R. v. Patel

R. v. Patel Collection Decisions of the Court of Appeal Date 2018-06-12 Neutral citation 2018 ONCA 541 Docket numbers C63600 Judges Doherty, David H.; Pepall, Sarah E.; Nordheimer, Ian V.B. Subject Criminal Decision Content COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO CITATION: R. v. Patel, 2018 ONCA 541 DATE: 20180612 DOCKET: C63600 Doherty, Pepall and Nordheimer JJ.A. BETWEEN Her Majesty the Queen Respondent and Kishorbhai Patel Appellant Jeffrey Rybak, for the appellant Megan Patric, for the respondent Heard and released orally: June 6, 2018 On appeal from the convictions entered on January 13, 2016 Justice Michael G. Quigley of the Superior Court of Justice, sitting without a jury. REASONS FOR DECISION [1] Mr. Patel appeals his convictions on 14 counts of fraud arising from his guilty plea. The appellant asserts that the trial judge failed to provide him with adequate assistance as an unrepresented person and also deprived him of his right to counsel which, before us, he asserts was an infringement of his rights under s. 10(b) of the Charter. [2] It is unnecessary to recite the lengthy background of this case, that spans more than five years. Throughout these proceedings, the appellant consistently said that he was retaining counsel, specifically, Michael Clarke. However, the appellant never, in fact, reached that retainer. [3] We see no merit to either of the issues raised by the appellant. The decision to grant or not to grant an adjournment is a matter that is within the discretion of any trial judge. This court should only interfere with a trial judge's refusal to grant an adjournment if it deprives an accused of a fair trial or the appearance of a fair trial: R. v. Hazout (2005), 199 C.C.C. (3d) 474 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 31. As important as the right to counsel is, it is not an unlimited right. It must be balanced against the timely disposition of cases. In this case, the appellant had months to properly retain counsel but, yet, never did so. Indeed, one year earlier, the court was faced with the same scenario and the “with or without counsel” trial date was adjourned. There comes a point at which the court is entitled to refuse any further adjournments for the purpose of retaining counsel. The trial judge cannot be faulted for determining that that time had come for the appellant. [4] There is also no merit to the contention that the trial judge failed to provide adequate assistance to the appellant as an unrepresented person. When the appellant decided to plead guilty, which we note he did after having consulted with his counsel of choice, and after that counsel had apparently worked out a resolution with Crown counsel, the trial judge ensured that the appellant knew what he was doing. Further, the trial judge engaged in a full plea inquiry before accepting the pleas and entering convictions. There is absolutely no evidence that would sustain any suggestion that the appellant did not know precisely what he was doing when he entered his pleas. We would also note on this point that, notwithstanding that the sentencing process consumed more than a further year after the guilty pleas were made, the appellant did not, at any time, raise any issue that his guilty pleas were involuntary or uninformed. Conclusion [5] The appeal is dismissed. “Doherty J.A.” “S.E. Pepall J.A.” “I.V.B. Nordheimer J.A.”