Adeli-Najafi v. Adeli-Najafi

2026 BCSC 264 Adeli-Najafi v. Adeli-Najafi IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: Adeli-Najafi v. Adeli-Najafi, 2026 BCSC 264 Date: 20260218 Docket: S188101 Registry: New Westminster Between: Lydia Adeli Nedjafi, as personal representative of the Estate of Mahdi Nedjafi, also known as Mahdi Adeli-Najafi Plaintiff And Hossein Adeli-Najafi, Pashai Holdings Ltd. and Denali Auto Group Ltd. Defendants Before: The Honourable Justice Layton Reasons for Judgment In Chambers Counsel for the Plaintiff: E.J.S. Aitken Counsel for the Defendants: L.C. Morrison Written Submissions of the Plaintiff: January 12 & 27, 2026 Written Submissions of the Defendants: January 21, 2026 Place and Date of Judgment: Port Coquitlam, B.C. February 18, 2026 Table of Contents Introduction.. 3 Discussion.. 4 Should Lydia receive special or uplift costs?. 4 Should Lydia receive costs in any event of the cause?. 7 Conclusion.. 9 Introduction [1] On December 11, 2025, I released my reasons for judgment allowing Lydia Adeli Nedjafi's application to set aside an order dismissing her father Mahdi Adeli-Nadjafi's civil action for want of prosecution and to make her plaintiff as personal representative of his estate: Adeli-Najafi v. Adeli-Najafi, 2025 BCSC 2462. [2] As I did in those reasons, I will refer to Ms. Nedjafi as Lydia, to her father as Mahdi, and to her uncle and his brother, the individual defendant Hossein Adeli-Nadjafi, as Hossein. [3] Lydia seeks costs for her application in any event of the cause, assessed as special costs under Rule 14-1(1)(b) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules, B.C. Reg. 168/2009 [Rules] or alternatively as uplift costs under s. 2(5) of Appendix B to the Rules. [4] Lydia argues that special or uplift costs are appropriate because Hossein was at the very least reckless and demonstrated a lack of concern for the truth - and was likely intentionally deceptive - in giving false and inadmissible hearsay evidence that Mahdi was dead, without which the dismissal application would not have been granted. Lydia also argues that costs in any event of the cause are justified because the application addressed a discrete issue that will not be revisited at trial. [5] The defendants oppose the requested costs order. They say that neither special nor uplift costs are warranted because Hossein did not intentionally or recklessly mislead the court on the dismissal application. They also say that giving Lydia costs in any event of the cause would unjustly reward her and harm the defendants if she ends up losing the action on the merits. [6] The parties filed written arguments on these issues, which I have determined can be decided without the need for oral submissions. Discussion [7] The context in which Hossein came to believe that Mahdi was dead, as well as the inadmissible hearsay nature of his affidavit evidence on this point, are discussed in detail in my reasons granting Lydia's application. I will not review the evidence and my findings again, but I have provided some pinpoint citations to them in the discussion below. [8] I will begin that discussion by addressing whether Lydia should receive special or uplift costs. After that, I will consider whether Lydia should receive costs in any event of the cause. Should Lydia receive special or uplift costs? [9] Special costs are punitive, not compensatory. Exceptional circumstances are required to justify awarding them. The threshold for making such an award is reprehensible conduct, a term that in this context is capable of wide meaning, including scandalous or outrageous conduct, but also milder forms of misconduct deserving of reproof or rebuke. See AM Gold Inc. v. Kaizen Discovery Inc., 2022 BCCA 284 at para. 53, leave ref'd 2022 CanLII 78979 (S.C.C.); Morriss v. British Columbia, 2021 BCCA 451 at para. 22, leave ref'd 2024 CanLII 22665 (S.C.C.); Garcia v. Crestbrook Forest Industries Ltd., 1994 CanLII 2570 (B.C.C.A.) at para. 17. [10] By contrast, the purpose of uplift costs is to indemnify the successful party, not punish the unsuccessful one. They will be awarded where the successful party establishes unusual circumstances that render costs on the standard fixed scale grossly inadequate or unjust. The phrase "unusual circumstances" encompasses conduct deserving of some form of rebuke, albeit less than that required for special costs. See s. 2(5) of Appendix B to the Rules; Ding v. Canam Super Vacation Inc., 2024 BCCA 102 at paras. 211-213, leave ref'd 2024 CanLII 93646 (S.C.C.); Prokam Enterprises Ltd. v. British Columbia Farm Industry Review Board, 2023 BCSC 606 at para. 19; Heffel v. Cole, 2023 BCSC 2140 at paras. 25-27. [11] Applying these principles to the circumstances here, I have concluded that neither special nor uplift costs are appropriate. In coming to this conclusion, I have relied on a number of considerations. [12] Importantly, I reject Lydia's submission that Hossein knowingly misled the court, or at the very least was recklessly indifferent towards the truth or showed a lack of concern for it. [13] In granting Lydia's application, I found that Hossein was careless in concluding that his brother Mahdi was dead: Adeli-Najafi at para. 106. A finding of recklessness would be justified if Hossein was subjectively aware that Mahdi might be alive, but despite foreseeing this possibility he unequivocally stated the contrary in his affidavit. The phrase "lack of concern for the truth", connotes a similarly subjective degree of fault: see, e.g., Chancery Estate Holdings Corp. v. Jetha, 2013 BCCA 145 at paras. 73-75; De Cotiis v. Hothi, 2019 BCSC 1910 at para. 14. Based on the application evidence, I am not prepared to characterize Hossein's state of mind as reckless or showing a lack of concern for the truth. [14] I also reject Lydia's submission that, a couple of months after the dismissal application was granted, Hossein learned that Mr. Magnus was still counsel of record and Mahdi was living in a care home in North Vancouver, at which point he was obligated to take steps to remedy his inaccurate evidence on the application. Lydia did not argue this point on the application. But in any event, based on Mr. Turner's Affidavit #2, filed along with the defendants' written submissions on costs, I find that this information was not passed on to Hossein by Mr. Turner. [15] Another important consideration is that, while it is at least probable that but for Hossein's inaccurate evidence and its undisclosed hearsay nature the dismissal order would not have been granted, other factors for which Hossein was not responsible helped cause this result. [16] For one thing, Mahdi would likely have learned about the dismissal application before it was heard, with the result that it would not been granted, had his former lawyer, Mr. Magnus, followed the Rules regarding the steps required to withdraw as counsel and provided timely and appropriate responses to questions asked and information conveyed to him by the defendants' lawyer, Mr. Turner. See Adeli-Najafi at paras. 33-37, 43-56, 128-129. [17] Similarly, Lydia returned the envelopes containing the application materials to Mr. Turner without telling Mahdi, even though she was his power of attorney and knew that: (a) Mr. Magnus was no longer acting for Mahdi; and (b) the envelopes contained legal materials related to Mahdi's action and had been sent by Mr. Turner: Adeli-Najafi at paras. 45-46, 108-114. Had Lydia shown Mahdi these envelopes, or even told him about them, he likely would have learned about the dismissal application before it was heard and taken steps to prevent it from being granted: Adeli-Najafi at para. 127. [18] In my reasons granting Lydia's application, I did not hold that she knowingly misled the court in providing an affidavit stating that she did not return the envelopes. But I have no difficulty in finding that in returning the envelopes Lydia was wilfully blind, because I am satisfied that she must have suspected that sending the envelopes back without telling her father risked him not learning about a court hearing to his detriment: Adeli-Najafi at paras. 123-124. 193. Given its subjective component, wilful blindness is a more blameworthy state of mind than is mere carelessness. [19] Lydia also failed to tell her father that Mr. Magnus was no longer acting for him, despite learning of this significant development over a year before the dismissal application was heard. The result was that, while her father presumably believed that Mr. Magnus would continue to receive materials relating to the case and if so get in touch with him, Lydia was under no such misapprehension: Adeli-Najafi at paras. 31-33, 130. [20] It is true that I was not prepared to visit Lydia's wilful blindness on her father in assessing whether the test was met for setting aside the dismissal order: Adeli-Najafi at paras. 124, 193. But it would be unfair to ignore this conduct so as to saddle the defendants with special costs as punishment or even with uplift costs as indemnity. [21] For these reasons, I find that the Hossein did not engage in reprehensible conduct of the sort needed to justify an award of special costs against the defendants. Nor does this case present unusual circumstances that would make costs on the ordinary scale grossly inadequate or unjust so as to justify awarding uplift costs. Should Lydia receive costs in any event of the cause? [22] The presumptive rule is that costs go to the successful party of an interlocutory application, but are not payable until the trial ends, and then only if the successful party is awarded costs at trial. Costs in the cause serve generally to maintain the appropriate balance between litigants until final judgment is rendered. The court has discretion to depart from this presumptive rule and order costs of the application in any event of the cause, but that discretion must be exercised judicially, not arbitrarily, and special circumstances are required. See Rule 14-1(9), (12) and (13); Martel v. Wallace, 2008 BCSC 436 at para. 28; Schrader v. Qin, 2024 BCSC 1956 at paras. 15-16; Wittman v. Blackbaud Inc., 2021 BCSC 1917 at paras. 7-8. [23] The categories of special circumstances that justify awarding costs in any event of the cause are not closed, but the three types of special circumstances that have been recognized are: (a) where bringing or opposing the application was unnecessary or unreasonable; (b) where it is unlikely that the underlying matter will go to trial; and (c) where the application concerns a discrete issue that is severable from the issues that will go to trial. See Martel at para. 28; Schrader at para. 17. [24] Whether any or all of these three factors will justify departing from the presumptive rule depends on the overall interests of justice, but the onus is on the party seeking costs in any event of the cause. The court must remember that an order for costs in any event of the cause may deter a party from asserting a meritorious claim or a defence on the ultimate merits. See Schrader at para. 18. [25] In this case, it was not unreasonable for the defendants to oppose Lydia's application. They made arguments that carried considerable strength. It could be said that Lydia's application, while ultimately successful, was close to the line on the merits. [26] There is also no reason to suppose that this matter will not go to trial. In fact, Lydia brought her application for this very purpose. [27] I agree with Lydia that the issue of whether the order dismissing Madhi's action for want of prosecution should have been set aside will not be litigated at trial, and that in opposing her application the defendants did not argue that the action lacked merit. [28] But the only cases the parties brought to my attention go both ways in terms of whether a party who successfully sets aside a default order or a dismissal for want of prosecution should receive costs in any event of the cause, and none engages in a considered analysis of the issue: Lauzon v. Lalonde, 2013 BCSC 429 (yes); Frans Wynans Fine Art Inc. v. The Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc., 2019 BCSC 498 (no); McLelland v. McLelland, 2025 BCCA 401 (no). [29] As Lydia points out, in neither Frans Wynans Fine Art Inc. nor McLelland did the party that had acquired the dismissal order do so without the other party being present and on the basis of inaccurate evidence. On the other hand, Hossein correctly notes that in Lauzon the plaintiff argued the application in the absence of the unrepresented defendants, and failed to serve the defendants with the requisition resetting the hearing despite knowing that they were unrepresented and intended to seek an adjournment to retain counsel. [30] I have concluded that it would not be in the interests of justice to award Lydia costs in any event of the cause, given that it was not only Hossein's conduct, but also the conduct of Lydia and her father's former counsel, which contributed to the circumstances giving rise to the dismissal order. [31] Plus, there was inordinate and inexcusable delay in not moving Mahdi's action forward. Awarding Lydia costs in any event of the cause would constitute a reward for such delay regarding an action that, by hypothesis if dismissed, lacks merit: Fong v. British Columbia (Public Safety and Solicitor General), 2022 BCSC 1049 at para. 25-30. Conclusion [32] Lydia has not established that this is an appropriate case for special or uplift costs, or for costs in any event of the cause. She will therefore have her costs of the application in the cause. "D. Layton J."