MI v Canada Employment Insurance Commission

MI v Canada Employment Insurance Commission Collection Employment Insurance (EI) Decision date 2023-02-07 Neutral citation 2023 SST 124 Reference number AD-23-71 Member Pierre Lafontaine Division Appeal Division Decision Application for leave to appeal refused Related decisions SST - MI v Canada Employment Insurance Commission - 2023 SST 5 - 2023-01-10 - General Division Decision Content Citation: MI v Canada Employment Insurance Commission, 2023 SST 124 Social Security Tribunal of Canada Appeal Division Leave to Appeal Decision Applicant: M. I. Respondent: Canada Employment Insurance Commission Decision under appeal: General Division decision dated January 10, 2023 (GE-22-2307) Tribunal member: Pierre Lafontaine Decision date: February 7, 2023 File number: AD-23-71 On this page Decision Overview Issue Analysis Conclusion Decision [1] Leave to appeal is refused. This means the appeal will not proceed. Overview [2] The Applicant (Claimant) lost his job because he did not comply with the employer’s COVID-19 vaccination policy (Policy). He was not granted an exemption. The Claimant then applied for Employment Insurance (EI) regular benefits. [3] The Respondent (Commission) determined that the Claimant lost his job because of misconduct, so it was not able to pay him benefits. After an unsuccessful reconsideration, the Claimant appealed to the General Division. [4] The General Division found that the Claimant was suspended and lost his job following his refusal to follow the employer’s Policy. He did not apply for an exemption. It found that the Claimant knew that the employer was likely to suspend and dismiss him in these circumstances. The General Division concluded that the Claimant lost his job because of misconduct. [5] The Claimant seeks leave to appeal of the General Division’s decision to the Appeal Division. The Claimant submits that he found and submitted to the General Division a tribunal decision like his case where the applicant was successful in receiving EI benefits and it was not considered. Since the decision, he has found another one like his case where that applicant was successful in getting EI benefits. [6] I must decide whether the Claimant has raised some reviewable error of the General Division upon which the appeal might succeed. [7] I refuse leave to appeal because the Claimant’s appeal has no reasonable chance of success. Issue [8] Does the Claimant raise some reviewable error of the General Division upon which the appeal might succeed? Analysis [9] Section 58(1) of the Department of Employment and Social Development Act specifies the only grounds of appeal of a General Division decision. These reviewable errors are that: The General Division hearing process was not fair in some way. The General Division did not decide an issue that it should have decided. Or, it decided something it did not have the power to decide. The General Division based its decision on an important error of fact. The General Division made an error of law when making its decision. [10] An application for leave to appeal is a preliminary step to a hearing on the merits. It is an initial hurdle for the Claimant to meet, but it is lower than the one that must be met on the hearing of the appeal on the merits. At the leave to appeal stage, the Claimant does not have to prove his case but must establish that the appeal has a reasonable chance of success based on a reviewable error. In other words, that there is arguably some reviewable error upon which the appeal might succeed. [11] Therefore, before I can grant leave to appeal, I need to be satisfied that the reasons for appeal fall within any of the above-mentioned grounds of appeal and that at least one of the reasons has a reasonable chance of success. Does the Claimant raise some reviewable error of the General Division upon which the appeal might succeed? [12] The Claimant submits that he found and submitted to the General Division a tribunal decision like his case where the applicant was successful in receiving EI benefits and it was not considered. Since the decision, he has found another one like his case where that applicant was successful in getting EI benefits. [13] The General Division had to decide whether the Claimant lost his job because of misconduct. [14] The notion of misconduct does not imply that it is necessary that the breach of conduct be the result of wrongful intent; it is sufficient that the misconduct be conscious, deliberate, or intentional. In other words, in order to constitute misconduct, the act complained of must have been wilful or at least of such a careless or negligent nature that one could say the employee wilfully disregarded the effects their actions would have on their performance. [15] The General Division’s role is not to judge the severity of the employer’s penalty or to determine whether the employer was guilty of misconduct by dismissing the Claimant in such a way that his dismissal was unjustified, but rather of deciding whether the Claimant was guilty of misconduct and whether this misconduct led to his dismissal.Footnote 1 [16] Based on the evidence, the General Division determined that the Claimant lost his job because he refused to follow the Policy. He had been informed of the Policy and was given time to comply. He was not granted an exemption. The Claimant refused intentionally; this refusal was wilful. This was the direct cause of his dismissal. The General Division found that the Claimant knew that his refusal to comply with the Policy could lead to his dismissal. [17] The General Division concluded from the preponderant evidence that the Claimant’s behavior constituted misconduct. [18] It is well-established that a deliberate violation of the employer’s policy is considered misconduct within the meaning of the Employment Insurance Act (EI Act).Footnote 2 [19] It is not really in dispute that an employer has an obligation to take all reasonable precautions to protect the health and safety of its employees in their workplace. In the present case, the employer followed the recommendations of Public Health officials in order to implement its Policy to protect the health of all employees and clients during the pandemic. The Policy was in effect when the Claimant was dismissed.Footnote 3 [20] I find no reviewable error in the General Division’s determination that it has no jurisdiction to decide questions about the efficiency or reasonableness of the employer’s Policy. [21] The question of whether the employer should have accommodated him, or whether the employer’s Policy violated his rights under the collective agreement, or whether the Policy violated his human and constitutional rights, is a matter for another forum. This Tribunal is not the appropriate forum through which the Claimant can obtain the remedy that he is seeking.Footnote 4 [22] The Federal Court has rendered a recent decision in Cecchetto regarding misconduct and a claimant’s refusal to follow the employer’s COVID-19 vaccination policy. The Claimant put forward that it was not proven that the vaccine was safe and efficient. He felt discriminated against because of his personal medical choice. The Claimant submitted that he has the right to control his own bodily integrity and that his rights were violated under Canadian and international law.Footnote 5 [23] The Federal Court confirmed the Appeal Division’s decision that, by law, this Tribunal is not permitted to address these questions. The Court agreed that by making a personal and deliberate choice not to follow the employer’s vaccination policy, the Claimant had lost his job because of misconduct under the EI Act. The Court stated that there exist other ways in which the Claimant’s claims can properly advance under the legal system. [24] In the previous Paradis case, the Claimant was refused EI benefits because of misconduct. He argued that the employer’s policy violated his rights under the Alberta Human Rights Act. The Federal Court found it was a matter for another forum. [25] The Federal Court stated that there are available remedies for a claimant to sanction the behaviour of an employer other than transferring the costs of that behaviour to the Employment Insurance Program. [26] In the Mishibinijima case, the Federal Court of Appeal stated that the employer’s duty to accommodate is irrelevant in deciding EI misconduct cases. [27] As stated previously, the General Division’s role is not to determine whether the employer was guilty of misconduct by dismissing the Claimant in such a way that his dismissal was unjustified, but rather of deciding whether the Claimant was guilty of misconduct and whether this misconduct led to his dismissal. [28] The preponderant evidence before the General Division shows that the Claimant made a personal and deliberate choice not to follow the employer’s Policy in response to the exceptional circumstances created by the pandemic and this resulted in him being dismissed from work. [29] The Claimant submits that he found and submitted to the General Division a tribunal decision like his case where the applicant was successful in receiving EI benefits and it was not considered.Footnote 6 [30] I note that the General Division did consider the case submitted by the Claimant in support of his position. The Member correctly noted that he did not have to follow that decision. Furthermore, the Member was not persuaded by its findings and reasoning. The General Division Member determined that the decision did not follow the Federal Court case law and exceeded its jurisdiction in deciding the way it did. The General Division Member decided that he could not focus on the employment law relationship, the conduct of the employer, and the penalty imposed by the employer. He had to focus on the conduct of the claimant. [31] I see no reviewable error made by the General Division when it decided the issue of misconduct solely within the parameters set out by the Federal Court of Appeal, which has defined misconduct under the EI Act.Footnote 7 [32] I am fully aware that the Claimant may seek relief before another forum, if a violation is established.Footnote 8 This does not change the fact that under the EI Act, the Commission has proven on a balance of probabilities that the Claimant was dismissed because of misconduct. [33] In his application for leave to appeal, the Claimant has not identified any reviewable errors such as jurisdiction or any failure by the General Division to observe a principle of natural justice. He has not identified errors in law nor identified any erroneous findings of fact, which the General Division may have made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material before it, in coming to its decision. [34] After reviewing the docket of appeal, the decision of the General Division and considering the arguments of the Claimant in support of his request for leave to appeal, I find that the appeal has no reasonable chance of success. Conclusion [35] Leave to appeal is refused. This means the appeal will not proceed. Footnotes Footnote 1 Canada (Attorney general) v Marion, 2002 FCA 185; Fleming v Canada (Attorney General), 2006 FCA 16. Footnote 2 Canada (Attorney General) v Bellavance, 2005 FCA 87; Canada (Attorney General) v Gagnon, 2002 FCA 460. Footnote 3 Directive #6, issued by the Ontario’s Chief Medical Officer of Health under section 77.7 of the Health Protection and Promotion Act. Footnote 4 In Paradis v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 FC 1282, the Claimant argued that the employer’s policy violated his rights under the Alberta Human Rights Act. The Court found it was a matter for another forum; See also Mishibinijima v Canada (Attorney General), 2007 FCA 36, stating that the employer’s duty to accommodate is irrelevant in deciding misconduct cases. Footnote 5 Cecchetto v Canada (Attorney general), 2023 FC 102. Footnote 6 AL v Canada Employment Insurance Commission, 2022 SST 1428; The Commission was granted leave to appeal of the General Division decision. Footnote 7 Paradis v Canada (Attorney General); 2016 FC 1282; Canada (Attorney General) v McNamara, 2007 FCA 107; CUB 73739A, CUB 58491; CUB 49373. Footnote 8 I note that in a recent decision, the Superior Court of Quebec has ruled that provisions that imposed the vaccination, although they infringed the liberty and security of the person, did not violate section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights. Even if section 7 of the Charter were to be found to have been violated, this violation would be justified as being a reasonable limit under section 1 of the Charter - Syndicat des métallos, section locale 2008 c Procureur général du Canada, 2022 QCCS 2455 (Only in French at the time of publishing).