VB3-02283

RPD File No. / No de dossier de SPR : VB3-02283 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and Decision ? Motifs et décision Applicant The Minister of Public Safety and Demandeur(e) Emergency Preparedness Respondent XXXX XXXX XXXX Intimé(e) Date(s) of Hearing January 16, 2015 Date(s) de l'audience Place of Hearing Heard by videoconference in Lieu de l'audience Vancouver, BC and Calgary, AB Date of Decision February 24, 2015 Date de la décision Panel Kerry Cundal Tribunal Counsel for the Peter Edelmann Conseil(s) de l'Intimé (e) Respondent Barrister and Solicitor Designated N/A Représentant(e)(s) Representative(s) Désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister Allanah Hatch Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] These are the reasons for the decision in the application made by the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (the "Minister") pursuant to section 108 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (the "Act")1 to have the Immigration and Refugee Board (the "Board") determine that the refugee protection of XXXX XXXX XXXX ("the Respondent") has ceased. An oral hearing of this application was conducted by the Division on January 16, 2015. DETERMINATION [2] The Panel finds that the Respondent's refugee protection has ceased for the reasons that follow. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS: [3] Counsel for the Respondent made an application to the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) that the Minister's cessation application constituted an abuse of process and a breach of procedural fairness due to an alleged delay in bringing the application to the Division. Counsel for the Respondent elected to suspend this application until a decision by the RPD has been made on the cessation application. The panel denied an application to have a Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) officer summoned for the purposes of the cessation hearing. Given that the panel finds that the application for summons is relevant to the abuse of process application, which is not before the RPD at this time, and not relevant to the cessation application, the panel rejected the summons application. The panel also rejected the application to call the Respondent's 15-year-old daughter as a witness because Counsel for the Respondent submitted that her testimony would speak to her mother's health and psychological state, which is already in evidence in medical letters and reports2 and is therefore redundant. Minister's Position [4] The Minister's cessation application was received by the RPD on September 19, 2013. The Minister's position is that the Respondent has voluntarily re-availed herself of the protection of her country of citizenship, Mexico, pursuant to section 108(a) of the Act and she has voluntarily re-established herself in Mexico pursuant to section 108(d) of the Act due to the following facts: * The Respondent applied for refugee status in Canada on or about August 25, 1997; * The Respondent received a positive decision from the Convention Refugee Determination Division (CRDD) of the IRB on May 28, 1999; * The Respondent obtained a Mexican passport issued sometime after her landing on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2010, and a subsequent Mexican passport was issued in Vancouver on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2013, valid until XXXX XXXX XXXX 2019; * On XXXX XXXX XXXX 2013, upon arrival from flight XXXX from Mexico, the Respondent declared to a Vancouver International Airport CBSA officer that this was her fourth trip back to Mexico; * The Respondent declared that her first trip was from XXXX 2004 until 2007. At that time, following a separation from her husband, she returned to Mexico with her Canadian-born daughter, lived at her brother's residence and her daughter attended school in Mexico during those years; and * The Respondent was asked why she no longer feared going back to Mexico, she stated that the Mexican government had changed and she feels safe to return to see her mother. [5] The Minister submits that, pursuant to subsection 108(2) of the Act, the Respondent's refugee protection should be determined to have ceased pursuant to subsections 108(1)(a) and 108(1)(d). Respondent's Position [6] Counsel for the Respondent submits that the devastating consequences to the Respondent should be taken into consideration, including the best interests of the child given the recent legislative changes significantly limiting the Respondent's recourse after a cessation application has been allowed, including the following: * Section.46(1)(c.1) of the Act establishing that permanent residence is lost upon a cessation decision being made by the Refugee Protection Division for any of the reasons described in paragraphs 108(a) to (d); * Section 40.1 of the Act rendering a person inadmissible upon cessation of refugee protection; * Section 110 of the Act providing that there is no appeal rights to the Refugee Appeal Division; * Section 25(1.2) of the Act providing a 12-month bar to making a humanitarian and compassionate ground application for permanent residence; * Section 24(4) of the Act providing a bar to making an application for a temporary resident permit. Further, Counsel for the Respondent submits that it is far from clear that the Respondent has, at the time of the hearing, the intention to re-avail herself of the protection of Mexico. Furthermore, Counsel for the Respondent submits that section 108(1)(e) applies if the reasons for which the person sought refugee protection have ceased to exist and notes the following facts: * The Minister has made no submissions pursuant to section 108(1)(e) and "would appear to concede the Respondent is no longer at risk and was not at risk at the time of her return to Mexico in 2004;"3 * The Respondent was originally at risk as a member of her husband's family, and in particular as a result of threats posed by members of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the main ruling party in Mexico from its founding in 1929 until 2000, when it lost the presidential election to Vincente Fox of the National Action Party (PAN);4 * After their successful refugee claim in Canada in May 1999, the Respondent's husband became increasingly abusive and they separated in 2003. On the urging of her parents, the Respondent made the decision to travel to Mexico with her daughter to Mexico; and * Generally, the Minister has taken a clear and unequivocal position that Mexico, as a "Designated Country of Origin" is a country that does not normally produce refugees and respects human rights and offers state protection. FACTS [7] The facts of this application are clear and are not in dispute. Counsel for the Minister confirmed during the hearing that given that the claimant affirmed the contents of her affidavit,5 credibility and the facts are not in dispute in this case. The following facts are admitted by the Respondent and confirmed under sworn testimony at the hearing: * In 1996, the Respondent's husband suffered serious beatings and attacks by members of the PRI, including threats against the lives of his family members;6 * The Respondent and her husband knew that "the people who had threatened her husband were involved in the PRI party and could exercise their influence and control with the police and throughout Mexico;"7 * The Respondent received refugee status on May 28, 1999; * The Respondent's husband started to drink and use drugs more frequently and from 2000 to 2004 abused the Respondent including sexual abuse;8 * The Respondent told her parents about the abuse and they wanted her to return to Mexico and offered to pay for her and her daughter's airfare;9 * The Respondent met with a Citizenship and Immigration officer in May 2004 to obtain her passport and told the officer that she was going back to Mexico because of the difficulties with her husband and she needed to be with her family in Mexico;10 * The Respondent applied to renew her Mexican passport at the Mexican Consulate in Vancouver, BC, which was valid until XXXX 2005;11 * The Respondent and her daughter lived with her mother and father at her brother's house and the Respondent cared for her two elderly and ill parents between 2004 to 2007;12 * The Respondent returned to Canada in XXXX 2007 because she believed her husband had changed and she was open to reconciliation;13 * The Respondent became a permanent resident on July 5, 2010;14 * The Respondent returned to Mexico from XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, 2011, to pay her respects to her father who had passed away and to see her mother who was still ill;15 * The Respondent submitted an application for citizenship on or about October 16, 2012. The Respondent wrote her citizenship test on February 20, 2014 and passed;16 * The Respondent was issued a Mexican passport on XXXX XXXX, 2013, from the Mexican Consulate in Vancouver, BC;17 * The Respondent visited Mexico from XXXX XXXX to XXXX, 2013, because her siblings told her that her mother was very ill and that she had better come soon;18 * The Respondent visited Mexico again from XXXX XXXX to XXXX XXXX XXXX 2013, to see her mother again. The Respondent had booked this holiday time off in October 2012 before her mother's health worsened in XXXX 2013;19 * The Respondent was questioned by a CBSA officer on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2013, upon return from Mexico and asked why she was no longer afraid of returning to Mexico;20 * The Respondent received a copy of the cessation application in September 2013. ISSUES [8] The issue in this claim is whether or not the Respondent's refugee protection has ceased, and if so, on what ground(s) pursuant to section 108(1) it has ceased. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS [9] Section 108 of the Act provides, Rejection (1) A claim for refugee protection shall be rejected, and a person is not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection, in any of the following circumstances: (a) the person has voluntarily reavailed themselves of the protection of their country of nationality; (b) the person has voluntarily reacquired their nationality; (c) the person has acquired a new nationality and enjoys the protection of the country of that new nationality; (d) the person has voluntarily become re-established in the country that the person left or remained outside of and in respect of which the person claimed refugee protection in Canada; or (e) the reasons for which the person sought refugee protection have ceased to exist. (2) On application by the Minister, the Refugee Protection Division may determine that refugee protection referred to in subsection 95(1) has ceased for any of the reasons described in subsection (1). (3) If the application is allowed, the claim of the person is deemed to be rejected. [10] Section 46(1) of the Act provides, 46(1) A person loses permanent resident status [...] (c.1) on a final determination under subsection 108(2) that their refugee protection has ceased for any of the reasons described in paragraphs 108(1)(a) to (d); [11] The Supreme Court of Canada has held that statutory interpretation requires the following guiding principles at paragraph 21 of Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 SCR 27:21 21. Although much has been written about the interpretation of legislation (see, e.g., Ruth Sullivan, Statutory Interpretation (1997); Ruth Sullivan, Driedger on the Construction of Statutes (3rd ed. 1994) (hereinafter "Construction of Statutes"); Pierre-André Côté, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada (2nd ed. 1991)), Elmer Driedger in Construction of Statutes (2nd ed. 1983) best encapsulates the approach upon which I prefer to rely. He recognizes that statutory interpretation cannot be founded on the wording of the legislation alone. At p. 87 he states: Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament." [12] Given the direction from the Supreme Court of Canada, the panel has considered the entire context of section 108 including the objectives of Canada's refugee law as outlined in the Act: 2(2) Objectives - refugees - The objectives of this Act with respect to refugees are [...] (b) to fulfil Canada's international legal obligations with respect to refugees and affirm Canada's commitment to international efforts to provide assistance to those in need of resettlement. [13] Further, the panel is mindful that Counsel for the Minister submitted that "The RPD has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction to determine if refugee protection has ceased pursuant to section 108. If the RPD does not exercise its jurisdiction, no other body has the jurisdiction to find that refugee protection ceased under that provision."22 Further, the panel agrees with the Minister's position that the panel cannot decline to exercise its jurisdiction to answer the Minister's application under subsections 108(1)(a) and (d), but may determine that one or more of the other grounds is established upon application by the Minister for cessation on a case by case basis. [14] Counsel for the Minister provided the Panel with the "Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status" ("the UNHCR Handbook", circa. 1979).23 Counsel for the Minister submits the following: The UNHCR Handbook recognizes that the first four cessation clauses "reflect a change in the situation of the refugee that has been brought about by himself" The fifth cessation clause has nothing to do with a refugee's actions; the refugee's actions are completely irrelevant to a finding of s.108(1)(e) [...] In addition, the legislation goes one step further and gives different consequences for the two situations: s.108(1)(a)-(d) results in the loss of permanent residence while s.108(1)(e) does not.24 [15] With respect to when refugee protection ceases to apply to a person due to having re-availed of the protection of the country of nationality, the UNHCR Handbook states that the refugee will have demonstrated that they are no longer "unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality." The UNHCR Handbook provides three requirements as to when it can be considered that this has occurred: the refugee has acted voluntarily, he or she has exhibited an intention to re-avail, and the refugee has actually obtained such protection. The UNHCR Handbook states: "If a refugee applies for and obtains a national passport or its renewal, it will, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be presumed that he intends to avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality."25 [16] The UNHCR Handbook provides additional interpretative guidance as to what constitutes circumstances as to when a refugee has acted voluntarily, and as to when they have demonstrated intent. With respect to the voluntariness of a refugee's actions, the UNHCR Handbook states at paragraph 120: He may also be constrained, by circumstances beyond his control, to have recourse to a measure of protection from his country of nationality. He may, for instance, need to apply for a divorce in his home country because no other divorce may have the necessary international recognition. Such an act cannot be considered to be a "voluntary re-availment of protection" and will not deprive a person of refugee status.26 The panel agrees with the Minister's submission regarding the panel's obligation to look at all of the Respondent's actions and assess all of the factors in terms of how they apply to each of the grounds argued by the Minister. The panel finds that upon careful examination of the facts and arguments, the panel has the discretion to decide how the law applies to the facts and each application must be decided on its own facts and merits. Counsel for the Minister submits that the important date is the date of the cessation hearing and not the chronological order of the facts, namely the date when the Respondent's need for protection ceased based on the chronological order of the facts. Minister's Counsel refers to the Federal Court decision in XXXX XXXX v. MCI 2014 FC XXXX27 at paragraph 130, wherein the Court found "the plain language of the provision states that permanent residence will be lost on final determination by the RPD of the section 108(2) cessation application, which has not yet been made."28 While the panel agrees that as an operation of law, the Respondent's refugee protection ceases as well when the RPD makes a final determination, the panel however finds that the chronological order of the specific facts of the Respondent's circumstances is an important factor in making a determination under subsection 108(1)(a), (d) and (e). [17] Paragraph 124 of the UNHCR Handbook states that a refugee obtaining a national passport may, under certain exceptional circumstances, not involve termination of refugee status, and refers to the previously quoted paragraph 120 for possible examples. Paragraph 125 of the UNHCR Handbook provides that certain States have removed refugee status from refugees who have visited their former home country with a travel document issued by the refugee's country of residence instead of a national passport issued from the former home country. The UNHCR Handbook states that these kinds of cases should be judged on their individual merits, and that "Visiting an old or sick parent will have a different bearing on the refugee's relation to his former home country than regular visits to that country spent on holidays or for the purpose of establishing business relations." The UNHCR Handbook also states that a "restrictive and well-balanced approach" should be adopted in interpreting the cessation clauses since "refugees should not be subjected to constant review of their refugee status."29 As noted, one of the objectives under the Act is also resettlement of refugees. [18] The Federal Court decision in Nsende v. Canada (M.C.I.) 2008 FC 53130 reaffirms the three requirements relating to re-availment as set out in the UNHCR Handbook and imports the UNHCR guidelines into Canadian jurisprudence. Regarding the refugee's intent, the Federal Court quotes from Professor Hathaway: Since there is not automatic linkage between the issuance or renewal of a passport and the granting of protection, it is critical that the real reason it is being sought form part of the determination authority's consideration. Unless the refugee's motive is genuinely entrusting of her interests to the protection of the state of her nationality the requisite intent is absent.31 [19] Further, although not binding, the panel finds that there is some analogy to be drawn with the case at hand and a recent Ontario Court of Appeal case, AG v. Vilanuevea-Vera, 2012 ONCA 657, an extradition case wherein the Court states: [21] We therefore conclude that when Ms. Vellanueva Vera acquired her Canadian citizenship, the justification for her being accorded refugee status disappeared. From Canada's perspective, both as a matter of international and domestic law, her refugee status ceased.32 Likewise in the case at hand, the panel must decide whether the Respondent's refugee status ceased, and if it has ceased, when it ceased and on what basis it has ceased. The panel also notes that although the panel is not tasked with making a determination regarding whether or not a person loses their permanent residence status, section 46(1) forms part of the legislative scheme and reflects legislative intent in recognizing the difference between situations where a Respondent's actions cease refugee protection and when circumstances outside the Respondent's control cease refugee protection. The panel finds that this distinction is an important factor in assessing on what ground(s) a Respondent's refugee protection ceases. In some cases, a person's refugee protection status may cease as an operation of law, such as obtaining Canadian citizenship. The panel is mindful that there may be arguments that as an operation of law a person's refugee status ceases when country conditions have changed and the person is no longer at risk. The panel however cannot ignore the Minister's application that refugee protection has ceased under subsections 108(1)(a) and (d), and may also consider if another ground applies under section 108(1). [20] The panel also notes that Justice Strickland states in her review of the CBSA officer's decision to make a cessation application, particularly regarding the CBSA officer's limited discretion and obligation to make an application if a prima facie case exists: [88] Presumably this would mean, for example, that if a permanent resident has been established in Canada for many years and, during that time, country conditions had changed such that they were no longer at risk in their country of origin and they return for the purpose of a three week holiday to visit family, the assessment of that information and the ENF-24 factors could result in a discretionary decision that a cessation application was not warranted. This would be because of an absence of a reasonable belief that a s.108(1) criteria had been met.33 [21] Both Counsels provided RPD decisions on cessation applications, which are not binding on the panel. The panel is mindful that there is limited jurisprudence on cessation applications and currently there are RPD decisions under review by the Federal Court on this matter. Although the above-noted case does not involve a review of an RPD decision, the logic of differentiating cases where country conditions have changed such that a person was no longer at risk with regard to the criteria in section 108(1) has some support in the jurisprudence available on this issue. ANALYSIS Credibility [22] The Respondent testified in a straightforward manner, and there were no inconsistencies or contradictions within her testimony or between her testimony and any of the documentary evidence provided. Therefore the panel finds that the Respondent is a credible witness. [23] In the panel's view, the issue in this claim requires a logical coherent consistent statutory interpretation of section 108 of the Act following Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd., supra. The panel respectfully disagrees with the Respondent's submission that humanitarian and compassionate considerations should be considered in assessing whether refugee protection has ceased as there is nothing in the legislation or jurisprudence to support this position. The panel however finds that the jurisprudence supports a contextual approach looking at all of the relevant factors in assessing whether or not refugee protection has ceased and for what grounds. For example, the panel finds that factors including the reasons for the Respondent's return including caring for ill parents, the death of her father and leaving an abusive relationship are relevant considerations. Further, the panel finds that whether or not the Respondent faced a risk of persecution in Mexico at the time of her return is also a relevant factor in determining cessation under subsections 108(1)(a), (d) and (e). Section 108(1)(a) Re-availment [24] The Respondent testified that in 2004 she did not face the same risk she faced when she left Mexico in 1997. She confirmed that she was not at risk during the four trips she took to Mexico outside of the general criminality and her brother's words of caution to be careful. The objective evidence supports the Respondent's testimony that she was not at risk in 2004 because the government had changed, namely the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), her agents of harm were no longer in power.34 The Respondent's basis for her refugee claim related to the targeting of her husband in 1996 by members of the Institutional Revolutionary Party,35 which subsequently lost power to Vincente Fox's National Action Party in July 2000.36 Minister's Counsel did not dispute this evidence and did not dispute the Respondent's testimony that she was no longer at risk in Mexico in 2004 or during any of her three subsequent short trips to Mexico. Minister's Counsel did not dispute the Respondent's testimony regarding her domestic abuse situation, the ailing health of her father and mother, and her father's death as reasons for obtaining a Mexican passport and her return to Mexico. The Respondent testified that her father passed away in 2010 and her mother passed away in XXXX 2014. [25] The test in Nsende supra, is conjunctive and requires that there are the following three requirements: (i) voluntariness; (ii) intention; and (iii) and actual receipt of state protection. The panel finds that although the Respondent's actions were voluntary, she did not have the intention to re-avail herself of Mexico's protection. In a situation where the risk has ceased prior to the Respondent's action of return to the country of origin, intention is also an important factor to consider. Particularly in light of the intention of Parliament as expressed by Minister's submissions that different consequences are intended under sections 108(1)(a) to (d) because these subsections reflect a person's own actions, rather than circumstances outside her control. The panel finds that it is a more nuanced analysis when a Respondent returns when as an operation of fact, if not law, her refugee protection has already ceased as compared to a person who obtains a passport and uses it to return to the country of origin when the risk is still ongoing. [26] Generally when a person obtains a passport and returns his or her country of citizenship where they continue to face a risk of harm, the questions of voluntariness, intent and actual receipt of state protection are viewed in some cases as credibility concerns and/or as what justification or what reasons were so important so as to compel a person to put themselves at risk to return. Further, questions regarding reasons for the return, any mitigation of the risk in returning, duration of the return, and other questions, become more relevant when a person obtains a passport and returns to his country when the risk is ongoing at the time of return. The panel notes that there may be cases where re-availment may occur when there is a change in circumstances prior to the return or use of a passport to another country and diplomatic consular protection may be required by the passport holder, but the panel weighs all of the relevant factors and decides each application on a case by case basis. Although these are also factors when the risk no longer exists, including in the case at hand, these factors are weighed with the fact that the risk no longer existed at the time of return. The panel finds that the Respondent in her circumstances had important reasons for returning to Mexico in 2004 and in her subsequent three short trips. The evidence is clear that she was her ill parents' primary caregiver from 2004-2007 and the primary purpose again, during her three subsequent short trips, was visiting and caring for an ill parent and received nothing further than a passport in terms of state protection in Mexico. She was a stay-at-home caregiver with no payment for her parents and did not require or seek the protection of the police in Mexico during her trips to Mexico. [27] Furthermore, the panel finds that the primary causal fact that ceased the Respondent's need for Canada's refugee protection occurred in 2000, prior to her return in 2004. The panel finds that the cause and date of the cessation is an important factor in assessing cessation under section 108; this fact is important because it is not the Respondent's actions that precipitated the cessation as a matter of fact, but rather a change in country conditions that is outside her control. To find that the Respondent in her particular circumstances had an intention to re-avail within the context of section 108(1)(a) is not in harmony or in keeping with the legislative scheme, Parliament's intent or in keeping with the ordinary and grammatical sense of the legislative text under section 108. [28] Pursuant to section 108(2) the panel may determine for any reasons enumerated under section 108(1) that a person's refugee protection has ceased. Further, not only is the word "may" permissive and it reflects discretion in a quasi-judicial context, but the use of the word "or" is disjunctive in section 108(1) also supports an interpretation that the panel may determine that one or more of the grounds is established upon application by the Minister for cessation on a case by case basis. Given the difficult and important reasons for the Respondent's return to Mexico and the fact that as an operation of fact, her need for refugee protection had ceased prior to her return and not by her actions, the panel finds that the required intention under section 108(1)(a) has not been established and the Respondent has rebutted the presumption that she intended to re-avail herself of Mexico's protection. Section 108(1)(d) Re-establishment [29] Generally, in assessing whether a person has re-established herself in the country of citizenship, a panel may look at what ties a person has in that country, whether she worked, accessed services, including government-provided services, how long she remained in that country and other considerations that may be relevant to determine whether she has re-established in her country of citizenship. [30] The panel finds that looking at the entire context and the Respondent's actions up until the time of the cessation hearing is relevant and important in determining whether or not she has re-established herself in Mexico. Namely the panel assesses the Respondent's time in Mexico from 2004-2007 with the following factors: (i) she did not have gainful employment outside of her parents' home in Mexico while in Mexico during any of her visits to Mexico; (ii) the fact that she has lived continuously in Canada since 2007; (iii) her successful application for permanent residence in 2010; (iv), her application for citizenship on or about October 16, 2012; and (v) the fact that she wrote her Canadian citizenship test on February 20, 2014, and passed and (vi) her continuing establishment in Canada including gainful employment, community involvement, and care of her Canadian minor child at that time of the hearing. Further, her primary reason for her visits to Mexico in the past was to care for her ill parents who are now both deceased and she no longer has that important purpose for traveling to Mexico and she has not returned since her last trip in XXXX 2013. The panel finds that these facts demonstrate at the time of the cessation hearing that the Respondent has not re-established herself in Mexico. Although she remained in Mexico to care for her ill and elderly parents during from 2004-2007 and was able to take her parents to their medical appointments and to shops, she did not have gainful employment during that time, she did not obtain any further protection from the Mexican government other than a passport. Furthermore, the panel finds that the evidence does not indicate that the Respondent returned to Mexico with a view to permanently reside as set out in the UNHCR Handbook. [31] The panel notes that this case is distinguished from a case where a person returns to his country of citizenship before a change in circumstances outside their control occurs and, in certain cases, the fact as to when the circumstances changed may be weighed as a factor for or against cessation under subsections 108(1)(a) and (d). Nonetheless, the panel finds that in all cases, whether or not the reasons for which the person sought refugee protection have ceased to exist outside of any actions a refugee has taken, is a relevant factor under section 108 and is consistent with a plain reading of the legislative text in a manner that is harmonious with the object of the Act and the intention of Parliament. As Minister's Counsel submitted the change in the legislated consequences reflects whether or not the Respondent's actions caused the cessation or whether a change in circumstances outside of the Respondent's control caused the cessation. Based on the totality of the evidence, the panel finds that the Respondent has not voluntarily become re-established in Mexico pursuant to subsection 108(1)(d). Section 108(1)(e) the reasons for which the person sought refugee protection have ceased to exist [32] As previously noted, it is not in dispute in this case whether the reasons for which the Respondent sought Canada's protection ceased to exist in 2000 due to the change in government outside of the Respondent's subsequent actions. The panel therefore finds that the Respondent's refugee protection has ceased pursuant to section 108(1)(e). [33] Having made this finding, the panel must now assess whether there are compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution, torture, treatment or punishment for refusing to avail herself of the protection of the country she left as outlined in section 108(4) of the Act. The Respondent has not provided any evidence of compelling reasons. Therefore, the panel finds that the respondent does not fall under the exception provided under section 108(4). [34] The panel notes that in some cessation cases, multiple grounds may be established pursuant to section 108(1) (a) to (e), but this is not that case and the panel finds that after assessing and weighing all of the evidence, the Respondent's refugee protection has ceased only pursuant to section 108(1)(e). CONCLUSION [35] The Panel finds that the Respondent's refugee protection conferred by the then CRDD on May 28, 1999, has ceased and the Respondent's claim is deemed to be rejected. [36] The Panel therefore finds that the claim of XXXX XXXX XXXX is rejected pursuant to section 108(3) of the Act. (signed) "Kerry Cundal" Kerry Cundal February 24, 2015 Date 1 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27. 2 Exhibit 9, pp. 1-7. 3 Exhibit 12, p. 7. 4 Exhibit 4, pp. 22-23. 5 Exhibit 4, pp. 208-225. 6 Exhibit 4, p. 212-213. 7 Exhibit 4, p. 213. 8 Exhibit 4, pp. 213-218. 9 Exhibit 4, p. 218. 10 Exhibit 4, p. 219. 11 Exhibit 4, p. 219. 12 Exhibit 4, pp. 218 - 220. 13 Exhibit 4, p. 220. 14 Exhibit 4, p. 221. 15 Exhibit 4, p. 222. 16 Exhibit 4, p. 222. 17 Exhibit 4, p. 222. 18 Exhibit 4, p. 222. 19 Exhibit 4, p. 222. 20 Exhibit 4, p. 223. 21 Rizzo and Rizzo Shoes, 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC), 1998 1 SCR 27. 22 Exhibit 11, p. 10. 23 Exhibit 10. 24 Exhibit 11, p. 12. 25 Exhibit 1, pp. 17-18. 26 Exhibit 1, p. 18. 27 XXXX XXXXX v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 28 Exhibit 11, p. 13. 29 Exhibit 10, page 1. 30 Nsende, Jean Claude v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3635-07), Lagacé, April 23, 2008, 2008 FC 531. Reported : Nsende v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2009] 1 F.C.R. 49 (F.C.). 31 The Law of Refugee Status, James C. Hathaway, Butterworths: Toronto, 1991. 32 AG v. Vilanuevea-Vera, 2012 ONCA 657. 33 Olvera Romero, Silvia v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6485-13), Strickland, July 9, 2014; 2014 FC 671. 34 Exhibit 4, pp. 9-10. 35 Exhibit 4, pp. 210-211. 36 Exhibit 4, p. 1 and p. 5. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RPD File No. / N° de dossier de la SPR : 2 RPD File No. / N° de dossier de la SPR : VB3-02283 RPD File No. / N° de dossier de la SPR : VB3-02283 1