Miron v. Trudel

Miron v. Trudel

Excluding unmarried common‑law partners from accident benefits granted to married spouses under the Ontario Standard Automobile Policy infringed s.15(1) because marital status is an analogous ground and the exclusion perpetuated disadvantage; the state failed to justify the distinction under s.1 (it was not a reasonably relevant or minimally impairing marker), and the appropriate remedial measure was to "read in" the 1990 broader statutory definition of "spouse" retroactively and remit for determination of eligibility.

Citation
[1995] 2 SCR 418
Parties
Appellant: John O. Miron; Appellant: Jocelyne Valliere; Respondent: Richard Trudel; Respondent: William James McIsaac; Respondent: Economical Mutual Insurance Company; Intervener: Attorney General of Canada; Intervener: Attorney General for Ontario; Intervener: Attorney General of Quebec; Intervener: Attorney General of Manitoba; Amicus Curiae: Amicus Curiae (W. Ian Binnie and Lisa A. Clarkson)
Court
Supreme Court of Canada
Jurisdiction
Canada
Judgment Date
25 May 1995
Procedural Posture
Appeal / Supreme Court of Canada on Appeal From the Ontario Court of Appeal (preliminary Motion Concerning Statutory Meaning of "spouse")
Outcome
Appeal allowed; primary holding that exclusion of unmarried common‑law partners from the prescribed policy violated s.15(1) and was not justified under s.1; remedy to read in 1990 definition of "spouse" retroactively and remit for trial.
Legal Topics
Charter S.15 Equality, Section 1 Justification (oakes), Marital Status Discrimination, Automobile Insurance Benefits, Remedial Reading‑in Under S.24(1)
Source Language
English

Case Brief

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Parties

John O. Miron

Appellant

Jocelyne Valliere

Appellant

Richard Trudel

Respondent

William James McIsaac

Respondent

Economical Mutual Insurance Company

Respondent

Attorney General of Canada

Intervener

Attorney General for Ontario

Intervener

Attorney General of Quebec

Intervener

Attorney General of Manitoba

Intervener

Amicus Curiae (W. Ian Binnie and Lisa A. Clarkson)

Amicus Curiae

Procedural Posture

Appeal / Supreme Court of Canada on Appeal From the Ontario Court of Appeal (preliminary Motion Concerning Statutory Meaning of "spouse")

  1. 1 Whether "spouse" in the Ontario Standard Automobile Policy includes an unmarried common‑law partner
  2. 2 Whether exclusion of unmarried common‑law partners from policy benefits violates s.15(1) of the Charter
  3. 3 If s.15(1) breached, whether the exclusion is justified under s.1 of the Charter

Ratio Decidendi

Excluding unmarried common‑law partners from accident benefits granted to married spouses under the Ontario Standard Automobile Policy infringed s.15(1) because marital status is an analogous ground and the exclusion perpetuated disadvantage; the state failed to justify the distinction under s.1 (it was not a reasonably relevant or minimally impairing marker), and the appropriate remedial measure was to "read in" the 1990 broader statutory definition of "spouse" retroactively and remit for determination of eligibility.

Court Disposition

Appeal allowed; primary holding that exclusion of unmarried common‑law partners from the prescribed policy violated s.15(1) and was not justified under s.1; remedy to read in 1990 definition of "spouse" retroactively and remit for trial.

Orders

  • Appeal allowed with costs
  • Insurer's application to strike out the appellants' action dismissed