KSM v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Opportunities and Social Development)

KSM v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Opportunities and Social Development) Court Court of Appeal Date 2025-07-31 Citation 2025 NSCA 61 Docket CA 540899 Judge/Registrar/Adjudicator Bourgeois, Cindy A. (Honourable Justice) (CA); Van den Eynden, Elizabeth (Honourable Justice) (CA); Fichaud, Joel E. (Honourable Justice) (CA) Document Type Decision Decision Content Nova Scotia Court of Appeal Citation: KSM v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Opportunities and Social Development), 2025 NSCA 61 Date: 20250731 Docket: CA 540899 Registry: Halifax Between: KSM Appellant v. Minister of Opportunities and Social Development, ZM (by her Guardian ad litem, Beth Archibald), NM (by his Guardian ad litem, Stephen Johnson) and CB Respondents Judges: Bourgeois, Fichaud and Van den Eynden, JJ.A. Appeal Heard: July 11, 2025, in Halifax, Nova Scotia Facts: The case involves a mother, KM, whose three children were placed in the permanent care and custody of the Minister of Opportunities and Social Development due to concerns under the Children and Family Services Act. The children were placed with relatives, and KM appealed the decision, alleging errors by the trial judge, discrimination, and bias, and sought to have her children returned to her care (paras 1-2, 7-9). Procedural History: • Nova Scotia Supreme Court (Family Division), February 24, 2025: The court placed the children in the permanent care and custody of the Minister of Opportunities and Social Development (para 1). Parties’ Submissions: • Appellant (KM): Argued that the trial judge made numerous errors, failed to accommodate her disability, discriminated against her, and was biased. She also claimed the trial judge failed to provide the oldest child with a voice and sought to have her children returned to her care (paras 2-3). • Respondent (Minister of Opportunities and Social Development): Argued that the children remained in need of protective services and that the trial judge's decision was correct (para 60). Legal Issues: • Did the trial judge err by failing to admit KM’s post-hearing evidence? • Did the trial judge err in finding the circumstances of the Minister’s investigation and initial intervention were irrelevant? • Did the trial judge err by admitting and relying upon post-removal allegations to justify a prior action? • Did the trial judge err by declining to admit into evidence letters authored by the oldest child, ZM, and thereby wrongly precluded her voice from being heard? • Did the trial judge fail to afford KM appropriate accommodation throughout the trial or otherwise deny her procedural fairness? • Did the trial judge conduct the proceeding in such a way as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias? Disposition: • The appeal was dismissed. Reasons: Per Bourgeois J.A. (Fichaud and Van den Eynden JJ.A. concurring): • The trial judge correctly focused on whether the children remained in need of protective services, not on the initial investigation's validity, as KM had consented to earlier findings (paras 64, 70). • The proposed fresh evidence was inadmissible as it was irrelevant to the issue of whether the children remained in need of protective services (paras 53-55). • The trial judge did not err in declining to admit ZM's letters, as they were deemed unreliable and the Guardian ad litem adequately represented ZM's voice (paras 84-85). • KM was provided with significant accommodations during the trial, and there was no breach of procedural fairness (paras 87-90). • There was no reasonable apprehension of bias; the trial judge applied the rules of evidence and law correctly (paras 94-95). This information sheet does not form part of the court’s judgment. Quotes must be from the judgment, not this cover sheet. The full court judgment consists of 97 paragraphs. Nova Scotia Court of Appeal Citation: KSM v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Opportunities and Social Development), 2025 NSCA 61 Date: 20250731 Docket: CA 540899 Registry: Halifax Between: KSM Appellant v. Minister of Opportunities and Social Development, ZM (by her Guardian ad litem, Beth Archibald), NM (by his Guardian ad litem, Stephen Johnson) and CB Respondents Restriction on Publication: s. 94(1) of the Children and Family Services Act Judges: Bourgeois, Fichaud and Van den Eynden, JJ.A. Appeal Heard: July 11, 2025, in Halifax, Nova Scotia Held: Appeal dismissed, per reasons for judgment of Bourgeois, J.A.; Fichaud and Van den Eynden, JJ.A. concurring Counsel: KM, appellant, with the assistance of NH, on her own behalf Angela Swantee, for the respondent Minister of Opportunities and Social Development Susan Young and Megan MacKay, articled clerk, for Guardian ad litem, Beth Archibald Ashley Dutcher, for Guardian ad litem, Stephen Johnson CB, respondent, not appearing Restriction on publication: Pursuant to s. 94(1) Children and Family Services Act, S.N.S. 1990, c. 5. Publishers of this case please take note that s. 94(1) of the Children and Family Services Act applies and may require editing of this judgment or its heading before publication. SECTION 94(1) PROVIDES: Prohibition on publication 94 (1) No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding pursuant to this Act, or a parent or guardian, a foster parent or a relative of the child. Reasons for judgment: [1] By orders issued February 24, 2025, Justice Daniel W. Ingersoll, a justice of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court (Family Division) placed three children in the permanent care and custody of the Minister of Opportunities and Social Development (“the Minister”)[1] pursuant to the provisions of the Children and Family Services Act (“the CFSA”)[2]. The oldest child, now 17, resides with her paternal grandfather in a kinship foster placement. The younger children, ages 14 and 13 respectively, are similarly placed with their maternal aunt. There is no plan to have the children placed for adoption. [2] The children’s mother, KM[3], appeals the trial judge’s decision, reported as 2025 NSSC 8, and the resulting orders. KM and her support person, NH, allege the trial judge made numerous errors, failed to provide her with accommodation due to her disability, discriminated against her, was biased and failed to provide the oldest child with a “voice”. She asks for the children to be returned to her care and for this Court to rebuke those involved in the “seizure” of her children, including the trial judge. [3] Shortly before the scheduled appeal hearing, KM filed a document entitled “NOTICE OF MOTION for ADEQUATE VOICE of the CHILD”, with supporting affidavits from the oldest child and NH. She asked for the motion to be heard the day before the appeal hearing by a single judge in chambers. The panel directed the motion would be heard as part of the appeal hearing and be treated as a motion for the introduction of fresh evidence. [4] KM clearly loves her children, and undoubtedly, they love her. She has put a great deal of effort into advancing her appeal and explaining why she believes the Minister should never have been involved with her family, and how various actors have engaged in criminal acts. However, as it was in the court below, her focus is misplaced. [5] At the final review hearing, the CFSA required the trial judge to address one question – did the child remain in need of protective services? Unfortunately, KM’s focus was not on that question, but rather, she attempted to litigate issues which had already been determined, or would have had no impact on what the trial judge was mandated to answer. [6] For the reasons to follow, I am of the view that none of the complaints KM and her support person, NH, bring to this Court have legal merit. Although the fresh evidence was provisionally accepted at the hearing, I would decline to admit it. I would dismiss the appeal. Background [7] The three children in this matter (ZM, born August *, 2007; NM, born March *, 2011 and SM, born July *, 2012) are the children of KM and CB. CB did not take an active role in the proceeding below, but did support KM’s position at the final review hearing that the children be returned to her care. [8] The history of the matter before the court was outlined by the trial judge in his reasons[4]: 1. Prior to the Minister’s involvement, ZM was living with her mother KM, SM was sleeping at her Aunt N’s home next door to KM’s home (in an attached duplex) and NM was spending time at his Aunt N’s home but was sleeping at KM’s home. 2. On April 25, 2022, the Agency received a referral from Victim Services that CB had assaulted his partner. KM was not CB’s partner at that time. As a result of this report the Agency met with ZM, NM and SM to determine if the children were at risk due to CB’s conduct. 3. On May 17, 2022, Agency social worker SM met with HM, the Vice Principal of ZM’s school (hereafter the Vice Principal). The Vice Principal disclosed that the school mostly contacted KM’s sister N, that ZM had missed 2-3 weeks of school, and nobody had reached out to let the school know what was going on, that ZM had been suspended for attending school under the influence of marijuana, and that she had heard ZM parties with older youths and provides sexual favours in exchange for drugs. 4. On May 17, 2022, Agency Social Worker SM spoke with KM who asked SM to address the issues with her sister N. KM insisted the children did not see CB much. 5. On June 1, 2022, the Agency received a referral from SW, the Principal at ZM’s school (hereafter the Principal) who advised ZM had been interviewed as a result of reports that ZM was selling ecstasy out of a school bathroom. The Principal reported ZM did not admit to selling drugs but had several vapes in her bag and a baggy containing a white substance which she says she brought from home. The Principal disclosed ZM stated she smoked marijuana with her mother. 6. That day, and as a result of the referral from the Principal, Agency Social Worker EK interviewed ZM at school. ZM denied selling drugs and that the baggy found in her bag contained cocaine. ZM said the baggie must have had marijuana in it as her mother smokes marijuana. ZM confirmed she smoked marijuana with her mother once the month prior. ZM denied any other drug use. 7. That same day, June 1, 2022, SM attended at KM’s home. During that home visit KM advised she had not smoked marijuana in over a year and had never smoked marijuana with ZM, but she had suspicions ZM was smoking marijuana. KM did not mention that ZM had been suspended from school earlier in the school year for attending school under the influence of marijuana. KM advised she did not know what cocaine was. SM observed KM’s home to be “incredibly cluttered.” KM did not permit SM to photograph the state of KM’s home. SM reported that NH, who was also in attendance, stated words to the effect “kids can’t live like this.” The Agency worker observed that KM became escalated when she sought to photograph KM’s home, became combative requiring her support person, NH to calm her down, and not appear to comprehend the situation despite it being explained several times. KM agreed to submit to a drug test. 8. KM was unable to produce a sample for a urinalysis on June 2, 2022. 9. On June 3, 2022, the Agency advised KM that it required that the children be placed with a family member pending investigation. KM ultimately acquiesced to a plan which placed ZM in the care of her grandfather, and SM and NM in the care of her sister N. 10. KM attended the commencement of the Interim Hearing of this matter on July 14, 2022, with counsel, and indicated she was not contesting the Minister’s assertion that there were reasonable and probable grounds to believe ZM, NM and SM were children in need of protective services. KM agreed to participate in parenting skills instruction and individual counselling. Justice Jollimore ordered that ZM remain in the care and custody of her grandfather, and SM and NM remain in the care and custody of N. 11. KM attended the completion of the Interim Hearing of this matter on July 29, 2022, and again indicated she was not contesting the finding that there were reasonable and probable grounds to believe ZM, NM and SM were children in need of protective services. 12. Justice Jollimore completed the Protection Hearing in this matter on October 4, 2022. KM was represented by counsel at the hearing and admitted (pursuant to Section 40(3) of the Act) ZM, NM and SM were children in need of protective services pursuant to Section 22(2)(g) of the Act with the Minister reserving the right to call evidence regarding the other protection grounds alleged in respect of Section 22 (2) (b) and (k). CB did not appear at the Protection Hearing. 13. KM also consented to services being ordered on October 4, 2022. The order stated KM would be referred for parenting skill instruction and referred for individual counselling or therapy. All other services were deferred. 14. Justice Jollimore completed the Disposition Hearing in the matter on January 3, 2023, and ordered ZM remain in the care and custody of her grandfather, and SM and NM remain in the care and custody of N. KM’s parenting time with the children was to be supervised. The Disposition Order indicates the issue of services was deferred. 15. The non-party supervision order was renewed on the same terms and conditions at Review Hearings on March 28, 2023, June 26, 2023, and October 30, 2023. All of these orders stated the issue of services was deferred. 16. On December 11, 2023, I granted an order placing ZM, NM and SM in the temporary care and custody of the Minister. This order resulted in the children’s placements, which did not change, being converted to kinship placements which provided for greater funding by the Minister to the two homes in which the children were placed. [9] To the above summary I would add: • The legal proceedings were commenced by way of a Notice of Child Protection Application filed on July 8, 2022. The Minister alleged the children were in need of protective services pursuant to s. 22(2)(b), (g) and (k) of the CFSA: 22 (1) In this Section, “substantial risk” means a real chance of danger that is apparent on the evidence. (2) A child is in need of protective services where . . . (b) there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer physical harm inflicted or caused as described in clause (a) [Clause (a) states: (a) the child has suffered physical harm, inflicted by a parent or guardian of the child or caused by the failure of a parent or guardian to supervise and protect the child adequately;] . . . (g) there is substantial risk that the child will suffer emotional abuse and the parent or guardian does not provide, refuses or is unavailable or unable to consent to, or fails to co-operate with the provision of, services or treatment or remedy or alleviate the abuse; (k) there is a substantial risk that the child will experience neglect by a parent or guardian of the child, and the parent or guardian does not provide, refuses or is unavailable or unable to consent to, or fails to co-operate with the provision of, services or treatment to remedy or alleviate the harm; • KM did not seek to challenge by way of appeal any of the previously made orders in the proceeding below. Specifically, she did not appeal the two Interim orders (made July 14 and 29, 2022) which found there were reasonable and probable grounds to believe the children were in need of protective services. Nor did she appeal the Protection Order (made October 4, 2022) that found the children were in need of protective services pursuant to s. 22(2)(g) of the CFSA. Further, she did not appeal any of the orders which directed her to participate in specified services; • The statutory deadline for the completion of all disposition orders had expired by the end of the final review hearing[5]; • The final review hearing commenced on January 2, 2024 and continued with evidence being called on January 22, 24, February 22, March 1, April 8, 9,15,16, and 26, 2024; • KM was assisted at the final review hearing by her support person, NH, who also filed an affidavit; • In final submissions to the trial judge, Minister’s counsel made clear the information reported by school personnel about ZM was not being offered as being true. Indeed, counsel said the information was irrelevant to the determination the trial judge needed to make: The information obtained from the school about [ZM], which did trigger an investigation, was never confirmed to be accurate. The Minister is not relying on that information contained in that referral and the Minister takes the position that the information has no bearing on the outcome of the permanent care trial. The Agency remained involved with the family and commenced these proceedings because of the concerns noted with the state of the home, possible drug use, and [KM]’s presentation. (Emphasis added) • After the completion of the hearing, KM filed a motion on August 15, 2024 to introduce additional evidence. The motion was supported by her proposed supplemental affidavit sworn the same day. In reasons reported as 2025 NSSC 7, the trial judge dismissed the motion. KM’s Perspective [10] Both at the final disposition hearing and on appeal, KM, advanced similar concerns about the Minister’s involvement with her family. It is useful to set them out early in these reasons. [11] KM is a single mother of five children. Her three youngest children are the subject of the child protection proceedings. KM has had a lot on her plate over the last several years. She suffered a workplace injury and was involved in a dispute over her entitlement to workers’ benefits. Additionally, she was involved in other litigation regarding the loss of her employment. To her credit, KM has been attending university to further her education and improve her opportunities to support her family. In the midst of all of this, the Minister received two referrals which triggered an investigation and resulted in the child protection proceedings. [12] In both this Court and at the final review hearing, KM was adamant the Minister should never have been involved with her family. Firstly, the concern about CB engaging in domestic violence with his present partner, had nothing to do with her or the children, who have very little contact with their father. More importantly, KM says the referral made by personnel at ZM’s school not only contained false allegations against ZM, but also was made illegally and maliciously. KM argued the school personnel’s interview of ZM was coercive and contrary to school policy and other legal principles. She is furious the school reported things to the Minister about ZM that are not true, and she wants to defend her child’s reputation. [13] KM also says she was not treated fairly by the Minister’s staff who investigated the referral. She asserts they interpreted her behaviour in a negative way and failed to consider the “bigger picture” – including she was justifiably upset about the false information being spread about herself and ZM. Her emotional reaction was part of her diagnosed Social (Pragmatic) Communication disorder and ADHD, and was unfairly interpreted by the Minister’s staff as being a sign of an undiagnosed mental disorder. KM says if the Minister’s staff had done a proper investigation, they would have realized why she reacted the way she did when they first came to her home. [14] Similarly, KM argues she was improperly painted as a drug user because she was unable to provide a urine sample when demanded by the Minister’s staff. She said her inability to do so was because of the physical difficulties caused by her workplace injury. Further, she claims that with adequate investigation, the Minister’s staff would have discovered this, instead of jumping to a negative conclusion about her. KM explains her mistreatment by the Minister’s staff made her suspicious of their intentions and that was why she did not engage in any services arranged through them. [15] KM explains she wants to see “the facts” on which the referrals against her and ZM were based. She wants to challenge the accuracy of what was being said about her and her child. She believes she was discriminated against by the Minister’s staff on the basis of her race (African Nova Scotian/Métis) and her disability. [16] On appeal KM says the trial judge made a number of mistakes. Although they will be addressed later in this decision, these include not recognizing the school’s conduct towards ZM was “illegal” and the resulting referral was false and malicious; by not permitting ZM’s “voice” to be heard in the proceeding, and by not reviewing and correcting Justice Jollimore’s earlier decisions. [17] KM also argues the lawyers for the Minister and Guardians ad litem “weaponized the word ‘relevant’ against her” – the evidence she wanted to introduce and the arguments she wanted to advance were said to be “not relevant”, yet everything they presented was “relevant”. She says the trial judge just went along with whatever the Minister’s lawyer said. KM asks this Court to look at “the bigger picture” and conclude the Minister had no reason to “steal” her children. Decision under Appeal [18] To put the issues on appeal in context, it is useful to review the relevant aspects of the trial judge’s reasons. At the outset, the trial judge addressed four preliminary issues: KM’s accommodation throughout the trial; the admissibility of affidavits filed by KM and NH; KM’s assertion the Minister’s investigation which triggered the child protection proceeding was improperly commenced, and whether two letters written by the oldest child ought to be admitted into evidence. [19] The trial judge noted KM had tendered a letter from a nurse practitioner, JL, which stated she “has a diagnosed social (pragmatic) communication disorder and ADHD” which “impact her ability to handle time pressures and multiple tasks.” It went on to state: “She has difficulty managing assignments, prioritizing tasks, and meeting deadlines”. [20] The trial judge found the letter did not comply with the requirements under the Civil Procedure Rules for the introduction of expert opinion evidence. Nonetheless, he accepted it as confirmation of the two diagnoses stated therein. The trial judge identified the limited usefulness of the letter as follows: [10] JL’s letter does not assist the court in understanding what accommodations KM required during the Agency’s investigation or during the permanent care and custody trial. Nor does the opinion assist the court in understanding whether these diagnoses affect KM’s capacity to parent safely and to understand and meet the needs of her children. [21] The trial judge outlined numerous accommodations sought and granted to KM during the trial. These will be noted later in these reasons. [22] With respect to the affidavits, the trial judge found both the affidavit of KM and of NH contained a significant volume of inadmissible and irrelevant information. KM’s affidavit contained 344 paragraphs and attached sixty-two exhibits. NH’s affidavit was also lengthy, comprising 153 paragraphs. As opposed to undertaking the time-consuming exercise of striking the offending passages during the trial or in his reasons, the trial judge noted he only considered material contained in the affidavits that was relevant and admissible. [23] The trial judge next addressed KM’s argument the investigation undertaken by the Minister was fatally flawed, and as such the whole protection proceeding should be dismissed. The trial judge found KM’s allegations of impropriety to be moot and irrelevant. He explained: [26] All of KM’s objections regarding the Agency’s engagement with her family fail to take into account the fact that on October 4, 2022, she admitted the children were in need of protection and consented to their placement with family members. KM’s admission that her children were in need of protection affirms the appropriateness of the Agency’s engagement and renders moot all of KM’s objections regarding the Principal’s interview with ZM, his report to the Agency, the Agency’s engagement with her family and the commencement of the Agency’s investigation. [27] Further, all of KM’s objections are irrelevant to the question of whether the children remain in need of protection and whether KM has mitigated the protection concerns which she admitted exist on October 4, 2022. KM’s objections do not assist in the determination of whether her children remain in need of protective services. (Emphasis added) [24] Notwithstanding the above finding, the trial judge addressed each of KM’s five concerns relating to the commencement of the protection proceedings. In his reasons, the trial judge explained why none would serve to render the Minister’s decision to engage with KM and her children inappropriate or otherwise contrary to the applicable legal principles. [25] Finally, the trial judge addressed whether two letters, written by the oldest child ought to be admitted into evidence as requested by KM. He determined the letters ought not to be admitted for two reasons: ZM’s Guardian ad litem did not support the introduction of the letters, and further, the letters were not reliable. [26] Having concluded his analysis of the preliminary matters, the trial judge then turned to the following issue: [59] I return to the question of whether ZM, NM and SM continue to be in need of protective services. In deciding whether the children remain in need of protective services I must consider if the circumstances that first warranted the Minister’s involvement continue to exist and whether other circumstances warranting a protection finding have arisen since that time. [60] The Minister submits that ZM, NM and SM remain in need of protective services within the meaning of Section 22(2) of the Act. [27] In addressing the above question, the trial judge directed himself as follows: [64] The Permanent Care and Custody hearing was the final review hearing in this proceeding. At this review hearing I must assume the protection order granted on October 4, 2022, was properly made at the time. It is not my function to retry the original need for protection. Rather, as noted, I must determine if the need for protection continues (S.R. v. Nova Scotia (Community Services), 2012 NSCA 46). That inquiry requires I consider whether ZM, NM and SM continue to be in need of protection and require a court order for their protection. The best interests of these children is the determining element in my analysis as to the need for protection. I must not consider the issue of the children’s ongoing need for protective services in a vacuum, but rather in light of the previous findings of this court, which must be taken as having been right at the time they were made (S.R. v. Nova Scotia (Community Services), supra). The need for continued protection may arise from the existence or absence of the circumstances which triggered the original protection finding or from circumstances which have arisen since that time (Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto v. M.C. [1994] S.C.J. No. 37, 2 S.C.R. 165). (Emphasis added) [28] The trial judge noted that on October 4, 2022, KM admitted the children were in need of protective services because of a substantial risk of emotional abuse. He then turned his mind to whether this protection finding had been resolved or mitigated. [29] The trial judge reviewed the evidence presented, and concluded KM had not undertaken any of the ordered programs or services that may have served to mitigate the protection concerns. The trial judge considered KM’s evidence that she had engaged in services through non-agency programs. He found the information provided was inadequate to explain the nature of the services in which she had participated. [30] The trial judge concluded the children remained in need of protective services. He further considered the Minister’s intention to maintain the children in the same kinship foster placements should permanent care orders be granted. The trial judge concluded permanent care orders were in the best interests of the children. [31] Before leaving the trial judge’s reasons, I note that although he canvassed the contents of the referral from school personnel in setting out the background of the proceedings, at no point did the trial judge make a determination that it was true. Nor did the trial judge set out what the school had reported about ZM as being a reason for finding the children remained in need of protective services. Issues [32] In her Notice of Appeal filed February 24, 2025, KM sets out two grounds of appeal, encompassing a variety of alleged errors, specifically: Error of Law – a palpable and overriding error in deciding the facts of the case Judicial abuse of deference in accepting or rejecting evidence in a bias and unneutral manner [33] In her factum, KM articulates more specifically the following issues: A. Did the judge err in finding that the May 2022 removal was lawful and justified? B. Did the judge err in admitting and relying upon post-removal allegations to justify a prior action? C. Did the court fail to ensure the Appellant received a fair hearing and meaningful participation? D. Did the court fail to protect the rights and voice of the child? E. Did the court fail to accommodate the Appellant’s disability, amounting to discrimination? [34] KM’s support person, NH, also filed a factum on her behalf. She listed the issues on appeal as follows: KM raised numerous issues throughout this factum, improperly formatted unfortunately and as per many other such problems but is aware of the various doctrines, tests, principles, etcetera (e.g. the doctrine of paramountcy, the doctrine of mootness, res judicata, etc,; the child-best-interest test, the harm test, etc.) that would apply. It is too overwhelming to address however, so overriding issues include the two main issues below. Hon. JI[6] was required to apply many and various statutes other than CFSA, such as the following, but did not. These include all levels of human rights-based legislation and international obligations (CFSA implemented them, so they apply). The federal Cannabis Act, the Nova Scotia Cannabis Control Act, school regulations, policies, and protocols, the Criminal Code of Canada, etcetera. (Time is up for the composing this document.) This appeal requires the type of scrutiny that Justice Robin Camp’s judicial neglect did, but even tremendously more so. [35] Elsewhere in her factum, NH alleges the trial judge demonstrated an “all-encompassing bias, unprofessionalism, seemingly intentional abuse, and negligence in the making of his final decisions and Orders”. [36] In the course of the appeal hearing, NH indicated KM was also seeking to challenge the decision rendered by the trial judge on the motion she had made to introduce further evidence after the trial had finished. The Notice of Appeal did not reference this decision, nor set out any ground of appeal specific to it. However, Civil Procedure Rule 90.11(1) gives this Court discretion to address issues not originally pled. In my view, KM’s concerns regarding the trial judge’s decision not to admit her post-hearing materials should be considered. [37] After having reviewed the written submissions and oral arguments made at the appeal hearing, I would re-frame and restate the issues to be resolved as follows: 1. Should the proposed fresh evidence be admitted? 2. Did the trial judge err by failing to admit KM’s post-hearing evidence? 3. Did the trial judge err in finding the circumstances of the Minister’s investigation and initial intervention were irrelevant? 4. Did the trial judge err by admitting and relying upon post-removal allegations to justify a prior action? 5. Did the trial judge err by declining to admit into evidence letters authored by the oldest child, ZM, and thereby wrongly precluded her voice from being heard? 6. Did the trial judge fail to afford KM appropriate accommodation throughout the trial or otherwise deny her procedural fairness? 7. Did the trial judge conduct the proceeding in such a way as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias? Standard of Review [38] In considering whether we should interfere with a decision under appeal, this Court must apply the appropriate standard of review. We apply different lenses to different types of alleged errors. The standard of review this Court will apply to the alleged errors of the trial judge was described in J.H. v. Nova Scotia (Community Services), 2023 NSCA 17 as follows: [16] The standard of review of a hearing judge’s decision in a child protection matter is well-settled. The Court may only intervene if the hearing judge erred in law or has made a palpable and overriding error in her appreciation of the evidence. In Mi’kmaw Family and Children’s Services of Nova Scotia v. H.O., 2013 NSCA 141, Saunders, J.A. wrote: [26] Questions of law are assessed on a standard of correctness. Questions of fact, or inferences drawn from fact, or questions of mixed law and fact are reviewed on a standard of palpable and overriding error. As Justice Bateman observed in Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 2005 NSCA 67 at ¶6: [6] ... Findings of fact and inferences from facts are immune from review save for palpable and overriding error. Questions of law are subject to a standard of correctness. A question of mixed fact and law involves the application of a legal standard to a set of facts and is subject to a standard of palpable and overriding error unless it is clear that the trial judge made some extricable error in principle with respect to the characterization of the standard or its application, in which case the error may amount to an error of law, subject to a standard of correctness. ... [27] Experienced trial judges who see and hear the witnesses have a distinct advantage in applying the appropriate legislation to the facts before them and deciding which particular outcome will better achieve and protect the best interests of the children. That is why deference is paid when their rulings and decisions become the subject of appellate review. ... [17] To justify this Court’s intervention, the appellant must satisfy us that in reaching her decision to place the children in permanent care, the hearing judge made an error of law or a palpable and overriding error of fact. Without such an error, we cannot re-weigh the evidence and substitute our view for that of the hearing judge. [39] There is, however, no standard of review in relation to matters giving rise to issues of procedural fairness, or judicial bias. This Court decides such issues as matters of first instance. Relevance and Admissibility [40] I was struck by KM’s argument that the word “relevant” was used as a weapon by the trial judge and lawyers to prevent her from successfully advancing her arguments in the court below. It underscores that what those who are legally trained view as “relevant”, and what laypersons view as “relevant” can be very different. [41] To a layperson, “relevant” may include information they believe is very important for a broad array of reasons. In the legal sphere, “relevant” has a specific meaning, and governs what evidence will be considered by the court. [42] In legal proceedings, relevant evidence is evidence which has the tendency to make a fact that is important to the determination of an issue before the court more or less likely. To be relevant, the evidence being offered must relate to the issues the court has to decide. If a party wants to introduce evidence that does not relate to what the judge has to decide, it will be found to be irrelevant. As a general statement, irrelevant evidence is not admissible. That means it is not considered by a trial judge in reaching their decision. [43] Even if proposed evidence may be relevant to an issue before the court, it may be inadmissible for other reasons. For example, evidence that is hearsay, whether given in oral testimony, or in an affidavit, is generally inadmissible. Hearsay is a statement made by a person outside of court, other than the witness, which is being offered to prove the truth of the statement. The CFSA permits hearsay to be used at an interim hearing to establish whether the Minister had reasonable and probable grounds to believe a child is in need of protective services. However, at later stages, the rule against hearsay applies. [44] Also, clear rules exist regarding the introduction of opinion evidence. If a party wishes to introduce evidence in which a witness offers an opinion, it must comply with Civil Procedure Rule 55. Notably, if a witness seeks to rely on their education or other expertise to express an opinion, that person must undergo the process of being “qualified” to do so. Opinions offered by witnesses who do not comply with the Rules, are inadmissible. [45] Trials are governed by the above legal principles regardless of whether a party is represented by a lawyer, or not. It is the trial judge’s responsibility to ensure that only relevant and admissible evidence is considered. Analysis Should the proposed fresh evidence be admitted? [46] KM is very concerned that ZM’s voice has not been heard in the legal proceedings. Her primary reason for seeking to introduce additional evidence on appeal is to correct the allegedly false and malicious information conveyed by the school about ZM. KM argues the fresh evidence is necessary so that ZM can tell the Court the things the school personnel said about her were not true. [47] KM’s motion was supported by affidavits from NH and ZM. A flavour of NH’s proposed fresh evidence can be gleaned from the following excerpt: 6. As a relevant part of my role on behalf of [KM], I have actually been in close contact with her daughter, [ZM], who I believed throughout has required my professional support as regards her stakeholder interests (as well as those of her siblings), which I adamantly perceive to have been wholly underestimated, undervalued, and abused by many and various people, as well as by the Family Court judges involved in this matter. 7. Unlike other provinces within Canada, Nova Scotia does not have a child advocate and is at an utter disadvantage in this regard. 8. The Family Courts in Nova Scotia have been taking the rights of children for granted in their approach to undertaking the best interest of the child, the voice of the child, and the child’s participatory rights. 9. From my perspective as a professional and as a reasonable-person observer, I contest that the Courts have been profoundly inadequately accommodating the voice of the child via biased guardian ad litem who are in an extreme conflict of interest as regards CPS. 10. From my perspective on behalf of [KM], [ZM], and their family-unit integrity, I contend that the Family Courts are addressing the rights of children in an unequivocally archaic, biased, patriarchal, and abusive fashion. 11. As a person with a professional degree in public relations, I have been educated and trained to do situational analyses, research, position papers, and interviews that relate to the type of understanding necessary to ascertain truth in controversial matters, for instance; and I have believed theses analysis are required in this child-protection matter – especially as regards [ZM]’s best interests and rights regarding her voice being heard and her being able to participate in this legal court case. [48] NH’s affidavit also recounts her understanding of events, as told to her by ZM, which preceded and allegedly gave rise to false information being contained in the referral made by school personnel to the Minister. [49] In her affidavit, ZM does not recount the events as conveyed to NH. She does assert: 2. My role in this child-protection appeal has been very upsetting and confusing for me as a respondent, because I had stated several times that the matter was initiated on lies about me in the school setting; and because I had no intention of going against my Mother, who I believe and stated many times is not guilty of any wrongdoing. 3. It is my belief and experience that my vulnerability and voice have been abused in this matter and used to attack my Mother; and I want to ensure that this ceases to be the case and for truth to be realized as much as possible on my Mother’s behalf and for the best interests of me and our family. [50] Fresh evidence can be accepted by this Court on an appeal in a child protection matter in three ways. Firstly, s. 49(5) of the CFSA permits the Court to “receive further evidence relating to events after the appealed order”. Secondly, Civil Procedure Rule 90.47(1) allows the Court to admit fresh evidence on “special grounds”. The assessment of “special grounds” is based on the factors set out in the Palmer[7] test, namely that the proposed evidence: • could not, by the exercise of due diligence, have been presented at trial; • is relevant, in that it bears upon a decisive or potentially decisive issue; • is credible; and • is such that, if believed, could reasonably have affected the result at trial. [51] Thirdly, if the proposed fresh evidence relates to an alleged denial of procedural fairness in the court below, the Palmer test gives way, and the Court may admit the evidence to assess an appellant’s complaint. [52] In all circumstances where an appellant seeks to introduce evidence on appeal, the proposed evidence must be in admissible form. [53] In my view, neither the affidavit of NH or ZM ought to be admitted as fresh evidence. I have reached this conclusion for a number of reasons: • None of the evidence relates to events after the Permanent Care and Custody orders, therefore, it is not admissible by virtue of s. 49(5); • NH’s affidavit is replete with inadmissible opinion evidence. NH was not qualified to give opinion evidence as required by Rule 55; • NH’s affidavit also contains inadmissible hearsay. In setting out what ZM told her about various events at school, NH is offering that evidence to prove the truth of its contents. That offends the rule against hearsay; • The proposed evidence does not meet the Palmer test in several ways. Primarily, ZM’s proposed evidence that information contained in the school referral about her was false, would not have changed the outcome of the final review hearing. The Minister specifically advised the trial judge the information was not relevant to the case it was putting forward; • Based on the Minister’s position, it is not at all surprising that the trial judge never made a finding the information was true. What the school personnel had said about ZM was not why he found she and her siblings remained in need of protective services. The information ZM is concerned about was never relevant to the decision the trial judge made; • There was no procedural unfairness which resulted in ZM’s view not being presented to the trial judge. The fact she disagreed with the information conveyed by the school, she felt her mother did nothing wrong, and she wanted to return home, was all conveyed to the court by her Guardian ad litem, Beth Archibald, during the court proceedings. Ms. Archibald provided five written reports to the trial judge. In the report dated December 8, 2023, she advised: Much of our meeting together was related to her feelings about the agency’s decisions that she and her siblings are in care. [ZM] told me she thinks that the process started because of what people said about her doing drugs at school which she has consistently denied to me. . . . I explained that the agency’s involvement is not her fault as the agency had other concerns related to her mother. [ZM] told me that her brother told her about what went on at court and I told her I wasn’t happy to hear he was sharing that with her. I explained that I was representing her interests in court, and I have always reported to the Court what she relayed to me as about her wishes. She has always told me her goal to go home. . . . Much of our time meeting [ZM] spent talking about her mother and why she and her siblings are in care when her mother has done nothing wrong. She described her mother as “having her children ripped out of her arms for no reason”. [ZM] feels everything her mother does it was for her children, and she is not an unfit mother as the agency said she is. • There is no need to admit the proposed evidence in order for ZM’s position to be known, it was conveyed to the trial judge by Ms. Archibald. [54] It is understandable a parent and a child would be upset if school personnel conveyed false information about them. However, this Court has neither the role nor the authority to hear and resolve every “wrong” a party wishes to advance. Our function is to assess whether the orders being appealed were marred by legal error. [55] If ZM had evidence, not otherwise before this Court, that was relevant to the decision we had to make, it could be admitted under the Palmer test, or insofar as it impacted procedural fairness, under the alternate route for fresh evidence. However, that was not the case here – what happened at the school did not impact on the permanent care decision. As such, it has no relevance to what needs to be decided on appeal. Although it is very important to KM and ZM to “set the record straight”, the objectionable information conveyed by school personnel was not legally relevant to what the trial judge decided, nor to this Court’s determination. Did the trial judge err by failing to admit KM’s post-hearing evidence? [56] As noted earlier, following the end of the final review hearing, KM filed a motion seeking to introduce further evidence for the trial judge’s consideration. That evidence, an affidavit sworn by KM, sought to address information contained in the Minister’s running file notes with respect to the children’s living circumstances at the beginning of the child protection investigation. Specifically, KM sought to provide an explanation as to why the children were spending large amounts of time at her sister’s home, and to refute comments attributed to her sister in the notes. [57] The trial judge did not admit the post-hearing evidence. In his written reasons the trial judge noted: • KM’s affidavit was not confined to facts, but contained submissions and argument which are not permitted; • KM’s evidence did not meet the requirements of the Palmer test; and • The information regarding the time the children spent with their aunt would have been relevant at the initial determination of whether the Minister had reasonable and probable grounds to believe the children were in need of protective services. But because that decision, as well as a protection finding had been made, KM’s proposed evidence regarding her sister’s involvement with the children was not relevant to the present issue – whether the children remained in need of protective services. [58] KM’s argument on this ground of appeal repeats the theme that the trial judge should have examined the circumstances giving rise to the Minister’s involvement with her family. She says the trial judge should have inquired into the faulty investigation and the validity of the things people were reporting to the Minister. She says the information she wanted to admit was relevant and the trial judge should have considered it. If he had properly done so, he would have concluded the Minister’s investigation was flawed and the children returned to her care. [59] KM’s view of what the trial judge should have done is not legally sound. The trial judge, at that particular stage of the CFSA proceeding needed only to determine one question – whether the children were still in need of protective services. He was correct in determining the evidence KM wanted to present was, for the most part, inadmissible, and the remainder did not relate to an issue properly before the court for resolution. [60] I would dismiss this ground of appeal. Did the trial judge err in finding the circumstances of the Minister’s investigation and initial intervention were irrelevant? [61] As noted earlier, at trial KM focused exclusively on the argument the Minister’s request to place the children in permanent care and custody should be dismissed because of serious flaws in the referrals and initial investigation. Her submissions on this point were summarized by the trial judge as follows: 1. The fact that CB assaulted his partner (who was not KM) had nothing to do with KM and her family and should not have resulted in the Minister’s engagement with KM or her family. 2. ZM’s Principal reported this matter to the Agency when he should have engaged the police and had he done so this investigation would never have occurred. 3. ZM’s principal’s report to the Agency was false and malicious. 4. ZM’s Principal acted on reports from students at ZM’s school concerning ZM’s behaviour without a proper investigation into the veracity of the allegations. 5. The Agency should have done a more thorough investigation prior to requiring the children be placed in the care of family members. [62] As noted earlier, the trial judge found all of these issues to be moot given KM had consented to interim orders finding there were reasonable and probable grounds to believe the children were in need of protective services, and later, at the protection stage, consented to a finding they were in need of protective services. [63] On appeal KM insists the record demonstrates she did not consent to those findings. She also argues the trial judge was not bound to the previously made orders. Her support person, NH, argued these points in her written submissions as follows: Hon. JI states that he is unable to question Hon. JJ’s[8] misconceived decision and must accept it as correct as though justice were a religious cult and her an infallible pope. This is not acceptable and flies in the face of judicial review. It is vital that Hon. JJ’s decision be rendered misconstrued and utterly unreliable given the fact that KM adamantly and consistently did not consent to the findings of protection concerns, which is a necessary component of the Minister’s ability to take children from parents, as per the CFSA – as well as in keeping with Legislative intentions. KM’s CPS-intervention-and-trials ordeal is tremendously complex in the above regard and required likewise contextually intensive judicial review processes by both Hon. JJ and Hon. JI, which did not happen, and the latter of whom falsely stated, in his final decision, that KM had admitted to protection concerns under Hon. JJ. Which unequivocally did not occur, as per the official Court transcript. KM’s submitted evidence and declared rights fell on deaf ears. [64] NH also asserts the trial judge failed to apply the correct legal principles in assessing the allegedly improper and potentially criminal conduct of the Minister’s employees and school personnel which in turn gave rise to the protection proceedings. She wrote in her factum: #9. Hon. JI errored in not having applied the many and various international, federal, and provincial rights, laws, statutes, policies, and regulations to KM’s daughter’s consecutive highschool-interogation ordeals, including (a.) the CPS-intake-social-worker’s unnecessary questioning of her regarding CB’s unfounded potential threat to his biological children, and (b.) the consequentially devastating questioning of her by the two principals and several CPS social workers regarding allegations (obtained from bullying students) of drug trafficking and untrue accusations attributed to her mother. #10. Hon. JI errored in not having applied the many and various international, federal, and provincial rights, laws, statutes, policies, and regulations to SM’s administrative search-and-seizure activity, and the all-encompassing and devastating results thereof. [65] The first argument can be dealt with quickly. The record clearly shows that KM, through her legal counsel and in her presence, consented to a finding there were reasonable and probable grounds to believe the children were in need of protective services. Any concerns about the accuracy of the referrals or the Minister’s reasons for being involved with her family should have been raised at this point in the proceedings. [66] Similarly, the record shows her legal counsel, in KM’s presence, consented to a finding the children were in need of protective services pursuant to s. 22(2)(g) of the CFSA. KM appears to believe that in order for her consent to be valid, she had to indicate it personally. When parties are represented, that is not required. The position stated by her counsel in open court in the midst of a court appearance served to communicate her consent. The trial judge was correct when he stated KM had consented to the interim orders and to the protection finding. [67] Further, KM’s attempts to challenge Justice Jollimore’s decisions both at trial and before this Court are misconceived. If she wished to dispute them, the CFSA required an appeal to have been brought within 25 days of the orders.[9] That is the mechanism the Legislature chose for parties to challenge decisions made at earlier steps in a CFSA proceeding. As noted earlier, KM did not appeal the earlier findings of Justice Jollimore. [68] KM has not provided any direct authority to support her assertion the trial judge erred by not re-assessing and re-examining the circumstances giving rise to the Minister’s intervention and Justice Jollimore’s earlier orders. With respect, her position has no legal merit. As alluded to earlier, there is well established judicial authority the trial judge’s approach was legally correct. [69] In Nova Scotia (Community Services) v. A.S., 2007 NSCA 82, Justice Cromwell (as he then was) stated: [11] Under appeal is a permanent care order made at a final disposition hearing. There is no dispute about the judge’s role at that disposition hearing: he had to determine whether the child continued to be in need of protective services and, if so, to make an order in the child’s best interests: see, for example, Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto v. C.M., [1994] 2 S.C.R. 165; Children’s Aid Society of Halifax v. T.B., 2001 NSCA 99, 194 N.S.R. (2d) 149 (C.A.) at para. 26; Nova Scotia (Minister of Community Services) v. D.W.S., [1996] N.S.J. No. 349 (Q.L.), 168 N.S.R. (2d) 27 (F.C.) at paras. 320 - 324; Nova Scotia (Minister of Community Services) v. F.A., [1996] N.S.J. No. 447 (Q.L.) (F.C.) at paras. 21 - 22. [12] The final disposition came at the end of over a year of court proceedings and services with respect to this child. Review of the disposition hearing must be undertaken in light of the factual and procedural context in which it occurred. In this case, there are two critical aspects of that context: first, the time limits under the Children and Family Services Act, S.N.S. 1990, c. 5 (“CFSA”) and, second, the requirement that previous findings that the child was in need of protective services made earlier in the process must be accepted as having been correct when made. . . . [17] The second critical part of the context relates to the effect of the findings earlier in the process that the child was in need of protective services. At the final disposition hearing, it is not the judge’s function to reconsider these earlier determinations: those previous findings must be accepted at face value. They are assumed to have been properly made at the time they were: G.S. v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Community Services), 2006 NSCA 20, 241 N.S.R. (2d) 148 (C.A.) at para. 19. At the final disposition hearing, the judge is to consider whether the need for protective services continues at that time. As Chipman, J.A. put it in Nova Scotia (Minster of Community Services) v. S.E.L. and L.M.L , 2005 NSCA 55, 184 N.S.R. (2d) 165 (C.A.) at para. 20: “... Once a finding of the need for protection has originally been made, there is still the requirement ... to consider whether the child is or is no longer in need of future protection..” [18] In summary, two of the key issues at the final disposition hearing are to determine whether the child remains in need of protective services and what order is required in the child’s best interests. The issue of the ongoing need for protective services is not to be considered in a vacuum, but in light of the previous findings of the court which must be taken as having been right at the time they were made. The nature of the order required in the child’s best interests must take into account the time limitations in the statute. (Emphasis added) [70] The trial judge was bound by the above principles. He was required to accept at face value the children were in need of protective services as found by Justice Jollimore. His required focus was on whether the circumstances that gave rise to that finding had changed. KM’s complaints about the initiating referrals and the Minister’s investigation were, as the trial judge said, irrelevant to the issue he was required to address. [71] Although the trial judge found KM’s concerns to be irrelevant to his task, he took the time to explain in his reasons why he did not find them to be supportable on the evidence before him. KM raises the same concerns about the Minister’s early involvement and the school referrals on appeal, but it is unnecessary for me to address them. They cannot give rise to grounds to interfere with the trial judge’s conclusion the children remained in need of protective services and it was in their best interests to be placed in the permanent care and custody of the Minister. [72] As a final point, the trial judge was not required to consider or apply the “various international, federal, and provincial rights, laws, statutes, policies, and regulations” KM and NH submitted were relevant at the final hearing. They were not relevant to the determination he had to make – whether the children remained in need of protective services. The trial judge was required to apply the statutory provisions contained in the CFSA, which governs child protection proceedings in Nova Scotia. [73] I would dismiss this ground of appeal. Did the trial judge err by admitting and relying upon post-removal allegations to justify a prior action? [74] In advancing this ground of appeal, KM again misplaces her focus. In her written material, she argues: B. Improper Reliance on Post Hoc Allegations 21. The judge relied on allegations entered in CPS records after the children had already been removed, which served to justify – rather than precede – the apprehension. This reversed the proper evidentiary process and offended principles of natural justice. (Emphasis in original) [75] KM’s complaint rests on the view that it is only the concerns and evidence available to the Minister at the time of apprehension which are relevant in a child protection proceeding. She asserts events which occur post-apprehension and information collected by the Minister thereafter, should not be considered in assessing whether the children are, or remain in need of protective services. [76] KM is mistaken. As noted in A.S.[10] above, “[c]hildren’s needs and circumstances are continually evolving and these ever changing circumstances must be taken into account”. [77] I would dismiss this ground of appeal. Did the trial judge err by declining to admit into evidence letters authored by the oldest child, ZM, and thereby wrongly precluded her voice from being heard? [78] KM says the trial judge erred by not admitting into evidence two letters written by the oldest child, ZM. In her factum she explains: 25. The Supreme Court of Canada in A.C. v Manitoba, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 181, held that young persons must be allowed to meaningfully participate in proceedings affecting their lives. The judge dismissed a key letter from one child correcting prior misinformation, denying her agency and voice. (Appeal book, Vol. 11, pp3353) (Emphasis in original) [79] In the factum filed by NH, she frames the concern as follows: #8: Hon. JI errored in not enabling KM’s daughter to have her voice accurately, actively, and rightfully heard (as per various rights), in the trial involving her and instead claiming that her voice was accurately/ideally heard via her guardian ad litem, despite various human-rights-based and child-best-interest considerations to the contrary. [80] Although I do not take issue with the proposition that “young persons must be allowed to meaningfully participate in proceedings affecting their lives” within certain contexts, it bears noting the A.C. decision involved the right of children over 14 years of age to exercise autonomy over medical decision-making. That decision specifically addresses the constitutionality of provisions in Saskatchewan’s child welfare legislation addressing when a child in care can make autonomous medical decisions. It has no direct relevance to the matter before the Court. [81] In Nova Scotia, the Legislature has chosen mechanisms to permit children to participate in child protection proceedings. This includes having their interests represented by a Guardian ad litem. That mechanism was used to ensure ZM and NM had a voice in the proceedings both in the court below and on appeal. The fact KM disagrees with the positions advanced by the Guardians ad litem does not constitute a reason for this Court to intervene. Further, NH’s opinion about the Legislature’s choice to utilize a Guardian ad litem to represent the views of a child in proceedings under the CFSA is inadmissible and of no consequence. [82] KM also complains ZM’s voice was not heard because her letters were not introduced into evidence. Again, the CFSA provides direction to a trial judge when a party seeks to introduce this type of evidence from a child. KM does not reference this statutory provision in her submissions. [83] Section 96(3) states: (3) Upon consent of the parties or upon application by a party, the court may, having regard to the best interests of the child and the reliability of the statements of the child, make such order concerning the receipt of the child’s evidence as the court considers appropriate and just, including (a) the determination of the persons, including parties, who may be present while the child is giving viva voce evidence; and (b) the admission into evidence of out-of-court statements made by the child. (Emphasis added) [84] The two words highlighted above are important. The use of “may” indicates a trial judge is not required to accept into evidence statements made by children. It is not automatic. Rather, a trial judge is mandated to consider the “reliability” of the statement to be admitted having regard to the best interests of the child. [85] In his reasons, the trial judge specifically notes that in considering whether to admit ZM’s letters into evidence, he was governed by s. 96(3). He gave five reasons for why he did not find the letters to be reliable. His analysis was detailed. He applied the correct law, and in doing so, made findings of fact that were available for him to make on the evidence before him. KM has not shown an error that would justify this Court interfering with his decision. [86] I would dismiss this ground of appeal. Did the trial judge fail to afford KM appropriate accommodation throughout the trial or otherwise deny her procedural fairness? [87] In his reasons, the trial judge noted the accommodations that had been afforded to KM: [12] KM sought and was granted significant and meaningful accommodations during this trial. For example, as accommodations to KM I granted: 1. evidence filing extensions and permitted KM to tender her evidence well after the trial commenced. 2. the opportunity for KM to be accompanied by support persons at trial to take notes. 3. permission to have KM’s support person, NH (who is not a lawyer), cross examine witnesses on KM’s behalf (all parties consented to this mode of questioning). 4. breaks during the trial as requested by KM. [13] In addition, I required the Minister to make an oral opening statement at the commencement of the trial (in addition to the Minister’s written pretrial submission) to ensure KM had the benefit of reading and hearing the Minister’s position regarding the request for a permanent care and custody order. [14] I required written submissions following the close of the permanent care and custody trial to ensure KM had the opportunity to obtain the Minister’s position in writing. [88] A review of the record supports the accuracy of the trial judge’s description of the accommodations afforded to KM. [89] KM has not, in her written or oral submissions, demonstrated the accommodations afforded to her fell short of what was required in the circumstances or negatively impacted on her ability to respond to the Minister’s case. [90] Nor does KM identify any procedural fairness concerns arising from the final disposition hearing. Her complaint the trial judge accepted the Minister’s evidence and did not accept hers, does not establish a lack of accommodation, or a breach of procedural fairness. [91] I would dismiss this ground of appeal. Did the trial judge conduct the proceeding in such a way as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias? [92] KM clearly disagrees with the trial judge’s conclusions. She says he should have considered a variety of arguments she advanced. She complains he confused her last name with that of the children’s father. She says the trial judge just went along with everything the Minister’s counsel said. [93] The principles relating to claims of judicial bias are well-known. In R.S. and J.L. v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Community Services), 2024 NSCA 75, Justice Van den Eynden explained: [42] Judicial bias was mostly recently reviewed by this Court in R. v. Nevin, 2024 NSCA 64. The meaning of bias was explained: [47] Bias has been defined as “a predisposition to decide an issue or a cause in a certain way which does not leave the judicial mind perfectly open to persuasion or conviction”. … [43] The test to assess whether a reasonable apprehension of bias claim has been established was also explained in Nevin: [47] …The test for establishing a reasonable apprehension of bias has been consistently applied by Canadian courts of all levels since the case of Committee for Justice and Liberty v. Canada (National Energy Board)[11]: [...] the apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by reasonable and right minded persons, applying themselves to the question and obtaining thereon the required information. [...] that test is “what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically—and having thought the matter through—conclude. Would he think that it is more likely than not that [the trier of fact], whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly.” [48] The notion of fairness in the context of reasonable apprehension of bias was further commented on by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. R.D.S[12]: [94] [...] Fairness and impartiality must be both subjectively present and objectively demonstrated to the informed and reasonable observer. If the words or actions of the presiding judge give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias to the informed and reasonable observer, this will render the trial unfair. [44] The burden on a party claiming a reasonable apprehension of bias or actual bias on the part of a judge is onerous. There is a strong presumption of judicial impartiality that must be overcome by a claimant. The inquiry is fact-specific and requires clear evidence of serious grounds (see Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada, 2003 SCC 45 at paras. 76-77 and R. v. Teskey, 2007 SCC 25 at para. 21). [94] Having reviewed the record and the trial judge’s reasons, I see nothing that would cause an objective observer to conclude there was a reasonable apprehension of bias on his part. The trial judge treated KM with patience and respect throughout the proceeding. It bears noting that a trial judge is not biased because they apply the rules of evidence. Nor is a trial judge biased because they decline to apply laws that have no application to the issue they are mandated to decide. Finally, a trial judge is not biased because they accept the legal argument made by one party over that of another. [95] I would dismiss this ground of appeal. Disposition [96] It is unfortunate KM has remained fixated on how the Minister’s involvement was triggered and how the initial investigation was undertaken. The fact she consented to, and did not appeal, the Interim and Protection orders, rendered the arguments she wanted to make irrelevant. She has spent much time and emotional energy on making arguments which neither the trial judge nor this Court have the mandate to address. [97] For the reasons above, I would dismiss the appeal. Bourgeois, J.A. Concurred in: Fichaud J.A. Van den Eynden, J.A. [1] When the proceeding started, the applicant was identified as the “Minister of Community Services”, and the initial orders issued use this reference. Nothing of legal significance turns on the name change, it is noted simply for clarity. [2] S.N.S. 1990, c.5, as amended. [3] In the decision under appeal, the trial judge uses “KM”. Although the appellant filed her Notice of Appeal using her full name, KSM, I will use the initials “KM” in these reasons for consistency. [4] 2025 NSSC 8, at para. 24. [5] At various places the final review hearing is referenced as the “Permanent care hearing”. They are the same, the outcome of which is the decision being appealed by KM. [6] In her factum, NH uses “Hon JI” as a reference to the trial judge. [7] R. v. Palmer, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 759. [8] This is a reference to Justice Elizabeth Jollimore who presided at the Interim, Protection and Disposition hearings. [9] Section 49(1). [10] 2007 NSCA 82. [11] [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369, at pages 394-395. [12] [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484, at para. 94.