Faria v. Ramos

2026 BCCA 201 Faria v. Ramos COURT OF APPEAL FOR BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: Faria v. Ramos, 2026 BCCA 201 Date: 20260504 Docket: CA51261 Between: Marcelo Sepulveda Magalhaes Faria Appellant (Respondent) And Daniely Mella Ramos Respondent (Claimant) Before: The Honourable Madam Justice Fisher (In Chambers) On appeal from: An order of the Supreme Court of British Columbia, dated December 15, 2025 (Ramos v. Faria, 2025 BCSC 2485, Vancouver Docket E240269). Oral Reasons for Judgment Counsel for the Appellant: V.L.C. Pontini The Respondent, appearing in person: D.M. Ramos Place and Date of Hearing: Vancouver, British Columbia May 4, 2026 Place and Date of Judgment: Vancouver, British Columbia May 4, 2026 Summary: The applicant applies for leave to appeal an interim support order in a family proceeding, primarily based on the judge's imputation of income on both parties. Held: Application for leave to appeal dismissed. The interests of justice do not favour granting leave to appeal. Interim orders in family law cases are highly discretionary and require exceptional circumstances to vary, which are not present here. The proposed appeal is not significant to the practice or the action. Although there is some merit to the grounds of appeal, this must be considered in the context of an interim order on issues that are highly fact-specific and subject to final determination on a complete record, and an appeal would unduly hinder the progress of the action. [1] FISHER J.A.: The applicant, Marcelo Faria, applies for leave to appeal an interim order in a family law proceeding. He also applies for an extension of time to file his notice of application and application book, which was filed and served two days after the deadline for doing so prescribed by R. 13(a) of the Court of Appeal Rules. [2] The interim order was made on December 15, 2025. Mr. Faria filed his notice of appeal seeking leave to appeal on December 29, 2025, but he did not file his application for leave and his application book until January 30, 2026. The respondent, Daniely Mella Ramos, takes no issue with an extension of time but opposes the application for leave. As both parties focused only on the application for leave to appeal, and given the very short delay, I am satisfied that an order extending the time is appropriate. Background [3] Briefly by way of background, Mr. Faria and Ms. Ramos separated in August 2023 after a 20-year relationship. The parties have one child, who was born in 2008. [4] The parties are from Brazil. Mr. Faria was trained as a doctor in Brazil and, in 2016, was earning an income of $97,735 CDN. They moved to Canada in 2017, and Mr. Faria found work as an Advanced Support and Recovery Specialist at the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia (ICBC), earning an income of $93,777. Ms. Ramos started an immigration and educational consulting business known as BFF. Both parties worked during the marriage. [5] In March 2021, the parties leased a condominium in Burnaby. In August 2023, just before their separation, they purchased a condominium in Langley. Mr. Faria and their son moved into the Langley property but Ms. Ramos stayed in the Burnaby property. [6] In early 2024, Mr. Faria decided to return to Brazil, having secured work as a professor as well as a surgeon. Ms. Ramos filed a notice of family claim seeking orders respecting parenting arrangements, child support, spousal support, and division of property. She and their son were living in the Burnaby property and she was paying the expenses to maintain the Langley property. [7] In January 2025, Ms. Ramos applied for interim retroactive spousal support, s. 7 expenses, and an order that she have sole parenting responsibilities. Interim Support Decision [8] On December 15 2025, the chambers judge adjourned the question of retroactive support to trial and ordered prospective interim spousal support, the sharing of s. 7 expenses, interim child support and sole parenting responsibility to Ms. Ramos. The child support order was by consent. In making the support orders, the judge imputed income to both parties. [9] In his reasons, the judge set out the factors in s. 15.2(4) of the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.), for making an interim award for spousal support: (4) In making an order under subsection (1) or an interim order under subsection (2), the court shall take into consideration the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse, including (a) the length of time the spouses cohabitated; (b) the functions performed by each spouse during cohabitation; and (c) any order, agreement or arrangement relating to support of either spouse. [10] He also referred to the objectives listed in s. 15.2(6) for making such an order. [11] The judge noted that interim support orders are often referred to as "rough justice", highlighting that there were factors complicating the making of a support order on an interim basis here. The most important was determining the parties' respective incomes, given that both argued their historic earnings did not reflect their current earning potential: see para. 51 and following. [12] The judge imputed income to both the parties based on their historic earnings. He found that Mr. Faria was underemployed as he left his job at ICBC and returned to Brazil where he was earning considerably less money as a professor and surgeon: para. 54. The judge imputed Guidelines income to Mr. Faria in the amount of his previous income at ICBC ($93,777): para. 55. [13] The judge found that Ms. Ramos, similarly, could earn considerably more than her reported income: para. 56. He stated: [56] An in-depth analysis of the claimant's earning potential from her company BFF is not possible on this interim application. Given the financial information I have for BFF and the claimant's work history I find that the claimant is capable of earning considerably more than $19,200 per year. [14] The judge imputed Guidelines income to Ms. Ramos in the amount of $45,000 per year: para. 58. This was based on her historic earnings, the gross profit of BFF, and the retained earnings and dividends paid by BFF. He said it was unclear from the evidence how much the changes to immigration and visa policies had impacted her ability to earn income from BFF, as she asserted. [15] The judge found Ms. Ramos had made out a prima facie case for both compensatory and non-compensatory entitlement to spousal support. He found she was the primary caregiver to the child during the relationship: para. 45. Her non‑compensatory entitlement was based on her financial need and the fact that she was maintaining the Langley Property: para. 59. Her compensatory entitlement was based on the length of the relationship, the fact that Mr. Faria was the high-income earner during the marriage, and Ms. Ramos' role as the primary caregiver for their child: para. 60. [16] The parties agreed there should be an interim order for child support, which the judge ordered in the amount of $893 per month, based on their imputed incomes. He also ordered Mr. Faria to pay Ms. Ramos prospective spousal support of $46 per month, also based on their imputed incomes, continuing until further ordered by the court. He declined to order spousal support retroactive to the date of separation, finding this issue was better left for trial, given the need for a more thorough analysis of the parties' incomes. The orders regarding parenting responsibility and s. 7 expenses are not in issue. The Proposed Appeal [17] Mr. Faria's proposed appeal alleges that the judge erred in making the interim support order by 1) imputing income to him based on historic Canadian employment without properly assessing the reasonableness of his return to Brazil and resumption of a long-standing career there; 2) finding Mr. Faria underemployed despite accepting that he was actively working as a surgeon and professor and taking steps to maximize his income; 3) finding Ms. Ramos was the primary caregiver during the marriage; and 4) imputing an artificially low income to Ms. Ramos without properly accounting for her control of a profitable, closely-held corporation. Leave to Appeal [18] Leave is required under R. 11(c) of the Court of Appeal Rules to appeal an order granting interim relief under the Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c. 25, or the Divorce Act. The interim order in this case requires Mr. Faria to pay child support in the amount of $893 per month (which obligation is not in dispute) and spousal support of $46 per month (which is in dispute). His primary complaint relates to incomes imputed by the chambers judge. [19] The four criteria to consider when determining whether it is in the interests of justice to grant leave to appeal are well known: 1) whether the point on appeal is of significance to the practice; 2) whether the point raised is of significance to the action itself; 3) whether the appeal is prima facie meritorious or, on the other hand, whether it is frivolous; and 4) whether the appeal will unduly hinder progress of the action. See Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Sessions, 2000 BCCA 326 at para. 10 (Chambers). [20] These criteria are all considered under the rubric of the interests of justice: Vancouver (City) v. Zhang, 2007 BCCA 280 at para. 10 (Chambers). [21] This Court's jurisdiction to vary interim orders made in family matters is "extremely limited": T.N. v. J.C.N., 2013 BCCA 432 at para. 10 (Chambers). This will only be done in "exceptional circumstances" where there is a clear reason to interfere with the order: F.(J.G.) v. B.(C.L.), 2003 BCCA 382 at para. 10 (Chambers). Justice Harris explained the basis for this in D.G.M v. L.L.M., 2021 BCCA 471 (Chambers): [18] The proposed appeal is of an interim order pending trial. It is a discretionary order, although, of course, discretion must be exercised on a principled basis. It is well recognised that interim orders in family matters work "rough justice" to create a workable temporary resolution of issues dividing parties until they can properly be resolved at trial on the basis of admissible evidence. As a result, this Court rarely entertains appeals from interim orders. The focus of the parties' efforts needs to be on getting to trial, not continuing their conflict in a different forum. Discussion 1. Significance to the practice [22] Mr. Faria submits the judge erred in law in failing to consider relevant evidence as to whether his underemployment in Brazil was reasonable. I would not consider this issue in the context of this case to be significant to the practice of family law. The principles are well established and the record before the chambers judge was limited given that the order made was an interim order. I agree with Ms. Ramos' submission that the appeal concerns a routine exercise of judicial discretion in the context of an interim support order and the alleged error is highly fact-specific. 2. Significance to the action [23] Mr. Faria submits this appeal is significant to the action because the respondent has not taken steps to move the proceedings below forward and, as a consequence, this interim order may remain in effect for a considerable period of time. I am not satisfied that this renders the appeal significant to the action. As the chambers judge observed, interim orders for support have often been referred to as "rough justice". A full determination of the parties' incomes and support entitlement will be conducted at trial and there are ways in which Mr. Faria can seek to move the proceedings along in the court below. 3. Merits [24] The question of the merits of the appeal asks whether the applicant has identified a "good arguable case of sufficient merit to warrant scrutiny by a division of this Court": Johnston v. Matheson, (also known as A.L.J. v. S.J.M.), 1994 CanLII 2614 (B.C.C.A.), 46 B.C.A.C. 158, at para. 10 (Chambers). This is a relatively low threshold: Bartram v. Glaxosmithkline Inc., 2011 BCCA 539 at para. 16 (Chambers). [25] Mr. Faria submits the judge misapplied the governing principles for income imputation--specifically, that income may only be imputed where a spouse is intentionally unemployed or underemployed in circumstances that are unreasonable. He says the chambers judge failed to meaningfully consider his mental illness as an explanation for why he returned to Brazil or that his return to Brazil was a bona fide resumption of a career in medicine, where he is actively maximizing his income by doing extra surgeries. [26] Mr. Faria also submits the judge erred by not accounting for Ms. Ramos' corporate income from BFF. He says her imputed income ($45,000) was not linked to the evidence that was before the judge, which included gross revenues to BFF of $144,081 in 2022, $135,232 in 2023 and $230,416 in 2024. He says the judge was required to look beyond nominal employment income where a spouse controls a closely-held corporation and his imputation of only $45,000 was an artificially low income. [27] Mr. Faria further submits the judge's finding that Ms. Ramos was the child's primary caregiver is not supported by the evidence which shows that caregiving during the marriage was shared. He says that it was only after he moved back to Brazil that Ms. Ramos became the primary caregiver. [28] Ms. Ramos submits the proposed appeal has no reasonable prospect of success because it asks the Court to re-weigh evidence and ignores the discretionary nature of interim relief and the court's obligation to make practical determinations in the face of incomplete disclosure. [29] I accept there is merit to the factual questions of whether Mr. Faria is unreasonably underemployed in Brazil and what income should be imputed to Ms. Ramos from her company. However, the judge's decision must be viewed in the context in which it was made. Ms. Ramos disputes Mr. Faria's actual earnings and earning capacity and Mr. Faria disputes Ms. Ramos' earnings from BFF. I agree with Ms. Ramos' submission that this was an interim order made in the context of incomplete and contested financial disclosure and the judge properly recognized that a full assessment of the parties' respective incomes was best left for trial. [30] Moreover, the judge expressed concern about the reduction in Ms. Ramos' income in 2025. He referred to the gross revenue of BFF in that year in addition to her declared income and stated that an in-depth analysis of her earning potential from BFF was not possible on this interim application. Given the record that was before him, his imputation of Ms. Ramos' income was reasonable. [31] As for the finding that Ms. Ramos is the primary caregiver, this would only be relevant to the issues of Ms. Ramos' entitlement to compensatory spousal support and retroactive spousal support, which again will be matters for trial. There is no merit to this issue in the context of this interim order. 4. Unduly hinder the progress of the action [32] This is an important factor that concerns the timing and possible interference with upcoming trial dates, possible settlement negotiations or time-sensitive aspects of the litigation: see Smith v. Global Plastics, 2001 BCCA 152 at para. 11 (Chambers); Gichuru v. Law Society of BC, 2012 BCCA 159 at para. 23 (Chambers). [33] Ms. Ramos submits this appeal will not resolve the issues and will delay the proceedings and increase costs. She also says the appeal is premature because it focuses on disputed factual issues requiring an evidentiary assessment and fuller disclosure, all of which is best left for trial, as the judge recognized. [34] Mr. Faria's counsel candidly accepts that the primary concern giving rise to this application stems from Mr. Faria's dispute about Ms. Ramos' entitlement to spousal support and the spousal order that was based on imputed income. Ms. Ramos says the interim order was simply a temporary order intended to provide some stability for her and her son. That order provides for a modest payment of $46 per month until the merits of the action are determined or otherwise resolved. The fact that Ms. Ramos has not taken active steps to move the action forward in the court below does not, in my view, justify granting leave to appeal. [35] Whether or not this proposed appeal will delay the ultimate trial of this matter, my view is that it will unduly hinder the progress of the action by requiring these parties to expend time and money on issues that have not been finally determined. They will be better served by engaging in the process in BC Supreme Court to have this dispute determined. 5. The interests of justice [36] Most of the factors do not weigh in favour of granting leave to appeal. This is particularly so given the highly discretionary nature of interim orders in family law cases and the fact-specific nature of the grounds of appeal. I am not satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances that warrant interference with the interim support order in this case. [37] The application for an extension of time is allowed but, for all of these reasons, the application for leave is dismissed. "The Honourable Madam Justice Fisher"