Lisenko v. Zamor

2025 BCSC 1712 Lisenko v. Zamor

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: Lisenko v. Zamor, 2025 BCSC 1712 Date: 20250904 Docket: E136201 Registry: Kelowna Between: Victoria Lisenko also known as Victoria Zamor Claimant And Samy Zamor Respondent Before: The Honourable Justice Hardwick Reasons for Judgment Counsel for the Claimant: C.G. Johnson The Respondent appearing in person: S. Zamor Place and Date of Trial/Hearing: Kelowna, B.C. June 5, 2025 Place and Date of Judgment: Kelowna, B.C. September 4, 2025 Table of Contents Introduction.. 3 Background.. 4 Overview of the Parties' Employment Circumstances. 8 Positions of the Parties. 9 Separation Date. 10 Division of Family Property and Debt. 12 Family Property. 12 Family Debt 12 Family Property and Family Debt - the Requested Equalization Payment 14 Unequal Division. 15 Spousal Support. 18 Imputation of Income. 19 Compensatory Spousal Support 20 Non-compensatory Spousal Support 21 Quantum and Duration of Spousal Support 25 Divorce. 27 Summary of Substantive Orders. 28 Costs. 29 Introduction [1] In his notice of application filed February 5, 2024 (the "Application"), the respondent, Mr. Samy Zamor, seeks determination of all outstanding issues in this family law action pursuant to R. 11‑3 of the Supreme Court Family Rules [Rules]. [2] Although Mr. Zamor is currently representing himself, he had counsel until shortly prior to the hearing before me.

Accordingly, the Application and the supporting affidavit materials were prepared with benefit of assistance from counsel. The claimant, Ms. Victoria Lisenko, formerly Victoria Zamor, has been represented by counsel throughout the proceedings and was represented by counsel at the hearing. [3] In the Application, Mr. Zamor broadly seeks, in addition to a divorce, an equal division of family property, including an equal division of the net sale proceeds of the family home (to be defined in due course), together with a very specific additional equalization payment and spousal support. Although Mr. Zamor also seeks in the Application an equal division of the family debt, his position on that issue is somewhat more nuanced and I will return to it. [4] Ms. Lisenko opposes the equal division of family property and Mr. Zamor's entitlement to spousal support. Ms. Lisenko seeks an unequal division of family property in her favour and equal division of family debt. [5] The parties agree to obtaining a divorce order, and the requirements for granting a divorce under s. 8 of the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 [Divorce Act] have been met. Accordingly, the issues that I must address are the parties' separation date, the appropriate division of family property and debt, and entitlement to and, if necessary, quantum of spousal support. [6] Both parties submit that this family law action is

suitable for summary determination under R. 11‑3 of the Rules on the basis that I am able to find the facts necessary to decide the issues of fact and law and that it would not be unjust to do so: see R. 11‑3(15). Upon considering the applicable factors in Gichuru v. Pallai, 2013 BCCA 60, I concur. Background [7] Ms. Lisenko was born in Odessa, a city in the former United Soviet Socialist Republic that is now located in the country of Ukraine. She is presently 42 years old. [8] Mr. Zamor was born in Montreal, Quebec and is also presently 42 years old. [9] The parties both have Israeli citizenship and were residing and working in Israel when they began living together in January 2016. [10] Mr. Zamor was working in the marketing industry as a "freelance creative generalist". Ms. Lisenko was working as a clinical data manager in the research and development department of Bioforum, an Israeli company. [11] The parties moved to Canada from Israel on March 14, 2017, and married on May 13, 2017, in West Kelowna, BC. [12] Mr. Zamor sponsored Ms. Lisenko's immigration from Israel to Canada. With the benefit of Mr. Zamor's sponsorship, Ms. Lisenko established permanent residency in Canada and eventually obtained Canadian citizenship. [13] Before moving to Canada, the parties had no Canadian bank accounts. They both held accounts with Israeli financial institutions with balances in

Israeli shekels, and Mr. Zamor had a PayPal account in his sole name. [14] On September 14, 2018, Ms. Lisenko moved her savings from Israel to Canada. After transaction fees and conversion from Israeli shekels, Ms. Lisenko eventually deposited $99,104.15 CAD into the parties' joint Scotiabank account. [15] These were pre‑relationship funds which were presumptively Ms. Lisenko's excluded property under s. 85 of the Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c. 25 [FLA]. [16] These funds were subsequently co‑mingled into the parties' other Canadian accounts, including being partially placed in a TFSA in Mr. Zamor's name alone before they were used for a portion of the down-payment on the parties' family home located at 1095 Toovey Road, Kelowna, BC. (the "Family Home"). There is evidence in the affidavit materials to trace the movement of these funds but it is not necessary to detail those transactions as Ms. Lisenko concedes that, as a result of the extensive co‑mingling, she lost the ability to assert an excluded property claim. [17] With respect to the purchase of the Family Home, the residence was acquired on July 30, 2021 for $1,090,000. It was placed in joint names. The parties put $79,652 from the TFSA account in Mr. Zamor's name towards the down payment. They sourced the remainder of the down payment for the Family Home by way of a $120,000 USD interest-free loan from Ms. Lisenko's Aunt,

Ina Tsukerman ("Aunt Ina"). The balance of the purchase price was funded by a mortgage from Scotiabank in the amount of $872,000 (the "Mortgage"). [18] The parties represented the contribution by Aunt Ina to the down payment as a "gift" to their mortgage lender, Scotiabank, using a signed "gift letter" from Aunt Ina. Mr. Zamor now concedes that Aunt Ina's portion of the down payment constitutes a loan rather than a gift (the "Aunt Ina Loan"), but on the condition that it was to be repaid on the sale of the Family Home and Ms. Lisenko refused until recently to list the property for sale. [19] In that regard, although an order for sale of the Family Home was sought in the Application, I was informed that the parties came to an agreement and listed the Family Home for sale approximately 35 days before the date of this summary trial hearing on June 5, 2025. There had already been one price reduction by that time and the list price was slightly below the purchase price. [20] Moving back in the chronology, the parties moved into the Family Home on September 15, 2021. [21] The parties disagree about when their relationship ended. Ms. Lisenko contends that parties separated on August 30, 2021, which is actually prior to the above noted move into the Family Home. Mr. Zamor contends that the parties separated on March 6, 2022. The separation date has quite minor relevance to the

substantive issues in dispute. Nonetheless, it is an issue that I must resolve in this action. [22] Important to the issue of determining the date of separation is the fact that at some point during the latter portion of the parties' marriage, they entered into a polyamorous relationship with another female. The parties disagree as to who initiated this and when exactly the polyamorous relationship commenced. This is a portion of the materials where the evidence directly conflicts and I have no basis upon which to decide what version of events, if either, is accurate. However, I have concluded that these specific details are not material given the other documentary evidence available on this issue. [23] Specifically, although the parties' marriage became tumultuous after they became polyamorous, Ms. Lisenko, Mr. Zamor, and the polyamorous partner continued to exchange messages of an, if not intimate, at least very familiar nature, with each other until on or about March 1, 2022. Mr. Zamor and Ms. Lisenko also continued to share similar messages between just each other during that same time frame. There is a very distinct change in Mr. Zamor and Ms. Lisenko's electronic communications between March 5, 2022 and March 6, 2022. On March 5, 2022, Ms. Lisenko sent Mr. Zamor a photo from a hotel where she staying with a note "wish you were here". Certain other messages were exchanged

that day. On the evening of March 6, 2022, Ms. Lisenko sent a message to Mr. Zamor stating "before you or I start any formal proceedings, where bank accounts or car ownership alterations, please let me confirm with Cando if this may affect my citizenship application. Ok?". Mr. Zamore responded, very shortly thereafter, "These will not affect your citizenship, but sure, if it makes you feel more at ease". [24] Also important in this chronology is that that Ms. Lisenko herself deposes that in December 2021, she attended at the local hospital for a what she describes as a nervous breakdown. [25] On January 4, 2022, Ms. Lisenko had a follow‑up appointment regarding the medication the psychiatrist prescribed to her at said December 2021 hospital visit. On March 3, 2022, Ms. Lisenko emailed Interior Health making meritorious complaints about the psychiatrist's conduct during the follow up appointment. In this email, she refers to Mr. Zamor as her husband, stating: "My husband was present with me during this appointment and can corroborate everything." [26] In March 2022, the parties attended a mediation but were ultimately unable to come to a final agreement on issues arising from the breakdown of the marriage. [27] Given the inability to reach an agreement at mediation, the parties remained living together in the Family Home until November 2022, when Mr. Zamor finally moved out of

the property. Mr. Zamor remained in a romantic relationship with the polyamorous partner and neither Ms. Lisenko nor Mr. Zamor asserts that there was a reconciliation, as defined by the governing legislation, during that period of time. [28] Ms. Lisenko continued to reside in the Family Home after Mr. Zamor moved out in November 2022 and continues to reside in the Family Home while it is currently listed for sale. [29] After Mr. Zamor moved out of the Family Home, he continued to contribute towards the Mortgage, insurance, and property taxes through until April of 2023. Since then, Ms. Lisenko has paid the all costs associated with the Family Home, including servicing the Mortgage. [30] At some point in the spring of 2022, the parties' repaid $25,000 USD of the Aunt Ina loan at her request. In the fall of 2022, Ms. Lisenko further repaid $25,000 USD of the Aunt Ina Loan. She did so, she concedes, by using family property. Accordingly, $70,000 USD remains outstanding on the Aunt Ina Loan. Aunt Ina has made no demand for repayment of the outstanding balance. [31] As of December 31, 2024, the balance owing on the Mortgage was $819,152.56. [32] Even based upon the current list price (or even simply the list price at the date of the hearing of the summary trial as these reasons were under reserve for approximately three months), there will be fairly limited equity in the Family Home

to divide after real estate commissions and closing costs are paid upon the sale. [33] Finally, although the parties have no children together, Ms. Lisenko had a child with a new partner in the spring of 2025. Overview of the Parties' Employment Circumstances [34] Both parties worked and earned quite significant incomes after moving to Canada and getting married. The parties shared finances and both deposited and withdrew money from their joint bank accounts to support their lifestyle. [35] Ms. Lisenko continued working remotely for Bioforum in Canada until June 2018, when she quit her employment with Bioforum and was hired part‑time by another Israeli company, Shoof. Mr. Zamor also worked for Shoof at this time. [36] While Ms. Lisenko worked for Shoof, she continued looking for other employment opportunities in Kelowna. [37] After leaving Shoof and briefly working for a company called Syreon, in 2020 Ms. Lisenko found employment with Cytel, where she continues to work. Mr. Zamor contends that he played an important role in Cytel hiring Ms. Lisenko, which I will address in due course. [38] Mr. Zamor continued his freelance career in Canada while being employed by various companies at different times including: a) Shoof from 2017 - 2019; b) Strawhouse (a media capital agency) and Remora Inc in 2019; c) e‑Ven Partners in 2020, a company created by Mr. Zamor and a business

partner; and d) Halston Court Capital Inc. ("Halston"), a company that bought e‑Van in December 2020, who then hired Mr. Zamor as an employee under their leadership until terminating his employment on August 31, 2022. [39] Mr. Zamor is now self‑employed as a creative and tech generalist assisting businesses primarily with web development and marketing. He has no employees and runs the business from his personal residence. [40] I will return to Mr. Zamor's current self-employment circumstances in more detail in due course as they factor strongly into his spousal support claim. Positions of the Parties [41] At the hearing of the Application, Mr. Zamor's sought the following relief: a) an order for divorce; b) an equal division of family property; c) an order that Ms. Lisenko to take responsibility for the entirety of the remainder of the Aunt Ina Loan; d) an additional equalization payment of some $8,915; and e) lump sum spousal support of between $26,000 to $30,000. [42] As noted above, Ms. Lisenko agrees to the order for divorce. As also noted above, Ms. Lisenko concedes that she does not have an excluded property claim on property she brought into the relationship due to the extensive co-mingling of the parties' assets during the relationship. However, Ms. Lisenko strongly relies on her independent source of funds which she contributed to the down payment on the Family Home to

support a claim for unequal division of family property. [43] Specifically, Ms. Lisenko argues for: a) an unequal division of family property with 70% allocated to her and 30% allocated to Mr. Zamor relying on factors (a), (c) and (i) of s. 95(2) of the FLA; b) equal sharing of the Aunt Ina Loan in USD on the basis that it is a family debt; c) a dismissal of Mr. Zamor's claim for a further equalization payment; and d) a dismissal of Mr. Zamor's spousal support claim. Separation Date [44] As previously noted, Ms. Lisenko claims the separation date was August 24, 2021, which is after she deposes that Mr. Zamor told her that he was in love with their polyamorous partner and suggested that the partner move into the Family Home with them. Ms. Lisenko says she told Mr. Zamor that the marriage was over and that, despite moving into the Family Home together they primarily slept in separate rooms and lived separate lives after that point. [45] On the other hand, Mr. Zamor claims the separation date was March 6, 2022, when he formally moved into a different room in the Family Home after he asserts that he had an in‑person conversation with Ms. Lisenko wherein he informed her of his intention to separate due to her alleged refusal to address her mental health issues. [46] Section 3 of the FLA provides that in assessing whether was an intention to separate, the court may consider both the

parties' communications to one other and their actions. Spouses may be separated despite continuing to live in the same residence: FLA, s. 3(4)(a). Justice Fleming described the factors for the court to consider in determining the date of separation in Nearing v. Sauer, 2015 BCSC 58, at para. 56, quoted with approval in Der Woon v. Zadorozny, 2020 BCCA 95 at para. 9: [9] . . . [56] Typically when the parties dispute the date of separation, the court's analysis focuses on the generally accepted characteristics of marriage including the intention to remain married, having sexual involvement, carrying on activities in public, sharing financial resources and sharing significant family events: [Sachdeva v. Sachdeva, 2013 BCSC 313] at para.

87. The court will also consider a range of other factors, including a clear statement by one of the parties of his or her desire to terminate the relationship. Sexual involvement, or lack thereof, is not conclusive: Newth v. Booth, 2011 BCSC 317 at para. 17. [47] Considering the evidence and applying the above law, I find that the date of separation was March 6, 2022. Although there was an obvious strain in the marriage in the late summer/fall of 2021 primarily as a result of the fallout of the parties' decision to enter into a polyamorous relationship, for the reasons set out below, I conclude that they had not yet separated without prospect of reconciliation. [48] As a starting point, the fact that the parties remained in the same house is clearly not determinative. They remained living separate and apart within the Family Home after March 2022. It is a well-recognized practical financial reality for many spouses to have to continue living in the same residence after their relationship ends. [49] Rather, my conclusion turns on the following factual findings: a) the parties' joint financial patterns were generally unchanged between August of 2021 and March 2022; b) the parties continued occasional sexual intimacy between August 2021 and March 2022; c) the messages exchanged between Ms. Lisenko and Mr. Zamor and between Ms. Lisenko, Mr. Zamor, and their polyamorous partner,

continuing until March 1, 2022 which are inconsistent with a final separation having occurred in August of 2021; d) the messages exchanged between Ms. Lisenko and Mr. Zamor on March 6, 2022 which are consistent with a separation without reconciliation having very recently occurred; e) Ms. Lisenko's email to Interior Health on March 3, 2022. In this regard, I do not consider Ms. Lisenko's reference to Mr. Zamor as her "husband" in this email as nearly significant as Mr. Zamor argues it to be. Whether they were separated or not, Ms. Lisenko and Mr. Zamor were still married at that date. It was not material for the purposes of complaining to Interior Health that Ms. Lisenko clarify that Mr. Zamor was her "recently separated spouse" or words to that effect. Rather, the significance of the email is that it confirms that Mr. Zamor was present with Ms. Lisenko for an important medical appointment on January 4, 2022. That is consistent with some form of ongoing marital relationship and inconsistent with Ms. Lisenko's version of events wherein the parties were leading separate lives; f) the contemporaneous initiation of the family law mediation process due to a marital breakdown in March 2022; and g) the lack of third-party evidence tendered by either Ms. Lisenko or Mr. Zamor corroborating either claimed separation date to assist in my determination. [50] Consequently, in considering

the "generally accepted characteristics of marriage" exhibited by the parties, I conclude, on the balance of probabilities, that the parties separated on March 6, 2022. [51] Based on the fact that their marriage-like relationship began in January 2016, the parties' total length of relationship was, I find, approximately six years and two months. Division of Family Property and Debt Family Property [52] Section 84 of the FLA sets out the comprehensive definition of "family property". Specifically, subject to s. 85 of the FLA, "family property" constitutes all real and personal property that, at the date of separation is legally or beneficially owned by at least one spouse. [53] All of the parties' assets in this action fall squarely within that definition. The most significant family property being, obviously, the Family Home. [54] Section 81 provides that upon separation, spouses are both presumptively entitled to an undivided half interest in all family property. That is the starting point. Family Debt [55] Section 86 of the FLA sets out the definition of "family debt". Family debt includes "all financial obligations incurred by a spouse during the relationship". It also includes financial obligations incurred by a spouse after the date of separation, provided the debt is "incurred for the purpose of maintaining family property". [56] Section 81 provides that spouses are both

presumptively liable for half of all family debt. Again, that is the starting point. [57] The Aunt Ina Loan was not documented when it was made other than by the above-mentioned gift letter. However, as noted, Mr. Zamor now concedes that it was not a gift. The evidence before me is also consistent with it being a demand loan which, to date, Aunt Ina has not yet made a demand for payment in full. [58] The parties incurred the Aunt Ina Loan during the marriage. Accordingly, the Aunt Ina Loan is a "family debt" under s. 86 of the FLA that both parties are presumptively equally responsible for. Ms. Lisenko's reluctance to sell the Family Home does not render her solely responsible for this family debt, particularly considering that the parties would not have been able to purchase the Family Home without the Aunt Ina Loan. [59] Aunt Ina made the Aunt Ina Loan to the parties in USD and the parties' payments to date have reflected the currency of the loan as being in USD. Therefore, it is appropriate for the parties' repayment of the Aunt Ina Loan to reflect the USD value of the loan. [60] Accordingly, I find that the Aunt Ina Loan is "family debt" that is to be paid by the parties out of the proceeds of the Family Home, based upon the CAD to USD exchange rate as of the closing date of the sale the Family Home even though Aunt Ina has not yet made demand for repayment. [61] In this

regard, while these reasons were under reserve, I was contemplating ordering that the parties' place $100,000 CAD from the net sale proceeds of the Family Home into a GIC to wait for the earlier of an improvement in the CAD to USD exchange rate or demand by Aunt Ina. I considered doing so on the basis that the USD to CDN exchange rate in the spring of 2021 when the Aunt Ina Loan was initially made was approximately $1.25 whereas the current exchange rate is approximately $1.39. [62] However, I did some, albeit not expert, research and determined that as of the date of these reasons, it will cost approximately $97,000 CAD to pay off the $70,000 USD owing on the Aunt Ina Loan. At the hearing of the summary trial in June 2025, it would have cost approximately $96,000 CAD. Six months prior to the hearing of the summary trial it would have cost approximately $98,000 CAD. One year prior to the hearing of the summary trial, it would have cost approximately $96,000 CAD. [63] In short, the CAD to USD exchange rate is not operating to the parties' benefit. However, that has not materially changed over the last approximately 15 months and there is nothing which would indicate it will change in the foreseeable future. Indeed, waiting to pay off the Aunt Ina Loan could potentially be detrimental to the parties. [64] Accordingly, I could find no basis upon which to warrant making the

somewhat unconventional order of withholding funds to pay off the debt at a later date and simply order that the Aunt Ina Loan shall be paid out the net sale proceeds of the Family Home using the necessary amount of CAD dollars to purchase $70,000 USD. Given that Aunt Ina has not made demand for payment, it remains open to the parties to agree in writing to an alternative arrangement notwithstanding my order, but the default will be that Aunt Ina shall be repaid $70,000 USD upon the closing of the sale of the Family Home as part of the distribution of the net sale proceeds. [65] The remainder of the sale proceeds from the Family Home, after the payment of the Mortgage (which is obviously conceded to be a family debt) and the Aunt Ina Loan are to be distributed between the parties in the proportions determined below. Family Property and Family Debt - the Requested Equalization Payment [66] Leaving aside the anticipated net sale proceeds of the Family Home momentarily, Mr. Zamor claims that an additional equalization payment of $8,915 is required from Ms. Lisenko to balance the parties' remaining assets and debts. [67] Ms. Lisenko's position is that no additional equalization is necessary as the remaining assets and debts are approximately equal and that, in any event, Mr. Zamor has not proven his claim. [68] I decline to order the equalization payment. [69] Mr. Zamor has

provided a Scott Schedule dated January 30, 2024, and F8 Financial Statement sworn February 4, 2025 ("Mr. Zamor's F8"), containing the values and amounts of various assets and bank accounts owned by the parties, but there are no documents to support many of the listed assets and debts. The onus was on Mr. Zamor to provide that information: see Visser v. Visser, 2019 BCSC 1856 at para. 138, citing Chatha v. Uppal, 2018 BCSC 6 at para. 309. [70] Additionally, in reviewing Mr. Zamor's Scott Schedule and Mr. Zamor's F8, it appears that most of debts listed are post-separation debts, which were not incurred for the purpose of maintaining family property and thus do not meet the definition of "family debt". For example, Mr. Zamor lists a $6,500 debt for CRA taxes owing for 2023. Mr. Zamor obviously incurred this debt after the March 6, 2022 separation date. Another example is a post-separation line of credit listed by Mr. Zamor. The purported inclusion of that particular post-separation debt is particularly incongruous when one recalls that Ms. Lisenko was solely responsible for servicing the Mortgage and paying all other expenses associated with the Family Home since April 2023 (albeit whilst receiving the benefit of exclusive occupancy). Unequal Division [71] As noted above, the general rule of equal division under s. 81 of the FLA is that spouses are entitled to family property

and responsible for family debt, regardless of their respective use or contribution. [72] Section 95 of the FLA authorizes the court to vary from the general rule and order an unequal division of family property and family debt where it would be "significantly unfair" to equally divide the property or debt. The factors that the court may consider in deciding whether an equal division would be significantly unfair are set out in s. 95(2) and (3) of the FLA. The factors relevant to this case include: 95 (2) . . . (a) the duration of the relationship between the spouses; . . . (c) a spouse's contribution to the career or career potential of the other spouse; . . . (i) any other factor, other than the consideration referred to in subsection (3), that may lead to significant unfairness. (3) The Supreme Court may consider also the extent to which the financial means and earning capacity of a spouse have been affected by the responsibilities and other circumstances of the relationship between the spouses if, on making a determination respecting spousal support, the objectives of spousal support under section 161 [objectives of spousal support] have not been met. [73] The Court of Appeal in Jaszczewska v. Kostanski, 2016 BCCA 286 at para. 41 held that the legislature intended the general rule of equal division to prevail unless persuasive reasons are shown for a different result and

adopted the following definition of "significantly unfair": [41] . . . As Mr. Justice Butler observed in Remmem v. Remmem, 2014 BCSC 1552 (B.C.S.C.), "significant" is defined as "extensive or important enough to merit attention" and the term refers to something that is "weighty, meaningful or compelling." He concluded that to justify an unequal distribution "[i]t is necessary to find that the unfairness is compelling or meaningful having regard to the factors set out in s. 95(2)". [74] In Venables v. Venables, 2019 BCCA 281, the Court of Appeal relied on Jaszczewska to hold that generally, the "significantly unfair" language requires "something objectively unjust, unreasonable or unfair in some important or substantial sense": see para. 91. [75] In Singh v. Singh, 2020 BCCA 21, decided the year following Venables, the Court of Appeal stated that to meet the high threshold of significant unfairness "[t]here must be a real sense of injustice that would permeate the result if the court did not deviate from the presumptive equal division": see para. 134. [76] In this case, Ms. Lisenko relies on the source of the funds she contributed to the down payment of the Family Home, discussed above, to support her claim for 70/30 unequal division of the family property in her favour. She specifically relies on Venables at para. 112, wherein the Griffin J.A. states: [112] In not expressly

dealing with the question of what happens when excluded property becomes family property, but by providing for reapportionment if equal division of family property would be significantly unfair, the FLA left it open to the court to consider, as a factor justifying reapportionment, the origins of family property as formerly excluded property contributed by one spouse. The degree of attention paid to this factor will, as in all property division matters, depend on all the circumstances. [77] Before continuing my analysis in this regard, I pause to note that this action was commenced by Ms. Lisenko before the Family Law Amendment Act, S.B.C. 2023, c. 12 received Royal Assent on May 11, 2023. The Family Law Amendment Act amends the FLA exclusion provisions to provide that if property is excluded, the exclusion applies despite any transfer of legal or beneficial ownerships of property from one spouse to the other spouse, but does not apply to proceedings commenced before its enactment. [78] Upon consideration of the foregoing law, I conclude that Ms. Lisenko has met the high burden of proving that equal division is significantly unfair to justify unequal division of family property in her favour. I do not agree that the division should be 70/30 in Ms. Lisenko's favour. As set out below, a 65/35 split between her and Mr. Zamor respectively is appropriate in the circumstances of this

case. [79] Specifically, I find that there is a basis for unequal division due to the relatively short duration of relationship and the independent source of funds Ms. Lisenko brought into the relationship which, along with the Aunt Ina Loan, allowed the parties to be able to purchase the Family Home. With equal division of the estimated net proceeds from the sale of that property, Mr. Zamor would end up in a substantially improved situation and Ms. Lisenko would end up in a notably worsened position relative to their situations before the relationship. That meets the threshold of significant unfairness in this particular case. However, a 70/30 unequal division would, when one considers that the parties are equally liable for the family debt, tip scales slightly too far in Ms. Lisenko's favour. Rather, given the high threshold for proving significant unfairness and considering all the circumstances, I have concluded that a 65/35 unequal division accords with the objectives of s.

95. Spousal Support [80] I recently summarized the objectives and categories of entitlement to spousal support under the Divorce Act, in Lehenbauer v. Kristinson, 2025 BCSC 660 as follows: [82] The objectives of a spousal support order are set out in the Divorce Act s. 15.2(6), which provides that an order that provides for the support of a spouse should: a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown; b) apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and above any obligation for the support of any child of the marriage; c) relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage; and d) in so far as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time. [83] Under the Divorce Act s. 15.2(4), courts must also take into consideration the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse, including: a) the length of time the spouses cohabited; b) the functions performed by each spouse during cohabitation; and c) any order, agreement or arrangement relating to support of either spouse. [84] No single objective set out in s. 15.2(6) is paramount, and all must be considered by the court: see Moge v. Moge, [1992] S.C.R. 813 at pp. 850-853, 1992 CanLII 25. The first

two objectives relate to compensatory support, and the last two objectives relate to non‑compensatory support. Compensatory entitlement will arise where, as a result of the parties' roles during the marriage, one spouse has suffered economic disadvantage or has conferred economic advantages on the other. Most often, such entitlement will arise where one spouse has sacrificed career opportunities in order to take on more of the family's household or child-rearing responsibilities. Upon the dissolution of the marriage, the spouse who has given up opportunities may be entitled to spousal support, either to compensate for diminished earning capacity or to share in the augmented earning capacity of the other spouse: see Zacharias v. Zacharias, 2015 BCCA 376 at para. 26. [85] Non-compensatory support entitlement focuses on the needs of the spouses and on their respective means. It is based on the idea that spouses, by virtue of marriage, have some ongoing responsibility to care for one another. The degree to which non‑compensatory principles will apply will depend on a close examination of not only the means and needs of the spouses, but also of the nature of the marital relationship and its duration: see Zacharias at para. 27. [86] A court is not required to decide one basis of support to the exclusion of the others, and the doctrine of equitable sharing is the overarching principle

to be focussed on by the court: see Chutter v. Chutter, 2008 BCCA 507 at para. 49. [81] The spouses in Lehenbauer had been in a marriage-like relationship/marriage for considerably longer than the parties to this action--approximately 14 years instead of approximately six years. However, there are some similarities between the two cases in that while both spouses had generally been employed throughout the relationship and there were no children involved, the greater earning trajectory of the wives resulted in a significant disparity in the spouses' incomes post-separation. After applying the above legal principles, I ordered that the respondent husband in Lehenbauer receive 48 months in spousal support on a strictly non‑compensatory basis (which was a departure from the duration pursuant to the presumptive range provided for under the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines [SSAG]) and at the low end of the SSAG quantum range: see paras. 117-125. Imputation of Income [82] Section 19 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175 [Guidelines] expressly addresses the ability of issue of income of imputation of income to payors of support on various enumerated grounds. [83] Particularly relevant to this family law action is the ability of the court to impute income on the basis of intentional under-employment: see s. 19(1)(a). Although the Guidelines are expressly directed at

child support, the jurisprudence interpreting s. 19 has a broader application in family law. [84] In Marquez v. Zapiola, 2013 BCCA 433, the Court of Appeal provides helpful guidance on the issue of income imputation in that broader context: [36] For the purposes of both child and spousal support, there is a broad judicial discretion to impute income to either or both spouses. However, the party seeking to have income imputed to the other spouse has the burden of establishing an evidentiary basis for such a finding. [37] The test for imputing income for intentional under-employment or unemployment is one of reasonableness, having regard to the parties' capacity to earn income in light of their age, education, health, work history and work availability. A spouse's capacity to earn income will include that person's ability to work or to be trained to work. See Van Gool v. Van Gool (1998), 113 B.C.A.C. 200, 44 R.F.L. (4th) 314 at paras. 28-31, Barker v. Barker, 2005 BCCA 177, 45 B.C.L.R. (4th) 43 at para. 19, and McCaffrey v. Paleolog, 2011 BCCA 378, 24 B.C.L.R. (5th) 62 at para. 46. [38] Although the legal foundation for awarding spousal support is different from that of child support (see Kerr v. Baranow, 2011 SCC 10, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 269 at para. 208), the test for imputing income for the purpose of fixing the quantum of support is similar. Again, the test is one of

reasonableness, having regard to the same factors to be considered in imputing income for child support. However, the concept of "needs" for non-compensatory support also includes a consideration of the marital standard of living: Myers v. Myers (1995), 65 B.C.A.C. 226, 17 R.F.L. (4th) 298 at para. 10, Moge at 870, Bracklow at para. 36. "Means" has been interpreted to include all capital and other sources of income (Leskun v. Leskun, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 920 at para. 29). [85] Furthermore, a finding of bad faith is not necessary to impute income: see Yeung v. Silva, 2016 BCSC 1682 at para. 46. [86] I will return to the issue of whether there is a basis to impute income to either party in due course. Compensatory Spousal Support [87] In this case, I am not satisfied Mr. Zamor has established entitlement to spousal support on a compensatory basis. The parties have entirely opposing views as to whether sponsoring Ms. Lisenko's to move to Canada was a financial benefit. Ms. Lisenko had a career in Israel before the move and it is not clear on the evidence before me that she experienced greater career opportunities in Canada than she would have otherwise. Particularly, I find, given she continued to work for Israeli based companies for a period of time. Additionally, there is no evidence of economic disadvantage suffered by Mr. Zamor in sponsoring Ms. Lisenko's move. [88] The evidence

Mr. Zamor relies on regarding his contribution to Ms. Lisenko's career is also weak. Mr. Zamor's claims he contributed to Ms. Lisenko's current employment with Cytel in the pharmaceutical industry by: a) managing her LinkedIn profile and communicating with potential employers and recruiters; b) putting her in contact with Cytel Recruiters and drafting communications to them for her; and c) having a direct role in negotiating Ms. Lisenko's salary increase from $105,000 to $145,000 in 2021. [89] It is not questioned that Mr. Zamor was a supportive husband in the sense that he wanted his wife to succeed professionally and occasionally assisted her in communications with employers. For example, Ms. Lisenko acknowledges that English is not her first language and Mr. Zamor would proofread documents related to her career. While helpful, that does not meet the threshold of contribution to establish entitlement to compensatory spousal support. [90] I also do not find Mr. Zamor has established that he is solely, or even primarily, responsible for negotiating the $40,000 salary increase for Ms. Lisenko as he claims. Again, while he states he assisted Ms. Lisenko, the only corroborating evidence of this assistance Mr. Zamor has provided is a screenshot of him expanding upon a draft message on Ms. Lisenko's behalf to her employer at Cytel requesting that she be transferred to a new

position. I find it is much more likely that Ms. Lisenko's salary increase was predominately based on her skillset and not on a negotiating strategy. Further, the negotiating strategy described by Mr. Zamor is not terribly novel. Non-compensatory Spousal Support [91] Mr. Zamor's claim for spousal support on a non‑compensatory basis is more complicated. [92] Mr. Zamor's income has fluctuated quite significantly over the last several years. According to the T1 personal income tax returns produced by Mr. Zamor, his Line 15000 income over the years 2021 through 2023 was as follows: a) 2023 - $55,961 (a combination of net self-employment income and employment insurance benefits); b) 2022 - $92,121.34 (a combination of T4 employment income and employment insurance benefits); and c) 2021 - $130,188 (all T4 employment income). [93] Mr. Zamor failed to put his 2024 T1 personal income tax return into evidence. I appreciate that it was not available when the summary trial materials were initially filed in early February 2025, but would have been in-hand sufficiently before the June 5, 2025, hearing and that is not the type of late filed affidavit that this court would resist receiving in the circumstances. [94] As a result, what I have to rely on is Mr. Zamor's F8 wherein he deposes he anticipates earning $64,000 in 2025. That is less than half of what he earned in 2021, the last full

year prior to separation based upon my above conclusion as to the parties' separation date. [95] To explain this significant decline in his income since the separation, Mr. Zamor claims that his career has been severely negatively impacted by recent technological developments in artificial intelligence that have replaced many of his core services. [96] Mr. Zamor also deposes that he travelled to Israel in 2023 with the primary purpose of securing new work contracts, but all three meetings with potential clients were cancelled due to the Israeli Palestinian conflict beginning on October 7, 2023. [97] Mr. Zamor further deposes to have been actively seeking further employment, including submitting over 350 job applications on LinkedIn alone, but has only secured a handful of interviews. Like Ms. Lisenko, I query whether this number is truly accurate. What I have before me in evidence is a two‑page screenshot showing that Mr. Zamor apparently applied for some 739 jobs but the overview details of only 15 jobs are shown and they include positions in New York, New York; Atlanta, Georgia; and Columbus, Ohio. More notably, however, is that Mr. Zamor's evidence, if accepted, dovetails with my earlier conclusion that his assistance in managing Ms. Lisenko's LinkedIn profile was helpful but not causally connected to her employment trajectory as Mr. Zamor has not had an equivalent degree of

success in marketing his own skillset through the same social networking service. [98] In terms of his expenses, Mr. Zamor's F8 claims annual expenses of $89,148 per annum. Without taking a fine-tooth comb to line items such as food and meals outside the home, I find this is not entirely reliable for two reasons: a) Mr. Zamor claims TFSA contributions of $1,000 per month. These payments are not required and should not be considered analysing Mr. Zamor's entitled to spousal support on a non-compensatory basis. They are also not consistent with the parties' historical records during the marriage; and b) Mr. Zamor claims $7,200 a year in CPP contributions based on an income of $64,000. That amount seems disproportionately high. [99] In contrast, Mr. Zamor has very modest housing expenses of only $1,300 per month. This is because he lives with the parties' former polyamorous partner in a strata property owned by that partner's mother who partially subsidizes their living expenses by charging below market rent. [100] Realistically, it would appear that Mr. Zamor's actual expenses are in the range of approximately $75,000 to $77,000 per annum with the recognition that Mr. Zamor would like to improve his current housing situation if he could financially afford to. [101] In comparison, Ms. Lisenko's line 15000 income as reported in her 2021 and 2022 T1 personal income tax returns was

as follows: a) 2022 - $143,455.15; and b) 2021 - $125,766.69 (note this was slightly lower than Mr. Zamor's). [102] Despite the obligation upon her pursuant to R. 5‑1, Ms. Lisenko only swore one Form F8 Financial Statement in this proceeding and that was back on May 5, 2023, more than two years before the hearing of the Application ("Ms. Lisenko's F8"). Furthermore, I have neither Ms. Lisenko's 2023 nor her 2024 T1 personal income tax returns in the application record material. [103] Rather, what I have to rely on is: a) Ms. Lisenko affidavit evidence that her salary with Citel "has reached $145,000 after multiple performance-based raises over [the] years"; and b) Mr. Zamor's evidence that Ms. Lisenko is earning approximately $152,000 per year. Mr. Zamor calculated this based upon a pay stub for Ms. Lisenko dated September 15, 2023 which "when extrapolated, indicates annual earnings of approximately $152,000". [104] As noted above, Ms. Lisenko had a baby in the spring of 2025. At the time she swore her third affidavit in this proceeding, she was still expecting and made no mention of any anticipated change in her salary upon the arrival of the child. In Ms. Lisenko's fourth affidavit, which I admitted at the hearing of the Application on conditions, she deposed that she anticipated her employment with Citel to be coming to an end after her maternity leave due to the fact that

the market in her field has slowed down significantly and she considers it unlikely that she will find a job with the same salary as Cytel. [105] I give very little weight to Ms. Lisenko's recent evidence in this regard. First of all, it is conclusory and entirely speculative. Further, Ms. Lisenko did not actually provide any details whatsoever of what her current income situation is while she is on maternity leave, how long she intends to take for maternity leave and so forth. Again, leaving aside concerns about late delivery and what constitutes impermissible surreply, there was an opportunity to try and put that information before the court and Ms. Lisenko did not do so. [106] In terms of his expenses, Ms. Lisenko's F8 claims annual expenses of $185,341.44. Again, without need for a fine‑tooth comb, these are also not entirely reliable. [107] The most obvious reason for this is her claim that she was paying $2,800 a month toward the Aunt Ina Loan as of May 2023. She was not. As set out above, Ms. Lisenko made a $25,000 USD payment in the fall of 2022 after the parties separated using funds which she concedes must be considered family property as she has no evidence to prove otherwise. She then calculated that amount as being an ongoing monthly payment in her F8 Financial Statement. It was not. That alone reduces her expenses by $33,600 per annum. [108] Also telling in Ms.

Lisenko's failure to update her form F8 Financial Statement for purposes of the Application is the allegation made by Mr. Zamor, which she has not responded to, that Ms. Lisenko has a new partner residing in the Family Home who may presumably be contributing to the costs of maintaining that property. Ms. Lisenko's F8 is based on her solely paying all expenses for that home without any contribution from any other person as it was sworn very shortly after Mr. Zamor ceased contributing to those expenses as described above. [109] Furthermore, upon the sale of the Family Home I strongly anticipate Ms. Lisenko's housing expenses will be reduced in any event as the cost of servicing the Mortgage alone is in excess of $60,000 per annum (again on the assumption that Ms. Lisenko is servicing this debt alone). [110] Despite some concerns about Mr. Zamor's explanation for his quite dramatic decline in income post-separation, I am ultimately satisfied that Mr. Zamor has proven an entitlement to spousal support on a non‑compensatory basis and that entitlement is not based on a disparity in income alone: see Lehenbauer at paras. 91-96. Rather, upon a consideration of the factors enumerated in the Divorce Act, I find that Mr. Zamor has established an entitlement to spousal support on a non-compensatory basis given the economic hardship arising from the breakdown of the marriage and consistent

with promoting the economic self-sufficiency of Mr. Zamor. Quantum and Duration of Spousal Support [111] In the particular circumstances of this case, and having regard to the "transitionary" nature of the support entitlement and the obvious desirability of a clean break between the parties, I am going to consider quantum and duration of support holistically in making a lump sum spousal support order: see Lee v. Lee, 2014 BCCA 383 at para. 65. [112] With respect to determining Guideline incomes of the parties, neither party has tendered particularly satisfactory evidence as detailed above. In light of that, I have determined there is no supportable basis upon which to impute income to either party. It may be that Mr. Zamor is underemployed and it may be that Ms. Lisenko's income is in excess of $145,000 per annum but given that this is a final order, there needs to be more than mere speculation on my part. Rough justice will no longer suffice. The best evidence I have is that Mr. Zamor's Guideline income is $64,000 per annum and Ms. Lisenko's Guideline income is $145,000 per annum. [113] In terms of quantum of support, although Mr. Zamor has established an entitlement to ongoing spousal support, that entitlement is strictly on a non‑compensatory basis. Further, with appropriate adjustments to his claimed expenses, Mr. Zamor is not far from achieving self‑sufficiency.

Considering all the circumstances, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to use the low end of the SSAG range. [114] In terms of duration of support, based upon the length of the parties' relationship/marriage and the presumptive range provided for under the SSAG, the duration of support payable would be between 37 months (three years, one month) and 74 months (six years, two months). [115] That is, however, only a presumptive range and the court may depart from it provided that there is a basis, articulated in the reasons, for doing so: see Chutter v. Chutter, 2008 BCCA 507 at para. 101. [116] This, I find, is a situation where a departure from the presumptive range is appropriate. [117] It was a six‑year relationship/marriage, it ended when the parties were in their late thirties, there were no children born of the relationship, and on balance both parties were gainfully employed throughout. [118] On this basis, I have concluded that the Mr. Zamor is entitled to spousal support from Ms. Lisenko for a period of 24 months (two years). [119] Using DivorceMate, based upon the Ms. Lisenko having a Guideline income of $145,000 per annum, Mr. Zamor having a Guideline income of $64,000 per annum, using the low end of the SSAG range and fixing the duration of support at 24 months, the lump sum spousal support that Mr. Zamor is entitled to is $9,426 (the "Lump Sum Spousal Support").

Attached as Schedule "1" to these reasons for judgment is the DivorceMate calculation confirming same. [120] Ms. Lisenko's obligation to pay the Lump Sum Spousal Support award to Mr. Zamor is suspended until the sale of the Family Home. The Lump Sum Spousal Support award shall be paid to Mr. Zamor from Ms. Lisenko's share of the net sale proceeds as calculated pursuant to these reasons for judgement. In the very unlikely event that Ms. Lisenko's share of the net sale proceeds is less than the Lump Sum Spousal Support award, Ms. Lisenko must pay the outstanding amount of the Lump Sum Spousal Support award to Mr. Zamor within 30 days of the completion of the sale of the Family Home. Divorce [121] As noted above, the parties have satisfied the requirements of a divorce under s. 8 of the Divorce Act. Furthermore, I have before me a clearance certificate and a registrar's certificate of pleadings. There is also no prospect of reconciliation and no collusion. [122] Accordingly, I order, pursuant to s. 12 of the Divorce Act, that Ms. Lisenko and Mr. Zamor, who were married at West Kelowna, BC, on May 13, 2017, shall be divorced from each other, such divorce to take effect 31 days after the date of these reasons. Summary of Substantive Orders [123] In addition to the above order for divorce, I have made the following orders in respect of the relief sought in the Application: a) Upon

the sale of the Family Home and after discharge of the Mortgage, payment of real estate commissions, legal fees and related disbursements associated with the sale, the net sale proceeds shall be distributed as follows: i. The Aunt Ina Loan, with a balance of $70,000 USD, shall be paid in full based upon the CAD to USD exchange rate as of the closing date of the sale the Family Home unless the parties otherwise agree in writing to defer repayment of the Aunt Ina Loan pending demand from Aunt Ina; ii. Subject to the terms of this order, Ms. Lisenko shall receive 65% of the remaining net sale proceeds after payment of the Aunt Ina Loan; and iii. Mr. Zamor shall receive 35% of the remaining net sale proceeds after payment of the Aunt Ina Loan; b) Mr. Zamor's claim for an equalization payment is dismissed; c) Ms. Lisenko shall pay Mr. Zamor lump sum spousal support in the amount of $9,426 in full and final satisfaction of any claim by Mr. Zamor for spousal support (defined above as the "Lump Sum Spousal Support"); d) Ms. Lisenko's obligation to pay the Lump Sum Spousal Support award to Mr. Zamor is suspended until the sale of the Family Home. The Lump Sum Spousal Support shall thereafter be paid to Mr. Zamor from Ms. Lisenko's share of the net sale proceeds of the Family Home. In the event that Ms. Lisenko's share of the net sale proceeds is less than the Lump Sum Spousal Support,

Ms. Lisenko must pay the outstanding amount of the Lump Sum Spousal Support to Mr. Zamor within 30 days of the completion of the sale of the Family Home; e) Except as otherwise provided herein, the parties shall retain for their sole use any assets registered in their name or currently in their possession; and f) Except as otherwise provided herein, the parties shall be responsible for all debt in their name. Costs [124] Neither party dealt with costs in submissions. [125] Costs are awardable at the discretion of the hearing judge pursuant to R. 16‑7. The general principle is that costs are awarded to the successful party, but the hearing judge has the discretion to depart from the prima facie rule that the successful litigant should be awarded costs. [126] The standard of "success" required for the award of the costs of an action under R. 16‑1(7) is "substantial success". The Court of Appeal in Harras v. Lhotka, 2016 BCCA 246, described the substantial success standard as follows: [48] "Success" for the purposes of costs means substantial success. The "substantial success" standard was described by Bouck J. in Fotheringham v. Fotheringham, 2001 BCSC 1321 at para. 45, endorsed by this Court in Marquez v. Zapiola, 2014 BCCA 35 at para. 16: Success in the event has been interpreted as "substantial success": see Fotheringham v. Fotheringham, 2001 BCSC 1321, 13 C.P.C. (5th) 302,

leave to appeal ref'd 2002 BCCA 454. In Fotheringham, Mr. Justice Bouck described this standard as follows: [45] Gold now seems to say that substantial success in an action should be decided by the trial judge looking at the various matters in dispute and weighing their relative importance. The words "substantial success" are not defined. For want of a better measure, since success, a passing grade, is around 50% or better, substantial success is about 75% or better. That does not mean a court must descend into a meticulous mathematical examination of the matters in dispute and assign a percentage to each matter. Rather, it is meant to serve as a rough and ready guide when [looking] at all the disputed matters globally. [127] See also the discussion of this issue in J.L.M. v. G.G.M., 2024 BCSC 1643 at paras. 40‑48. [128] In this case, I am not satisfied that either party was substantially successful. Rather, I consider that the there was divided success and the appropriate exercise of my discretion is to order that the parties bear their own costs. [129] The exception to the foregoing would be if there was an offer to settle made pursuant to R. 11‑1(1) that either party wishes the court to consider in relation to the issue of costs: see R. 11‑1(5). [130] In that event, the party seeking to rely on R. 11‑1 must provide, through Supreme Court Scheduling, written submissions not

exceeding 10 pages within 14 days of these reasons for judgment. The responding party shall provide any responding submissions not exceeding 10 pages within 28 days of these reasons for judgment. The parties are at liberty to agree on an alternate schedule but must advise the court, again through Supreme Court Scheduling, of that schedule prior to the expiry of the 28 days. [131] If no written submissions are received, the default order will be that the parties each bear their own costs. "Hardwick J." Schedule "1"