P.D.B. v. L.D.A.

2021 BCSC 1984 P.D.B. v. L.D.A. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: P.D.B. v. L.D.A., 2021 BCSC 1984 Date: 20211012 Docket: E211056 Registry: Vancouver Between: P.D.B. Claimant And L.D.A. Respondent Before: The Honourable Madam Justice Tucker Reasons for Judgment Counsel for Claimant: J.F. Brown Counsel for Respondent: R. Choudhry Place and Date of Hearing: Vancouver, B.C. September 7, 9 and 10, 2021 Claimant's Application for Leave to Reopen: Vancouver, BC September 29, 2021 Place and Date of Judgment: Vancouver, B.C. October 12, 2021 Table of Contents Paragraph Range I. INTRODUCTION [1] - [9] II. BACKGROUND [10] - [35] A. The Parties [10] - [18] B. Parenting After the Separation [19] - [29] C. Campbell River [30] - [35] III. THE RESPONDENT'S RELOCATION APPLICATION [36] - [54] A. Nature of the Application [36] - [43] B. Timing and Circumstances of the Application [44] - [54] IV. THE CLAIMANT'S APPLICATIONS [55] - [86] A. Application to Reopen [56] - [60] B. Parenting Time Application [61] - [86] V. ORDERS [87] - [93] A. Relocation and Related Orders [87] - [87] B. Parental Responsibilities [88] - [89] C. Parenting Time [90] - [90] D. Interim Orders by Consent [91] - [91] E. Costs [92] - [93] I. Introduction [1] P.D.B. ("the claimant") and L.D.A. ("the respondent") commenced living in a marriage-like relationship in or about February 2016. [2] They have one child together ("R.B."), born in 2016. This September, R.B. turned five and started kindergarten. [3] The parties separated on November 21, 2020, with the respondent leaving the family home and taking R.B. Both parties continue to reside within the City of Vancouver, with the claimant continuing on in the former family home. [4] On July 15, 2021, the respondent applied under the Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c. 25 [FLA] seeking an order permitting her to relocate with R.B. to Campbell River. [5] On July 16, 2021, the claimant filed an application seeking an interim order providing for the parties to share parenting time on a 50/50 basis and for shared parental responsibilities. [6] Between the separation date and filing of the present applications, the parties have parented without an agreement or order. [7] After the applications were filed, the parties entered an interim agreement on parenting time ("Interim Agreement"). The Interim Agreement is expressly without prejudice to the applications and governs pending determination of the applications. [8] A hearing on the cross-application was held on September 7, 9 and 10, 2021. [9] On September 29, 2021, the claimant sought leave to reopen his application to effectively vary the Interim Agreement and to adduce fresh evidence in support of his case for parenting time. II. Background A. The Parties [10] The parties met in October 2015 and began dating in November 2015. The respondent discovered she was pregnant in January 2016. In February 2016, the parties began living together. [11] The respondent grew up in Campbell River, a city located on Vancouver Island. The respondent's sister and her family live in Campbell River and the respondent's parents live nearby on Cortes Island. The respondent's brother and his family live in Vancouver. [12] The claimant grew up in England. His extended family continues to reside in England, except for his aunt and her husband, who are in Vancouver. [13] When the parties met, the respondent was teaching full-time at a private grade school, Mulgrave School ("Mulgrave"), in West Vancouver. She has been employed at Mulgrave since 2006. In addition to teaching, she did contract work as an examiner and developing an International Baccalaureate program film curriculum. The claimant was working primarily as a freelance session musician, but also taught music part-time and was in a band that played events and commercial venues. When the music industry was slow, the claimant also took contract work as a painter. [14] Following a maternity leave, the respondent returned to work at Mulgrave on a part-time basis in August 2017, and then returned to full-time in September 2018. The claimant continued to work as usual, but also looked after R.B. when the respondent was at work and his schedule permitted. After the respondent returned to work, the parties also had the help of a nanny. [15] On August 26, 2019, R.B. began attending pre-kindergarten at Mulgrave. R.B. would go to Mulgrave with the respondent when the respondent went into work, and was generally in after-care for the afternoon. The claimant would sometimes pick up R.B. after pre-kindergarten if his schedule permitted. [16] During the school summer breaks, the respondent usually took R.B. on extended trips to Cortes Island to visit the respondent's parents. The claimant would vacation by joining the respondent and R.B. on Cortes Island as his work permitted. [17] In March 2020, the respondent took R.B. to Cortes Island for a planned two-week visit. When the COVID-19 pandemic was declared, the respondent decided to stay on Cortes Island. The claimant joined them there about six weeks later, and they all stayed together on Cortes Island until they returned to Vancouver in August 2020. [18] In August 2020, the claimant starting working as an assistant music teacher at Fraser Academy under a fixed-term one-year contract. The Fraser Academy, like Mulgrave, is a private grade school. On March 8, 2021, the claimant was offered and accepted a full-time music teacher position with Fraser Academy for August 2021 to August 2022. With Fraser Academy's support and encouragement, the claimant also enrolled in a part-time university program to obtain an education degree. B. Parenting After the Separation [19] In December 2020, the parties continued to have regular meals together with R.B. [20] Starting in January 2021, the claimant generally had parenting time with R.B. for 8-9 hours each Sunday and from 4-6:00 p.m. on Tuesdays and Thursdays. [21] From January 7 - 10, 2021, the parties took a joint family trip with R.B. to Manning Park. [22] The parties attended a joint counselling session with Dr. M.G. Following the counselling, the respondent agreed the claimant could have R.B. stay overnight at his home. Their first overnight visit was on February 12, 2021. Since then, the claimant has had R.B. overnight about once a week. Along with the overnight visit, he has had after-school parenting time (4-6:00 p.m.) two days a week. [23] In early 2021, the respondent was often with the claimant and R.B. during the claimant's parenting time. This practice ended in June 2021. [24] The parties agree that the separation has caused R.B. to experience some anxiety. R.B. is presently seeing a counsellor selected by the agreement of the parties. [25] After the joint counselling session, the claimant continued to see Dr. M.G. and continued still as of the hearing. His counselling is, at least in part, directed at co-parenting constructively with the respondent and helping R.B. process the separation. In his counselling, the claimant has learned to identify when R.B. is anxious, breathing exercises to teach and do along with R.B., and mirroring techniques to ensure R.B. feels heard and supported. [26] The claimant has sought increased parenting time, including additional overnight time, since shortly after the separation. The respondent has resisted additional time, expressing concerns about stressing R.B. The respondent perceives R.B. as resistant to being parted from her care, a resistance she attributes to R.B.'s anxiety and to the fact that she and R.B. are closely bonded. [27] When the applications were filed, the parties contemplated scheduling a late July hearing. In August 2021, when it became apparent that the applications were unlikely to be heard before September, the parties entered the Interim Agreement. [28] Under the Interim Agreement, the claimant has parenting time each Monday from 9:30 a.m. to 6 p.m. and each Tuesday from 9:30 a.m. through to Wednesday at 6 p.m. R.B. began attending kindergarten at Mulgrave on August 23, 2021. Since the start of kindergarten, the claimant's Monday and Tuesday parenting time has started at about 4:00 p.m., rather than at 9:30 a.m. [29] The parties also made a special agreement for the week of August 16, 2021. Mulgrave's teaching staff returned to work earlier than Fraser Academy's staff did. As the respondent worked the week of August 16th and the claimant did not, the claimant also had R.B. for the day on the Thursday and Friday of that week. C. Campbell River [30] The respondent says that before the separation the parties had agreed that the family would move together to Campbell River. She says there was a concrete plan to move in either September 2021 or September 2022, and that the proposed relocation amounts to her carrying on with that plan even though the claimant has changed his mind. [31] The claimant concedes there was agreement on the concept of moving to Campbell River one day, but says it was a distant retirement plan and never an imminent relocation. [32] On July 8, 2016, the parties bought a house in Campbell River. The respondent says the house was intended to be the family residence under a five-year plan to move to Campbell River. The claimant says the house was a long-term investment to be maintained by rental income through to their retirement. The respondent says the parties agreed that R.B. would attend Ecole Deux Mondes in Campbell River; the claimant says the respondent registered R.B. at the school without his knowledge or consent. [33] While the respondent described herself as having given her "notice" to Mulgrave, she continues to be employed by Mulgrave. She arranged to have a 70% teaching caseload and to perform her Mulgrave work remotely. She has always been able to do her contract work remotely. [34] The respondent says that if her application is allowed, she plans to reside with her sister in Campbell River and give an eviction notice to the Campbell River house tenants. Once the tenants are gone, she would move into the Campbell River house with R.B. [35] The respondent asserts that she has a support system in Campbell River, that R.B. is bonded with her parents and her sister's family, and that the cost of living is less in Campbell River and thus R.B. will have a better lifestyle there. III. The respondent's RELOCATION Application A. Nature of the Application [36] At the hearing, counsel described the respondent's application as one for a final order. She sought an interim order in the alternative. [37] As noted by claimant's counsel, no summary trial application was made: see Supreme Court Family Rules, Rules 10-1(3) and 10-11(1). The respondent's application as filed also indicates it is a matter within the jurisdiction of a master. I informed counsel at the outset that the application would be heard only as one for an interim order. [38] The FLA has two provisions addressing relocation of a child. Section 69 applies when there is an agreement or order regarding parenting arrangements in place, and s. 46 applies when there is not. [39] During submissions, the respondent acceded to the claimant's position that her application is properly brought under s. 46. I concur. The Interim Agreement was expressly made without prejudice (see S.R.W. v. R.C.D.A.D., 2021 BCSC 1158 at para. 16), and it was entered into only after the respondent's application was filed. [40] Section 46 reads as follows: Changes to child's residence if no agreement or order 46 (1) This section applies if all of the following circumstances exist: (a) no written agreement or order respecting parenting arrangements applies in respect of a child; (b) an application is made for an order described in section 45(1)(a) or (b) [orders respecting parenting arrangements]; (c) the child's guardian plans to change the location of that child's residence and the change can reasonably be expected to have a significant impact on that child's relationship with another guardian. (2) To determine the parenting arrangements that would be in the best interests of the child in the circumstances set out in subsection (1) of this section, the court (a) must consider, in addition to the factors set out in section 37(2) [best interests of child], the reasons for the change in the location of the child's residence, and (b) must not consider whether the guardian who is planning to move would do so without the child. [41] The onus under s. 46 rests with the respondent as applicant. The court is directed to focus on the best interests of the child and the reasons for proposed relocation. [42] The best interests of the child are addressed in FLA, s. 37 and are to be assessed taking into consideration the factors set out in s. 37(2). Section 37 provides: Best interests of child 37 (1) In making an agreement or order under this Part respecting guardianship, parenting arrangements or contact with a child, the parties and the court must consider the best interests of the child only. (2) To determine what is in the best interests of a child, all of the child's needs and circumstances must be considered, including the following: (a) the child's health and emotional well-being; (b) the child's views, unless it would be inappropriate to consider them; (c) the nature and strength of the relationships between the child and significant persons in the child's life; (d) the history of the child's care; (e) the child's need for stability, given the child's age and stage of development; (f) the ability of each person who is a guardian or seeks guardianship of the child, or who has or seeks parental responsibilities, parenting time or contact with the child, to exercise his or her responsibilities; (g) the impact of any family violence on the child's safety, security or well-being, whether the family violence is directed toward the child or another family member; (h) whether the actions of a person responsible for family violence indicate that the person may be impaired in his or her ability to care for the child and meet the child's needs; (i) the appropriateness of an arrangement that would require the child's guardians to cooperate on issues affecting the child, including whether requiring cooperation would increase any risks to the safety, security or well-being of the child or other family members; (j) any civil or criminal proceeding relevant to the child's safety, security or well-being. (3) An agreement or order is not in the best interests of a child unless it protects, to the greatest extent possible, the child's physical, psychological and emotional safety, security and well-being. (4) In making an order under this Part, a court may consider a person's conduct only if it substantially affects a factor set out in subsection (2), and only to the extent that it affects that factor. [43] Under s. 216(1) and (2) of the FLA, the court is to make interim orders, to the extent practicable, based on the requirements that would apply to a final order. B. Timing and Circumstances of the Application [44] The claimant's primary response position is that the relocation application should not be determined on an interim basis or on the record before me. He points to the conflicts in the affidavit evidence and the fact that neither disclosure nor discovery have taken place yet. He says there is no evidence establishing urgency. [45] The respondent maintains that the record is adequate and that the affidavit evidence before me includes documents that will enable me to make any determinations of credibility required. She argues that this case is distinguishable from those cited by the claimant in support of his position because the parties had a a pre-separation agreement to relocate. [46] While interim relocation applications are sometimes granted, the caselaw cautions against proceeding on a deficient record: see Hellberg v. Netherclift, 2017 BCCA 363 at paras. 100 and 101; Nolie v. Reece, 2016 BCSC 2201 at paras. 25-36; and D.R.K. v. S.G.G., 2013 BCSC 2107 at paras. 16-20. The court has also expressed concerns about making an order that can be effectively final in its practical impact. Finally, urgency has been a significant consideration in the determination as to whether to proceed. [47] These concerns are reflected in the following paragraphs from Justice Young's decision in Nolie: [27] Relocation is, as Master Scarth said in D.R.K v. S.G.G., 2013 BCSC 2107, one of the most serious decisions the court is asked to make. It can have a lifelong impact on a child and his or her relationship with a non-moving parent. When granted at the interim stage, it can be tantamount to a final order. [28] The authorities indicate that courts are reluctant to consider relocation applications at the interim stage particularly where the move would significantly reduce the non-moving parent's time with the child. [32] In S.L.S. v. J.A.S., 2013 BCSC 1775, Mr. Justice Rogers refused to grant the mother's interim application to relocate the parties' nine-year-old child from Peachland to Pitt Meadows because the mother's new partner had a job that required him to move. The parties had shared parenting time equally up to that point by agreement. The court dismisses the mother's application based on an analysis of s. 69(4) and the child's best interest, but also expressed concern about deciding the issue on an interim application. [33] At paragraph 31, he said in part as follows: I will start this discussion with a cautionary note. These are interim applications. They are based on affidavit evidence. The parties have not yet conducted examinations for discovery. Neither the parties nor their supporting affiants have been subject to cross-examination before the court. C's views, whatever they may be, are not known other than through the party's clearly self-serving hearsay attestations. The court does not have the benefit of a report pursuant to s. 211 of the Act. Much about this case has not, therefore, been fully elucidated. Under such circumstances, the court should proceed cautiously. The court should be careful about making an interim order that endorses a parenting regime that is significantly different than one that served the child well for some time after the parties' separation. That is not to say that the status quo should be slavishly preserved - it is only to say that the trial judge will likely be in a much better position than a chambers judge to fully assess all of the factors that will influence a decision about where C's best interests lie. [34] I entirely agree with these comments. ... [48] The record on this application is insufficient to the import of the judicial task at hand. [49] There are conflicts in the affidavit evidence before me. Moreover, the evidence is significantly focussed on whether there was a pre-separation plan for the entire family unit to relocate to Campbell River. I do not agree the existence (or not) of a pre-separation plan to move is a central or distinguishing fact. Regardless, there is no joint family plan now. R.B.'s best interests must be assessed in light of the existing (i.e., post-separation) facts. [50] As it stands, there is little evidence before me that is concrete or specific and relatively little that is focussed on R.B. and her interests. Among other gaps, no s. 211 report has been done and R.B.'s views are not before the court in any fashion. [51] The claimant's parenting time with R.B. would be significantly impacted - in frequency, amount and quality - by the proposed relocation. Campbell River is a significant distance from Vancouver and involves a lengthy ferry ride as well as driving time. Taking a flight is possible, but there no evidence before me that indicates that is a practical alternative. There are issues relating to R.B.'s age and her inability to travel on her own. In short, there is no version of going back and forth between Vancouver and Campbell River that would not amount to a dramatic depature from the status quo. [52] Finally, no urgency has been established. As the respondent works remotely, she has no employment-related need to be in Campbell River. The respondent attested that she will have to vacate her Kitsilano residence in the coming months in order for some renovation work to be carried out. Her evidence is unacceptably vague, but even if accepted, provides a reason to move from that apartment, not to move to Campbell River. [53] While the respondent understandably wishes to spend more time with her sister and parents, the respondent has family in Vancouver as well and the claimant does not object to R.B. visiting Campbell River and Cortes Island during the respondent's parenting time. [54] The proposed relocation should be considered at trial. It would ill serve R.B.'s interests to determine the matter on the record before me. IV. The Claimant's ApplicationS [55] The claimant's July 16, 2021 application seeks interim orders about parental responsibilities and parenting time: FLA, ss. 40, 41, 45(1) and 216. A. Application to Reopen [56] The claimant submits that the principles to be considered here are those that apply on an application to reopen a trial. The latter are discussed in Moradkhan v. Mofidi, 2013 BCCA 132, and were recently restated in Mayer v. Mayer Estate, 2020 BCCA 282: [20] Bearing that in mind, Justice Garson's summary of the applicable principles in Moradkhan nevertheless remains helpful (I have jettisoned the adjective "unfettered" from the second bullet point): [31] I would summarize the main principles applicable to such an application in the following way: - it is generally speaking in the interests of justice to consider that a trial is complete when each side has closed their case and the judge has delivered his or her judgment; - a judge's discretion to reopen a trial should be exercised with restraint; - a party may not use the rule to re-argue, re-cast, or re-state his or her case, rather the rule is available to remedy what might otherwise be a substantial injustice; - it is not intended that a party should be able to lead substantial new evidence, nor does the rule generally permit the leading of new expert evidence; - the reasons that the evidence was not led or submissions not made in the first place may be relevant to the exercise of the judge's discretion, particularly where the failure to do so in the first place was a considered or pragmatic decision; and - the discretion should only be exercised if the reception of the new evidence would probably change the result of the trial. I would add to this list that a judge may reasonably exercise such discretion where a relatively discreet error in math or some mechanical consideration of the evidence is clearly in error. Finally, the overarching consideration is whether it is in the interests of justice that the court reopen the case. (See also Brown v. Douglas, 2011 BCCA 521, 314 B.C.A.C. 143.). [57] The claimant has cited no authority dealing with an application to reopen an interim application as opposed to a trial. Interim orders are stop-gap measures in any event, and the law on varying interim orders reflects particular concern about family matters becoming bogged down in interim proceedings: see, for example, M.A.F. v J.C.F, 2021 BCSC 1477 at paras. 64-69 and Hama v. Werbes (1999), 66 B.C.L.R. (3d) 120 (S.C.) at paras. 6-12. That said, it is unnecessary to explore the point any further here. The claimant's application would be denied in any event. [58] The claimant entered the Interim Agreement and then affirmed it at the hearing. He now seeks weekend parenting time, and says it was only after the hearing that he realized the respondent would not agree to vary the Interim Agreement to allow that. The claimant's discontent with the negotiated terms does not provide a basis for re-opening his application to seek new orders. [59] The claimant's proposed fresh evidence would consist of his recounting of views allegedly expressed by R.B.'s counsellor on September 15, 2021. In other words, hearsay evidence of inadmissible expert opinion. It is an understatement to describe such evidence as unlikely to affect the result of the application. [60] Leave is denied. B. Parenting Time Application [61] The claimant seeks an order allocating the parties equal parenting time in accordance with the following rotating 2-2-3-3 schedule: [62] As for parental responsibilities, the claimant seeks these terms: (a) In the event of the death of a guardian, the surviving guardian will be the only guardian of [R.B.]; (b) Each guardian will have the obligation to advise the other guardian of any matters of a significant nature affecting the [R.B.]; (c) Each guardian will have the obligation to discuss with the other guardian any significant decisions that have to be made concerning [R.B.], including significant decisions about the health (except emergency decisions), education, religious instruction and general welfare; (d) The guardians will have the obligation to discuss significant decisions with each other and the obligation to try to reach agreement on those decisions; (e) In the event the guardians cannot reach agreement on a significant decision despite their best efforts, either party may apply for directions to the court; (f) Each guardian will have the right to obtain information concerning [R.B.] directly from third parties, including but not limited to teachers, counsellors, medical professionals, and third party care givers. [63] The respondent consents to much of the proposed order regarding parental responsibilities, but argues that she should be the default decision-maker if the parties disagree, with the claimant then having to apply to court to challenge her decision. [64] For parenting time, the respondent submits that she should have a greater share of parenting time. She proposes some limited and gradual increase to the claimant's parenting time, but opposes any additional overnight parenting time. [65] The respondent's position is primarily based her historical role: M.F.W. v. M.A.H., 2019 BCSC 588 at paras. 149 and 153. She claims to have done the bulk of the active parenting since R.B. was born, noting her maternity leave, her initial part-time return to work, and her role in matters touching upon R.B.'s healthcare and education. The respondent attests that the claimant's pre-separation active parenting was minimal, and characterizes him as inattentive, lacking in planning and coping skills, and as significantly relying on others to care for R.B. whenever the respondent was absent. [66] The respondent says that R.B. gets anxious about going to stay overnight with the claimant. She also expresses concern that the claimant will fail to respond if R.B. has nightmares while staying at his home. The respondent is also concerned about the frequency of R.B.'s urination and speculates that she may have stress-induced pollakiuria. [67] The claimant acknowledges that the respondent did more of the active parenting during the relationship. He says that while the respondent was on maternity leave and working part-time, he was concerned about supporting the family and working hard to build a reputation and career as a professional musician. He agrees that the respondent generally took the lead in planning and scheduling appointments and activities for R.B., but submits that he has always been an engaged parent and that he could and did take care of R.B. on his own prior to the separation. [68] The evidence does not indicate the respondent was a disinterested or unengaged father. He engaged in activities with R.B. and took her to visit friends and for regular visits with his aunt. The claimant and R.B. have a shared musicality and appear to have a special rapport built around that. They have an established relationship and a close bond. [69] It is not surprising that the parties had the assistance of a nanny when they were both were working full-time and no doubt the claimant's work schedule caused him frequently to be absent in the evenings. I am satisfied on the evidence that the claimant did look after R.B. on his own, as his schedule allowed, at times while the respondent was working or involved in work-related activities. [70] The respondent described several incidents she argues reflect poorly on the claimant's character, colouring him as short-tempered and irresponsible. I am satisfied that she is not accurately, fairly or fully portraying these incidents. She expressed no genuine concerns regarding them before raising them in evidence on his application. She also agreed to his having parenting time, including overnight parenting time, after and despite the incidents she describes. As part her relocation application, she suggested the claimant might have R.B. for a solid month during summer breaks. Her position in these respects simply cannot be reconciled with her assertions that the claimant is unreliable. [71] There is evidence from collateral witnesses who have observed the claimant and R.B. spending time together, including from of a long-term neighbour who attests that he is a capable parent to R.B. and that she regularly entrusts him with her own children so they can play together in his care. The claimant has also had success as a grade school music teacher, a position of responsibility that requires some considerable patience. [72] I am satisfied the claimant is well able to look after R.B. [73] R.B.'s best interests, as assessed in light of all her needs and circumstances, are the sole consideration in determining parenting arrangements: FLA, s. 37. [74] The respondent says R.B. has expressed anxiety about going to stay overnight with the claimant. I accept that she has. The parties agree she has suffered some anxiety as a result of the separation. But the evidence indicates that R.B. settles in quickly and is happy once she arrives. The claimant continues in the former family home and when R.B. goes there, she is going to a familiar place and using her own prior bedroom. On the whole, the evidence suggests that it is transitioning between her parents that causes R.B. anxiety, as opposed to spending time with the claimant. A set parenting schedule is likely to make these transition smoother for both parties and thus easier for R.B. herself. [75] Aside from the fallout of the separation, R.B. is a happy and healthy child. The evidence does not establish pollakiuria, let alone a stress reaction. While it is conceivable that R.B. could have nightmares while staying with the claimant, the claimant is alert to the possibility and is able to provide comfort should that occur. The claimant has spoken with his own counsellor about how to allay R.B.'s anxiety when it affects her. It is appropriate for the claimant to play a role in helping R.B. adjust to her post-separation family structure. [76] The evidence suggests R.B. would adapt to shared parenting time, including a schedule that includes additional overnight time with the claimant. [77] At five, R.B. is young for her wishes to be given significant weight, but the evidence suggests that she is happy and secure in both parents' care and feels comfortable in both households. [78] As the parties both live reasonably close to one another, moving between households will not disrupt R.B.'s kindergarten or her extracurricular activities. Her outside-the-household activities will be stable and continuous, she will simply be with or accompanied by different parents on different days. [79] It is clear that both parties love R.B. very much. I am satisfied they both want to do whatever is in R.B.'s best interests. R.B. is fortunate - she not only has two parents able to fulfil their parental responsibilities, but two parents who very much want the opportunity to do so. [80] The parties have different personalities and, thus unsurprisingly, different parenting styles, but that is a common situation. The combination is likely to ultimately be to R.B.'s benefit, although at present the different styles appear to be creating tension between parties. The claimant has completed the Parenting After Separation course. The respondent is directed to so as well, unless she has already. [81] There are no family violence issues here. [82] The facts here are unlike those in M.F.W. There, the mother had stayed at home with the children for a decade, while the father worked out of town and rarely saw the children. The claimant, the respondent and R.B. lived together on a full-time basis during the relationship and the claimant has been an active and engaged father. It is not appropriate here for the respondent to have greater parenting time and responsibility based on her historical role. [83] With his new career, the claimant has work hours that are regular, predictable, and align with R.B.'s own school hours. While the claimant is taking university courses as well, he will have evenings after R.B. is in bed and the respondent's parenting time to attend to studies. There is no present obstacle to his taking care of R.B. on a shared basis. [84] A child should develop a meaningful relationship with both parents. Maximum contact with each parent is desirable unless the best interests of the child dictate otherwise: K.R. v. J.W., 2015 BCSC 977 at para. 28; Boychuck v. Singleton, 2008 BCCA 355 at paras. 16-19. There are no countervailing factors here. [85] I am satisfied that the claimant's proposed schedule is workable and will serve R.B.'s best interests. As the parties are reasonably close together, exchanges on a 2-2-3-3 schedule are feasible without disrupting R.B.'s other activities, and will ensure that R.B. is not long separated from either parent. It is a schedule that provides the parties with equal amounts of time, but also involves both parents in weekday and weekend family time and activities. [86] Finally, the claimant's parenting time has increased gradually over time since the separation. He and R.B. had significant time together in August. In the circumstances, moving to a 2-2-3-3 schedule will not pose an overly abrupt change for R.B. V. Orders A. Relocation and Related Orders [87] The respondent's July 15, 2021 application is dismissed. B. Parental Responsibilities [88] The claimant's September 29, 2021 application for leave to reopen his July 16, 2021 application is denied. [89] Under ss. 39(1), 40, 41 and 216 of the FLA, the claimant and the respondent, as guardians, will exercise parental responsibilities for R.B. on these terms: a) Each will have the parental responsibilities for R.B. outlined under s. 41 of the FLA; b) Each must advise the other guardian of any matters of a significant nature affecting R.B., including any significant decisions about her health (except emergency decisions), education, religious instruction and general welfare; c) Each must discuss with the other guardian any significant decisions that have to be made concerning R.B.; d) Each must try to reach an agreement on those decisions; e) If the parties cannot reach an agreement on a significant decision despite their best efforts, either may apply to the court for directions; and, f) Each will have the right to obtain information about R.B. directly from third parties including, but not limited to, teachers, counsellors, medical professionals, and third party caregivers. C. Parenting Time [90] Under ss. 45(1) and 216 of the FLA: a) The parties will have shared parenting time on the 2-2-3-3 schedule set out above at paragraph 61; b) The 2-2-3-3 schedule will take effect the first Monday following this decision; and, c) The parties may vary the schedule by written agreement. D. Interim Orders by Consent [91] By consent: a) in the event of the death of a guardian, the surviving guardian will be the only guardian of R.B.; b) under FLA, s. 64(1), the respondent will not remove R.B. from the Lower Mainland except during her ordered parenting time, until further order of the court or by written agreement between the parties; and, c) under FLA, s. 91, both parties are restrained from disposing of, transferring, converting, or exchanging into another form any property in which the other may have an interest. E. Costs [92] The claimant has been successful on the disputed orders under the July 15 and 16, 2021 applications. The claimant will have the costs of both applications and those costs are in any event of the cause. [93] As the respondent was not called upon to respond to the September 29, 2021 application to reopen, there will be no order for the costs of that application. "Tucker, J."