R. v. Blackmon

R. v. Blackmon

The guilty plea by a co-accused is not evidence against co-accused and can be disregarded; there was no substantive prejudice from the timing of the plea or inability to compel the co-accused to testify; severance was unlikely and speculation about possible testimony is insufficient; the acceptance of the plea did not create a reasonable apprehension of bias nor such unfair prejudice that the judge could not disabuse himself of it; therefore the mistrial application was properly dismissed.

Citation
2007 BCSC 1616
Parties
Crown: Regina; Accused: Richard Francis Blackmon; Accused: Lida Lee Christianson; Accused: Justin Mark Havey
Court
Supreme Court of British Columbia
Jurisdiction
Canada
Judgment Date
7 November 2007
Procedural Posture
Criminal Breaking and Entering (s.348(1)(a) Criminal Code) / Trial — Post Crown Case; Application for Mistrial After Co Accused Entered Guilty Plea (s.606(4))
Outcome
Application for mistrial dismissed.
Legal Topics
Mistrial, Guilty Plea by Co Accused, Accessory After the Fact, Compellability of Witnesses, Severance, Apprehension of Bias, Disregard of Inadmissible Evidence, Criminal Code S.348(1)(a), Criminal Code S.23, Criminal Code S.606(4), Criminal Code S.592
Source Language
English

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Parties

Regina

Crown

Richard Francis Blackmon

Accused

Lida Lee Christianson

Accused

Justin Mark Havey

Accused

Procedural Posture

Criminal Breaking and Entering (s.348(1)(a) Criminal Code) / Trial — Post Crown Case; Application for Mistrial After Co Accused Entered Guilty Plea (s.606(4))

  1. 1 Whether acceptance of a guilty plea by a co-accused after the Crown's case requires declaration of a mistrial
  2. 2 Whether the trial judge can fairly disregard a co-accused's guilty plea when deciding the case against remaining accused
  3. 3 Whether the inability to compel the co-accused to testify prejudiced the remaining accused and required severance

Ratio Decidendi

The guilty plea by a co-accused is not evidence against co-accused and can be disregarded; there was no substantive prejudice from the timing of the plea or inability to compel the co-accused to testify; severance was unlikely and speculation about possible testimony is insufficient; the acceptance of the plea did not create a reasonable apprehension of bias nor such unfair prejudice that the judge could not disabuse himself of it; therefore the mistrial application was properly dismissed.

Court Disposition

Application for mistrial dismissed.

Orders

  • Mistrial application dismissed.