Canada Judgment

Supreme Court of British Columbia

Knelsen Estate

On this page

Professional case brief

Research organized from the available case record

Source document

01

Holding and result

The court concluded the exception to the usual costs rule applies because the petition was reasonably brought and was necessitated by the conduct of the deceased and parties in creating legitimate uncertainty about spousal status; however, because Ms. Wertz will likely be the sole beneficiary and the estate is modest, ordering costs paid from the estate would be tantamount to each party bearing their own costs, so the court ordered each petitioner to bear their own costs.

Court disposition

Each petitioner to bear their own costs of the proceedings.

Orders

  • Each of the petitioners shall bear their own costs of these proceedings.

02

Material facts

Parties

Norma Arnold

Petitioner Counsel: B. Hankins

Alanna Wertz

Petitioner Counsel: K. Rule

Amounts and remedies

  • Preferential Spousal Share Under S.21 (expected): CAD 300,000
  • Lump Sum Costs Requested by Successful Petitioner: CAD 12,000

03

Procedural history

  1. Posture

    Estate Administration and Spousal Status Petitions Under WESA / Post Judgment Costs Determination

04

Questions and positions

Legal issues

Party arguments

Applicant
Ms. Wertz submitted that the ordinary rule applies: the unsuccessful party should pay the successful party's costs. She opposed payment from the estate, noted the estate is modest, and sought costs assessed as a lump sum of $12,000 payable by Ms. Arnold personally.
Respondent
Ms. Arnold argued costs payable to Ms. Wertz should be paid from the estate as either a cost of administration or as costs necessitated by the deceased's pre-death conduct that created confusion about relationship status. Alternatively, she sought that each party bear their own costs.

05

Court’s reasoning

  1. 01

    SCCR Rule 14-1(9)

    Costs generally awarded to the successful party unless court orders otherwise

  2. 02

    Tisalona v. Easton, 2017 BCCA 272

    Court's discretion to depart from costs rule must be exercised judicially and not arbitrarily

  3. 03

    Lee v. Lee Estate (1993), 84 B.C.L.R. (2d) 341 (S.C.)

    In estate litigation the court may order costs to be paid from the estate where litigation was necessary to settle doubts caused by the testator's conduct or main beneficiaries, as a cost of administration

  4. 04

    Lee v. Lee Estate (1993), 84 B.C.L.R. (2d) 341 (S.C.)

    Proceedings under dependants' relief differ because they presume validity of the will and do not necessarily benefit the estate; such actions are less readily treated as costs of administration

06

Ratio, limits and disposition

Ratio decidendi

The court concluded the exception to the usual costs rule applies because the petition was reasonably brought and was necessitated by the conduct of the deceased and parties in creating legitimate uncertainty about spousal status; however, because Ms. Wertz will likely be the sole beneficiary and the estate is modest, ordering costs paid from the estate would be tantamount to each party bearing their own costs, so the court ordered each petitioner to bear their own costs.

Obiter and limits

  • Estate cases more readily permit deviation from the ordinary costs rule where the litigation was necessary to resolve doubts caused by the testator or main beneficiaries
  • Actions under dependants' relief legislation are distinct because they presume validity of the will and do not benefit the estate in the same way as probate disputes
  • There are authorities where ordinary costs rules were applied to spousal status disputes, but the court found facts here justified departure

Court disposition

Each petitioner to bear their own costs of the proceedings.

  • Each of the petitioners shall bear their own costs of these proceedings.

Source and reliance status

Supreme Court of British Columbia · 13 March 2020

This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.

Judgment reading view

Judgment text

The complete available source text.

Source document

Supreme Court of British Columbia

Judgment· 13 March 2020

2020 BCSC 373

2020 BCSC 373 Knelsen Estate

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: Knelsen Estate, 2020 BCSC 373 Date: 20200313 Docket: S-P-125254 Registry: Kelowna In the Matter of the Estate of Jason Knelsen, Deceased -and- Docket: S125505 Registry: Kelowna In the Matter of the Estate of Jason Jacob Knelsen, Deceased Before: The Honourable Madam Justice Horsman Reasons for Judgment Re Costs Counsel for the Petitioner/Respondent Normal Arnold: B. Hankins Counsel for the Petitioner/Respondent Alanna Wertz: K. Rule Date of Written Submissions received: February 26 and March 3, 2020 Place and Date of Judgment: Kelowna, B.C. March 13, 2020

INTRODUCTION [1] In reasons for judgment indexed at 2020 BCSC 134, I allowed the petition of the petitioner Alanna Wertz and dismissed the petition of Norma Arnold. I expressed the provisional view that Ms. Wertz, as the successful petitioner, was entitled to her costs of the proceeding at Scale B. I gave leave to the petitioners to provide further written submissions on the issue of costs if either sought a different order, which they have both now provided. [2] Ms. Arnold seeks an order that costs payable to Ms. Wertz are payable from the estate of Mr. Knelsen rather than by Ms. Arnold personally. Alternatively, Ms. Arnold seeks an order that each party bear their own costs. [3] Ms. Wertz argues that there is no reason in this case to depart from the ordinary rule that the unsuccessful party must pay the costs of the successful party. She seeks an order that Ms. Arnold pay her costs, and that the costs be assessed on a lump sump basis at $12,000.

DISCUSSION [4] By way of brief background, the petitions raised overlapping issues regarding the administration and distribution of the estate of the deceased, Jason Knelsen. The petitioner Norma Arnold is Mr. Knelsen's mother. The petitioner Alanna Wertz was in a marriage-like relationship with Mr. Knelsen for approximately 12 years prior to his death. They have two children together. Mr. Knelsen died by suicide on August 15, 2018. [5] The issue central to both petitions was whether Ms. Wertz was Mr. Knelsen's spouse within the meaning of s. 2 of the Wills, Estates and Succession Act, S.B.C. 2009, c.13 [WESA], at the time of his death. Ms. Arnold maintained that the spousal relationship between Ms. Wertz and Mr. Knelsen had terminated by the time of his death, and therefore the children were the sole beneficiaries of Mr. Knelsen's estate. In her cross-petition, Ms. Wertz sought declarations that she was Mr. Knelsen's surviving spouse, and accordingly entitled to the preferential spousal share of his estate under s. 21(5) of the WESA. [6] I allowed Ms. Wertz's petition and dismissed Ms. Arnold's petition. [7] Rule 14-1(9) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules, B.C. Reg. 168/2009 [SCCR] provides that the costs of a proceeding must be awarded to the successful party unless the court orders otherwise. The court's discretion to depart from the usual rule that costs follow the event is

not unfettered; it must be exercised judicially and not arbitrarily or capriciously: Tisalona v. Easton, 2017 BCCA 272. [8] Ms. Arnold says that the ordinary rule that the unsuccessful party shall pay the costs of the successful party ought not to apply in the circumstances of this case. She says that Ms. Wertz's costs should be paid out of the estate as they are either a) a "cost of administration", or b) a cost necessitated by Mr. Knelsen's actions prior to death in creating confusion as to the status of his relationship with Ms. Wertz. Ms. Arnold says that Mr. Knelsen's repeated statements to family and friends that his relationship with Ms. Wertz was "over", was the impetus for the filing of her petition. Ms. Arnold relies on Gosbjorn v. Hadley, 2008 BCSC 1614; Lee v. Lee Estate (1993), 84 B.C.L.R. (2d) 341 (S.C.) [Lee Estate]; Leung v. Chang, 2014 BCSC 1243; and Dyson v. Moser, 2004 BCSC 500. [9] The estate cases cited by Ms. Arnold suggest that exceptions to the ordinary costs rules are made more readily in estate cases than other areas of the law. The reasons for this are explained by Master Horn in Lee Estate at 346-47: In probate or administration actions or in proceedings for the construction of wills, the rule may be more frequently departed from. In such cases where the validity of a will or the capacity of the testator to make a will or the meaning of a will is in

issue, it is sometimes the case that the costs of all parties are ordered to be paid out of the estate. This is upon the principle that where such an issue must be litigated to remove all doubts, then all interested parties must be joined and are entitled to be heard and should not be out of pocket if in the result the litigation does not conclude in their favour. The estate must bear the cost of settling disputes as a cost of administration .The question to be asked in such case is whether the parties were forced into litigation by the conduct of the testator or the conduct of the main beneficiaries. But the case is different where the litigation does not relate to the validity of the will or the capacity of the testator or the construction of the will. Actions brought under dependants' relief legislation presume the validity of the will and the capacity of the testator and that his intentions are clear. There are no doubts to be settled. The remedies provided by such legislation are directed to the maintenance and support of the dependants of the testator and are based on public policy. The legislation does not invalidate the will, it merely permits the court to vary the provisions made by the testator. So an unsuccessful action under such legislation cannot be said to have been caused by the testator, or to have been necessary to enable the estate to be distributed. The

action does not benefit the estate. [10] Ms. Wertz argues that there are no reasons to depart from the usual cost rules in the present case. She cites cases in which costs have been awarded in the ordinary way where there has been a dispute over spousal status: Davey v. Gruyaert, 2007 BCCA 20; Volovsek v. Donaldsen, 2019 BCSC 1820; and Mother 1 v. Solus Trust Company, 2019 BCSC 200. Ms. Wertz points out that Mr. Knelsen's estate is a modest one, and says that Ms. Arnold should face costs consequences in pursuing risky litigation that put estate assets at risk. [11] In my view, in the circumstances of the present case it is appropriate to depart from the usual rule that the unsuccessful party must pay the costs of the successful party. Although this was not a case that concerned the validity of a will, it is also not akin to a wills variation application. The actions of Mr. Knelsen and Ms. Wertz in the weeks before Mr. Knelsen's death, reviewed in detail in my original judgment, raised legitimate questions as to whether Ms. Wertz's relationship with Mr. Knelsen had terminated prior to his death. Mr. Knelsen had told numerous friends and family members that his relationship with Ms. Wertz had ended. Ms. Wertz initiated a relationship with another man who she referred to as her "boyfriend", and she told Ms. Arnold (among others) that she and Mr. Knelsen had broken up. [12] The

uncertainty around the relationship between Mr. Knelsen and Ms. Wertz had to be resolved in order for Mr. Knelsen's estate to be distributed. If the spousal relationship had terminated, Ms. Arnold was an obvious person to apply to administer Mr. Knelsen's estate. In bringing such an application, Ms. Arnold was not acting as an officious inter-meddler. The petition was necessitated by the actions of both Mr. Knelsen and Ms. Wertz before Mr. Knelsen's death. Ms. Arnold acted reasonably in bringing the petition. [13] For these reasons, I conclude that the circumstances of the present case fall within the exception recognized in the cases cited by Ms. Arnold where departure from ordinary costs rules is appropriate in estate cases. CONCLUSION/ORDER [14] Ms. Arnold has asked for an order that Ms. Wertz's costs be paid out of the estate. Ms. Wertz will likely be the only beneficiary of the estate given that her preferential share under s. 21 of the WESA ($300,000) is expected to exceed the net value of the estate. Accordingly, the order sought by Ms. Arnold, that costs payable to Ms. Wertz be paid out of the estate, is tantamount to an order that each party bear their own costs. [15] Accordingly, I order that each of the petitioners bear their own costs of these proceedings. "Horsman J."

Source wording is retained. Consult the source document for its original formatting and pagination.

Authorities

Authorities used by the court

Cases, legislation, regulations, and constitutional provisions identified in the available record.

Knelsen Estate, 2020 BCSC 373

Case cited

Tisalona v. Easton, 2017 BCCA 272

Case cited

Gosbjorn v. Hadley, 2008 BCSC 1614

Case cited

Lee v. Lee Estate (1993), 84 B.C.L.R. (2d) 341 (S.C.)

Case cited

Leung v. Chang, 2014 BCSC 1243

Case cited

Dyson v. Moser, 2004 BCSC 500

Case cited

Davey v. Gruyaert, 2007 BCCA 20

Case cited

Volovsek v. Donaldsen, 2019 BCSC 1820

Case cited

Mother 1 v. Solus Trust Company, 2019 BCSC 200

Case cited

Wills, Estates and Succession Act, S.B.C. 2009, c.13, s.2

Legislation

Legislation referenced in the available case record.

Wills, Estates and Succession Act, S.B.C. 2009, c.13, s.21(5)

Legislation

Legislation referenced in the available case record.

Supreme Court Civil Rules, B.C. Reg. 168/2009, r.14-1(9)

Legislation

Legislation referenced in the available case record.

Case-aware research

Ask AI about this case

The judgment and available research above are public. New questions open in a separate private conversation grounded in this case.

About this LexChat collection

This page organizes the available case record for research. Verify quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the source document. Corrections can be reported to hello@esheria.ai.

Legal information, not legal advice. Research summaries do not replace the judgment.