MA8-11870

Immigration and Refugee Board Refugee Protection Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié Section de la protection des réfugiés RPD File No. / No de dossier de la SPR : MA8-11870 Private Proceeding Huis clos Claimant(s) Demandeur(e)s d'asile XXXX XXXXXXXX Date(s) of Hearing Date(s) de l'audience June 18, 2010 November 8, 2010 Place of Hearing Lieu de l'audience Montréal, Quebec Date of Decision Date de la decision November 26, 2010 Panel Tribunal Me Michelle Langelier Claimant's Counsel Conseil du demandeur d'asile Me Michael Dorey Tribunal Officer Agent du tribunal Annie Lemaine Designated Representative Représentant désigné N/A Minister's Counsel Conseil du minister Claude Beaupré [1] XXXX XXXXXXXX (the claimant), a citizen of Burundi, is claiming refugee protection under section 96 and paragraphs 97(1)(a) and (b) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). The Minister of Public Safety (the Minister) is intervening in this claim and is requesting the claimant's exclusion from the protection provided under sections 96 and 97, pursuant to section 98 of the IRPA, under articles 1F(A) and (C)1 of the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (the Convention). SUMMARY OF ALLEGED FACTS [2] Because he became President Nkurunziza's XXXX in XXXX 2005, the claimant received death threats beginning in XXXX 2007 from militia and other rebel elements who were jealous that he, a Tutsi, had gained access to a position so close to those in power. He entered Canada on XXXX, 2007, and claimed refugee protection that day. ANALYSIS [3] The claimant's identity was established to the panel's satisfaction by means of the identity documents submitted on the record.2 [4] The Minister is requesting the claimant's exclusion because he is of the opinion that there are serious reasons for considering that the claimant committed or was complicit in crimes against peace, war crimes or crimes against humanity or that he is guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. According to section 98 of the IRPA, a person referred to in Article 1F of the Convention is not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. [5] Section 98 of the IRPA states that a person referred to in Article 1F(a) or (c) of the Convention is not a refugee; that is, any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that: (a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes; (b) ... (c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. is not a refugee. The burden of proof imposed in such a case rests on the Minister and, according to the case law, is lower than a balance of probabilities.3 That being said, given the serious consequences of exclusion on a person's claim for protection, the exclusion clauses must be interpreted in a restrictive sense. [6] First, I must determine whether the Burundian army, during the period when the claimant was a member, committed acts mentioned in Article 1F. I will now refer to some non-exhaustive excerpts from the evidence submitted by the Minister and the tribunal officer. Documentary evidence [7] The Minister's representative produced some brief evidence, made up of three documents. According to one document, in 2007, the Burundian government decided, after years of fratricidal war, to pursue the reconstruction of the country;4 it indicates that the claimant prepared to do community work. This document dates from 2007 and, as a result, does not concern the years the claimant, a career soldier, was a member of the army involved in the war in Burundi. [8] The other two documents filed by the Minister are much more powerful and are more relevant to the analysis of the acts committed by the Burundian army during the years when the claimant was an active member, that is from 19XX to 20XX (he joined the army in 19XX, but went to school from 19XX to 19XX). The documents are two Amnesty International reports dating from 19XX and 20XX. [9] I also considered the documentation submitted by the tribunal officer, specifically, the Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in Burundi.5 I consider these to be reliable sources. [10] What is reported in this documentary evidence about the acts committed by the Burundian army between 19XX and 20XX is overwhelming. First, the extent of the violence committed by the government armed forces and by the Tutsi and Hutu armed forces sometimes makes it difficult to identify those guilty of the massacres; however, it is established that soldiers and members of the Burundian security forces participated in the serious human rights violations committed by the armed groups between 1993 and 1996.6 [11] The evidence also indicates that the armed forces were responsible for massacres even in areas where the armed groups were not active. For example, in November 1995, the government armed forces killed more than 500 unarmed civilians in a rural part of Bujumbura. What is shocking is that the government troops used bayonets rather than guns to kill their victims, including children; according to the report: The killers must therefore have been able to identify their victims and to know that many of them posed no threat to the security forces.7 [12] The evidence reports on serious human rights abuses against people who were displaced during the conflict since 1993. It indicates that more than 450,000 people were forced to flee their homes because of the armed conflict. It reports on one incident in which civilians sought shelter in a church; as they were leaving to return home on the approval of local and government authorities, they were prevented from doing so by soldiers who fired on them.8 The evidence also indicates that: The humanitarian consequences of mass and prolonged population displacement are worsened by the systematic looting of crops and destruction of property, which is carried out by armed political groups and government forces.9 [13] As is unfortunately the case in all armed conflicts, Burundian women were subjected to sexual violence by armed forces members during the civil war: Since the start of the conflict, scores if not hundreds of women and young girls have been raped or coerced into sex by members of the armed forces and opposition combatants.10 [14] However, one of the worst human rights violations committed during this civil war in Burundi was the treatment of children. The evidence submitted by the Minister is clear, and the following excerpts are telling: Tens of thousands of unarmed civilians have been extrajudicially executed by members of the armed forces in Burundi since 1993. Amnesty International has gathered information on hundreds of cases where children, and even babies, have been shot, bayoneted or beaten to death by members of the armed forces with virtual total impunity. ... At least 20 people, including several children, who had fled from Maramyva, Mutimbuzi commune, Bubanza on 31 July during a military operation in the Mpanda area.11 [15] Most of the people in the camps for displaced persons were children-more than 200,000, according to the documentary evidence.12 The evidence also indicates that in some areas, particularly in southern Burundi, the Burundian army prevented civilians from leaving the camps. [16] Finally, I must mention the use of child soldiers by the Burundian army during the civil war years, a practice that, in my opinion, is a disgrace to humanity. Once again, I cite the evidence, which states that the Burundian government even acknowledged this practice: The Transitional Government is further violating children's rights by failing to take adequate measures to end the use of child soldiers. Thousands of child soldiers have been recruited by all parties to the conflict. Some children act as fully fledged soldiers, others are used as lookouts and informants, or for menial duties. In a report, Enfant soldat : Un défi à lever pour le Burundi, Child soldiers: A challenge for Burundi, produced by the Burundian human rights ministry in September 2001, the government acknowledged that some children were used to collect information and to perform domestic services for the security forces.13 [17] One might think that all of these violations and scandalous abuses ended with the September 2006 Ceasefire Agreement, but the documentary evidence indicates that this was not the case. According to a United Nations report from November 2007: The number of cases of sexual violence has significantly increased, committed both by security and National Defence Forces personnel. A significant increase in rape and grave sexual violence, abductions and illegal detention of children and child recruitment has been observed.14 ... Particularly alarming is the fact that the perpetrators of most of the reported abuses were affiliated with the national security forces....15 [18] In light of this evidence, I am of the opinion that the Burundian army was responsible for serious and systemic human rights abuses during the entire time the claimant was an active member, that is, from 19XX to 20XX. Acts committed [19] In Hajialikhani, the Honourable Justice Reed stated the following about the concept of crimes against humanity: The definition of "crimes against humanity" set out in the London Agreement reads: Article 6 ... Crimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds ....16 [20] A similar definition is adopted in other cases. Sivakumar adds an important dimension: Crimes against humanity must generally be committed in a wide-spread, systematic fashion;17 [21] Finally, Mugesera18 clearly states the conditions under which a criminal act may be considered a crime against humanity: As we shall see, based on the provisions of the Criminal Code and the principles of international law, a criminal act rises to the level of a crime against humanity when four elements are made out: An enumerated proscribed act was committed (this involves showing that the accused committed the criminal act and had the requisite guilty state of mind for the underlying act). The act was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack. The attack was directed against any civilian population or any identifiable group of persons; and The person committing the proscribed act knew of the attack and knew or took the risk that his or her act comprised a part of that attack. [22] The evidence cited and mentioned above clearly demonstrates that the Burundian army, throughout the period the claimant was an active member, systematically committed a large number of barbaric and inhumane acts and serious acts of persecution and that this persecution was widespread and systematic and directed against the civilian population and the targeted groups. [23] I conclude that the Burundian army committed crimes against humanity during the above-mentioned period. In light of this conclusion, I do not need to visit the other notions set out in Article 1F of the Convention. [24] I will now analyze whether, in that context, there are serious reasons for considering that the claimant is guilty of crimes against humanity, either as an actor or as an accomplice. Claimant's complicity [25] Although the documentary evidence indicates that members of the Burundian army committed human rights violations during and after the armed conflict, I have no concrete evidence that the claimant himself participated in such violations. The claimant's lawyer argued that the claimant's name does not appear anywhere in the hundreds and hundreds of pages submitted by the Minister. He further argued that the Minister's request is XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. [26] I reject those arguments. First, the right to claim refugee protection claim in Canada is recognized in our laws, just as is the Minister's right to intervene to oppose a claim. In addition, I am of the opinion that, considering section 98 of the IRPA, the Minister's request must be analyzed seriously. [27] As for Mr. Doray's argument that the Minister inundated the panel with non-relevant documentation, my answer is that, first, the Minister did not submit hundreds and hundreds of pages of evidence, but rather only 60 pages, including the cover letter, the notice of intervention itself, the list of exhibits and the relevant tabs. [28] In addition, while it is correct that the claimant is not linked to specific crimes in any of these documents, he could have been complicit in acts committed by other members of the army. [29] The consistent case law on this matter indicates that complicity in crimes against humanity implies a shared common purpose and personal and knowing participation in the acts of which the organization is guilty. More specifically, an individual who is part of such an organization, who does not take measures to prevent the acts committed by the organization if it is possible to do so, and who does not dissociate himself or herself from the organization at the first possible opportunity, but who on the contrary actively supports the organization, demonstrates a shared common purpose. Mens rea is therefore a critical element when assessing complicity. [30] I cannot express myself better than the Honourable Justice Mosley, when he addressed complicity in the context of exclusion: [22] The law makes it clear that in order to be complicit in the commission of an international offence an individual's participation must be personal and knowing. Complicity in such an offence rests on a shared common purpose: Gutierrez, above at para. 22, citing Penate, above at para. 4 This has been described as the mens rea requirement of the exclusion clause: Cardenas v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] F.C.J. No. 139 at para. 12 (T.D.) (QL) [Cardenas]. [23] In the context of assessing complicity by way of involvement with an organization, the first step is to look at the purpose of the organization in question. Where the "main objective of the organization is achieved by crimes against humanity or is directed towards a limited and brutal purpose, membership is generally sufficient to establish complicity": Pushpanathan v. Canada at para. 41. Unless the organization at issue is found to have a limited, brutal purpose however, mere membership in a group responsible for international crimes is not enough: Sivakumar, above at para. 13.19 [31] Therefore, I must determine whether the Burundian army, at the time the claimant was an active member, that is, from 19XX to 20XX, can be described as an organization directed toward a limited and brutal purpose. The case law indicates that an organization whose very existence "is premised on achieving political or social ends by any means deemed necessary"20 is open to a presumption that mere membership in that organization implies complicity, without necessarily linking the claimant's complicity to a particular crime committed by the organization. The Federal Court in Ramirez,21 a key case in this matter, states as follows: It seems apparent, however, that where an organization is principally directed to a limited, brutal purpose, such as a secret police activity, mere membership may by necessity involve personal and knowing participation in persecutorial acts. [32] The Federal Court was also called upon in Pushpanathan22 to rule on what determines that an organization that otherwise pursues political objectives is directed toward limited and brutal purposes. The Honourable Justice Blais stated as follows: ... where there is no evidence that political objectives can be separated from militaristic activities, an organization could still be found to have a limited, brutal purpose. ... If the main objective of the organization is achieved by crimes against humanity or is directed towards a limited and brutal purpose, membership is generally sufficient to establish complicity. [33] I am of the opinion that the evidence establishes that the Burundian army used all means deemed necessary to achieve its objectives, means that I mentioned earlier: massacres; murder; rape and sexual violence against women, girls and even young girls; summary executions; systematic torture; pillaging; forced displacement of populations; and the use of child soldiers. [34] The evidence clearly shows that the Burundian army, in the years the claimant was a member, was an organization directed to a limited and brutal purpose. In this case, it is presumed that the claimant has the mental capacity required, the mens rea necessary for a conclusion of complicity.23 The claimant is therefore presumed to be complicit in crimes against humanity committed by the Burundian army from 19XX to 20XX. [35] This presumption is rebuttable.24 To determine whether the claimant could reverse it, I considered the criteria set out in Ryivuze25 to determine complicity: Determining whether or not Mr. Ryivuze was complicit in the crimes committed by the government of Burundi is essentially a question of fact which requires an assessment of his personal situation. (Sivakumar, supra, at paragraph 2) On this point, the Federal Court has listed six factors which must be considered to determine whether or not an individual is complicit in crimes against humanity: (1) the nature of the organization; (2) the method of recruitment; (3) position/rank in the organization; (4) knowledge of the organization's atrocities; (5) the length of time in the organization; and (6) the opportunity to leave the organization. [36] I will now analyze each factor in light of the specific facts in this case. Nature of the organization [37] I have already determined that the nature of the Burundian army from 19XX to 20XX was that of an organization directed to a limited and brutal purpose. Method of recruitment [38] The claimant testified about the circumstances that led him to join the army. Like his father before him, he chose a military career. He explained that he did not have a specific plan initially, but that under the influence of President Nkurunziza himself, with whom he XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, he entered XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. He stated that his decision to study there was largely motivated by the fact that [translation] "it was an easy way to make a living" and that [translation] "I was told that I would have an easy life after studying there". [39] Therefore, the claimant joined the Burundian army of his own volition. I note that when he joined the army in 19XX, the inter-ethnic violence leading to the civil war had already begun.26 The documentary evidence shows that even before that period, Burundi had a long history of political violence:27 Before October 1993, most killings were carried out by government forces and the majority of victims were Hutu civilians. Each round of major killings, particularly in 1965, 1969, 1972, 1988 and 1991, resulted in thousands of civilian deaths. It has been estimated that at least 80,000 people were killed in 1972 alone; some estimates have suggested that several hundred thousands were killed. [40] In that context, the claimant was asked why he joined the Burundian army, which had such a long, bloody history, and was confronted in particular with the excerpt from the evidence that I just cited. He answered that he had known since his childhood that there were ethnic problems in his country and that he knew that people had died, but that he was not aware of how many and in what circumstances. He also added that he could not say that the army was responsible for these [translation] "problems" because people "accused each other" in this conflict. [41] That type of answer is representative of the claimant's testimony overall: he never directly named the serious violations committed, talking instead about [translation] "problems" and "incidents", and he alleged that he did not know any details about the human rights situation in his country, first because he was too young, and then because he was studying and far from the conflict areas. Furthermore, he avoided pointing at the army as being primarily responsible for the serious violence committed. The fact that the claimant voluntarily joined the Burundian army during the civil war, knowing the worst violations that it had already committed, is an element to which I attach a great deal of importance. Position/rank in the organization [42] As I have already determined that the Burundian army, at the time the claimant was an active member, was an organization directed to a limited and brutal purpose, it is not necessary for the claimant to have had a senior position within the organization's hierarchy for him to be considered complicit. I will nevertheless analyze the claimant's evidence about this aspect because I find that there is a lack of credibility that undermines all of his allegations. [43] The claimant testified at length about his work in the Burundian army. First, he amended his testimony as to the year he allegedly began being an active soldier, first stating that he finished his studies in 19XX and then correcting it to 19XX. Confronted with his written statements,28 in which he gave 19XX as being when he began his active service within the army, the claimant explained that he finished his courses in 19XX but that the university gave him two years to complete his dissertation. He alleged that during this writing time, he was still considered a soldier, but that he absolutely did not participate in any army activity. [44] I do not accept the claimant's explanations for this change in the date that he allegedly began his active duty as a soldier in the Burundian armed forces. He gave the date of 19XX several times, and it was not until the last possible moment during the hearing that he changed the date. I believe that the claimant was trying to minimize his participation in the Burundian army, which committed the worst atrocities. [45] As for the claimant's work in the Burundian army, he told the immigration officer when he made his initial refugee protection claim29 that from 19XX to 19XX or 19XX he was the XXXX XXXX of the XXX XXXX. He added that, in that capacity, he was responsible for XX soldiers. He gave military, civic and physical training. He stated that the training he gave lasted four months, and then his students were transferred and he received more students, and so on. [46] Confronted with this discrepancy between his previous statements and his testimony at the hearing, the claimant stated that the date of XXXX 19XX, which he indicated30 was when he began his position with XXX XXXX, is a theoretical date. I do not accept that explanation because the form asked for actual dates, not [translation] "theoretical" dates. The claimant's credibility with respect to what he really did in the Burundian army beginning in 19XX (when the civil war was at its worst) is undermined. [47] When he testified at the hearing, the claimant amended his work history. He testified that he was not a platoon leader; rather, he supervised the students. Those students were not soldiers doing their compulsory military service at this time of war, as he had told the immigration officer,31 but that they were young people who had completed high school and were doing their [translation] "compulsory civilian service". He testified that this civilian service consisted of protecting sites for displaced persons and that during training, the young people learned protection techniques and how to act around the displaced persons, and even received training on human rights. [48] He also testified that the students slept at the site of the XXX XXXX during their four-month training and that that is why he told the immigration officer that they were XXX XXXX soldiers. He even testified that he was not part of the XXX XXXX as such. [49] The documentary evidence does not mention any efforts by the Burundian army in the worst years of the civil war to enforce human rights and adequately protect the camps for displaced persons. On the contrary, as I stated earlier, there is overwhelming evidence of the human rights violations suffered by the displaced civilians in the camps at the hands of the Burundian government army. For these reasons, I do not believe the version given by the claimant at the hearing. I believe that he trained young soldiers, who then ran rampant throughout the country and in the camps for displaced persons, with the known consequences. [50] The claimant told the immigration officer that around 19XX or 19XX, he became a XXXX and was responsible for training; that is, he no longer gave training himself, but rather he supervised the instructors and managed the content of the training programs. The claimant then stated that from 19XX to 20XX, he was the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX-XXXX [XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX- XXXX XXXX] XXXX XXXX XXXX at the school. [51] During the hearing, the claimant testified that, being XXXX XXXX, he supervised three instructors who gave courses. He gave his opinion on the training, he even sometimes accompanied the young students during sessions on human rights, or he ran with them during physical exercises. He added that there was military and tactical training, but that he did not give those courses. He stressed that most of the training was on civic-mindedness. [52] Considering the documentary evidence, it is reasonable to believe that the young soldiers who were trained at that time were not trained to be models of civic-mindedness and respect for human rights. I am of the opinion that the claimant minimized his involvement and participation in training young soldiers in the Burundian army during the worst years of the civil war, and it is reasonable to believe that he gave and supervised training that was much more tactical and military in nature than he would like to have believed. Knowledge of the organization's atrocities [53] The claimant's testimony regarding his knowledge of the atrocities committed by the Burundian army was not credible. [54] When asked first how, in his opinion, the young people who were trained under his leadership learned to protect the camps for displaced persons, the claimant answered that he did not know because he never went there and that he knew nothing more about the young people once their training was over. When asked who the displaced people were, the claimant did not know; Burundians probably, but he did not have any details. [55] When asked whether the camps for displaced people were attacked during the period when he was in the XXX XXXX, the claimant repeated that he did not know and added that he did not have a decision-making position. It is strange that the claimant would add this information to his answer: either he knew whether the camps had been attacked or he did not. Why did he see fit to state that he did not have a decision-making position? That answer suggests that he knew that camps had been attacked, but that he was trying to dissociate himself from those acts. I draw a negative inference about his overall credibility. [56] I do not believe that the claimant did not know what was going on in the camps for displaced persons. He was in his country, he was a career soldier, and he had heard talk of the atrocities. He cannot credibly allege that he was not aware of what was happening to the displaced persons. [57] When asked whether the XXX XXXX was involved in the rebellion, the claimant initially answered that he did not know because he did not talk to the other officers. He then added in the same breath that he discussed it but that he did not have decision-making authority. Confronted with the fact that he did indeed know that the XXX XXXX had been involved in the rebellion, the claimant tried once again to minimize his answer, stating that, yes, they were involved in protecting the country. He added once again that he personally had nothing to do with the military operations. [58] It is implausible that the claimant was not aware of the seriousness and the systematic and systemic nature of the crimes committed by the Burundian army. Here, I cite the words of the Honourable Justice Teitelbaum of the Federal Court in Shakarabi:32 If, as in the present case, an individual lives and works in a country where persons around him are disappearing and where one hears of persons arrested and tortured, it appears to me, to be totally unbelievable that one would not have knowledge of what is taking place. [59] During the second sitting of the hearing, the claimant was asked whether, in his opinion, the Burundian army, during the period when he was member, had respected human rights. Astonishingly, he answered, [translation] "I would say yes, but I heard things that were not right. But since I did not work in those places, I could not see the acts. There were ethnic problems, but I do not have any details". I am of the opinion that this attitude is an affront to the thousands of victims, or at best, wilful blindness. [60] Finally, regarding the mass recruitment of child soldiers, the claimant testified that he never actually saw child soldiers with his own eyes. He sometimes saw young men who looked to be 16 or 17 years old, but never children. Confronted with his statement to the immigration officer that he had indeed seen child soldiers in platoons,33 he justified himself by stating that what he meant by [translation] "child soldiers" was young men 16 or 17 years old. [61] I do not accept that explanation, because the concept of child soldier cannot be simpler: children who are soldiers. Clearly. A young man, 16 or 17 years old, is usually already physically mature and does not look like a child of the age of 10 or even younger. The documentary evidence indicates that children as young as 6 years old were saved by a humanitarian organization after forced recruitment.34 [62] The documentary evidence also indicates that the minimum age for recruitment into the Burundian army is 16.35 In those circumstances, if the claimant told the immigration officer that he had seen child soldiers, it is reasonable to conclude that he was not referring to young men enlisted in the regular way and who had already reached official recruitment age. I believe that the claimant, as he told the immigration officer, had seen child soldiers with his own eyes during the period when he was a soldier. [63] In the words of the Honourable Justice Martineau in Mohacsi:36 [A] claimant's first story is usually the most genuine and, therefore, the one to be most believed. Length of time in the organization [64] The claimant was an active member of the Burundian army from 19XX to 20XX, or 12 years, which is a considerable amount of time. Opportunity to leave the organization [65] As for opportunities to leave the organization, I conclude that the claimant voluntarily remained in an organization that he knew was guilty of serious human rights violations. [66] According to his testimony, the only reason he left the army in 20XX was that he felt threatened because his persecutors were jealous and wanted to kill him. He never left the army during all the years of atrocities. [67] When asked whether he had at least tried to confront the members of the army and to denounce the many abuses, the claimant answered that it was hard for him to hear about all of these atrocities, but that he never tried to discuss them because in the army, there were [translation] "moral talks". When asked whether he had said anything during these group talks, the claimant answered that he had not because he never saw any abuse with his own eyes. He had the impression that if he had talked, it would have been seen as going over his superior's head and, in any case, other soldiers had addressed the issue. [68] I conclude that not only did the claimant remain a member of the army, but also that he made no effort to dissociate himself from the atrocities committed by the army, even though he admitted that he could have since other soldiers addressed the issue. [69] After analyzing all of these elements, I am of the opinion that the claimant did not rebut the presumption that he was complicit in crimes against humanity committed by the Burundian army between 19XX and 20XX. CONCLUSION [70] For the reasons mentioned above, I determine that Article 1F(a) of the Convention applies to the claimant because there are serious reasons for considering that he was complicit in crimes against humanity. [71] Therefore, pursuant to section 98 of the IRPA, I determine that the claimant is not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. Michelle Langelier Me Michelle Langelier November 26, 2010 Date IRB translation Original language: French REFUGEE PROTECTION DIVISION / RACE / PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP / MILITARY SERVICE / MINISTER'S INTERVENTION / EXCLUSION / ART. 1F(A) / CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY / HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS / PERSONAL AND KNOWING PARTICIPATION / COMPLICITY / FAILURE TO DISASSOCIATE / MALE / NEGATIVE / BURUNDI 1 These articles of the Convention can be found in Schedule 1 of the IRPA. 2 See the claimant's passport, submitted as Exhibit A-2, in a bundle. 3 See Ramirez v. Canada, [1992] 2 F.C. 306, page 312; Penate v. Canada, [1994] 2 F.C. 79, at paragraph 4; Moreno v. Canada [1994] 1 F.C. 298 C.A., pages 310-311. 4 See Exhibit M-2: "L'armée et la police doivent s'atteler au développement du pays," article dated February 13, 2007. 5 See Exhibit A-1: National Documentation Package on Burundi, March 2009, tab 5.2: United Nations. November 28, 2007. Security Council. Report of the Sectretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in Burundi. (S/2007/686). 6 See Exhibit M-4: Amnesty International, Burundi. Armed Groups Kill Without Mercy. 1996, pages 2, 3, 7, 14. 7 Ibid., page 4. 8 See Exhibit M-3: Amnesty International, Burundi. Poverty, Isolation and Ill-treatment: Juvenile Justice in Burundi. 2002, page 4 of 23. 9 Ibid., pages 4 and 5 of 23. 10 Ibid., page 5 of 23. 11 Ibid., pages 3 and 4 of 23. 12 Ibid., page 4 of 23. 13 Ibid., page 5 of 23. 14 See Exhibit A-1, tab 5.2 above, page 3. 15 Ibid., page 6. 16 Canada v. Hajialikhani, [1999] 1 F.C. 181. 17 Sivakumar v. Canada, [1994] 1 F.C. 433, at paragraph 14. 18 Mugesera v. Canada, [2005] S.C.J. No. 39, at paragraph 119. 19 Thomas v. Canada, 2007 FC 838, at paragraphs 22 and 23. 20 Moreno v. Canada, [1994] 1 FC 298, at paragraph 45. 21 Ramirez v. Canada, [1992] 2 FC 306, at page 317. 22 Pushpanathan v. Canada, 2002 FCTD 867, at paragraphs 40 and 41. 23 Pineda Collins v. Canada, 2005 FC 732, at paragraph 23. 24 Yogo v. Canada, 2001 FCTD, at paragraph 15; Saridag v. Canada, [1994] FCJ No. 1516, at paragraph 10. 25 Ryivuze v. Canada, 2007 FC 134, at paragraph 38. 26 See Exhibit M-4, page 5, paragraph 3. 27 M-4, page 3, last paragraph. 28 See questions 6 and 7 of his Personal Information Form (PIF), questions 10 to 13 of the interview with the immigration officer, and question 6 B) of form IMM 5474; the latter two documents were submitted as Exhibit A-2, in a bundle. 29 See question 13 of the interview with the immigration officer. 30 See question 5C) of form IMM-5474, submitted as Exhibit A-2, in a bundle. 31 See answers to questions 13 and 14 of the interview. 32 Shakarabi v. Canada, IMM-1371-97, at paragraph 25. 33 See answer to questions 15 and 16 of the interview with the immigration officer. 34 See Exhibit M-3, page 5 of 23, paragraph 2. 35 Ibid. 36 Mohacsi v. Canada, 2003 FCTD, April 11, 2003, paragraph 21; the same sentence also appears in Lubana v. Canada, 2003 FCT 116, paragraph 13. --------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- RPD File No. / No de dossier de la SPR : MA8-11870 18