Sweet v. Canada (Attorney General)

Sweet v. Canada (Attorney General) Court (s) Database Federal Court of Appeal Decisions Date 2005-02-07 Neutral citation 2005 FCA 51 File numbers A-8-04 Notes Digest Decision Content Date: 20050207 Docket: A-8-04 Citation: 2005 FCA 51 CORAM: ROTHSTEIN J.A. NOËL J.A. MALONE J.A. BETWEEN: JAMES A. SWEET Appellant and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA, THE CORRECTIONAL SERVICE OF CANADA, THE COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTIONS, LUCIE McCLUNG, FRED TOBIN, JAN LOOMAN, MAURICE GIROUX, BELINDA ROSCOE, and MIKE KER Respondents Heard at Toronto, Ontario, on January 19, 2005. Judgment delivered at Ottawa, Ontario, on February 7, 2005. REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: MALONE J.A. CONCURRED IN BY: ROTHSTEIN J.A. NOËL J.A. Date: 20050207 Docket: A-8-04 Citation: 2005 FCA 51 CORAM: ROTHSTEIN J.A. NOËL J.A. MALONE J.A. BETWEEN: JAMES A. SWEET Appellant and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA, THE CORRECTIONAL SERVICE OF CANADA, THE COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTIONS, LUCIE McCLUNG, FRED TOBIN, JAN LOOMAN, MAURICE GIROUX, BELINDA ROSCOE, and MIKE KER Respondents REASONS FOR JUDGMENT MALONE J.A. I. INTRODUCTION [1] This appeal concerns the right of a prisoner to be heard prior to his discharge from a treatment program. II. FACTS [2] Mr. Sweet is an inmate at Warkworth Penitentiary because of his conviction as a repeat sex offender. Warkworth Penitentiary is his 'parent' or 'home' institution. To speed his release, he voluntarily entered the Sexual Offenders Programme (the RTC Programme), which provided for thirty weeks of treatment. This program required that he move to the Regional Treatment Centre (the RTC) located at Kingston, Ontario, which is a fully accredited psychiatric hospital operated under the Ontario Mental Health Act. [3] Prior to entering the RTC Programme, the appellant signed a "Treatment Contract" that outlined the scope of the group and individual treatments he would receive. Among its terms was an acknowledgement that threatening behaviour directed towards other inmates could be grounds for dismissal from the RTC Programme. [4] This contract also satisfied requirements established by the Correctional Service of Canada (the CSC) at paragraph 7 of the Standard Operating Practices (SOP) 700-15, which reads as follows: 7. Prior to a transfer to a regional health/psychiatric centre to participate in a program or an assessment or to receive health care services, the offender shall be clearly informed that upon completion of the program or assessment or the provision of the required health services, he or she will be returned to his or her parent institution. Furthermore, the offender shall be advised that failure to fully participate in programming, in cases where that is the purpose of the transfer, may result in a discharge from the program and return to his or her parent institution. In some cases, it may be necessary to temporarily house an offender in another institution for a short period of time before returning him or her to the parent institution. Every movement between institutions requires a transfer warrant. 7. Avant qu'un délinquant ne soit transféré à un centre de santé ou centre psychiatrique régional pour y participer à un programme, y subir une évaluation ou y recevoir des soins de santé, il doit être clairement informé qu'une fois le programme, l'évaluation ou le traitement terminé, il sera renvoyé à son établissement d'origine. De plus, lorsque le transfèrement vise à permettre au délinquant de participer à un programme particulier, il faut l'informer que son manque de participation active à ce programme pourrait entraîner son renvoi du programme et son retour à son établissement d'origine. Dans certains cas, il peut être nécessaire d'héberger le délinquant temporairement dans un autre établissement avant de le renvoyer à son établissement d'origine. Chaque fois qu'un délinquant est déplacé d'un établissement à l'autre, il faut émettre un mandat de transfèrement. [5] Within five days of his arrival, another inmate complained that Mr. Sweet had subjected him to verbal and physical abuse. An investigation by the Program Director immediately followed and a meeting was held in which the appellant gave his version of the events and was advised that a recommendation for his return to Warkworth Penitentiary was being considered. The Program Director concluded that Mr. Sweet had indeed used threatening language and accordingly had failed to comply with the behavioural expectations outlined in his Treatment Contract. [6] On November 22, 2000, the Acting Deputy Warden made the decision to discharge Mr. Sweet from the RTC Programme. On November 23, 2000, he was informed of this decision as well as the reasons for the discharge. That same day, a return transfer warrant was executed and Mr. Sweet was returned to Warkworth Penitentiary. [7] Mr. Sweet was not granted an opportunity to respond to the decision to discharge him from the RTC Programme prior to his return to Warkworth Penitentiary and maintains that he was falsely accused. No force was used to remove him from the RTC premises. While he agreed to leave, he stated that he would be contacting his lawyer. Upon returning to his parent institution, he launched a grievance wherein he complained that he was involuntarily transferred from the RTC to Warkworth Penitentiary without compliance with section 12 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Regulations, SOR/92-620 (the Regulations), which he alleges requires his input prior to relocation. [8] At the final-level grievance, it was determined by a delegate of the Commissioner of the CSC (the Commissioner) that Mr. Sweet's transfer was involuntary and that he was not granted an opportunity to respond to the notification of the proposed transfer. Nevertheless, it was also determined that the decision to transfer him from the RTC back to Warkworth Penitentiary was justified as he had failed to maintain behavioural expectations while at the RTC. III. THE DECISION UNDER APPEAL [9] Mr. Sweet sought judicial review of the final-level grievance decision before the Federal Court, requesting that his involuntary transfer be quashed and that an order directing his return to the RTC be issued. In detailed reasons dated December 10, 2003 (reported as Sweet v. Canada (Attorney General) et al. (2003), 244 F.T.R. 285), a judge of the Federal Court (the Applications Judge) concluded that the Commissioner's final-level grievance decision was flawed. She concluded that the discharge from the RTC and the transportation back to Warkworth Penitentiary was not an involuntary transfer. Conducting a purposive and contextual reading of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, S.C. 1992, c. 20 (the Act), she found that transfers only apply to situations when it is expected that an inmate will be permanently housed in a new parent institution until released or further transferred. [10] Therefore, the Applications Judge determined that there was no transfer, but rather an escorted temporary absence from the parent institution. Paragraphs 9(a) and (f) of the Regulations authorize escorted temporary absences from an institution for medical reasons and for personal development for rehabilitative purposes, respectively. Those paragraphs read as follows: 9. For the purposes of paragraph 17(1)(b) of the Act, the institutional head may authorize an escorted temporary absence of an inmate 9. Pour l'application de l'alinéa 17(1)b) de la Loi, le directeur du pénitencier peut autoriser le détenu à sortir sous surveillance : (a) for medical reasons to allow the inmate to undergo medical examination or treatment that cannot reasonably be provided in the penitentiary; ... a) pour des raisons médicales, afin de lui permettre de subir un examen ou un traitement médical qui ne peut raisonnablement être effectué au pénitencier; (f) for personal development for rehabilitative purposes to allow the inmate to participate in specific treatment activities with the goal of reducing the risk of the inmate re-offending, and to allow the inmate to participate in activities of a rehabilitative nature, including cultural and spiritual ceremonies unique to Aboriginal peoples, with the goal of assisting the reintegration of the inmate into the community as a law-abiding citizen; f) pour du perfectionnement personnel lié à sa réadaptation, afin de lui permettre de participer à des activités liées à un traitement particulier dans le but de réduire le risque de récidive ou afin de lui permettre de participer à des activités de réadaptation, y compris les cérémonies culturelles ou spirituelles propres aux autochtones, dans le but de favoriser sa réinsertion sociale à titre de citoyen respectueux des lois; [11] Accordingly, the Applications Judge found that the appellant's discharge from the RTC Programme was not an involuntary transfer and remitted the matter back to the Commissioner for a redetermination of the final-level grievance. IV. ANALYSIS Standard of Review [12] When reviewing judicial decisions, this Court applies the rules of appellate review as articulated in Housen v. Nikolaisen, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235. Questions of law are to be reviewed on a correctness standard while questions of fact are to be reviewed on a palpable and overriding error standard. Questions of mixed fact and law are generally to be reviewed on a palpable and overriding error standard unless a pure question of law can be extricated, in which case an error is one of law mandating review on a correctness standard. [13] This Court is further required to determine whether the Applications Judge has chosen and applied the correct standard of review, and if not, to assess the administrative body's decision in light of the correct standard of review (see Dr. Q v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 226 at paragraph 43). [14] In assessing the standard of review for prisoners' grievance decisions, the Applications Judge adopted the analysis set out by Lemieux J. in Tehrankari v. Correctional Service of Canada (2000), 188 F.T.R. 206 (T.D.) at paragraph 44. After conducting a pragmatic and functional analysis, Lemieux J. concluded that a correctness standard would apply if the question involved the proper interpretation of the legislation, a standard of reasonableness simpliciter would apply if the question involved an application of the proper legal principles to the facts, and a patently unreasonable standard would apply to pure findings of fact. [15] The Applications Judge determined that the issues in this case required the proper interpretation of the Act and Regulations before that interpretation could be applied to the facts of the situation. This suggests review on a correctness standard and I am in agreement with that assessment. [16] An issue not specifically dealt with by the Applications Judge is whether the appellant was afforded the benefits of natural justice and procedural fairness with regard to the decision to discharge him from the RTC Programme. Questions of procedural fairness are questions of law and require review on a correctness standard (see C.U.P.E. v. Ontario (Minister of Labour), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 539 at paragraph 100). The Purposive and Contextual Approach [17] The appellant's first argument is that the Applications Judge erred in undertaking a purposive and contextual reading of the Act and the Regulations. In my view, the Applications Judge did not err in this regard. Rather, the modern approach to statutory interpretation is that proposed by E. A. Driedger, where "the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament" (Construction of Statutes (2nd ed. 1983), at 87). This approach has been widely endorsed by the Supreme Court of Canada as the preferred approach to statutory interpretation (see for example Alberta Union of Provincial Employees v. Lethbridge Community College, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 727 at paragraph 25). The approach of the Applications Judge to the interpretation of the Act and the Regulations was consistent with this jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada. Application of Section 29 of the Act [18] Mr. Sweet's main argument is that his move to the RTC cannot be construed as anything but a transfer. He argues that the move had all the indicia of a transfer, including the fact that a transfer warrant was required, that all his belongings were removed, that his Warkworth Penitentiary cell was reassigned, and that upon his arrival at the RTC he had a 'new address'. Mr. Sweet's submission is therefore that his return to Warkworth Penitentiary was also a transfer, but in this case an involuntary transfer. [19] As noted above, the Applications Judge concluded that the discharge from the RTC and return to Warkworth Penitentiary was not an involuntary transfer, but part of an escorted temporary absence from the parent institution. With respect, I am unable to agree with this determination. In my view, Mr. Sweet's initial move from Warkworth Penitentiary to the RTC was a 'transfer' within the meaning of section 29 of the Act. [20] Section 29 of the Act provides the Commissioner with the authority to 'transfer' a person from one penitentiary to another penitentiary, provincial correctional facility, or hospital. It states: 29. The Commissioner may authorize the transfer of a person who is sentenced, transferred or committed to a penitentiary to (a) another penitentiary in accordance with the regulations made under paragraph 96(d), subject to section 28; or (b) a provincial correctional facility or hospital in accordance with an agreement entered into under paragraph 16(1)(a) and any applicable regulations. 29. Le commissaire peut autoriser le transfèrement d'une personne condamnée ou transférée au pénitencier, soit à un autre pénitencier, conformément aux règlements pris en vertu de l'alinéa 96d), mais sous réserve de l'article 28, soit à un établissement correctionnel provincial ou un hôpital dans le cadre d'un accord conclu au titre du paragraphe 16(1), conformément aux règlements applicables. [21] Section 12 of the Regulations sets out the procedural requirements that apply before the transfer of an inmate pursuant to section 29 of the Act. These procedural protections apply to transfers that are not conducted at the request of the inmate (i.e. involuntary transfers) and read as follows: 12. Before the transfer of an inmate pursuant to section 29 of the Act, other than a transfer at the request of the inmate, an institutional head or a staff member designated by the institutional head shall 12. Sauf dans le cas du transfèrement demandé par le détenu, le directeur du pénitencier ou l'agent désigné par lui doit, avant le transfèrement du détenu en application de l'article 29 de la Loi : (a) give the inmate written notice of the proposed transfer, including the reasons for the proposed transfer and the proposed destination; a) l'aviser par écrit du transfèrement projeté, des motifs de cette mesure et de la destination; (b) after giving the inmate a reasonable opportunity to prepare representations with respect to the proposed transfer, meet with the inmate to explain the reasons for the proposed transfer and give the inmate an opportunity to make representations with respect to the proposed transfer in person or, if the inmate prefers, in writing; b) après lui avoir donné la possibilité de préparer ses observations à ce sujet, le rencontrer pour lui expliquer les motifs du transfèrement projeté et lui donner la possibilité de présenter ses observations à ce sujet, en personne ou par écrit, au choix du détenu; (c) forward the inmate's representations to the Commissioner or to a staff member designated in accordance with paragraph 5(1)(b); and c) transmettre les observations du détenu au commissaire ou à l'agent désigné selon l'alinéa 5(1)b); (d) give the inmate written notice of the final decision respecting the transfer, and the reasons for the decision, d) l'aviser par écrit de la décision définitive prise au sujet du transfèrement et des motifs de celle-ci : (i) at least two days before the transfer if the final decision is to transfer the inmate, unless the inmate consents to a shorter period; and (i) au moins deux jours avant le transfèrement, sauf s'il consent à un délai plus bref lorsque la décision définitive est de le transférer, (ii) within five working days after the decision if the final decision is not to transfer the inmate. (ii) dans les cinq jours ouvrables suivant la décision, lorsque la décision définitive est de ne pas le transférer. [22] In this appeal, Mr. Sweet voluntarily entered the RTC Programme, and as such, the procedural protections set out in section 12 of the Regulations were not applicable to his transfer from Warkworth Penitentiary to the RTC. In addition, Mr. Sweet's Treatment Contract contemplated a thirty-week program, after which he would be returned to his parent institution. His absence from Warkworth Penitentiary would therefore end upon his discharge from the RTC Programme, whether that be upon completion of the program or pursuant to a breach of contract. [23] Paragraphs 9(a) and (f) of the Regulations (see above at paragraph 10), relied upon by the Applications Judge, provide that an institutional head may authorize an escorted temporary absence pursuant to paragraph 17(1)(b) of the Act. The entirety of subsection 17(1) is relevant and reads as follows: 17. (1) Where, in the opinion of the institutional head, (a) an inmate will not, by reoffending, present an undue risk to society during an absence authorized under this section, (b) it is desirable for the inmate to be absent from penitentiary, escorted by a staff member or other person authorized by the institutional head, for medical, administrative, community service, family contact, personal development for rehabilitative purposes, or compassionate reasons, including parental responsibilities, (c) the inmate's behaviour while under sentence does not preclude authorizing the absence, and (d) a structured plan for the absence has been prepared, the absence may, subject to section 746.1 of the Criminal Code, subsection 140.3(2) of the National Defence Act and subsection 15(2) of the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, be authorized by the institutional head (e) for an unlimited period for medical reasons, or (f) for reasons other than medical, (i) for a period not exceeding five days, or (ii) with the Commissioner's approval, for a period exceeding five days but not exceeding fifteen days. [Emphasis Added.] 17. (1) Sous réserve de l'article 746.1 du Code criminel, du paragraphe 140.3(2) de la Loi sur la défense nationale et du paragraphe 15(2) de la Loi sur les crimes contre l'humanité et les crimes de guerre, le directeur du pénitencier peut autoriser un délinquant à sortir si celui-ci est escorté d'une personne - agent ou autre - habilitée à cet effet par lui lorsque, à son avis_: a) une récidive du délinquant pendant la sortie ne présentera pas un risque inacceptable pour la société; b) il l'estime souhaitable pour des raisons médicales, administratives, de compassion ou en vue d'un service à la collectivité, ou du perfectionnement personnel lié à la réadapta- tion du délinquant, ou pour lui permettre d'établir ou d'entretenir des rapports familiaux notamment en ce qui touche ses responsabilités parentales; c) la conduite du détenu pendant la détention ne justifie pas un refus; d) un projet structuré de sortie a été établi. La permission est accordée soit pour une période maximale de cinq jours ou, avec l'autorisation du commissaire, de quinze jours, soit pour une période indéterminée s'il s'agit de raisons médicales. [Je souligne.] [24] It is apparent that both subsection 17(1) of the Act and section 9 of the Regulations create a distinction between absences for medical reasons and absences for personal development for rehabilitative purposes. In the present appeal, Mr. Sweet's move from Warkworth Penitentiary to the RTC was not for medical reasons; rather, it was to provide personal development for rehabilitative purposes. As set out in paragraph 17(1)(f) of the Act, such an absence may not exceed a maximum period of fifteen days. Accordingly, Mr. Sweet's move to the RTC for a thirty-week treatment program cannot be said to be an escorted temporary absence from his parent institution pursuant to this section. [25] In my analysis, Mr. Sweet's move from Warkworth Penitentiary to the RTC is properly characterized as a 'transfer' pursuant to section 29 of the Act, even though it was only of a temporary nature. I find nothing in the Act or Regulations to suggest that a 'transfer' pursuant to section 29 must be permanent in nature; and while the majority of 'transfers' may be permanent, the section does not exclude the possibility of a temporary 'transfer'. [26] However, the decision to discharge Mr. Sweet from the RTC Programme cannot be said to constitute a decision to 'transfer' him back to the parent institution. Rather, once the discharge decision was made, the temporary nature of his initial voluntary 'transfer' necessitated an expeditious return to his parent institution. A return to his parent institution was contemplated in the initial voluntary 'transfer' and occurred as a matter of course once he was discharged from the RTC Programme pursuant to a breach of the Treatment Contract. [27] I am further comforted in this analysis by the wording of paragraph 7 of SOP 700-15, which speaks of a 'transfer' to a regional health or psychiatric centre and a 'return' to the parent institution (see above at paragraph 4). The fact that a transfer warrant is required for any move, including a return to a parent institution, is a mere administrative formality and does not imply a 'transfer' pursuant to section 29 of the Act in all cases. [28] A purposive and contextual analysis of the Act and Regulations also supports this conclusion. In situations where a transfer of a temporary nature is contemplated, characterizing the return of an inmate to his or her parent institution as a further 'transfer' pursuant to section 29 of the Act would create serious administrative and logistical difficulties that would frustrate the functioning of treatment facilities such as the RTC. Characterized as a 'transfer', an inmate who had successfully completed a treatment program could refuse to voluntarily return to his or her parent institution. This would give rise to the procedural requirements set out in section 12 of the Regulations. To ensure the safe and efficient functioning of treatment facilities, inmates discharged from a treatment program must be removed from the treatment facility and promptly returned to their parent institution. Therefore, section 12 of the Regulations cannot apply when an inmate is returned to his or her parent institution upon discharge from an RTC treatment program. The Discharge Decision - The Duty of Procedural Fairness [29] This is not to say that Mr. Sweet will not be afforded the benefits of procedural fairness with respect to the decision to discharge him from the RTC Programme. The real question here is whether the appellant was provided an opportunity to respond to the allegations made against him prior to the decision to discharge him from the RTC Programme. This issue was not dealt with by the Applications Judge. [30] I think that there are two options available to this Court with respect to the procedural fairness issue. One is to remit the matter to the Applications Judge for a determination of the procedural fairness question. The other is for this Court to exercise the discretion the Applications Judge could have exercised to determine whether Mr. Sweet was afforded the appropriate level of procedural fairness. Since the matter has been outstanding since November 2000 and since this panel is in as good a position as the Applications Judge to conduct this analysis, I will proceed to finally dispose of the matter. [31] Every public authority making an administrative decision that affects the rights, privileges or interests of an individual has a duty to comply with the rules of natural justice and to follow rules of procedural fairness (see Cardinal v. Director of Kent Institution, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 643 at 653). However, as L'Heureux-Dubé J. noted in Knight v. Indian Head School Division No. 19, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 653 at 682, "the concept of procedural fairness is eminently variable and its content is to be decided in the specific context of each case". [32] The content of the duty of fairness on a public body, such as the CSC, was set out by L'Heureux-Dubé J. in Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 and was recently summarized by McLachlin C.J. in Congrégation des témoins de Jéhovah de St-Jérôme-Lafontaine v. Lafontaine (Village), [2004] 2 S.C.R. 650 at paragraph 5. Accordingly, the content of the duty of fairness varies according to five factors: (1) the nature of the decision and the decision-making process employed; (2) the nature of the statutory scheme and the precise statutory provisions pursuant to which the public body operates; (3) the importance of the decision to the individuals affected; (4) the legitimate expectations of the party challenging the decision; and (5) the nature of the deference accorded to the body. [33] In this case, an assessment of these factors suggests that the level of procedural fairness to be accorded to the appellant is relatively low. [34] First, the nature of the decision and the decision-making process employed is a primary consideration in this appeal. Within a prison setting, procedural fairness does not require the same level of participation when undertaking an administrative decision as opposed to a decision with respect to a disciplinary charge (Gallant v. Canada (Deputy Commissioner, Correctional Service Canada), [1989] 3 F.C. 329 at 342 (C.A.)). In Gallant, Marceau J.A. noted that "to appreciate the practical requirements of the audi alteram partem principle, it is wrong to put on the same level all administrative decisions involving inmates in penitentiaries". [35] The decision to discharge Mr. Sweet from the RTC Programme was a decision predicated by a breach of behavioural conditions set out in SOP 700-15 and included in the Treatment Contract. The rules and behavioural conditions are included in the Treatment Contract to ensure the safe and efficient functioning of the treatment programs and the maintenance of good order within the treatment facility. The nature of the discharge decision is therefore more akin to an administrative transfer decision than to a formal disciplinary decision. The decision-making process involved an investigation by the Program Director, a meeting with the inmate, and a final decision by the Acting Deputy Warden. [36] Second, the statutory scheme provides an inmate with the ability to appeal an administrative decision by way of a grievance mechanism. The availability of a grievance process provides an inmate with a further opportunity to submit a written complaint in which he or she can raise issues relevant to the decision and make further representations. [37] Third, the importance of the decision to the individual affected is relatively moderate. While the completion of the RTC Programme is part of Mr. Sweet's correctional plan, he remains eligible to reapply for treatment at the RTC in the future. [38] Fourth, there are no indications that any promises or regular practices were breached in the decision-making process. Mr. Sweet's procedural expectations could only be founded on the Treatment Contract that he signed and the grievance process set out in the Regulations; both of which were applied and followed in this case. [39] Finally, there is no formal decision-making process set out in the legislation for making these kinds of routine administrative decisions. Since the institutional head has expertise in dealing with these types of behavioural issues, some deference should be accorded to the decision-making processes that have been created. [40] During the investigation into the alleged incident, Mr. Sweet was informed that a recommendation for his return to Warkworth Penitentiary was being considered and he was provided with the opportunity to respond. In my analysis, providing the appellant with an opportunity to confront the allegations made against him prior to the decision being made and an opportunity to make further representations by way of a grievance process is sufficient to ensure that the requisite level of procedural fairness was provided. V. Conclusion [41] The appellant asks for costs against the respondent's solicitor. There is no merit to this request. [42] I would dismiss the appeal with costs. "B. Malone" J.A. "I agree Marshall Rothstein J.A." "I agree Marc Noël J.A." FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL Names of Counsel and Solicitors of Record DOCKET: A-8-04 STYLE OF CAUSE: James A. Sweet v. The Attorney General of Canada et al PLACE OF HEARING: Toronto, Ontario DATE OF HEARING: Wednesday, January 19, 2005 REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: Malone J.A. CONCURRED IN BY: Rothstein J.A. Noël J.A. DATED: February 7, 2005 APPEARANCES BY: Mr. James A. Sweet For the Appellant Mr. Derek Edwards For the Respondents SOLICITORS OF RECORD: Mr. James A. Sweet Appellant on his own behalf Warkworth Institution 15847 County Road 29 Percy Boom Side Road Warkworth, ON K0K 3K0 Mr. John Sims For the Respondent Deputy Attorney General of Canada