650 (B.C.C.A.), and also 1999

BCCA 188; L.C.T. v. R.K., 2017 BCCA 64). Such hardship was found to exist in one case because the payor parent, if required to pay the table amount of support, would have insufficient funds to meet his own basic needs and those of the children when they were with him during his parenting time: Dugan v. Dugan, 2001 BCSC 219. [96] In situations of retroactive awards, the Supreme Court of Canada cases referred to earlier in these Reasons have emphasized that payors resisting awards based on current inability to pay are subject to a stringent standard of proof. Any such claimant must provide sufficient reliable evidence to enable the court to properly assess their current and prospective financial circumstances. The otherwise prevailing presumption against reducing the table-calculated award will only be rebutted where the payor parent establishes on a balance of probabilities that even with a flexible payment plan, they cannot and will not ever be able to pay the retroactive amounts. [97] Reduction of retroactive amounts (or arrears) is a last resort in exceptional cases. Even if the court concludes that the payor's financial circumstances will give rise to difficulties paying down arrears or retroactive awards, it ought first to consider whether hardship can be mitigated by ordering a temporary suspension, periodic payments, or other creative payment options: see Colucci v.

Colucci, 2021 SCC 24. [98] In his final submissions the Father states: I am in a very vulnerable financial situation and do not have family here that can support me. I have been at the brink of bankruptcy on multiple occasions due to the legal expenses from litigation abuse and dishonest negotiation attempts, only averted by increasing my credit line, but this is obviously not sustainable in the long term and had a very negative effect on my mental health. Any unforeseen expenses are putting my financial health at severe risk. I applied to consider extraordinary circumstances and financial hardship. A bankruptcy on my side simply because the claimant is unwilling to get a full-time job or acknowledge the financial support from her parents would be highly unfair towards me and the children and beneficial for no one, except maybe for [the grandfather] to satisfy his sadistic and vengeful attitude. [99] Neither party provided the court with the "child expense budget" necessary to make any determination under s. 9(b) of the Guidelines, including in particular the allocation of their fixed and variable expenses related to the children. Parties who do not lead the required evidence cannot complain about the absence of a "full" Contino analysis. [100] The Father did file an updated Financial Statement on April 16, 2024 which formed part of the Amended Trial Record in this case. He

incorrectly identified his current "employment income" as $49,036, although he did attach an Employee Earnings Statement for the March 22 to April 4, 2024 payroll period which disclosed the biweekly LTD benefit payment of $2,313.70 (an annualized income of $60,156 also subject to tax gross up for child support purposes). He also disclosed his 2023 tax return which indicated employment income that year in the amount of $89,307. [101] The Father says, correctly it appears, that he lives "frugally". He owns a 2021 Volkswagen Tiguan motor vehicle purchased in October 2021 with currently outstanding financing of $37,772 towards which he pays $726 a month. Other significant vehicle expenses include insurance, licensing and fuel in the vicinity of $550 a month. The purchase of this relatively expensive vehicle appears to have been improvident and, if another vehicle was required (as the Father suggested) something less expensive could have sufficed. [102] His rental housing costs are $2,652 a month and he also spends approximately $383 a month on utilities and $1,300 a month on food, meals outside the home and household supplies. He has just received a formal notice increasing his rent to $2,744 a month starting September 1, 2023. His annual rental expense is now going to be $33,000 a year which is over 50% of his current net income. [103] As at the date of the financial statement,

the Father also owed $23,560 on four credit cards and a line of credit with Tangerine bank. How and why this debt was incurred was neither explained in detail nor corroborated, although reference was earlier made to legal fees for this litigation. [104] The Mother's monthly expenses are also set out in her Financial Statement filed March 26, 2024. The listed monthly expenses are less than the Father's to some degree, but many of them are expenses which she identifies as being concurrently paid by the grandparents. [105] Both parents live in a three bedroomed home which neither of them own. The Mother's $2500 "rent" for that home is notional as the housing expenses are paid by the grandparents. As noted, the Father's rental expense is a significant expense, accounting for approximately 50% of his net income. His return to full time employment at full salary will hopefully ease the burden over time. [106] One very significant difference between the parties' financial situations, is that the Mother has no debt (beyond whatever moral obligation she may have to repay her parents). The Father has significant debt, at least some of which was improvidently incurred. [107] Although he claims hardship relief with respect to child support, the Father did not provide any comparison of household standards of living analysis, whether as set out in Schedule II of the Guidelines or

otherwise. [108] The Mother provided to the court three alternative Household Income Ratios based on the parties' 2023 Line 15,000 incomes not including as a deduction the BC Hydro contributions to the Fathers locked-in RRSP (scenario one), including those contributions as a deduction (scenario two), and using the Father's LTD benefits as his annual income (wrongly calculated to be approximately $55,000, without any gross up for income tax). In all three scenarios, the Father has a substantially higher standard of living than does the Mother and hence the Mother submits, pursuant to s. 10(3) of the Guidelines (if they apply), the court is required to deny the Father's application respecting undue hardship. [109] In the Mother's household standards of living comparison, the Father's household income ratio (total adjusted family income/low-income measures) is at least twice as high as the Mother's. Even if a new scenario was calculated based on the appropriate numbers derived from the court's findings in these Reasons for Judgment, the Father's standard of income at no time falls below that of the Mother. [110] This case is not an extraordinary situation of the sort that would usually warrant a finding of undue hardship pursuant to s. 10 of the Guidelines. However, the same evidence presented in support of the undue hardship claim can be used for the adjustment analysis

contemplated by s. 9 of the Guidelines. It can also be used for the purposes of reducing the amount of retroactive support that would otherwise be retroactively imposed, albeit subject to the restrictions articulated in the Supreme Court of Canada case law referred to above. [111] Here we have a Mother whose actual income is below the poverty line and is only able to support her children and have a place to live as a real result of the generosity of the grandparents. Absent that assistance, she would have been destitute in the past three years. The assistance only ensures she and the children have a rather basic standard of living. [112] The Father enjoys significantly higher income than the Mother but has made some unwise financial decisions that have resulted in significant debt commitments. His cash situation is such that he cannot realistically afford to pay full child and spousal support (including any retroactive award) and at the same time service his debt, pay an increasing rent obligation, and cover the children's expenses during his parenting time. He is, to some degree, the author of his own misfortune in terms of some debt choices he has made. [113] It must also not be forgotten that the Father has flagrantly breached his child support obligations since the date of separation. He has never volunteered or paid even a small amount of child support. He cannot

reasonably expect the court to completely ignore that wrongdoing. [114] The Mother has provided no reasonable explanation why she waited almost two years following separation to issue this lawsuit for child and spousal support. This arguably militates in favor of a reduced award of retroactive support. [115] The Mother's proposed future imputed income exceeds her actual income. Given this, and given also that the grandparent's assistance enables only a basic standard of living, I decline to further reduce the set-off amounts of child support in the Father's favor on account of that assistance. [116] In all the circumstances, I make the following orders regarding child support: 1. For as long as the shared parenting regime continues, the amount of support should reflect a set-off of the parties' income, actual or imputed; 2. The retroactive award (to the end of June, 2024), which would otherwise be in the amount of $33,300, is, as a result of hardship considerations, set at $20,000 and payment of that award is suspended until the Father returns to full-time work or such other time as this court may determine upon application of either party; 3. Payment of retroactive award, once triggered, may be made in increments of a minimum of $500 per month or such higher amounts as the parties may agree or as ordered by the court on application of either party; 4. Commencing July 1, 2024,

and on the first day of each month thereafter, the monthly amount of child support payable by the Father to the Mother is $848.00; 5. No later than June 1st every year hereafter, the parties must exchange their income information and related tax return and earnings statements, as required by the Guidelines, and the child support shall be adjusted to reflect the amount produced by setting off their respective Line 15000 income, to be effective July 1st of each year; 6. If the Father's Line 15000 income is less than or equal to $85,000, his income for annual child support adjustment purposes will be imputed at $85,000; 7. If the Mother's Line 15000 income is less than or equal to $21,315, her income for annual child support adjustment purposes will be imputed at $21,315. Section 7 Special or Extraordinary Expenses [117] In Sadana v. Sadana, 2021 BCSC 111, I provided a "plain English" explanation of child support principles for the benefit of two self represented litigants. That explanation included the following commentary on special and extraordinary expenses payable pursuant to s. 7 of the Guidelines: [62] Special and Extraordinary Expenses Section 7 of the Guidelines gives the court the discretion to order payment of certain expenses over and above the "regular" table amount. However, in order to qualify for a s. 7 order, the expenses must be proven to be "special" or

"extraordinary" in some way. This is because the basic table amounts of child support are designed to cover all the "ordinary" costs of raising a child: food, shelter, clothing and other necessities are all ordinary, as are many educational, extracurricular and recreational expenses. So when does an expense qualify as special or extraordinary? First, it must fit within one of the categories of expenses listed in section 7, as follows: * child care expenses incurred as a result of the custodial parent's employment, illness, disability or education or training for employment; * that portion of the medical and dental insurance premiums attributable to the child; * health-related expenses that exceed insurance reimbursement by at least $100 annually, including orthodontic treatment, professional counselling provided by a psychologist, social worker, psychiatrist or any other person, physiotherapy, occupational therapy, speech therapy and prescription drugs, hearing aids, glasses and contact lenses; * extraordinary expenses for primary or secondary school education or for any other educational programs that meet the child's particular needs; * expenses for post-secondary education; and * extraordinary expenses for extracurricular activities. This list is exhaustive. If the claimed expense does not fit into any of those categories, it cannot be a special or extraordinary

expense. Even where an expense fits into one of the listed categories that is not the end of the story. The expenses must be both "necessary" -- as defined in relation to the child's best interests -- and "reasonable," as measured against the combined financial means of the parents (and, where appropriate, the child) as well as the family's spending patterns prior to separation. In addition if the expense is one listed under subsection (d) or (f) - educational programs or extracurricular activities - the party claiming the expense must prove that they are "extraordinary." There is no straightforward definition for "extraordinary" although section 7.1, recently added to the Guidelines, provides some assistance; it requires a sort of proportionality inquiry, looking at the nature and number of activities, any special needs or talents of the child, the overall cost of the activities, and any other similar relevant factors. Because the tests are fact-specific, one cannot say what types of expenses qualify in every case. One can however identify expenses which generally do not qualify as special or extraordinary, namely; 1. expenses such as entertainment, pets, vacations, school fees, school supplies, children's allowances, meals outside the home, personal grooming, and clothing 2. a home computer, cell phones, and other electronic devices commonly found in most homes 3.

recreational sports and other similar extracurricular activities -- dance lessons, community sports leagues, ski trips, etc. unless the child has unique skill sets beyond that of the "average child" which may warrant extra support. [118] In a shared parenting situation, such as this case, s. 7 expenses are sometimes folded into the income set-off discretionary adjustments contemplated by subsections 9(b) and (c) of the Guidelines. In this case, however, the Mother seeks to have s. 7 expenses dealt with separately, albeit also generically. She essentially seeks a declaration that the following expenses be characterized as special and extraordinary and must be paid by the two parents in proportion to their respective annual Line 15,000 or imputed incomes (currently 73% by the Father and 27% by the Mother): · that portion of the Father's medical and dental insurance premiums attributable to the children; · medical and dental expenses, including: i. prescription drugs; ii. regular dental check-ups, cleaning and care, after deducting the amount covered by the Father's extended health and dental plan and/or the Canada Dental Benefits program; · expenses related to the L.P.W.S.'s autism therapy, including Watermelon Sessions, Watermelon Group Events and other Autism Events, after the annual $6,000 funding has been exhausted, up to a maximum of $400 per annum; · extraordinary expenses

for primary or secondary school education or for any other educational programs that meet the child's particular needs, such as for workbooks, activities and field trips; and, · such other extraordinary expenses for extracurricular activities agreed upon by the parties (none currently). [119] As well, the Mother seeks orders regarding the procedure for securing reimbursement through the Father's health, dental or other benefit plans for which the children are eligible i.e., · the Father must fill out any necessary forms or provide any necessary permissions to allow the Mother to seek reimbursement directly through any such benefit provider; and, · the Mother will submit the receipts to the benefit providers and notify the Father of any amounts not covered, whereupon the Father will then pay to the Mother his proportionate share of any costs which are not reimbursed. [120] For his part, the Father says he has consistently cooperated in providing insurance coverage for the children through his employment and that he will continue to do so. He says he is "committed to supporting his children's needs to the best of his ability" however he stresses that his "financial hardship and limited income significantly limits his ability to contribute to additional expenses beyond the insurance coverage he already provides". [121] I am not prepared to make any generic declaration of what sort

of future expense might fall within the category of s. 7 special and extraordinary expenses to be shared by the parties. As noted earlier, I have not been provided with any specific "child expense budget" of the sort required to make any determination under s. 9(b) of the Guidelines, nor have I been provided with any precise accounting in respect of the $6,000 annual autism funding that is provided for the benefit of L.P.W.S. [122] It must be recalled that any special or extraordinary experience of the sort payable under s. 7 of the Guidelines must be (i) necessary in relation to the children's best interests and (ii) reasonable in relation to the families means. [123] I do agree that the children's medical and dental expenses would ordinarily qualify for proportional sharing by the parents to the extent they exceed available reimbursement under the Father's benefits plan and/or any Canada Dental Benefit plan, as would any reasonably required additional autism therapy for L.P.W.S. once the available annual $6,000 funding from the government has been exhausted. Therefore I make an order to that effect. [124] I also make the two procedural orders requested by the Mother in relation to the reimbursement process. [125] Beyond that, however, I simply order that any additional special or extraordinary expenses of the sort contemplated by s. 7 of the Guidelines are to be payable by

the parents on a proportionate basis provided both parties first agree in writing beforehand to the expense being incurred. Spousal Support [126] The Mother claims retroactive and future spousal support from the Father pursuant to the DA which provides as follows: Spousal support order 15.2 (1) A court of competent jurisdiction may, on application by either or both spouses, make an order requiring a spouse to secure or pay, or to secure and pay, such lump sum or periodic sums, or such lump sum and periodic sums, as the court thinks reasonable for the support of the other spouse. Terms and conditions (3) The court may make an order under subsection (1) or an interim order under subsection (2) for a definite or indefinite period or until a specified event occurs, and may impose terms, conditions or restrictions in connection with the order as it thinks fit and just. Factors (4) In making an order under subsection (1) or an interim order under subsection (2), the court shall take into consideration the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse, including (a) the length of time the spouses cohabited; (b) the functions performed by each spouse during cohabitation; and (c) any order, agreement or arrangement relating to support of either spouse. Spousal misconduct (5) In making an order under subsection (1) or an interim order under subsection (2), the court

shall not take into consideration any misconduct of a spouse in relation to the marriage Objectives of spousal support order (6) An order made under subsection (1) or an interim order under subsection (2) that provides for the support of a spouse should (a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown; (b) apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and above any obligation for the support of any child of the marriage; (c) relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage; and (d) in so far as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time. Priority to child support 15.3 (1) Where a court is considering an application for a child support order and an application for a spousal support order, the court shall give priority to child support in determining the applications. Reasons (2) Where, as a result of giving priority to child support, the court is unable to make a spousal support order or the court makes a spousal support order in an amount that is less than it otherwise would have been, the court shall record its reasons for having done so. Consequences of reduction or termination of child support order (3) Where, as a result of giving priority to child

support, a spousal support order was not made, or the amount of a spousal support order is less than it otherwise would have been, any subsequent reduction or termination of that child support constitutes a change of circumstances for the purposes of applying for a spousal support order, or a variation order in respect of the spousal support order, as the case may be. [127] There are three main dimensions to any claim for spousal support namely 1. entitlement, 2. duration and 3. amount. The DA leaves a broad discretion to judges in individual cases regarding all three dimensions. [128] The threshold question is entitlement. As I summarized in Gisler v. Gisler, 2015 BCSC 323, [56] The leading decisions from the Supreme Court of Canada dealing with this subject have articulated three separate bases for entitlement to spousal support: compensatory, non-compensatory, and contractual support: Moge v. Moge, 1992 CanLII 25 (SCC), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813 (compensatory support); Bracklow v. Bracklow, 1999 CanLII 715 (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 420 (non-compensatory support); and Miglin v. Miglin, 2003 SCC 24 (contractual support). [57] Compensatory principles address the contributions of a spouse to the relationship and the spouse's losses upon its breakdown. The classic application, although by no means the only one, arises in relationships where one spouse did not pursue employment outside the

home in order to care for the children. The end of that relationship places the spouse at an economic disadvantage, which compensatory support should address ("foregone careers and missed opportunities": Bracklow). [58] Non-compensatory principles address the needs of a spouse after the breakdown of the relationship. This kind of support arises out of the relationship itself and is based on the social obligation of a spouse to look after a former partner who is in difficulty, rather than letting that burden fall upon the public. [59] Self-sufficiency is only one objective, and is only a goal "insofar as practicable". In determining what is practicable, the court will consider all circumstances, including the recipient spouse's age, gender, skills, education, opportunity for retraining, and the realistic prospect of the spouse finding a job that enables him or her to become self-sufficient: Tedham v. Tedham, 2005 BCCA 502. [60] However, no one principle or set of objectives dominates the analysis. A court should balance the various relevant factors and strike the balance that best achieves justice in the particular case. This is a highly fact-specific exercise in each case. [61] Marriage alone does not automatically entitle a spouse to support upon its dissolution. Further, no single statutory objective is paramount, so both the compensatory and non-compensatory grounds can be

used to justify entitlement. Generally speaking, however, any significant disparity in incomes at the end of a marriage or relationship will usually give rise to an entitlement to some spousal support for some period of time. [62] The leading case law referred to above addressed only entitlement and not the more mundane and difficult issues of amount and duration with which the trial courts are called upon to grapple on a daily basis. [65] In practice, the Federal Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines ["SSAG"] released by the Federal Department of Justice are usually applied in most cases to determine the amount and duration of spousal support [66] The [SSAG] provide two basic formulas for determining the amount and duration of spousal support. The first is the "without child support formula" and the second is the "with child support formula". As the names suggest, the dividing line between the two is the absence or presence of a dependent child and a concurrent child support obligation at the time spousal support is determined. [67] Both formulas use income sharing as the method for determining the amount of spousal support. The formulas then produce ranges for the amount and duration of support, not just a single number. The precise number chosen within that range will be determined by the court depending upon the facts of any particular case. [68] The starting point under both

formulas is the definition of income used in the Federal Child Support Guidelines. Generally speaking a spouse's annual income is determined using the sources of income set out under the heading "total income" and aggregated on line 150 of an individual's income tax return. [129] In this case, the Mother claims entitlement to spousal support on both a compensatory and non-compensatory basis. With respect to the former, she relies on the fact that during their relationship, she was the person who stayed at home and primarily cared for the children while the Father worked outside the home. With respect to the latter, she submits that her ability to earn income "is significantly and negatively impacted by her learning disabilities and physical health issues, all of which she had prior to meeting the [Father]". [130] The Mother invokes case law standing for the proposition that "a spouse who marries knowing that the other has a potential limitation to his or her earning capacity either presently or in later years must bear the consequences of that upon the dissolution of the marriage": Jenkins v. Jenkins, 1999 CanLii 5969 (BCSC) at para.

50. See also McCracken v. Matthew, 2023 BCSC 2203 at para. 43 and R.G.N. v. R.H.N., 2003 BCSC 333. [131] The Father resists spousal support on the basis that it was the Mother's abuse which led to the breakdown of the marriage, the duration of the marriage was short, and that the Mother "is capable of self-efficiency given her work experience, education and ongoing financial support from her parents". [132] I am satisfied that the Mother is entitled to receive spousal support from the Father. [133] First, even accepting his assertions of abuse by the Mother (which I have not found to be the case), subsection 15.2(5) of the DA makes it clear that any such misconduct is not to be taken into consideration when it comes to issues of entitlement. [134] Second, while I am inclined to agree that the claim for compensatory spousal support is weak (there is little or no evidence supporting any finding of "foregone careers or missed opportunities"), there are strong grounds for a non-compensatory spousal support award in this case. I have already described the challenges confronting the Mother's ability to find and maintain employment in the past and the same challenges will continue to confront her in the future. She is reliant upon social assistance and financial support from her parents and this too is likely to continue in the future. In many respects, this is a classic case for

non-compensatory spousal support. [135] Attached as Appendix A to these Reasons for Judgment is the DivorceMate Software printout reflecting the parties current actual/imputed income and the child support/spousal support outcomes in the shared parenting scenario pursuant to both the Guidelines and the SSAG. With respect to the latter, the SSAG formula produces a range for spousal support of $529-$964 per month for an indefinite (unspecified) duration ranging from a minimum of four years to a maximum of 17 years from the date of separation. [136] Attached to these Reasons for Judgment and marked as Appendix B are the DivorceMate Software calculations respecting child support and spousal support based on the parties' imputed income of $85,000 (Father) and $21,315 (Mother) as of July 1, 2025. As will be seen, child support on a "straight set off" basis increases to $975 a month and spousal support ranges from a low of $388 a month to a high of $942 a month. [137] As with child support, the Father has not paid any spousal support to the Mother since the date of separation. As noted, the Mother is now claiming both retroactive and future spousal support in addition to child support. [138] The considerations with regard to the suitability of retroactive spousal support are similar to the "D.B.S. factors" applicable to retroactive awards of child support, although the weighing of

those factors can differ depending on concerns over notice, delay and misconduct: Kerr v. Baranow, 2011 SCC 10 at paras. 207-208. As with child support, hardship occasioned by any retroactive award will be taken into account. [139] It will be recalled that s. 15.3 of the DA accords priority to child support when determining any application for spousal support. Where such priority results in an otherwise reduced spousal support order, or none at all, subsection 15.3(2) of the Act requires that the court to explain why such a determination has been made. [140] The simple fact of the matter is that, given his current income, debt load and household budget, the Father is going to find it very challenging to meet his child support obligations. [141] I have already taken the hardship factor into account in reducing the retroactive award of child support and in postponing any payments on that account until his anticipated return to full-time work. To impose a spousal support obligation upon him at this time, let alone any retroactive award in this regard, would very likely be the proverbial final straw that breaks the already overburdened camel's back. I am satisfied that in such circumstances the Father would very likely have insufficient funds to meet his own basic needs and those of the children when they are with him during his parenting time. Hense, spousal support must yield to

child support at least until the Father can establish himself in full-time employment remunerating him at a higher rate than is currently the case. [142] For these reasons, although I have found that entitlement exists for a spousal support order in favour of the Mother, I decline to make such an order at this time so that the Father's child support obligation might be given priority in the circumstances. However, the spousal support claim should be reviewed in three years time, at which time the parties must make full disclosure of their financial circumstances (including a properly completed and updated form F8 Financial Statement) with such further discovery of witnesses and documents as the parties may agree or the court might order. Family Debt and Family Property [143] The DA does not address division of property and/or debt and any such issues between the parties are therefore governed by Parts 5 and 6 of the FLA. [144] Section 81 of the FLA contemplates an equal entitlement to family property and equal responsibility for family debt: Equal entitlement and responsibility 81 Subject to an agreement or order that provides otherwise and except as set out in this Part and Part 6 [Pension Division], (a) spouses are both entitled to family property and responsible for family debt, regardless of their respective use or contribution, and (b) on separation, each spouse has a

right to an undivided half interest in all family property as a tenant in common, and is equally responsible for family debt. [145] Section 84 of the FLA defines family property: Family property 84 (1) Subject to section 85 [excluded property], family property is all real property and personal property as follows: (a) on the date the spouses separate, (i) property that is owned by at least one spouse, or (ii) a beneficial interest of at least one spouse in property; (b) after separation, (i) property acquired by at least one spouse if the property is derived from property referred to in paragraph (a) (i) or from a beneficial interest referred to in paragraph (a) (ii), or from the disposition of either, or (ii) a beneficial interest acquired by at least one spouse in property if the beneficial interest is derived from property referred to in paragraph (a) (i) or from a beneficial interest referred to in paragraph (a) (ii), or from the disposition of either. [146] Section 85 of the FLA provides for "excluded property" which is not subject to division following separation of spouses: Excluded property 85 (1) The following is excluded from family property: (b) inheritances to a spouse; (b.1) gifts to a spouse from a third party; (2) A spouse claiming that property is excluded property is responsible for demonstrating that the property is excluded property. [147] Section 86 of the

FLA defines "family debt": Family debt 86 Family debt includes all financial obligations incurred by a spouse (a) during the period beginning when the relationship between the spouses begins and ending when the spouses separate, and (b) after the date of separation, if incurred for the purpose of maintaining family property. [148] During their relationship the parties appear to have kept their respective bank accounts, credit cards and debt separate. The Mother was not aware of the debt or other liabilities owed by the Father, whether related to his credit card accounts, line of credit or any loan agreement related to his vehicle, a 2019 Volkswagen Golf. She had no access to his bank or credit card statements. [149] In 2018, the maternal grandfather gifted the Mother a 2010 Ford Escape motor vehicle with an estimated value of $4,000 and a current value of approximately $2,000 (as set out in her form F8 Financial Statement). The Father agrees this is excluded property. [150] It is also undisputed that, · during the marriage, the Father contributed to CPP through his employment while the Mother made no such contributions as a result of being unemployed; and, · after the date of separation (January 2021), the Father disposed of certain family property without the Mother's knowledge or consent (and without providing her any proceeds of disposition) including: · the 2019 Volkswagen

Golf which was traded in as part of the Father's purchase of a Volkswagen Tiguan in October 2021 the trade-in allowance was $18,500; · his RRSP ($10,595.67); · his DPSP ($1167.53); and, · certain Employee Stocks ($913.67). [151] Some of these stocks were purchased after separation and hence would be excluded property. The evidence did not precisely delineate the amounts involved. [152] While the Father's form F8 Financial Statement dated April 16, 2024 set out his current debt balances (approximately $61,330 as at that date), he did not testify at trial regarding outstanding debt as at the date of separation (January 2021). At least three of the credit cards he lists were acquired following separation, as was the financing for the Volkswagen Tiguan. He did not testify under oath about any outstanding balance on the Tangerine MasterCard and the Tangerine line of credit as of January 2021. Likewise, no evidence under oath was provided regarding any outstanding financing on the Volkswagen Golf, although on his April 16, 2024 financial statement, the Father claimed a "negative equity of $3,600" (without explaining if and how that related to its assigned trade-in value of $18,500 in October 2021). [153] In final submissions, the Mother sought the following: · a compensation payment from the Father of $15,588 representing her half interest in the trade-in value/disposition proceeds

of the Volkswagen Golf, Motorola Employee Stocks, RRSP and DPSP; · equalization of CPP based on May 1, 2015 as the date of cohabitation and the January 2021 date of separation determined by the court; · the parties each retain all other property in their name or possession as their sole and separate property; and, · the parties would each be responsible for their own debts. [154] While the Father did not testify to these matters under oath at trial, his final written submissions purported to provide details regarding his financial situation that did not appear in his 2024 Financial Statement. In particular, he submitted: · the financial assets were disposed of to pay off outstanding debt on credit cards and/or cover other immediate expenses for the family; · the aggregate Tangerine debt in January 2021 was $5,760 and the "negative equity" of $3,600 was the net trade-in value of the Volkswagen Golf after deducting the outstanding debt on its financing contract (apparently detailed on the purchase contract for the Volkswagen Tiguan, a screenshot of which was marked as Exhibit 5 but on which the figures are so small as to be illegible). [155] I acknowledge that this additional "evidence" by the Father is technically inadmissible and that counsel for the Mother did not have an opportunity to cross-examine the Father on some of these details that he later provided in submissions.

Nevertheless, it often happens in family law cases involving self represented litigants that the court must resort to "rough justice" that includes a relaxed approach to the technical rules of evidence. [156] In the result, I choose to give weight to the Father's submissions because it is highly likely family debt existed at the time of separation which was later rolled over by subsequent dealings (including credits derived from financial asset disposition proceeds) and it is highly likely that the Volkswagen Golf had a net negative trade-in value after deducting the outstanding balance on the vehicle financing. [157] I therefore decline to grant compensation to the Mother on account of family property or debt as at the date of separation and instead order that each party will retain the property and debt in their respective names and that the parties CPP credit will be divided equally based on May 1, 2015 being the date of cohabitation and the date of separation that has been determined by this court. [158] I also order that: 1. Each party will remain solely responsible for the debts in their own names, shall not pledge the credit of the other, and shall hold the other harmless for any debts in their name whether arising during the marriage or post-separation; and, 2. Each party will indemnify the other from liability for the other party's personal tax liability incurred

before, during or after the marriage. Conduct Orders [159] The Mother seeks various conduct orders pursuant to the FLA which she claims would be in the children's best interests and would: · decrease the high-conflict nature of the parties' relationship; · assist the parties becoming better co-parents by creating a framework for communication which will help prevent misunderstandings and further conflict; · foster a collaborative and loving environment in each party's home conducive to the healthy growth and development of the children; · provide the children with a sense of stability and consistency between households; and, · prioritize the children's needs above the parties' needs, thereby promoting the children's sense of security and belonging. [160] The Mother particularly invokes ss. 222(b), 225 and 227 as the basis for the Court's jurisdiction to grant orders managing negative behaviours, communication protocols, and any other matters promoting positive resolution of any future disputes. [161] Relying on the above FLA provisions, the Mother seeks the following orders: 1. the parties will communicate regarding parenting issues only through the co-parenting application, Our Family Wizard, except in the case of emergencies in which case the parties may communicate with each other in the most efficient way possible, including by telephone; 2. the parties will at all times

communicate with each other in a courteous and respectful manner and will refrain from blaming, accusing, insulting or making disparaging or negative comments about the other parent and/or their family members, friends or new partners directly to the children or in their presence, which include comments by one party attributing blame to the other for the breakdown of the marriage; 3. the parties will: (a) put the best interests of the children before their own interest; (b) encourage the children to have a good relationship with the other parent and speak to the children about the other parent in a positive and respectful manner; and, (c) will make best efforts to dissuade any third parties from speaking negatively about the other party to the children directly or in their presence. 4. the parties will not: (a) ask the children about the other party; (b) relay messages intended for the other party to the children; (c) directly or indirectly discuss the matrimonial litigation or any dispute between the parties with the children; (d) discuss any inappropriate adult matters with the children; and, (e) discuss plans or changes to the parenting schedule, activities or education with the children that have not already been agreed to by the other party. [162] The Father objects to the proposed conduct orders, saying they are "excessive and unnecessary". He particularly objects to any

"requirement to use a specific co-parenting app with high subscription fees" which he says would "impose an undue financial burden". [163] The Ontario Chapter of the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts has produced a social science-based "Parenting Plan Guide" (AFCC Ontario, December 2021) which is frequently referred to by the courts in Ontario and which I also endorsed in L.V.J. v. E.M.S., 2023 BCSC 2087 at para.

86. I am given to understand that a similar guide is "under construction" by the British Columbia chapter of the AFCC. In any event, it might be helpful to the parties to reproduce here the following observations regarding communications found on page 12 of the Ontario version of the guide: Some separated parents are able to maintain warm and friendly relations with each other, but for many, their relationship is likely to be strained, especially in the period following the separation. Even if parents have a good relationship, there will be disagreements. Despite disagreements, especially if parents have a strained relationship, it is important for children that their parents communicate effectively and respectfully. Often much communication between separated co-parents is by email, text or other electronic communication. There is a lot of information available to help co-parents communicate effectively. One central theme is to focus communications on the specific matters at issue and avoid negative comments about the other person. It may be helpful for parents to see themselves as partners working together. The communication should reflect the common goal of moving forward with child rearing with minimal conflict. A helpful slogan is that such communication should be "BIFF": Brief, Informative, Friendly and Firm. If the other party is making derogatory comments, it is not

helpful to "respond in kind". Instead, each parent should use their best efforts to "take the high road". Consider how the other parent may feel and react before sending a text or email. One way to think about communications with the other parent is to imagine how a judge might later view the exchanges. Would a judge view your emails as cranking things up and focused on the other parent, or calming them down and child-focused? [164] The simple fact of the matter is that the children involved in this case are still young and the parents will necessarily be required to communicate and cooperate regarding parenting matters for many years to come. If the parents' relationship remains strained and/or high conflict in nature, then a court-imposed communication protocol will likely be helpful. Nevertheless, detailed conduct orders can also be a source of continued conflict, with frustrated parents often applying to court for sanctions such as fine for each breach that may occur, whether minor or major in nature. [165] As well, judicial exhortation regarding conduct and communications are often so vague in nature that they are incapable of enforcement even if they are embodied in a court order. [166] Nevertheless, I agree that in this case a conduct order such as the one sought by the Mother may be helpful, at least until such time as the parties agree that it is no longer necessary. I

therefore grant the conduct order in the terms sought by the Mother, except I would start the first sentence of paragraph one above with the phrase "Until such time as the parties agree otherwise in writing, ". Summary and Conclusion [167] For ease of reference, I repeat here all of the orders made in these Reasons for Judgment: Divorce 1. An order for divorce is granted effective on the 31st day following the day on which these Reasons for Judgment are released; Separation Date 2. The date of the parties' separation for the purposes of this family law case is January 30, 2021; Guardianship 3. Both the Mother and Father are and will each remain the children's guardians; Parenting Time 4. The children will have parenting time with the Mother from Monday after school until Friday morning at school drop-off; 5. The children will have parenting time with the Father from Friday after school until Monday morning at school drop-off; 6. On Monday mornings, the Father will be responsible for dropping off the children at school; 7. On Monday afternoons the Mother will be responsible for picking up the children at school; 8. On Friday mornings, the Mother will be responsible for dropping off the children at school; 9. On Friday afternoons the father will be responsible for picking up the children from school; 10. This schedule will also apply for all statutory holidays or professional

development days (or any other days off school) which may fall on a Monday or Friday. It will also apply during spring break and winter break from school. On all such Mondays the Father will be responsible for dropping off the children at the Mother's home at 10 a.m., and on all such Fridays the Mother will be responsible for dropping off the children at the Father's home at 3 p.m.; 11. For the summer school holidays, each parent is entitled to two uninterrupted alternating periods of 14 days each. Starting in 2024, the Mother will have the first two week period, the Father will have the second, the Mother will have the third and the Father will have the fourth, following which the regular parenting schedule set out above will resume. The schedule will be reversed in the year 2025 and thereafter will rotate annually; 12. On Christmas Eve and Christmas Day, one parent will have parenting time with the children from 12 p.m. on December 24 until 12 p.m. on December 25 and the other parent will have parenting time with the children from 12 p.m. on December 25 through to 12 p.m. on December 26. In 2025 the first scheduled parenting time will be with the Mother and the second with the Father, and the schedule will also rotate annually. Each parent will be responsible for picking up the children from the other parent's care at the start of their respective parenting time; 13. The

Mother is permitted to take L.P.W.S. to his Watermelon Group events or other autism events up to the maximum of two weekend days per month, even if the even conflicts with his regular parenting time with his Father. The Mother must provide the Father with no less than 72 hours notice of any such events and she will be responsible for picking the son up from the Father's care and promptly returning him to that care after the conclusion of the event(s); 14. This schedule is subject to change by written consent of both parties whether on an ad hoc basis for particular times/events or more generally as a permanent change to the schedule set above; Parental Responsibilities and Decision-Making Authority 15. During their respective parenting time, each of the Mother and the Father will be solely responsible for the following matters: a. having day-to-day care, control and supervision of the children and making all necessary day-to-day decisions affecting them; b. making decisions respecting where the children will reside and with whom the children will associate, provided that both parties will notify the other beforehand of any proposed change of address where the children will reside or stay and of any other adults living in their residence who will be sharing living space with the children; c. making emergency health decisions for the children with the other parent is not

available for immediate consultation; d. receiving and responding to any notice that a parent or guardian is entitled or required by law to receive; e. giving, refusing or withdrawing consent for the children in relation to any activities proposed to be undertaken during their parenting time 16. Both parents must discuss and try to agree on any of the following significant decisions that may have to be made concerning the children; m. decisions respecting the children's cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage; n. decisions respecting the children's education and participation in extracurricular activities, including the nature, extent, location and cost thereof; o. subject to s. 17 of the Infants Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 223, giving, refusing or withdrawing consent to medical dental and other health‑related treatments for the children; p. applying for a passport, license, permit, benefit, privilege or other similar matter for the children; q. giving, refusing or withdrawing any required consent for the children on matters other than activities during each parent's parenting time; r. subject to any applicable provincial legislation, i. starting, defending, compromising or settling any proceeding relating to the children; and, ii. identifying, advancing and protecting the children's slip legal and financial interests.

17. In the event that, despite their best efforts and the involvement of any parenting counsellor they may have retained, the parents are unable to reach agreement on any of the significant matters listed above, then the Mother will be entitled to make those decisions and the Father will have the right to apply to this court, if he so wishes, for a determination of the matter in the best interests of the children; 18. The Mother is to ensure the children at all times have current Canadian passports and, if regulations allow and the Father wishes, an appropriate German or European passport to facilitate travel in Europe. These passports must remain in the possession and control of the Mother except where they are required by the Father for any agreed upon sojourning in Europe. For all such sojourning, the Father must provide to the Mother a detailed itinerary including the address(es) where the children will be residing/sleeping and the names of the persons with whom they will generally be associating. During all such international travel, the Father must make arrangements for the children to have private Zoom or other video-conferencing with the Mother for at least 15 minutes at a mutually convenient time every second day of the travel; Child Support 19. For as long as the shared parenting regime continues, the amount of child support will be determined by a set-off of the

parties' income, actual or imputed; 20. The retroactive award (to the end of June, 2024), which would otherwise be in the amount of $33,300, is, as a result of hardship considerations, set at $20,000, however payment of that award is suspended until the Father returns to full-time work or such other time as this court may determine upon application of either party; 21. Payment of retroactive award, once triggered, may be made in increments of a minimum of $500 per month or such higher amounts as the parties may agree or as ordered by the court on application of either party; 22. Commencing July 1, 2024, and on the first day of each month thereafter, the monthly amount of child support payable by the Father to the Mother is $848.00; 23. No later than June 1st every year hereafter, the parties must exchange their income information and related tax return and earnings statements, as required by the Guidelines, and the child support shall be adjusted to reflect the amount produced by setting off their respective Line 15000 income, to be effective July 1st of each year; 24. If the Father's Line 15000 income is less than or equal to $85,000, his income for annual child support adjustment purposes will be imputed at $85,000; 25. If the Mother's Line 15000 income is less than or equal to $21,315, her income for annual child support adjustment purposes will be imputed at

$21,315; Section 7 Expenses 26. The following expenses are s. 7 special or extraordinary expenses that must be paid by the parties in proportion to their respective Line 15000as imputed income (currently 73% by the Father and 27% by the Mother): · that portion of the Father's medical and dental insurance premiums attributable to the children; · medical and dental expenses, including: iii. prescription drugs; iv. regular dental check-ups, cleaning and care, after deducting the amount covered by the Father's extended health and dental plan and/or the Canada Dental Benefits program; · expenses related to the L.P.W.S.'s autism therapy, including Watermelon Sessions, Watermelon Group Events and other Autism Events, after the annual $6,000 funding has been exhausted, up to a maximum of $400 per annum; 27. The Father must fill out any necessary forms or provide any necessary permissions to allow the Mother to seek reimbursement directly through any such benefit provider; 28. The Mother will submit the receipts to the benefit providers and notify the Father of any amounts not covered, whereupon the Father will then pay to the Mother his proportionate share of any costs which are not reimbursed; 29. Any additional special or extraordinary expense of the sort contemplated by s. 7 of the Guidelines are also to be payable by the parents on a proportionate basis provided both parties first

agree in writing beforehand to the expense being incurred; Spousal Support 30. Although the Mother has established entitlement to a spousal support order, no such order is made at this time so that the Father's child support obligation might be given priority; 31. However, the spousal support claim should be reviewed in three years time, at which time the parties must make full disclosure of their financial circumstances (including a properly completed and updated form F8 Financial Statement) with such further discovery of witnesses and documents as the parties may agree or the court might order; Family Debt and Family Property 32. The Mother's claim for a compensation order is dismissed; 33. Each party will retain the property and debt in their respective names and the parties' CPP credit will be divided equally based on May 1, 2015 being the date of cohabitation and the date of separation that has been determined by this court; 34. Each party will remain solely responsible for the debts in their own names, shall not pledge the credit of the other, and shall hold the other harmless for any debts in their name whether arising during the marriage or post-separation; 35. Each party will indemnify the other from liability for the other party's personal tax liability incurred before, during or after the marriage; Conduct Orders 36. Until such time as the parties otherwise agree in

writing the parties will communicate regarding parenting issues only through the co-parenting application, Our Family Wizard, except in the case of emergencies in which case the parties must communicate with each other in the most efficient way possible, including by telephone; 37. The parties will at all times communicate with each other in a courteous and respectful manner and will refrain from blaming, accusing, insulting or making disparaging or negative comments about the other parent and/or their family members, friends or new partners directly to the children or in their presence, which include comments by one party attributing blame to the other for the breakdown of the marriage; 38. The parties will: (a) put the best interests of the children before their own interest; (b) encourage the children to have a good relationship with the other parent and speak to the children about the other parent in a positive and respectful manner; and, (c) make best efforts to dissuade any third parties from speaking negatively about the other party to the children directly or in their presence.

39. The parties will not: (a) ask the children about the other party; (b) relay messages intended for the other party to the children; (c) directly or indirectly discuss the matrimonial litigation or any dispute between the parties with the children; (d) discuss any inappropriate adult matters with the children; and, (e) discuss plans or changes to the parenting schedule, activities or education with the children that have not already been agreed to by the other party. [168] The general rule in family law cases is that costs of the proceeding are generally awarded to the party who has achieved substantial success at trial. However, the court may depart from the general rule when the circumstances justify a different approach, including such factors as hardship, conduct of the parties in the litigation, the existence of settlement offers, and the importance of not upsetting any balance achieved by the award. [169] In this case, the Father accuses the Mother of "litigation abuse" perpetrated mostly at the instance of the maternal grandparents. No such "abuse" was evident during the trial and, indeed, the litigation appears to have been triggered by the Father's unreasonable refusal to pay any child support whatsoever. [170] In the circumstances, it appears that the Mother is the substantially successful party in this litigation and I see no reason why the court should depart from

the general rule that costs should follow the event and should be assessed in accordance with Appendix B of the Supreme Court Family Rules on the scale of "ordinary difficulty". [171] Should either party wish to contest such an outcome, they are granted liberty to apply for a different order, however if no such application is filed within 30 days of the date of these Reasons for Judgment, costs are awarded as set out above. "Kent J." Appendix A Appendix B