Begg v. Provincial Rental Housing Corporation

2026 BCSC 726 Begg v. Provincial Rental Housing Corporation IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: Begg v. Provincial Rental Housing Corporation, 2026 BCSC 726 Date: 20260417 Docket: S1914628 Registry: Vancouver Between: Liam Begg Plaintiff And Provincial Rental Housing Corporation, British Columbia Housing Management Commission aka BC Housing, the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, His Majesty the King in Right of the Province of British Columbia, and John Doe #1 Defendants Before: The Honourable Justice J. Hughes Oral Reasons for Judgment (Costs) Counsel for the Plaintiff: D.S. Klein Counsel for the Defendants, Provincial Rental Housing Corporation and British Columbia Housing Management Commission: J. Peterson D. Ignatieff, Articled Student Place and Date of Hearing: Vancouver, B.C. April 10, 2026 Place and Date of Judgment: Vancouver, B.C. April 17, 2026 Introduction [1] In this personal injury action, the plaintiff advances a claim in negligence arising from an incident where he fell down a staircase in an apartment building operated by the defendants, Provincial Rental Housing Corporation and British Columbia Housing Management Commission. [2] The trial came on for hearing on liability alone on December 8, 2025. The plaintiff tendered an agreed statement of facts and called two witnesses--himself and a forensic engineer, Dr. Yasser Korany--before closing his case. [3] After the plaintiff closed his case, the defendants brought a no-evidence motion pursuant to Rule 12-5(4) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules, B.C. Reg. 168/2009, on the basis that the plaintiff had not adduced any evidence on two essential elements of his claim: standard of care and causation. The plaintiff had not anticipated a no-evidence motion and was thus afforded time to respond. [4] The no-evidence motion was argued on December 10 and 11, 2025. Oral reasons were scheduled to be given on the morning of December 12, 2025. However, immediately prior to those reasons being delivered, the plaintiff applied to re-open his case. I heard and dismissed the plaintiff's application to reopen, with oral reasons indexed at 2025 BCSC 2639. I then delivered oral reasons allowing the defendants' no-evidence motion and dismissing the plaintiff's claim, indexed at 2025 BCSC 2640. [5] The parties were granted leave to make further submissions on costs. In March 2023, the defendants had delivered a formal offer to settle and now seek an order for costs of the action to March 5, 2023, and double costs thereafter. The plaintiff consents to an order of costs of the action to the defendants as sought, but opposes the order for double costs. [6] It is undisputed that the defendants' offer is a valid offer under Rule 9-1 of the SCCR. The issue on this application is thus whether the defendants are entitled to double costs consequent on the plaintiff's failure to accept the offer. This issue largely turns on whether the offer ought reasonably to have been accepted by the plaintiff when it was delivered in March 2023, or at any point thereafter prior to its expiry on December 5, 2025. Facts relevant to costs [7] The defendants delivered the formal offer to settle by letter dated March 6, 2023 (the "Offer"). The Offer was a "walk-away" offer to waive costs in exchange for a consent dismissal order and execution of a release. It indicated that it was being made in accordance with two decisions of this court awarding double costs in circumstances where the defendants "were forced to go to trial where it was obvious that those defendants were not liable", citing McCaffrey v. Kang, 2014 BCSC 2294 and Johnson v. Jamieson, 2015 BCSC 648. [8] On March 13, 2023, one week after delivering the Offer, the defendants sent the plaintiff an unsworn statement from his ex-girlfriend, Gianna Hibbard, given March 3, 2023. In her March 2023 statement, Ms. Hibbard stated that: she was with the plaintiff at a local pub on the night of the incident; the plaintiff had "numerous pints" and was not buying drinks for others; the plaintiff was "very drunk at the time of his fall and on the way home"; the plaintiff fell from the 6th or 7th stair in the staircase; the handrail for the first set of stairs was stable; and the plaintiff's eyes rolled to the back of his head just before his fall. [9] Ms. Hibbard's March 2023 statement was inconsistent with an earlier statement that she gave to an insurance adjuster on July 24, 2019. The July 2019 statement was given prior to the dissolution of her relationship with the plaintiff and in the presence of the plaintiff and his counsel. In the July 2019 statement, Ms. Hibbard stated that: the plaintiff's foot hit the steps and he fell backwards; he was holding on to the railing at the time; the railing did not come off the wall, but the screw attaching it to the wall was loose; the fall resulted from a combination of the loose railing and the stairs themselves; and the building was not well-maintained. [10] As of the spring of 2023, document production was limited but the plaintiff had been examined for discovery. The plaintiff's evidence on discovery was that: he had purchased six beers while at a local bar the night of the incident; he was not sure if he drank them all; and he did not have any memory of his fall. The plaintiff also gave evidence that he had lived in the apartment for a few years prior to the incident, had no specific memory of falling down the stairs before the incident, but had a vague recollection of Ms. Hibbard tripping going up the stairs. [11] In early June 2025, the plaintiff conducted an examination for discovery of the defendants' representative, David Chow. Mr. Chow was a property portfolio manager for Ms. Hibbard's apartment and gave evidence that he inspected the staircase handrail after the incident and that it was firmly attached to the wall, but he could rotate the handle approximately ¼ inch. He also said that the carpet on the stairs was in good condition with no obvious tears or tripping hazards. Mr. Chow also testified that: the building manager, Wanda L'Heureux, did annual inspections and was very thorough; Ms. Hibbard did not report any issues with the handrail prior to the incident; and handrails coming loose was not a known issue in the building. [12] Over the ensuing months, the parties exchanged expert reports as follows: a) On June 26, 2025, the plaintiff served an expert report from Dr. Korany, a forensic structural engineer, dated June 26, 2025. Dr. Korany opined on whether the stairs complied with the 1975 and 2012 building codes and identified areas of non-compliance that he opined could have contributed to the plaintiff's fall: b) On September 3, 2025, the defendants served an expert report from Dr. Aaron Shapiro, a forensic toxicologist, dated September 2, 2025. Dr. Shapiro opined that: the plaintiff's blood alcohol concentration ("BAC") at the time of the incident was approximately three times the legal driving limit; that this would have compromised multiple faculties including balance, motor coordination, and judgment that are essential for climbing stairs; and thus an individual with a similar blood alcohol concentration to that of the plaintiff would be at a significantly higher risk of falling down stairs when compared to a sober person; c) On September 15, 2025, the defendants served a report from Dennis Chimich, a biomechanical engineer, dated September 12, 2025. This report was both an originating report and responded to Dr. Korany's report. Mr. Chimich opined, inter alia, that: a trip with the swing foot while ascending stairs would be expected to result in a forwards fall with contact; and a ¼ inch rotation of the handrail would not have substantially altered the effectiveness of the handrail in response to a loss of balance; d) On October 1, 2025, the plaintiff served a supplemental report from Dr. Korany which, inter alia, responded to Mr. Chimich's evidence about handrail studies; and e) On November 12, 2025, the defendants served a second report from Mr. Chimich responding to Dr. Korany's supplemental report. [13] The Plaintiff did not deliver reports from a biomechanical engineer or slip-and-fall expert in response to Mr. Chimich's reports; choosing instead to rely on Dr. Korany. Nor did the plaintiff deliver a report in response to Dr. Shapiro's opinion. [14] The parties exchanged trial briefs in October 2025. The only two witnesses the plaintiff indicated he intended to call were Dr. Korany and "Lay Witness #1". The defendants' trial brief indicated that they intended to call Ms. Hibbard, Mr. Chow, Ms. L'Heuruex, Mr. Chimich and Dr. Shapiro. [15] The Offer provided that it was open for acceptance until 4:00 p.m. on the last business day before the commencement of the first day of trial. The trial commenced on December 8, 2025, meaning that the Offer was open for acceptance from March 6, 2023 until 4:00 p.m. on December 5, 2025, a period of approximately two years and nine months. Legal Principles [16] Unless the court otherwise orders, costs of a proceeding are awarded to the successful party: Rule 14-1(9). As noted above, the plaintiff concedes that the defendants are entitled to costs of the action at Scale B. The issue is whether the defendants are entitled to double costs on account of the Offer from March 6, 2023, or some later date. [17] Rule 9-1(4) provides that the court may consider an offer to settle when exercising its discretion in relation to costs. Rule 9-1(5) in turn provides jurisdiction to award double costs of all or some of the steps taken in the proceeding after an offer to settle has been made. [18] Rule 9-1(6) lists four factors that a court may consider in making an order for double costs: Considerations of court (6) In making an order under subrule (5), the court may consider the following: (a) whether the offer to settle was one that ought reasonably to have been accepted, either on the date that the offer to settle was delivered or served or on any later date; (b) the relationship between the terms of settlement offered and the final judgment of the court; (c) the relative financial circumstances of the parties; (d) any other factor the court considers appropriate. [19] The underlying rationale for the double costs provisions contained in Rule 9-1(5) is set out in Hartshorne v. Hartshorne, 2011 BCCA 29: [25] An award of double costs is a punitive measure against a litigant for that party's failure, in all of the circumstances, to have accepted an offer to settle that should have been accepted. Litigants are to be reminded that costs rules are in place "to encourage the early settlement of disputes by rewarding the party who makes a reasonable settlement offer and penalizing the party who declines to accept such an offer" (A.E. v. D.W.J., 2009 BCSC 505, 91 B.C.L.R. (4th) 372 at para. 61, citing MacKenzie v. Brooks, 1999 BCCA 623, Skidmore v. Blackmore (1995), 2 B.C.L.R. (3d) 201 (C.A.), Radke v. Parry, 2008 BCSC 1397). In this regard, Mr. Justice Frankel's comments in Giles are apposite: [74] The purposes for which costs rules exist must be kept in mind in determining whether appellate intervention is warranted. In addition to indemnifying a successful litigant, those purposes have been described as follows by this Court: · "[D]eterring frivolous actions or defences": Houweling Nurseries Ltd. v. Fisons Western Corp. (1988), 37 B.C.L.R. (2d) 2 at 25 (C.A.), leave ref'd, [1988] 1 S.C.R. ix; · "[T]o encourage conduct that reduces the duration and expense of litigation and to discourage conduct that has the opposite effect": Skidmore v. Blackmore (1995), 2 B.C.L.R. (3d) 201 at para. 28 (C.A.); · "[E]ncouraging litigants to settle whenever possible, thus freeing up judicial resources for other cases: Bedwell v. McGill, 2008 BCCA 526, 86 B.C.L.R. (4th) 343 at para. 33; · "[T]o have a winnowing function in the litigation process" by "requir[ing] litigants to make a careful assessment of the strength or lack thereof of their cases at the commencement and throughout the course of the litigation", and by "discourag[ing] the continuance of doubtful cases or defences": Catalyst Paper Corporation v. Companhia de Navegação Norsul, 2009 BCCA 16, 88 B.C.L.R. (4th) 17 at para. 16. [20] These principles, together with the factors set out in Rule 9-1(6) provide the framework for my analysis below. Analysis (a) Ought the plaintiff to have accepted the Offer? [21] This focus of the analysis under this factor is not whether the offer itself was reasonable, but rather whether the plaintiff ought reasonably to have accepted it: Olson v. Cranbrook (City), 2026 BCSC 278 at para. 9. Reasonableness is assessed based on the circumstances that existed when the offer was open for acceptance, not by reference to the award eventually made: C.P. v. RBC Life Insurance Company, 2015 BCCA 30 at para. 97. [22] The defendants say that the Offer ought reasonably to have been accepted by the plaintiff given the significant gaps in his evidence that should have made it apparent to him that he would not be able to establish liability against the defendants. The plaintiff disagrees and raises multiple grounds on which he says show that he was not reasonably required to accept the Offer. [23] First, the plaintiff asserts that a walk-away offer attracts a higher standard in that the plaintiff's case must be of very doubtful merit, or of such hopeless prospect of success that the result is for-ordained, in order for it to be reasonable for them to accept it. The plaintiff relies on Burnett v. Moir, 2012 BCSC 1286 and Leach v. Insurance Corporation of British Columbia, 2022 BCSC 2243, in support of this submission. In both cases, the court declined to award double costs on the basis that the plaintiffs' claims were not sufficiently meritless to make the offers ones that reasonably ought to have been accepted. [24] Burnett was a personal injury claim arising out of a physical altercation in a pub. The plaintiff's claim was dismissed because he failed to establish liability. The defendants sought a variety of costs orders, including double costs based on a walk-away offer. The Court declined to order double costs, concluding as follows: [48] In my view, this is not a case for double costs. The offer made by the plaintiff to forego costs if the plaintiff discontinued his action against them is not an offer that "ought reasonably to have been accepted" between February 22 and March 3, 2011, while it was open for acceptance. This was not a case where the result was for-ordained and the plaintiff's case had no merit. That conclusion is supported by the judgment of Justice Pitfield in concluding that the defendants' application to dismiss under the summary trial provisions of the Rules was inappropriate and the issue required a trial to determine. The conclusion is further buttressed by the dismissal of the no evidence motion at trial. [Emphasis added] [25] Leach was a motor vehicle action in which the plaintiff's claim was dismissed because she failed to establish negligence on the part of the nominal defendant: para. 4. The defendant had made an offer of $10,000 plus disbursements shortly before trial. Chief Justice Hinkson, as he then was, declined to award double costs based on that offer, finding that it was not unreasonable for the plaintiff to reject the offer: [17] Nor do I find that it was unreasonable for Ms. Leach to reject the offer. "The line between the dogged pursuit of a very dubious claim and the determined exploration of a legitimate but ultimately unsuccessful theory of liability is not always clear-cut": Burnett v. Moir, 2012 BCSC 1286 at para. 53 [Burnett]. Yet, in this case, I accept that the plaintiff's claim was not one of very doubtful merit, nor was her prospect of success near hopeless as described in Burnett. [Emphasis added] [26] I do not interpret either Burnett or Leach as imposing a different or higher standard under Rule 9-1(6)(a) for walk-away offers than other offers. In both cases, the Court was simply applying the well-settled test of whether the plaintiff ought reasonably to have accepted the offer to the facts at hand, which by necessity included an assessment of the strength of those plaintiffs' respective cases. [27] In any event, the plaintiff's case was in my view weaker than in Leach and Burnett. In Burnett, the plaintiff's case survived a no-evidence motion: para. 48. And in Leach, Ms. Leach had both lay and expert evidence that supported her theory of negligence. While that evidence was not accepted at trial, the Court found that this outcome could not have been known to her before trial: Leach at para. 18. In the present case, the defendants' no-evidence motion was successful on the basis, inter alia, that the plaintiff had not adduced any evidence to establish the applicable standard of care or the defendants' breach thereof. [28] Second, the plaintiff says that Ms. Hibbard's March 2023 change in evidence created a credibility issue that would need to be determined at trial, but did not make it unreasonable for him to reject the Offer. I agree. Neither of Ms. Hibbard's statements were given under oath and it was unknown what her sworn evidence would be at trial and whether it would be accepted by the Court. It remained possible--though less probable as the discovery process unfolded--that Ms. Hibbard's initial version of events, which was more supportive of the plaintiff's position, might have ultimately been accepted in whole or in part. [29] I also agree with the plaintiff that it was not unreasonable for him not to have accepted the Offer before he had conducted his examination for discovery of Mr. Chow and absent fulsome document disclosure from the defendants. Mr. Chow was not examined until June 2025, and it was not until August and September 2025 that the defendants' lists of documents were produced. [30] However, I find that by the end of October 2025--after the parties' originating expert reports and Dr. Korany's supplemental report had been delivered and trial briefs exchanged--the state the available evidence had changed in material respect such that it became incumbent on the plaintiff to undertake a critical analysis of the strength of his case and reconsider his position regarding the Offer. By this point in time: a) Mr. Chow's evidence on discovery that the railing was securely attached to the wall was corroborated with contemporaneous documentation; b) Ms. Hibbard's evidence the plaintiff fell backwards down the stairs had not changed and was consistent with Mr. Chimich's opinion that the mechanism of injury was a backwards fall; c) Mr. Chimich's opinion that the defects in the staircase identified by Dr. Korany would have resulted in a forwards fall remained uncontradicted; d) The plaintiff had not delivered expert evidence connecting the defects that Dr. Korany identified as potentially causative of a fall with the backwards fall that he suffered or the location on the stairs where the fall occurred; and e) Ms. Hibbard's 2023 statement that the plaintiff was "very drunk" when he fell was corroborated by Dr. Shapiro's uncontradicted toxicology report in which he opined that the plaintiff's BAC was three times the legal limit and that he was thus at a significantly higher risk of falling down stairs than when sober. [31] With this body of evidence in hand and having turned his mind to the witnesses he intended to call at trial as set out in his trial brief, the plaintiff was required to make a careful assessment of the strength of his case and whether he would be able to establish that the defendants were liable based on the evidence he intended to lead at trial to prove his case. [32] I am not persuaded by the plaintiff's submission that there remained a live issue about the condition of the carpets on the staircase that warranted proceeding to trial such that it remained reasonable for him not to accept the Offer. This assertion is difficult to accept in face of Mr. Chow's evidence and supporting documentation. [33] By October 2025, the plaintiff had delivered all of his expert reports but still did not have any evidence to establish the applicable standard of care, or that the defendants breached it. This represented a fundamental gap in the plaintiff's evidence. It ought to have been obvious to the plaintiff that Dr. Korany's evidence about what steps would have been necessary to maintain the stairs was insufficient to fill the gap. [34] When pressed on the lack of standard of care evidence, counsel for the plaintiff submitted that it was not obvious that the plaintiff was required to lead evidence proving the standard of care and thus this element could reasonably have been overlooked. I disagree. The plaintiff ought to have known that he was required to lead evidence to prove each of the essential elements of his negligence claim against the defendants, including standard of care. [35] The plaintiff also submitted that because this was an occupier's liability claim, the defendants bore the onus of proving the applicable standard of care, relying on Atkins v. Jim Pattison Industries Ltd., 61 B.C.L.R. (3d) 183, 1998 CanLII 6503 (B.C.C.A.) at para. 6. I cannot accept this submission because it impermissibly reverses the onus of proof and misconstrues Atkins. The plaintiff's interpretation of Atkins overlooks the key fact that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case of negligence against the defendant. That was the context within which the Court stated that the defendant occupier "must at least establish that there was routine compliance with the scheme" when discussing the ways in which a defendant occupier could refute a prima facie case: para. 6. Atkins does not impose any burden on a defendant occupier to prove the applicable standard of care in the absence of the plaintiff first establishing a prima facie case of negligence. [36] On any reasonable assessment of the lay and expert evidence as it existed by October 2025, the plaintiff ought to have been alive to the significant weaknesses in his case, the fact that it would be very difficult for him to prove liability, and that he therefore faced a high risk that his claim would be dismissed. By this point in time, the plaintiff was well-positioned to understand the perils of his position and should have been alive to the significant gaps and shortcomings in his case, including in particular the lack of evidence to establish the standard of care. [37] I therefore find that the Offer was one that the plaintiff ought reasonably to have accepted by the end of October 2025. (b) Relationship between the Offer and the final judgment [38] This factor requires examination of the relationship between the offer and the final judgment, not the underlying circumstances of the claim: Olson at para. 18. Offers to waive costs have been found sufficient to support an award of double costs: Johnson v. Jamieson, 2015 BCSC 648 at para. 15; P.H. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2016 BCSC 173 at para. 40. [39] The defendants acknowledge that the walk-away nature of the Offer was effectively the same as the result achieved at trial in terms of liability, but say that it nonetheless would have left the plaintiff in a much better position in terms of his exposure to having to pay the defendants' costs and disbursements. The plaintiff responds by saying that by the summer of 2025, he had already incurred significant disbursements of his own, including the cost of Dr. Korany's report, and so there was little incentive to him to accept the walk-away offer. [40] I agree with the defendants that the Offer was superior to the result achieved at trial. First, the plaintiff would have been in a better position as to costs had he accepted the Offer since he is now subject to an award of costs against him. Acceptance of the Offer would have entirely negated the risk that the plaintiff would be liable to pay the defendants' costs and disbursements in the event that he was unsuccessful in establishing liability at trial. The plaintiff ought to have expected that the defendants' costs would not be insignificant if the matter proceeded to trial, particularly given that the defendants had delivered multiple expert reports, making the Offer a significantly superior result in terms of costs exposure. [41] Second, had the plaintiff accepted the Offer, he would not have had to incur the additional costs and disbursements of preparing his own case for trial, including the significant additional cost of preparing Dr. Korany and having him testify at trial. [42] I therefore find that the disparity in between the Offer and the result achieved at trial weighs in favour of an award of double costs. (c) Financial circumstances of the parties [43] The plaintiff does not assert that the relative financial circumstances of the parties is a factor that weighs against an order of double costs. Conclusion [44] The defendants are entitled to an award of costs at Scale B to October 31, 2025, and to an award of double costs thereafter. [45] The defendants are also entitled to costs of this application. "Hughes J."