Canada Judgment

Federal Court

McLean v. Canada

On this page

Professional case brief

Research organized from the available case record

Source document

01

Holding and result

The Court approved the Payment Protocol because it reasonably balances a class member's right to retain counsel of choice with the need to protect the class by requiring documentation, payment into trust, compliance with professional regulation, and prior court approval of fees and disbursements, thereby addressing concerns from prior settlements and decisions.

Court disposition

Motion granted on consent; Payment Protocol approved as modified by the Court

Orders

  • Payment Protocol approved (as modified by the Court)
  • Motion granted without costs
  • Individual Counsel fees and disbursements require prior court approval before release from trust
  • Claims Administrator to follow the Payment Protocol and to receive stipulated documentation as required by the Protocol

02

Material facts

Parties

Garry Leslie McLean

Plaintiff Counsel: Gowling WLG (Canada) LLP

Roger Augustine

Plaintiff Counsel: Gowling WLG (Canada) LLP

Claudette Commanda

Plaintiff Counsel: Gowling WLG (Canada) LLP

Angela Elizabeth Simone Sampson

Plaintiff Counsel: Gowling WLG (Canada) LLP

Margaret Anne Swan

Plaintiff Counsel: Gowling WLG (Canada) LLP

Mariette Lucille Buckshot

Plaintiff Counsel: Gowling WLG (Canada) LLP

Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada as represented by the Attorney General of Canada

Defendant Counsel: Attorney General of Canada

Mary Rose Naytowhow

Moving Party Counsel: Nicholas W.K. Racine

03

Procedural history

  1. Posture

    Class Proceeding / Consent Motion for Approval of Payment Protocol to Regulate Payments to Individual Counsel; Motion Granted

04

Questions and positions

Legal issues

Party arguments

Applicant
The moving party sought court approval of a contingency payment arrangement for Individual Counsel and a Payment Protocol requiring the Claims Administrator to communicate with Individual Counsel and to pay amounts owing to claimants to Individual Counsel in trust; the Protocol was developed to address concerns raised in prior decisions and was submitted on consent.
Respondent
The Defendant and Class Counsel required safeguards: compliance with law society regulations, clear disclosure to claimants that Class Counsel offer free services, preservation and release of Class Counsel obligations only if claimants knowingly forego those services, documentation to Claims Administrator and Class Counsel, payment into trust, and court approval before funds are released.

05

Court’s reasoning

  1. 01

    Settlement Clause 13.04; Federal Courts Rule 334.4

    Court supervision and prior approval required for solicitor payments and charging of fees and disbursements by counsel retained for class claimants

  2. 02

    Federal Court jurisprudence including McLean v Canada (Attorney General), 2019 FC 1525

    Court may approve settlement administration protocols that balance individual choice of counsel with protection of the class

  3. 03

    Federal Court practice and decision in Wenham v Canada (Attorney General), 2020 FC 590

    Documentation and payment into trust combined with court approval provide necessary protections for class members

06

Ratio, limits and disposition

Ratio decidendi

The Court approved the Payment Protocol because it reasonably balances a class member's right to retain counsel of choice with the need to protect the class by requiring documentation, payment into trust, compliance with professional regulation, and prior court approval of fees and disbursements, thereby addressing concerns from prior settlements and decisions.

Obiter and limits

  • The Payment Protocol may be used by others in similar situations and issues arising should be brought to the Court's attention
  • The ultimate responsibility for the claimant's choice to forego free legal services rests with the class member
  • The release of Class Counsel obligations as part of the Protocol addresses Class Counsel's concerns about competing obligations

Court disposition

Motion granted on consent; Payment Protocol approved as modified by the Court

  • Payment Protocol approved (as modified by the Court)
  • Motion granted without costs
  • Individual Counsel fees and disbursements require prior court approval before release from trust
  • Claims Administrator to follow the Payment Protocol and to receive stipulated documentation as required by the Protocol

Source and reliance status

Federal Court · 17 June 2020

This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.

Judgment reading view

Judgment text

The complete available source text.

Source document

Federal Court

Judgment· 17 June 2020

2020 FC 702

McLean v. Canada Court (s) Database Federal Court Decisions Date 2020-06-17 Neutral citation 2020 FC 702 File numbers T-2169-16 Decision Content Date: 20200617 Docket: T-2169-16 Citation: 2020 FC 702

CLASS PROCEEDING BETWEEN: GARRY LESLIE MCLEAN, ROGER AUGUSTINE, CLAUDETTE COMMANDA, ANGELA ELIZABETH SIMONE SAMPSON, MARGARET ANNE SWAN AND

MARIETTE LUCILLE BUCKSHOT Plaintiffs and HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF CANADA as represented by

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA Defendant and

MARY ROSE NAYTOWHOW Moving Party

REASONS FOR ORDER PHELAN J. [1] These are the Court’s Reasons for granting the specific motion and approving the “Payment Protocol” to regulate the process for payments and communications to non-Class Counsel [Individual Counsel] retained by claimants in respect of the Indian Day School Settlement [Settlement]. [2] The Moving Party had brought a motion for approval of a contingency payment of Individual Counsel. The parties developed a Payment Protocol to address a number of issues raised in this Court’s decision in McLean v Canada (Attorney General), 2019 FC 1525, and to settle the Moving Party’s motion. The motion is on consent and the Payment Protocol reasonably deals with the specific circumstances of the Moving Party. [3] The process established in the Settlement was, in part, an acknowledgement and an effort to avoid the well-recognized problems encountered under the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement. [4] As a result, the parties adopted Clause 13.04, a more specific provision but one consistent with Rule 334.4. As a result, both payments to a solicitor (Rule 334.4) and the charging of fees and disbursements by Individual Counsel require prior approval of the Court. [5] However, the Settlement does not restrict or limit a Class Member’s right to retain counsel of their choice to assist with the Class Member’s claim even though Class Counsel is committed to

doing such work for free. Class Counsel also have other ongoing obligations to Class Members post-Settlement. [6] In 2019, three law firms (including Bergerman Smith LLP, counsel on this motion) attempted to secure Court approval for a proposed pre-approved contingency fee arrangement for potential claimants. In dismissing that motion, the Court expressed a number of concerns with the motion including the assurance that an arrangement with Individual Counsel be compliant with law society regulations, that Claimants understood that the legal services being contracted with Individual Counsel were available for free from Class Counsel and that in retaining Individual Counsel a Claimant had to release Class Counsel from obligations which it owed the Claimant as a member of the Class. [7] The Moving Party brought a motion on May 11, 2020, seeking an Order directing the Claims Administrator to communicate with Individual Counsel and to pay any amounts owing to the Claimant to the Individual Counsel in trust. That motion has been superseded by the consent motion granted. [8] The parties subsequently resolved the motion in accordance with the Payment Protocol (as modified by the Court). [9] In my view, the Payment Protocol reasonably addresses the right of a Class Member to retain counsel of their choosing with the intent and purpose of the Settlement, the obligations and commitments

of Class Counsel, and the rights of the Class as a whole. [10] The Payment Protocol does not undermine the rights of the Class and seeks a balance between avoiding the problems of the Residential Schools Settlement and according Class Members their choice of counsel. The release of Class Counsel’s obligations addresses their concern. [11] Finally, the payment into trust provides Individual Counsel with assured payment, and the requirement for Court approval of payment to Individual Counsel and the Court’s ongoing supervision provides the protections necessary for the Class. [12] The Payment Protocol gives the Claims Administrator useful guidance and protection in the due administration of the Settlement. [13] In my view, the provision requiring documentation to the Defendant and Class Counsel gives a measure of information ultimately to the Court. The documentation itself should give the Class Member sufficient information to make an informed decision to forego free legal services. Ultimately, the responsibility for that choice must rest with the Class Member/Claimant. [14] The Payment Protocol is consistent with this Court’s decision in Wenham v Canada (Attorney General), 2020 FC 590, without the complexity as “assignments” or terms of an Order in Council. [15] In the final analysis, the ultimate protection to Class Members is that Individual Counsel must have the fees and

disbursements approved by the Court before those funds may be released from trust. [16] The Court recognizes that this Payment Protocol may be used by others in similar situations. With the requirement that the Claims Administrator and Class Counsel receive the stipulated documents, issues arising in any specific situation can and should be brought to the Court’s attention. [17] The motion is granted without costs in the form issued. "Michael L. Phelan" Judge Ottawa, Ontario June 17, 2020

FEDERAL COURT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: T-2169-16 STYLE OF CAUSE: GARRY LESLIE MCLEAN, ROGER AUGUSTINE, CLAUDETTE COMMANDA, ANGELA ELIZABETH SIMONE SAMPSON, MARGARET ANNE SWAN AND MARIETTE LUCILLE BUCKSHOT v HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF CANADA as represented by THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA AND MARY ROSE NAYTOWHOW MOTION IN WRITING CONSIDERED AT OTTAWA, ONTARIO, PURSUANT TO RULE 369 OF THE FEDERAL COURTS RULES REASONS FOR ORDER: PHELAN J. DATED: june 17, 2020 WRITTEN REPRESENTATIONS BY: Catharine Moore Travis Henderson Sarah-Dawn Norris Sarah Jane Howard For The Defendant Nicholas W.K. Racine

FOR THE MOVING PARTY SOLICITORS OF RECORD: Gowling WLG (Canada) LLP Barristers and Solicitors Ottawa, Ontario For The Plaintiffs Attorney General of Canada Ottawa, Ontario For The Defendant

Source wording is retained. Consult the source document for its original formatting and pagination.

Authorities

Authorities used by the court

Cases, legislation, regulations, and constitutional provisions identified in the available record.

McLean v Canada (Attorney General), 2019 FC 1525

Case cited

Wenham v Canada (Attorney General), 2020 FC 590

Case cited

Case-aware research

Ask AI about this case

The judgment and available research above are public. New questions open in a separate private conversation grounded in this case.

About this LexChat collection

This page organizes the available case record for research. Verify quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the source document. Corrections can be reported to hello@esheria.ai.

Legal information, not legal advice. Research summaries do not replace the judgment.