R. v. Scofield

2018 BCSC 419 R. v. Scofield IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: R. v. Scofield, 2018 BCSC 419 Date: 20180316 Docket: 48854 Registry: Vernon Regina v. Dylan William Scofield Restriction on publication: Pursuant to ss. 486 and 539 of the Criminal Code of Canada Before: The Honourable Mr. Justice G.P. Weatherill Supplementary Reasons for Sentence Counsel for the Crown: M. Cissell L.A. Ruzicka Counsel for the Accused: J.R. Avis Place and Date of Hearing: Vernon, B.C. February 8, 2018 Written Submissions Filed: February 8, 21, March 9 and 14, 2018 Place and Date of Supplementary Result Given: Kelowna, B.C. March 16, 2018 Place and Date of Judgment: Vernon, B.C. March 16, 2018 Introduction [1] These reasons should be read in conjunction with my reasons given on January 23, 2018 indexed at 2018 BCSC 91 ("Reasons"). [2] Mr. Scofield plead guilty to two counts of sexual interference under s. 151(a) of the Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C‑46 [Code] that, because the Crown proceeded by indictment, carried with them a mandatory minimum sentence of one-year incarceration ("Mandatory Minimum"). [3] In the Reasons, I declared the Mandatory Minimum unconstitutional because it infringed Mr. Scofield's rights under s. 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms [Charter] not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment ("Declaration"): para. 128. [4] I held that due to the exceptional circumstances of this case, including that Mr. Scofield was a first-time offender who suffers from significant cognitive deficits, the fit and proper sentence should be a six-month conditional sentence. [5] At the time I issued the Reasons, the Crown sought, and I granted, an opportunity to consider whether, despite the Declaration, the infringement of Mr. Scofield's rights could be justified under s. 1 of the Charter, which reads: The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. ("s. 1 Argument"). [6] The Crown has now decided to take no position on the s. 1 Argument, but instead applies to have the Court "read in" to s. 151(a) the 90‑day mandatory minimum prescribed by s. 151(b) for summary conviction offences. [7] Mr. Scofield opposes the Crown's application. [8] Written submissions were submitted by both sides. Section 151 [9] Section 151 of the Code is a hybrid offence. The Crown may elect to proceed by way of indictment or summary conviction. That section reads: 151 Every person who, for a sexual purpose, touches, directly or indirectly, with a part of the body or with an object, any part of the body of a person under the age of 16 years (a) is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 14 years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of one year; or (b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than two years less a day and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of 90 days. [10] The Declaration struck out the one‑year mandatory minimum under s. 151(a), but did not affect the 90‑day mandatory minimum under s. 151(b). The Crown's Position [11] In order to ensure consistency with Parliament's intent that the offence of sexual interference under s. 151 carry a mandatory minimum penalty, the Crown asserts that the appropriate constitutional remedy in this case is to sever the reference to the Mandatory Minimum in s. 151(a) and to replace it with a 90‑day mandatory minimum sentence so that it is similar to s. 151(b). [12] Failure to do so, the Crown argues, would leave an anomaly in that there would be a mandatory minimum sentence of 90 days for less serious summary conviction offences but no mandatory minimum sentence for more serious indictable offences. [13] Further, the Crown argues, if there was an absence of a mandatory minimum sentence, Parliament's clear intention to make conditional sentences unavailable for the offence of sexual interference committed against a child would be defeated. [14] Additionally, the Crown says that the Declaration striking down the Mandatory Minimum under s. 151(a) leaving a 90‑day mandatory minimum sentence under s. 151(b) will result in challenges to the 90‑day mandatory minimum sentence on the basis that it arbitrarily creates a harsher sentencing regime for summary conviction offences than indictable offences, which could not have been Parliament's intent. [15] The Crown argues that in considering constitutional remedies the Court should defer to Parliament's objective in enacting s. 151, because legislative schemes are structured to deal with complex social problems and reflect a number of overlapping and conflicting interests. Deference to Parliament is therefore a critical factor: Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37 at paras. 35, 37 [Hutterian Brethren]. [16] The Crown asserts that the least intrusive remedy and the one that maintains the legislative objective is the one this Court must consider, which is to "read in" a 90‑day mandatory minimum sentence into s. 151(a). Mr. Scofield's Position [17] Mr. Scofield's position is essentially that the only appropriate remedy is to declare the Mandatory Minimum mandated by s. 151(a) to be of no force or effect and to strike out the words " and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of one year " in that section, leaving the balance of the section intact. [18] It is then for Parliament, and not this Court, to decide how to proceed from there. Issues [19] The constitutional questions raised by my Reasons are as follows: (1) Does s. 151(a) of the Code infringe Mr. Scofield's rights under s. 12 of the Charter? (2) If so, is the infringement a reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under s. 1 of the Charter? (3) If not, what is the appropriate constitutional remedy? Discussion Issue #1 - Does s. 151(a) of the Code infringe Mr. Scofield's rights under s. 12 of the Charter? [20] Yes. [21] I have already addressed this issue in the Reasons. Issue #2 - If so, is the infringement a reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under s. 1 of the Charter? [22] No. [23] Given the Declaration that the Mandatory Minimum is unconstitutional, what remains to be determined is whether the Mandatory Minimum falls within a range of reasonable alternatives that can be demonstrably justified. Generally, courts do not take the same deferential posture during a s. 1 assessment involving a penal statute that directly threatens the liberty of an accused, as they would in a case involving a complex regulatory response to a social problem that is challenged: Hutterian Brethren at para. 37. [24] The test involved in determining whether s. 1 of the Charter can save the Declaration was set out in R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 at 138‑39 as follows: i. The objective (or ultimate aim) of the law must be of sufficient importance to warrant overriding the right; and ii. The means chosen to achieve the objective must be proportional to both the objective and the effect (or actual consequences) of the law. [25] The proportionality analysis in the second branch of the Oakes test involves three components: i. The measures chosen to limit the right must be rationally connected to the objective of the law; ii. They must impair the guaranteed right or freedom as little as reasonably possible (minimal impairment); and iii. There must be overall proportionality between the deleterious effects of the measures and the salutary effects of the law. [26] The Crown has the onus of establishing a s. 1 justification. However, in light of the Supreme Court of Canada's s. 1 analysis in R. v. Nur, 2015 SCC 15 at paras. 111-118, the Crown takes no position on whether the violation of Mr. Scofield's s. 12 rights is a " reasonable limit [that can be] demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society" under s. 1 of the Charter. [27] The first branch of the Oakes test (the Mandatory Minimum has a pressing and substantial objective) is easily met. There is no debate that crimes involving the sexual abuse of children are serious and abhorrent in our society. [28] Likewise, there is a rational connection between the Mandatory Minimum and the goals of denunciation and retribution: Nur at paras. 112, 113 and 115. [29] While conceding that there is a pressing and substantial objective and a rational connection, Mr. Scofield argues that the Mandatory Minimum fails both the minimal impairment and the final proportionality analyses of the second branch of the Oakes test: Nur at paras. 113-115. [30] Respecting minimal impairment, the questions are whether the limit on the accused's rights is reasonably tailored to Parliament's objective and whether there are less harmful means of achieving Parliament's goal. The Crown must show the absence of less drastic means of achieving Parliament's objective, and the impingement on the accused's right must be no more than what is reasonably necessary to achieve that objective: Nur at para. 116. [31] Mr. Avis argues, on Mr. Scofield's behalf, that there are a number of alternatives available to Parliament, other than the Mandatory Minimum, that would address its objective without violating s. 12 of the Charter. [32] Mr. Avis quotes McLachlin, C.J.C. in Nur at paras. 116 and 117 as follows: [116] The question at this stage is whether the limit on the right is reasonably tailored to the objective. A court asks "whether there are less harmful means of achieving the legislative goal": Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567, at para. 53. The government must show the absence of less drastic means of achieving the objective "in a real and substantial manner": para. 55. The impingement on the Charter right must be no more than what is reasonably necessary to achieve the state's objective. [117] Parliament could have achieved its objective by drafting an offence with a close correspondence between conduct attracting significant moral blameworthiness -- such as those engaged in criminal activity or conduct that poses a danger to others -- and the mandatory minimum, rather than a sweeping law that includes in its ambit conduct attracting less blameworthiness for which the mandatory minimum sentence would be grossly disproportionate. The government has not discharged its burden on this branch of the Oakes test. There are less harmful means of achieving the legislative goal. [33] Mr. Avis again quotes McLachlin, C.J.C. in R. v. Lloyd, 2016 SCC 13 at paras. 3, 35-36: [3] As this Court's decision in R. v. Nur, 2015 SCC 15, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 773, illustrates, the reality is that mandatory minimum sentences for offences that can be committed in many ways and under many different circumstances by a wide range of people are constitutionally vulnerable because they will almost inevitably catch situations where the prescribed mandatory minimum would require an unconstitutional sentence. One solution is for such laws to narrow their reach, so that they catch only conduct that merits the mandatory minimum sentence. Another option to preserve the constitutionality of offences that cast a wide net is to provide for residual judicial discretion to impose a fit and constitutional sentence in exceptional cases. This approach, widely adopted in other countries, provides a way of resolving the tension between Parliament's right to choose the appropriate range of sentences for an offence, and the constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. [35] As I have already said, in light of Nur, the reality is this: mandatory minimum sentences that, as here, apply to offences that can be committed in various ways, under a broad array of circumstances and by a wide range of people are vulnerable to constitutional challenge. This is because such laws will almost inevitably include an acceptable reasonable hypothetical for which the mandatory minimum will be found unconstitutional. If Parliament hopes to sustain mandatory minimum penalties for offences that cast a wide net, it should consider narrowing their reach so that they only catch offenders that merit the mandatory minimum sentences. [36] Another solution would be for Parliament to build a safety valve that would allow judges to exempt outliers for whom the mandatory minimum will constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Residual judicial discretion for exceptional cases is a technique widely used to avoid injustice and constitutional infirmity in other countries: Department of Justice Canada, Research and Statistics Division, Mandatory Sentences of Imprisonment in Common Law Jurisdictions: Some Representative Models (2005) (online), at pp. 1, 4 and 35. It allows the legislature to impose severe sentences for offences deemed abhorrent, while avoiding unconstitutionally disproportionate sentences in exceptional cases. The residual judicial discretion is usually confined to exceptional cases and may require the judge to give reasons justifying departing from the mandatory minimum sentence prescribed by the law. It is for the legislature to determine the parameters of the residual judicial discretion. The laws of other countries reveal a variety of approaches: Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1997 (S. Afr.), No. 105 of 1997, s. 51(3)(a); Firearms Act 1968 (U.K.), 1968, c. 27, s. 51A(2); Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006 (U.K.), 2006, c. 38, s. 29(4); Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (U.K.), 2000, c. 6, ss. 109(3), 110(2) and 111(2); Sentencing Act (N.T.), s. 78DI; Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic.), s. 10(1); Sentencing Act 2002 (N.Z.), ss. 86E, 102 and 103; Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (S.A.), s. 17; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2012); Penal Code [Brottsbalken] (Swed.), c. 29, s. 5. There is no precise formula and only one requirement -- that the residual discretion allow for a lesser sentence where application of the mandatory minimum would result in a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to what is fit and appropriate and would constitute cruel and unusual punishment. [34] I agree with Mr. Avis that there are reasonable alternatives even within a mandatory minimum sentencing regime that would avoid imposing grossly disproportionate sentences on less blameworthy offenders, and that if such measures were drafted into s. 151--for example, if Parliament legislated a more tailored approach to the application of the mandatory minimum, or even better, if Parliament simply allowed sentencing judges the discretion to determine a fit and proper sentence in each case--there would be less impingement on the offender's right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. [35] As in Nur, the Mandatory Minimum is a sweeping law that encompasses all conduct regardless of the accused's blameworthiness and includes conduct for which the Mandatory Minimum would be grossly disproportionate. There are less harmful means of achieving the legislative goal: para. 117. [36] The final Oakes factor to consider involves weighing the impact of the Mandatory Minimum on the rights of offenders who would be subjected to non-proportional sentences that Canadians would find shocking and abhorrent against the salutary effects of the law. [37] I agree with Mr. Avis that the Crown has not established that the imposition of the Mandatory Minimum on offenders such as Mr. Scofield, and others captured by the reasonably foreseeable applications of s. 151(a), will have the salutary effect of deterrence in any proportionate manner. [38] While the Supreme Court of Canada may have left open the possibility that s. 1 of the Charter could save a mandatory minimum penalty that has been struck down as unconstitutional: R. v. Ferguson, 2008 SCC 6 at para. 32; R. v. Latimer, 2001 SCC 1 at para. 78, I have not been referred to any case where a court has done so. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada has held that a s. 12 breach founded on reasonable hypothetical circumstances could not be justified under s.1 on three occasions: R. v. Smith, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 at 1080‑81; Nur at paras. 111‑118; Lloyd at paras. 48‑50. [39] As the Supreme Court of Canada pointed out, it will be difficult to show that a mandatory minimum sentence that has been found to be grossly disproportionate under s. 12 is proportionate as between the deleterious and salutary effects of the law under s. 1 as required by the Oakes test: Nur at para. 111. [40] In light of my conclusion that the Mandatory Minimum was grossly disproportionate to what Mr. Scofield's fit and proper sentence should be, I find that the Mandatory Minimum does not constitute a reasonable limit demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under s. 1. Issue #3 - What is the appropriate constitutional remedy? [41] Section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 grants this Court jurisdiction to declare laws of no force or effect only to the extent the law is inconsistent with it. Therefore, s. 151(a) can only be struck down to the extent it is inconsistent with the Charter, which in this case it is in respect of the Mandatory Minimum. [42] Where a mandatory minimum sentence is found to violate s. 12 and is not saved under s. 1, the appropriate remedy is normally to declare the provision to be of no force and effect: Ferguson at paras. 13 and 74. [43] In Schachter v. Canada, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679, the Supreme Court held at 718 that severance or reading in were appropriate remedies that would only be warranted in the clearest of cases where each of the following criteria is met: i. The legislative objective is obvious and severance or reading in would further that objective, or would constitute a lesser interference with that objective than would striking down; ii. The choice of means used by the legislature to further its objective is not so unequivocal that severance or reading in would constitute an unacceptable intrusion into the legislative domain; and iii. Severance or reading in would not involve an intrusion into the legislative budgetary decisions so substantial as to change the nature of the legislative scheme in question. [44] This test was affirmed at para. 51 of Ferguson, which involved a strictly indictable offence. The Court did not have to address a hybrid offence as is the case here, where there is a constitutionally valid mandatory minimum sentence for the same offence where the Crown proceeds summarily. [45] The Supreme Court of Canada has directed that there should be as little interference as possible with the will of Parliament: Schachter at p. 696. To "read in", as the Crown suggests, would amount to this Court making ad hoc choices from a variety of options, none of which was pointed to with sufficient precision by the interaction between s. 151(a) and s. 12 of the Charter. This is the task of the legislature, not the courts: Schachter at pp. 706-707. [46] The Crown asserts that the least intrusive measure would be to read a mandatory minimum sentence of 90 days into s. 151(a). That way, it says, Parliament's objective to sanction sexual offences against children with a term of imprisonment would be met. Reading in such a provision, it argues, would be less of an interference with Parliament's will than would striking the Mandatory Minimum and would not be an unacceptable intrusion into the legislative domain. [47] I disagree. [48] As Mr. Avis pointed out in his written submissions at para. 21: While the Crown argues that it was Parliament's clear intention to have a mandatory minimum sentence for all sexual offences against children, there is absolutely nothing to indicate that Parliament would have enacted a 90 day minimum sentence for a s. 151 offence proceeded with by indictment. Parliament may well choose to keep a one year mandatory minimum sentence, but also incorporate sufficient safeguards to avoid infringements of s. 12. Where [Parliament] intends to have identical mandatory minimum sentences for hybrid offences whether proceeded with summarily or by indictment, it enacts identical mandatory minimum sentences. (For instance, the minimum punishments mandated by s. 255(1)(a) for s. 253 and s. 254 offences are the same whether by summary conviction or indictment.) [49] I agree with Mr. Avis on this point. [50] An argument similar to the Crown's argument was rejected by Beames J. in R. v. E.R.D.R., 2016 BCSC 1759 at paras. 20-23. The Crown argues that I should not follow E.R.D.R. because Parliament clearly intended that there should be mandatory minimum sentences for all sexual offences committed against children. [51] This issue was fully argued before Beames J. and I agree with her conclusion on the point. In any event, judicial comity militates in favor of me following her decision. [52] In further support of its submission that Parliament clearly intended that there should be mandatory minimum sentences for all sexual offences committed against children, the Crown argues that s. 742.1(f)(iii) of the Code prohibits the imposition of a conditional sentence order for sexual assault, which is significant because as I recognized at paragraph 85 of the Reasons, "s. 271 offences and s. 151 offences are very similar when involving a complainant under the age of 16". Therefore, the Crown submits, I should read a mandatory minimum sentence of 90 days into s. 151(a). [53] In my view, this argument is not meritorious. If Parliament intended to prohibit conditional sentence orders for s. 151, it would have included s. 151 in s. 742.1(f). [54] Therefore, I have determined that the appropriate remedy is to strike down the Mandatory Minimum mandated by s. 151(a) as being of no force and effect, as it is inconsistent with s. 12 of the Charter. [55] The doctrine of severance requires that, generally speaking, the court should only strike down and sever the offending portion of the impugned section to interfere with the law as little as possible: Schachter at pp. 696-697. [56] In this case, it is the mandatory minimum sentence of one year--no matter what the circumstances of the offence or the offender--that is wrongly included in s. 151(a). It is clear that Parliament would have enacted, and prior to 2005 did enact, the balance of the section without the Mandatory Minimum. While Parliament's intention--to sanction all sexual offences against children with a term of imprisonment--seems clear, there are a number of potential exceptions or safeguards that could have been included in the section, which would have allowed a sentencing judge discretion not to impose a mandatory minimum sentence in cases that would otherwise offend the Charter. This could have been accomplished in a number of ways, including a more tailored approach to the application of the mandatory minimum, or allowing sentencing judges the discretion not to apply the mandatory minimum in circumstances where to do so would be grossly disproportionate. Decision [57] For the above noted reasons, I decline to read the 90‑day minimum sentence into s. 151(a). [58] Following the approach outlined in Schachter, I conclude that the least intrusive remedy is to strike out the following words in s. 151(a) that are declared to be of no force and effect: "and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of one year". Sentence [59] Mr. Scofield, please stand. [60] For the reasons set out in my Reasons, I sentence you to a six-month conditional sentence. [61] The Crown seeks a five-year prohibition order under s. 161 restricting Mr. Scofield from being within two kilometers of the two victim's L.N. and M.L.'s residence, school or work; not to seek employment or volunteer in a capacity that involves a position of trust or authority toward persons under the age of 16 years; and to the use of the internet to access social media websites, the purpose of which is to date, meet or communicate with other individuals unless under appropriate adult supervision. [62] Section 161 provides: 161 (1) When an offender is convicted, or is discharged on the conditions prescribed in a probation order under section 730, of an offence referred to in subsection (1.1) in respect of a person who is under the age of 16 years, the court that sentences the offender or directs that the accused be discharged, as the case may be, in addition to any other punishment that may be imposed for that offence or any other condition prescribed in the order of discharge, shall consider making and may make, subject to the conditions or exemptions that the court directs, an order prohibiting the offender from (a) attending a public park or public swimming area where persons under the age of 16 years are present or can reasonably be expected to be present, or a daycare centre, schoolground, playground or community centre; (a.1) being within two kilometres, or any other distance specified in the order, of any dwelling-house where the victim identified in the order ordinarily resides or of any other place specified in the order; (b) seeking, obtaining or continuing any employment, whether or not the employment is remunerated, or becoming or being a volunteer in a capacity, that involves being in a position of trust or authority towards persons under the age of 16 years; (c) having any contact -- including communicating by any means -- with a person who is under the age of 16 years, unless the offender does so under the supervision of a person whom the court considers appropriate; or (d) using the Internet or other digital network, unless the offender does so in accordance with conditions set by the court. [63] Sexual interference contrary to s. 151 of the Code is one of the offences referred to in s. 161(1.1). A prohibition order under s. 161 is discretionary and applies only to offenders who constitute a danger to children: R. v. Heywood, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761. [64] The Crown correctly points out that the offence against L.N. continues to have an emotional impact on her and that Mr. Scofield used social media and dating websites to develop and maintain contact with L.N. and M.L. [65] I have considered s. 161 and its purpose, which is to serve an overarching protective function to shield children under the age of 16 from sexual violence: R. v. K.R.J., 2016 SCC 31 at para. 44. [66] The discretionary nature of s. 161 allows the sentencing judge flexibility to address the degree of risk of an individual offender re‑offending in the community and to craft an order that is tailored to the circumstances of the individual offender: K.R.J. at para. 47. [67] Section161 orders can be imposed only when there is an evidentiary basis upon which to conclude that the particular offender poses a risk to children and the sentencing judge is satisfied that the terms of such an order are a reasonable attempt to minimize that risk: K.R.J. at para. 48. [68] Without repeating the circumstances of the offences and the offender as set out in my Reasons (including paras. 125-127), I am not persuaded that the Crown has established that Mr. Scofield remains a danger to children or that a broad ranging s. 161 order of the kind it seeks is necessary, appropriate or justified in the unique circumstances of this case. [69] The offences to which Mr. Scofield pled guilty to occurred over four years ago. Since then, there is no suggestion that he has engaged in any behaviour of concern. He has the benefit of a very supportive living environment. Specific deterrence is not a concern in this case and I am satisfied that the type of "full-blown" s. 161 prohibition order the Crown seeks is not necessary. In my view, such a far-reaching order is unjustified and would have far too severe an impact on Mr. Scofield's liberty. [70] However, given the use Mr. Scofield made of internet dating websites in this case, I am persuaded that an order under s. 161(1)(d) restricting his use of the internet or other digital networks to access dating websites such as MeetMe, unless in the presence of appropriate adult supervision, should be made. [71] I therefore decline to make a s. 161 prohibition order in the nature sought by the Crown, but I do make an order prohibiting Mr. Scofield for two years from today's date from accessing internet dating websites, the purpose of which is to date, meet or communicate with other individuals, unless appropriate adult supervision is present. [72] The conditions of Mr. Scofield's conditional sentence will be as follows: 1. You are to keep the peace and be of good behaviour; 2. You are to appear before the Court when required to do so by the Court; 3. You are to report to a supervisor within seven days of today's date and thereafter as required by the supervisor and in the manner directed by the supervisor; 4. You are to remain within the jurisdiction of this Court unless written permission to go outside this jurisdiction is obtained from the Court or your supervisor; 5. You must notify the Court or the supervisor in advance of any change of name or address, and promptly notify the Court or your supervisor of any change of employment or occupation; 6. You shall abstain from communicating directly or indirectly with either L.M. or M.L.; and 7. You shall attend such counselling program or programs as are directed by your supervisor that shall, as near as possible, be the type of programs that were recommended by Dr. Joneja. Ancillary Orders [73] In addition to the conditional sentence of six months, I make the following ancillary orders: 1. Because of the two convictions, there will be a mandatory order pursuant to s. 490.012(1) of the Code that Mr. Scofield be registered with the Sex Offender Registry pursuant to the Sex Offender Information Registration Act, S.C. 2004, c. 10 [SOIRA], and comply with the terms of SOIRA for life. 2. There will also be a mandatory order for a sample of Mr. Scofield's DNA pursuant to s. 487.051(1) of the Code. 3. Lastly, there will be a victim impact surcharge of $200 or one day in default. [74] Since his arrest and since entering into the undertaking with the Court, there is no suggestion that Mr. Scofield has breached the terms and conditions of his release. [75] This sentence may not satisfy everyone but, as I explained in my Reasons, the law requires my sentence to balance many factors not just satisfy one particular interest. [76] Mr. Scofield, I hope you think long and hard about your actions and the harm you have caused to L.N., M.L., their families, those closest to them, and the impacts on your community. Your decisions in life can have repercussions and reverberations that you may not feel but can profoundly affect others. I also remind you that a breach of your conditional sentence order will result in you spending the balance of your sentence behind bars. [77] I wish you well in the future. "G.P. Weatherill J." The Honourable Mr. Justice G.P. Weatherill