VB8-06039

RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : VB8-06039 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person who is the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, ON Appel instruit / entendu à Date of decision March 9, 2020 Date de la décision Panel M. Oh Tribunal Counsel for the person who is the subject of the appeal Robin David Bajer Conseil de la personne en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister Kamal Gill Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION OVERVIEW [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX ("the Respondent") is a citizen of Libya, who claims to face a risk to his life in Libya from militias, who have threatened to kidnap him. The Refugee Protection Division ("RPD") accepted his claim and determined that he is a person in need of protection. The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and the Minister of Public Safety ("the Minister") appeal the RPD's decision. The Minister argues that the RPD erred in finding that the Respondent faces a personalized risk in Libya, and by failing to consider whether the risk he faces is one that would be faced generally by other individuals in Libya. The Minister also states that the RPD wrongly determined that the Respondent has no viable internal flight alternative ("IFA") in Libya. DETERMINATION [2] Pursuant to paragraph 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act ("IRPA"), the appeal is dismissed. I agree with the Respondent and find no error in the RPD's reasons. The Respondent is being personally targeted in Libya, as he and his siblings are the direct subjects of the kidnapping threats, which are life-threatening in nature. While these types of incidents are not uncommon in Libya, I agree with the Respondent that this does not mean that he merely faces a generalized risk. In addition, I find that the RPD's conclusions on the potential IFA are well-supported and that there is no error in the RPD's application of the two-prong IFA test. The Refugee Appeal Division ("RAD") therefore confirms the RPD's positive determination, finding that the Respondent is a person in need of protection. BACKGROUND [3] The Respondent first came to Canada in XXXX 2012, seeking to study abroad due to the unstable situation in Libya following the fall of the government of Muammar Gaddafi. He arrived on a study permit and studied English, later attending the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX for XXXX XXXX. [4] During the Respondent's time in Canada, the situation in Libya continued to deteriorate. In 2016, the Respondent's brother was kidnapped in Tripoli by the Misrata Brigade militia. He was beaten while in captivity and eventually released two weeks later upon payment of a ransom by the Respondent's father, amounting to 100,000 Libyan dinars (the current equivalent of approximately CAD 95,000). Most of the Respondent's siblings have fled from Libya as a result of this situation. [5] Some time in 2016, the Respondent's father informed him that he had received phone calls from unknown callers, demanding money, and threatening to kidnap the Respondent and his brothers if he did not pay. The Respondent's family was perceived as being wealthy. The Respondent's grandfather and father were successful businesspeople. The Respondent's father traded houseware supplies, and their family name had come to be associated with relative wealth. However, due to the security situation, his father was forced to close his shop and run a much smaller business. He could no longer afford to support the Respondent's studies in addition to having other sons living abroad. Eventually, the Respondent's study permits expired. Without options to remain in Canada, and fearing the risks in Libya, the Respondent decided to make a refugee claim in 2017. The RPD's decision [6] The RPD heard the Respondent's claim on July 4, 2018 and issued a written decision on September 18, 2018, granting the Respondent's claim as a person in need of protection. The RPD found that the Respondent's allegations were credible. However, it found that he was not a Convention refugee, given that there was no nexus between the Respondent's fear of persecution and a Convention ground. [7] The RPD proceeded to consider whether the Respondent is a person in need of protection due to the life-threatening conditions resulting from the risk of kidnappings in Libya. The Minister had intervened in writing, arguing that the generalized risk exception applied in this case, and that in any event there was a viable IFA in the city of Tobruk. The RPD, however, did not agree with the Minister's submissions on these issues. The RPD concluded that the risk to the Respondent was personalized, and though similar risks may be faced by many individuals in the country, the risk was sufficiently individualized in this case so as not be one that is faced generally by other individuals in Libya. In assessing the viability of the IFA, the RPD preferred the evidence relied upon by the Respondent. Citing documents on internally displaced persons ("IDP") in Libya and the risk from armed groups, the RPD found that conditions were such that it would be unreasonable for the Respondent to seek refuge in Tobruk. Role of the Refugee Appeal Division [8] The jurisprudence establishes that the RAD is required to undertake an independent assessment of the evidence and reach its own determination. Deference is owed to the RPD only where the RPD held a meaningful advantage in assessing evidence.1 [9] In the present case, I see no reason to show deference to any of the RPD's findings. I have applied a correctness standard and arrived at independent findings based on the evidence before me. Admissibility of New Evidence [10] The Respondent has provided a number of pieces of new evidence on appeal, all of which relate to the death of his brother. The Respondent describes that on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2018, his brother was killed during a visit to Libya. This was the same brother who had been abducted previously. While sitting outside a café, unknown individuals approached, asking for him. They fired shots, and according to the Respondent, the bullets ricocheted off a wall and killed him. [11] The new evidence includes: i. An affidavit from the Respondent, describing that his brother has since been killed in Libya2; ii. A forensic report about the brother's death3; and iii. A letter from the Respondent's father, speaking to the circumstances around the death of the Respondent's brother4. [12] All of the new evidence will be admitted. [13] As the subject of the appeal, the IRPA limits the Respondent's ability to present new evidence to the RAD. Subsection 110(4) of the IRPA states that, on appeal, the person who is the subject of the appeal may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim or that was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the claim's rejection. If the new evidence meets the requirements of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA, the RAD must then consider factors around the credibility, relevance, and newness of the evidence.5 [14] Items (ii) and (iii) are also subject to Rule 29 of the Refugee Appeal Division Rules, as those documents were provided later along with translations, after the Respondent's Record had already been filed. The RAD received the Rule 29 application on March 6, 2019. I am satisfied that the forensic report and father's letter have relevance and probative value, in terms of their ability to establish that the Respondent's family continues to be targeted in Libya. The information about the brother's death was not known before. While the Rule 29 application was received nearly four months after the Respondent's Record was filed and might have been provided earlier with reasonable effort, on weighing the relevant factors, the value of the evidence outweighs the lateness of the filing of the evidence. I therefore allow the Rule 29 application. [15] As to whether the new evidence meets the admissibility provisions under subsection 110(4) of the IRPA, I am satisfied that the evidence arose after the RPD had already rejected the claim. The new evidence could not have been provided earlier for the RPD to consider. For admissibility purposes, I find that the new evidence is sufficiently credible, brings information that was not previously known, and is relevant to the matters on appeal. The documents are therefore admitted. [16] The Minister has not disputed the admissibility of the new evidence, but challenges the amount of weight that should be placed on it. The Minister points out that no police report has been provided, and that there appears to be no reasonable explanation for its absence. The Minister also disputes the probative value of the new evidence in terms of its capacity to establish the motivations of the shooters. I would not describe this as a "random shooting" as the Minister does, given that the father's letter describes that the shooters asked for the Respondent's brother by name. However, I agree with the Minister that the evidence is incapable of establishing why the brother was specifically targeted. The identity of the shooters is unknown. The identity of those who made threatening calls to the Respondent's father is also unknown. It is unclear whether the two incidents are truly connected. I share the Minister's view that the intentions of the shooters are difficult to ascertain from the evidence. [17] Neither party has requested an oral hearing, and given that the new evidence does not raise serious credibility issues that would be central and dispositive of the claim, an oral hearing will not be held. ANALYSIS [18] The appeal raises two issues: a) Whether the RPD erred in determining that the risk faced by the Respondent is not one that is faced generally by other individuals in Libya; and b) Whether the RPD erred in finding that there was no viable internal flight alternative in Tobruk. [19] For the reasons provided below, I find no error in the RPD's reasons. a) Whether the RPD erred in determining that the risk faced by the Respondent is not one that is faced generally by other individuals in Libya [20] The Minister argues that the RPD erred in finding that the Respondent is a person in need of protection, as the risk to the Respondent is not personalized, and is one that is faced generally by others in Libya. I agree, however, with the RPD's analysis. The RPD's reasons [21] The RPD cited evidence from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR") about the security situation in Libya. There was ongoing fighting between rival armed groups in many parts of the country. Daily assassinations, bombings, and kidnappings were taking place. Thousands of people had died since May 2014 and hundreds of thousands had been displaced. The RPD considered that kidnappings by militia groups were endemic. The Misrata militias in particular were noted as one of the largest military forces in the country, comprising of over 200 militias and 40,000 fighters. Clearly, the risk of kidnapping from this, or other groups, is one that is faced generally by many in Libya. [22] However, the RPD went on to consider the Respondent's individual circumstances. The RPD considered that the Respondent and his father had testified credibly about how threats have continued even after the Respondent's brother had been returned to the family. Though the callers were unidentified, the threats were made specifically towards the Respondent and his siblings. Therefore, although the general security situation posed a risk for much of the Libyan population, the risk to life for the Respondent was personalized. The Minister's arguments [23] According to the Minister, the RPD based its analysis on the Respondent's profile, as the son of a wealthy businessman and as a returnee from abroad. The Minister argues that the RPD erred by failing to personalize the risk to the Respondent and by failing to assess whether the risk faced by him is prevalent and widespread in Libya, faced by a significant subset of the population. [24] Citing jurisprudence, the Minister emphasizes that the question of whether the risk is personalized is an essential element to consider. In the present case, however, there was no evidence that the Respondent had ever personally been targeted while living in Libya or while he was in Canada. Since the Respondent had never been targeted himself, it is argued that the risk is not personalized. [25] The Minister stresses that the RPD itself pointed out that kidnapping by militia groups was endemic in Libya. It was evident that abductions were widespread or prevalent in Libya. In other words, the risk faced by the Respondent is one faced generally by a large group of individuals in Libya. The Minister relies on the Federal Court's decision in Paz Guiffaro6, where the Court stated that claims based on past and likely future targeting would not succeed under paragraph 97(1)(b)(ii) of the IRPA where: (i) such targeting occurred or is likely to occur because of the claimant's membership in a subgroup of persons returning from abroad or perceived to have wealth or other reasons; and (ii) that sub-group is sufficiently large that the risk can reasonably be characterized as being widespread or prevalent in that country.7 The Minister says that the mere possibility that the Respondent may be identified personally as a target does not remove him from the generalized risk exception, since he faces the very same risk that is faced by many Libyans. The Respondent's arguments [26] The Respondent disputes the Minister's characterization of the threat to him in Libya. The Respondent stresses that his father has received and continues to receive threats to abduct him and his brothers. This, contrary to the Minister's argument, amounts to personal targeting. [27] The Respondent cites jurisprudence about how personal targeting distinguishes an individualized risk from a generalized risk. The Respondent relies on several Federal Court cases that have emerged, rejecting the notion of personal targeting as "merely an extension of", "implicit in" or "consequential harm resulting from" a generalized risk.8 Some of the cases find it untenable for personal targeting to occur, resulting in a risk to life, and yet for this to be insufficient because it is a generalized risk faced by a large subset of the population. The concern highlighted by these cases is that paragraph 97(1)(b)(ii) should not be interpreted so narrowly as to strip it of any content or meaning. In assessing whether the risk falls under the generalized risk exception, the jurisprudence relied upon by the Respondent suggests that the approach should be to compare the nature and degree of risk faced by the claimant to that faced by all or a significant part of the population to determine if they are the same. The inquiry is not as concerned with the cause of the risk as it is with the likelihood of what will happen to the claimant in the future as compared to many others in the population.9 [28] The Respondent argues that the RPD's approach was consistent with what the jurisprudence demands. The RPD conducted an individualized inquiry. It assessed the particular nature of the risk as well as the Respondent's own situation. It considered that the risk was sufficiently personalized for it to conclude that the Respondent faced a risk to life as a person in need of protection. According to the Respondent, the fact that abductions are widespread in Libya underscores the heightened risk, but did not mean that the Respondent's risk is a generalized one. The RAD's independent assessment [29] I agree with the Respondent's arguments as well as his interpretation of the jurisprudence on this issue. [30] Paragraph 97(1)(b)(ii) of the IRPA contemplates two conjunctive elements: 1) The claimant must establish that there is a personal risk; and 2) The claimant must establish that the risk faced by them is not one faced generally by others in or from their country. According to the cases relied upon by the Minister, satisfying the first element does not automatically lead to satisfying the second.10 For instance, in Innocent11, Justice Mainville stated that a separate analysis is required to assess whether the risk is faced by other individuals from the country in question.12 Similarly, in Prophete13, Justice Tremblay-Lamer considered that there would be situations where a claimant had been targeted in the past and might be targeted in the future, but whose risk situation is similar to a segment of the larger population. In that case, the Court considered that an individual may have a personalized risk, but one that is shared by many other individuals.14 [31] I am persuaded, however, by the Respondent's arguments about the applicable line of jurisprudence. This includes the cases relied upon by the Respondent, as well as the Federal Court's decisions in Portillo15 and Correa16, among others. A clear line of authorities has emerged from the Federal Court, which expressly rejects the approach that the Minister argues should be followed in the present case. In Herrera Chincilla17, for instance, Justice de Montigny acknowledged that a consensus had emerged as to the proper approach to be followed, endorsing Justice Gleason's decision in Portillo, supra. In Portillo, Justice Gleason stated the following: [40] In my view, the essential starting point for the required analysis under section 97 of IRPA is to first appropriately determine the nature of the risk faced by the claimant. This requires an assessment of whether the claimant faces an ongoing or future risk (i.e. whether he or she continues to face a "personalized risk"), what the risk is, whether such risk is one of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment and the basis for the risk. [...] [41] The next required step in the analysis under section 97 of IRPA, after the risk has been appropriately characterized, is the comparison of the correctly-described risk faced by the claimant to that faced by a significant group in the country to determine whether the risks are of the same nature and degree. If the risk is not the same, then the claimant will be entitled to protection under section 97 of IRPA. Several of the recent decisions of this Court (in the first of the above-described line of cases) adopt this approach.18 [32] I agree with the Respondent that the RPD correctly applied the above approach. As mentioned in Portillo, the first step is to determine the nature of the risk. In assessing claims of risks to life under paragraph 97(1)(b) of the IRPA, the characterization of the risk is crucial. In my view, the Minister's submissions mischaracterize the risk that was asserted by the Respondent, and which was considered by the RPD. The RPD did not base its assessment merely on the Respondent's profile as the son of a wealthy businessman who would be returning from Canada. The question of whether life-threatening kidnapping would occur was not a purely hypothetical one that was based on the Respondent's profile. It had already occurred to the Respondent's brother. The Respondent's father continued to receive threats that his children - the Respondent included - would be kidnapped. This constituted an ongoing, personal risk. [33] As to whether the risk faced by the Respondent is of the same nature and degree as that faced by a significant subset of the Libyan population, I agree with the Respondent that this is one of those cases where the fact of personal targeting is sufficient to remove the case from the category of generalized risk. It cannot be said that the Respondent faced the same risks as those experienced generally by others in Libya. The fact that the Respondent himself was among the siblings contemplated for kidnapping in the phone calls to his father heightens his risk beyond the more abstract risk of widespread kidnapping in Libya. As the jurisprudence indicates, it is not sufficient to conclude that the risk of criminal activity encountered by the Respondent is generalized because a significant portion of the population is subject to that same criminal activity.19 Subsection 97(1)(b) should not be read in a manner that strips it of its content and meaning. In this case, if life-threatening kidnapping is a risk that is faced by many, if not most, Libyans, and this were to act as a bar to protection, the requirements of paragraph 97(1)(b) could hardly ever be met. [34] For these reasons, I see no error in the RPD's findings on this issue. I reach the same determination in my assessment. b) Whether the RPD erred in finding that there was no viable internal flight alternative in Tobruk [35] I also agree with the Respondent that there is no error in the RPD's analysis of the IFA issue. The RPD's findings [36] The RPD determined that although the Minister had proposed the city of Tobruk as a potential IFA, the second prong of the IFA test could not be met. The RPD found that conditions in that part of the country were such that it would be unreasonable, in all the circumstances, for the Respondent to travel and seek refuge there. [37] The RPD considered the Minister's evidence about Tobruk, which focused on the overall levels of violence there and the numbers of reported violent incidents in the area. There was one document, item 1.7 of the National Documentation Package ("NDP") for Libya, which was cited frequently by the Minister in submissions, but the information quoted from it could not be located. The RPD therefore gave no weight to those statements. [38] The RPD gave more weight to the documents relied upon by the Respondent, regarding the internal displacement of Libyans and the treatment of returnees. The evidence indicated that IDP's faced vulnerability and risk of abuse at the hands of armed groups. Though the RPD considered the Minister's evidence about the levels of violence in the area, it found that underreporting of incidents was likely. In the current security situation, the RPD found that without any family ties in Tobruk and without having lived independently in Libya, there was little to mitigate the Respondent's vulnerability to abuse as a returnee who has relocated internally in Libya. The Minister's arguments [39] The Minister submits that the RPD failed to provide an adequate analysis of the IFA issue and that it did not apply the relevant jurisprudence. [40] With respect to the RPD's treatment of the Minister's evidence, the Minister clarifies that its written submissions relied on a United Kingdom Upper Tribunal decision that was hyperlinked at section 2.4.3 of item 1.7 in the Libya NDP. The Minister faults the RPD for failing to follow-up with the Minister to clarify the references contained in submissions. [41] The Minister also says that the second prong of the IFA test was indeed met, emphasizing the Respondent's profile as a young, independent man who managed to study in Canada without any support network. The Respondent's English skills, level of education, and employment as a clerk at his father's company are highlighted. The Minister says it would not be unreasonable in all the circumstances for the Respondent to relocate to Tobruk. According to the Minister, the Respondent's lack of family ties and his having never lived independently in Libya are insufficient to render the IFA unreasonable. The Respondent's arguments [42] The Respondent insists that the RPD made no errors in its IFA analysis. The RPD set out the correct IFA test and simply preferred the evidence that the Respondent relied upon, since those pertained to individuals bearing the Respondent's profile. The documents relied upon by the Minister focused merely on the overall levels of violence that had been reported. [43] The Respondent reiterates the same factors outlined in his submissions to the RPD about the reports of targeted killings, assaults, and kidnappings in Tobruk. The Respondent emphasizes that the reports were likely to be underreported due to fear of reprisal and the lack of official statistics. The Respondent also highlights how the evidence on the conditions in Libya was not specific to any one region, but indicated that the problems, including kidnapping by militia, was endemic throughout the country. The documentary evidence indicated that IDP's faced risks of abuse by armed groups. The UNHCR had called for the suspension of all returns to Libya until the security and human rights situation improved considerably. [44] With respect to the RPD's treatment of the Minister's submissions, the Respondent argues that the RPD cannot be faulted for being unable to locate the source of the Minister's quotes, which were not properly cited, and which came from a tribunal decision that was not even contained within the NDP item itself, but could only be accessed through a hyperlink leading to another webpage. The Respondent argues, moreover, that the cited tribunal decision is now outdated. The RAD's independent assessment [45] I am unable to agree with the Minister's arguments. [46] Though the Minister's submissions referred to it as "expert evidence"20, the United Kingdom Upper Tribunal decision is not a source of evidence. Like the present decision, it simply interprets evidence contained in the record before the decision-maker. The RPD had no obligation to accept the UK tribunal's findings. Its persuasive value is questionable, since the evidence relied upon in the UK tribunal decision did not form part of the RPD's own evidentiary record. Without having the same evidence before it, the RPD could not be in a position to agree or disagree with the UK tribunal's conclusions. Regardless of whether the RPD ought to have sought clarification on the citations in the Minister's submissions, I am not satisfied that the RPD erred in giving no weight to the cited information, which did not even form part of the RPD's evidentiary record. I also agree with the Respondent that the tribunal decision, concerning a matter that was heard in November 2013, is too dated for its conclusions to be reliable. Much of the evidence cited in the decision dates back to 2010 and 2011. [47] The Minister highlights the RPD's mention of the Respondent's lack of family ties and his never having lived independently in Libya, but it seems that the Minister fails to appreciate why these factors were mentioned in the RPD's reasons. The core concern for the RPD was that IDP's and returnees faced serious risks from armed groups. The findings on this issue were well-supported by evidence. [48] According to the UNHCR, the overall security situation in Libya remained highly volatile and unpredictable. There was ongoing fighting between rival armed groups, daily assassinations, bombings, and kidnappings. Communities hosting IDP's were under growing strain from the influx of people. A number of problems affecting IDP's had been reported, including food security, health resources, shelter, and sanitation.21 Other evidence indicated that IDP's were vulnerable to abuses, and that many IDP's were subjected to threats, intimidation, and targeted attacks.22 [49] With respect to the situation specifically in Tobruk, there was mixed evidence. There may be a perception that the city is relatively safer, as it currently hosts the Libyan House of Representatives, which fled from Tripoli in 2014 while a rival government was based in Tripoli. Item 13.8 of the Libya NDP discusses the possibility of relocation to Tobruk. In January 2016, the city hosted about 6.4% of IDP's (or 17,205 individuals) who were being tracked by the International Organization for Migration. That number had decreased to about 11,530 a few months later. According to one source cited in item 13.8, Tobruk was considered a peaceful city with no ongoing military clashes. It was, generally-speaking, easier for someone with family or tribal ties to relocate there. These tended to be individuals originally from Eastern Libya with ties to a dominant tribe there.23 However, other sources cited in item 13.8, such as Human Rights Watch, warned that the lack of access to information in Libya prevented a meaningful individualized risk assessment, and that anyone forcibly returned to any part of Libya would be exposed to a real risk of serious harm.24 The UNHCR took a similar position, urging the suspension of forcible returns to Libya until the security and human rights situation had improved considerably. The UNHCR considered that under the current circumstances, the relevance and reasonableness criteria for an internal flight alternative were unlikely to be met.25 [50] I agree with the Respondent that Tobruk is not necessarily immune to the problem of kidnappings and violence. I agree as well that reports of killings and kidnappings are likely to be underreported, and that the lack of official statistics in the context of the current security situation make it difficult to reliably report statistics. Even considering this context, there were reports of kidnapping and several targeted killings in the Tobruk, some of which are recorded in the Minister's own evidence.26,27,28 [51] I agree with the RPD that the volatile security situation, which is said to affect the entire country according to human rights organizations, and documented issues with IDP's in Libya, render the proposed IFA unreasonable. In the context discussed, where item 13.8 specifically speaks to the relevance of family and tribal ties, the Respondent's access to social, economic, and family support networks in the proposed IFA was a relevant factor to consider. It was not the mere absence of family and the Respondent's inexperience living independently that was determinative. Rather, the RPD was correctly considering that the absence of supports meant that there was nothing to mitigate the risk to the Respondent in the potential IFA. I see no error in the RPD's reasons. I reach the same conclusion in my assessment of the evidence. CONCLUSION [52] For the above reasons, I agree with the RPD that the Respondent personally faces a risk to his life in Libya, and that the same risk is not faced generally by others in Libya. I also find that no viable IFA exists for the Respondent. I therefore confirm the RPD's positive determination. The Respondent is a person in need of protection. [53] The appeal is dismissed, pursuant to paragraph 111(1)(a) of the IRPA. (signed) "M. Oh" M. Oh March 9, 2020 Date 1 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93 (CanLII), [2016] 4 FCR 157; see also Rozas Del Solar, Paola v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1145. 2 Exhibit P-1, Respondent's Record, at pp. 19-20. 3 Exhibit P-2, Rule 29 Application, at pp. 1-2. 4 Ibid., at pp. 4-6. 5 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh, 2016 FCA 96 (CanLII). 6 Paz Guiffaro v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 182 (CanLII). 7 Ibid., at para. 33. 8 Correa v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 252 (CanLII) at para. 46. 9 Ortega Arenas v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 344 (CanLII) at para. 14. 10 Innocent v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 1019 (CanLII) at para. 18; see also Paz Guiffaro v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 182 (CanLII) at para. 32. 11 Innocent v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 1019 (CanLII). 12 Ibid., at para. 39. 13 Prophete v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 331 (CanLII). 14 Ibid., at para. 18. 15 Portillo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 678 (CanLII). 16 Correa v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 252 (CanLII). 17 Herrera Chinchilla v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 546 (CanLII). 18 Portillo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 678 (CanLII) at paras. 40-41. 19 Herrera Chinchilla v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 546 (CanLII) at para. 28. 20 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 7, at p. 334, para. 7. 21 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 3, National Documentation Package ("NDP") for Libya (April 30, 2018), item 1.10. 22 Ibid., at items 1.5, 2.1. 23 Ibid., at item 13.8, Responses to Information Request (RIR), LBY105631.EF. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 4, at pp. 133-134, 153. 27 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 5, at pp. 309, 311, 313, 315, 317, 319, 326. 28 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 3, NDP for Libya (April 30, 2018), item 1.11, at section 2.35. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : VB8-06039 RAD.25.02 (January, 2020) Disponible en français 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (January, 2020) Disponible en français