TB8-18893

RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB8-18893 TB8-18894 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Persons who are the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX Personnes en cause Appeal considered / heard at Montreal, QC Appel instruit / entendu à Date of decision August 3, 2020 Date de la décision Panel Max Wolpert Tribunal Counsel for the persons who are the subject of the appeal Howard P Eisenberg Conseil des personnes en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION OVERVIEW [1] I dismiss the appeal of Ms. XXXX. I allow the appeal of Mr. XXXX. [2] XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX is a citizen of Jordan. XXXX XXXX is a stateless Palestinian with a travel document for Palestinian refugees issued by Lebanon. He was born in Saudi Arabia in 1977 and lived there until his status ended in 2017. [3] The Appellants have a three-year-old daughter born in Canada. [4] The Appellants departed from Jordan on XXXX XXXX, 2017, for Canada and claimed refugee protection on October 11, 2017. [5] The RPD dismissed Ms. XXXX claim because it found that the alleged impossibility for a woman, but not a man, to sponsor a foreign spouse and daughter to live in Jordan would constitute discrimination but not persecution. I find, though for different reasons, that the RPD result was correct on the evidence before it. [6] The RPD rejected Mr. XXXX claim, based on fear of persecution by Hezbollah in Lebanon, because it found that his only country of former habitual residence was Saudi Arabia, with which I agree, and that he had not established that he was outside that country by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution, with which I disagree. Allegations [7] The Appellants alleged that: [8] In 2012, Mr. XXXX visited family in Lebanon. A few months later he received a phone call from his cousin in Lebanon who said that members of Hezbollah were searching for Mr. XXXX as they had learned, accurately, that Mr. XXXX, in the course of his then employment by a Saudi XXXX XXXX, had dealings with Jewish suppliers in America. Mr. XXXX never returned to Lebanon after that. [9] In XXXX 2017, Mr. XXXX subsequent employer laid him off. His status in Saudi Arabia was contingent upon being sponsored for a work permit. He was unable to find another job in that country. He and Ms. XXXX thus were forced to leave Saudi Arabia. [10] Ms. XXXX would not be able to sponsor Mr. XXXX or their child to live in Jordan with her. A Jordanian man, by contrast, can sponsor his spouse and any children to immigrate. RPD reasons Appellants generally credible [11] The RPD found the Appellants generally credible1 and made no negative credibility findings. Mr. XXXX - Country of Former Habitual Residence (CFHR) - Saudi Arabia only [12] Mr. XXXX alleged that both Lebanon and Saudi Arabia were his countries of former habitual residence. The RPD found, however, that Mr. XXXX only CFHR was Saudi Arabia. This was because, apart from some business trips and time spent at university in India, he had spent his entire life there. In addition, he had testified that he was not entitled to live in Lebanon or under the Palestinian Authority.2 Mr. XXXX - Saudi Arabia - no serious possibility of persecution [13] The RPD found that Mr. XXXX had not established a serious possibility of persecution, or a personal risk of harm under IRPA section 97, in Saudi Arabia. He led some evidence that as a Palestinian he was not entitled to certain social services or postsecondary studies there, but this treatment did not rise to the level of persecution; rather, he had a successful working career in that country. There was also no evidence that his employment sponsorship was lost for reasons amounting to persecution or that his inability to return to Saudi Arabia was itself persecutory.3 Ms. XXXX - discrimination, not persecution, in Jordan [14] Ms. XXXX alleged that she cannot live with her husband or their Canadian daughter in Jordan because her status there and her gender do not allow her to sponsor family members. She might be discriminated against as a result, the RPD found, but there was not enough evidence that this would rise to the level of persecution or IRPA section 97 risk.4 NEW EVIDENCE The evidence presented by the Appellants is accepted only in part [15] The Appellants have applied to have admitted as new evidence: i. An affidavit signed by Mr. XXXX about a month after he received the RPD decision.5 This lists his relatives (3 aunts, 4 uncles and 11 cousins) in Lebanon, and gives some detail about the amount of time he spent there on vacations until Hezbollah threatened him in 2012. It also states that after the RPD decision, his cousin WhatsApp'ed him a letter, attached as an exhibit, stating that the cousin had received further threats against Mr. XXXX from Hezbollah. ii. An affidavit of the same date by Ms. XXXX.6 It states that she fears returning to Jordan because her husband has no right of entry to Jordan and that under Jordanian law she cannot sponsor him. It adds that were she to return to Jordan without him, she would be unable to survive because of the stigma against a married woman living alone. Her father would thus force her to divorce Mr. XXXX and remarry to be protected. Finally, she writes that although she told the RPD that she feared going back to Jordan because she could not live there with her husband, she was not asked to elaborate or explain. Admissibility of new evidence - the law [16] According to the law,7 I can only accept evidence that: i. arose after the RPD decision; or ii. was not reasonably available at the time of the decision; or that you could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to bring to the RPD before the decision. [17] If the evidence meets one or more of these requirements, I must decide if the evidence is new, credible and relevant before I can accept it.8 New evidence - Appellants' position [18] Counsel submits that both affidavits postdate the RPD decision, are relevant and probative, and address and refute issues central to its findings. They respond to concerns that were central to the RPD reasons, but were not canvassed at the hearing.9 New evidence - admissibility - analysis Mr. XXXX affidavit - admissible only in part [19] The fact that the affidavits were composed and signed after the RPD decision is not determinative of their meeting the statutory admissibility criteria. The questions instead are when the information they contain arose, when it became known to the Appellants, and whether they could reasonably have been expected to present it to the RPD. Relatives in Lebanon - inadmissible [20] Regarding Mr. XXXX affidavit list of relatives, he obviously knew this information before the RPD hearing. His former counsel asked him at that hearing whether he had family in Lebanon. He answered that he had maternal aunts, who live in Beirut.10 In my opinion, that question signalled to him that information about the extent of his family in Lebanon could be pertinent to his claim, and also gave him a reasonable opportunity to expand on it. The new details on this point in the affidavit thus do not meet any of the statutory admissibility criteria. Time spent in Lebanon - admissible [21] All the time Mr. XXXX spent in Lebanon was years before the RPD hearing. Nevertheless, the extent and nature of his time there were pertinent to his arguable case that Lebanon should be considered a second CFHR for him. Yet the RPD member only asked him whether he had ever been to Lebanon, and when told yes, simply asked when the last time had been.11 His then counsel's only question on this area was whether he had ever lived in Lebanon, to which he replied that he had not.12 None of the questioning invited Mr. XXXX to discuss how often, how long and in what circumstances he had been there. Given that he was probably unfamiliar with the law on determining CFHRs, I agree with Counsel that the failure to canvass these points rendered it unreasonable to expect that Mr. XXXX would have brought them up at his own initiative. I also find this evidence new, credible, and relevant to his arguments about whether Lebanon is a CFHR for him. I thus admit this part of his affidavit as new evidence. Cousin's new information - inadmissible [22] After Mr. XXXX testified that his cousin told him in 2012 that Hezbollah was looking for him, the RPD member asked whether there had been any other contact from them. Mr. XXXX replied that he had no idea.13 In his affidavit, he states that because of the RPD's question, he realized that it was important to ask if anyone had received other threats against him, so he asked his cousin for a letter about that. [23] In the undated letter, the cousin writes that Hezbollah keeps asking about Mr. XXXX. He mentions an inquiry by them about him at a shop "some time ago." He adds that "recently" they asked about him by his full name. He then states that they interrogated him twice at the print shop to know if there had been any contact between him and Mr. XXXX at all. He ends by telling Mr. XXXX not ever to think of coming back to Beirut. [24] The RPD decision was signed twenty days after the hearing. Neither Mr. XXXX nor his former counsel advised the RPD before the decision that he was following up with his cousin. [25] Mr. XXXX risk from Hezbollah was central, in fact, primary, to his claim that he had a well-founded fear of persecution in Lebanon, which he argued to the RPD was a CFHR. The RPD asked him whether there was any post-2012 contact from Hezbollah. It was thus reasonable to expect him to bring to the RPD any evidence of other Hezbollah inquiries about him after 2012 and up to the time of the RPD decision. There was no evidence of difficulty in communicating with his cousin. Such evidence was thus reasonably available to him at the time of the decision. That evidence is therefore inadmissible. [26] That leaves the question whether any of the Hezbollah inquiries the cousin writes about occurred after the RPD decision. In the cousin's letter, attached to Mr. XXXX affidavit just over XXXX weeks after that decision, the cousin speaks of such inquiries "some time ago" and "recently". In my opinion, this is too vague and insufficient to meet Mr. XXXX burden to establish that any of these happened after the RPD decision. The entire letter, and the portions of the affidavit referring to it, are thus inadmissible. Ms. XXXX affidavit - inadmissible [27] Ms. XXXX is a citizen of Jordan and no other country. In her BOC, completed before she had counsel, she wrote about her husband's problems in Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. In answer to the question in which countries she risked serious harm, she wrote Lebanon and Syria. She did, however, mention several times Mr. XXXX alleged inability to get a permit or visa to live in Jordan, the family separation that would ensue, and their need to be together in a safe country. [28] It was apparent that, by the time of the RPD hearing, Ms. XXXX understood that she personally could only claim protection against Jordan. She testified clearly to that.14 She then explained that she could not live there with her husband. Asked why not, she said that a female Jordanian citizen could not obtain any kind of status for her foreign spouse, while a male citizen could obtain Jordanian citizenship for his.15 After those two answers, the hearing moved on to other matters. At the end of the hearing, she was asked what her fear was in returning to Jordan. She said it was that she cannot live there with her daughter and husband.16 [29] The new information that Ms. XXXX seeks to introduce is that she would be unable to survive in Jordan without her husband because of the stigma against a married woman living alone, and that as a result, her father would force her to divorce and remarry. There is no indication in her affidavit or submission that she only realized or learned of these potential problems after the RPD decision. In her affidavit and in Counsel's submission, Ms. XXXX thus argues in effect that she could not reasonably have been expected to provide evidence about these additional risks. That is because she argues they were not canvassed, since she was not asked any follow-up questions or asked to elaborate and explain her testimony that she could not live in Jordan with her husband. [30] It is true that at the RPD, Ms. XXXX was at first asked only two basic questions about Jordan: what country was she claiming protection from, and why could she not live there with her husband. After she replied about women, but not men, being able to obtain immigration status for their spouses, the hearing got sidetracked to other matters, regarding Mr. XXXX and Lebanon.17 At that point, it was arguable that Ms. XXXX had been limited to testifying why her husband could not enter Jordan, and cut off from elaborating on the additional consequences she would face were that to come to pass. [31] She was later asked again, however, what her fear was of returning to Jordan. This was an open-ended question and an opportunity to elaborate. She limited herself to saying she could not live there with her daughter and husband. In these circumstances, I do not agree that she was deprived of the opportunity fully to explain the risks she could face in Jordan. [32] In the result, I find that Ms. XXXX affidavit is inadmissible as new evidence. Lebanon as CFHR - Appellant's position [33] Counsel submits that the RPD erred in finding that Lebanon is not a CFHR for Mr. XXXX, because: [34] According to the objective documentary evidence, Mr. XXXX having been issued his Lebanese Travel Document for Palestinian Refugees means that he is a refugee registered with the Lebanese government and enjoys a right to enter, reside in and move freely within that country.18 [35] Although Mr. XXXX mistakenly testified-apparently confusing residency with citizenship and its full rights to work, education and health care-that he does not have a right to live in Lebanon, the NDP evidence proves that in fact he does. The RPD erred in failing to consider this.19 [36] Mr. XXXX spent a considerable amount of time in Lebanon until his last visit in 2012. He did not go back after that because of the threat made against him that year by Hezbollah.20 [37] The Federal Court has instructed that the definition of a CFHR should not be unduly restrictive so as to prevent surrogate protection to a stateless person who has demonstrated a well-founded fear of persecution. Given the amount of time Mr. XXXX spent in Lebanon; that he travelled on a Lebanese travel document giving him the right to return and live there; that he has close relatives in that country, the acts he complained about in his BOC and his testimony occurred in Lebanon; and that he fears persecution there by Hezbollah, Lebanon ought to have been found to be a CFHR.21 Lebanon as CFHR - analysis - RPD correct [38] Saudi Arabia is clearly a CFHR for Mr. XXXX. A stateless person, however, may have more than one country of former habitual residence. In order to be found to be a Convention refugee, a stateless person who has more than one country of former habitual residence must show that there is a serious possibility that they would suffer persecution in at least one of them, and that they cannot return to any of the others.22 [39] Former habitual residence implies a situation where a stateless person was admitted to a country with a view to enjoying a period of continuing residence of some duration. No minimum period, however, is necessary. The claimant does not have to be legally able to return to a country of former habitual residence for it to be so described. The claimant must, however, have established a significant period of de facto residence in the country in question.23 [40] When asked if he had ever lived in Lebanon, Mr. XXXX said no.24 Asked whether he was entitled to do so, he replied that he was not. He added, however, that he now had no right to reside anywhere at all in the world.25 [41] Mr. XXXX was born in Saudi Arabia. Although he studied at a university in India for four years, earning his XXXX XXXX degree, he described himself as having lived in Saudi Arabia all his life.26 [42] Mr. XXXX has relatives in Lebanon (his mother and four siblings live in Saudi Arabia).27 Until he turned 21 years old in 1998, he spent XXXX XXXX each year, sometimes XXXX, in Lebanon on family vacation. He then started working, so that was reduced to XXXX to XXXX weeks a year,28 ending in 2012 when his cousin called him to tell him of the threat from Hezbollah.29 That indicates that between his birth and age 34, he spent something over 2-1/2 years in Lebanon. [43] Mr. XXXX never lived in Lebanon and, when he visited relatives there, he stayed for a few weeks. While there is no minimum period for residence to establish a CFHR, there has to be some period of residence. By his own description, his stays in Lebanon were simply visits. [44] I find Mr. XXXX family ties in Lebanon and travel document issued by Lebanese authorities are insufficient to establish habitual residence. Even if he has the right to enter and remain in Lebanon, he never actually lived there. That and the fact that he was born outside of Lebanon are what distinguish his case from, for example, Al-Khateeb, where the claimant was born in the CFHR and resided there for XXXX months.30 I acknowledge that Mr. XXXX spent five times as much as that in Lebanon, but the intentionally transient quality of his stays there prevents Lebanon from being a former habitual residence. I take Counsel's point that he quite probably would have spent even more time in Lebanon but for Hezbollah's 2012 threat. There was no evidence, however, that he would have done anything other than vacation there. [45] I find that Saudi Arabia is the only CFHR in the present case. Mr. XXXX was born there and lived in that country for over 35 years, completing his primary and secondary school education and all his career up till leaving for Canada in that country. Unable to return to Saudi Arabia [46] The burden is on a refugee claimant to show on the balance of probabilities that they are unable to return to any country of former habitual residence.31 The NDP corroborates that Saudi law requires that a citizen or business must sponsor foreign workers in order for them to obtain legal work and residency status.32 Given Mr. XXXX uncontradicted testimony and employer's termination letter,33 which the RPD accepted, he has fulfilled that preliminary burden with respect to Saudi Arabia. Unwilling to return owing to a well-founded fear of persecution [47] The remaining burden on Mr. XXXX, according to IRPA section 96 and binding Canadian court decisions,34 is to demonstrate that owing to a well-founded fear of persecution he is outside Saudi Arabia and unable or unwilling to return there. [48] For reasons that will be apparent below, I make a finding whether Mr. XXXX would have a well-founded fear of persecution by Hezbollah in Lebanon, based on their threat made against him in 2012. Based on Mr. XXXX testimony, which the RPD found credible, and the Lebanon NDP evidence,35 I find that there is more than a mere possibility that he would be persecuted there. Persecution - RPD incorrect Testimony [49] Mr. XXXX testified that he had to attend university abroad because Saudi Arabia bars temporary residents from its postsecondary institutions. He said that generally all foreign workers have no rights in that country. Their passports are seized and held by their employers, so they cannot travel out of the country without their agreement. He was unable to travel to Syria when his father became terminally ill while visiting there in 2009, because his employer refused permission. As a temporary resident, he could not buy a car or rent housing without his employer's approval. His birth in Saudi Arabia entitled him to no status at all and no path to permanent residence or citizenship. As a Palestinian, he was not entitled to social services or public health care. He also had no property rights there.36 RPD reasons [50] The RPD held that Mr. XXXX did not lead evidence to show that he faces a serious possibility of persecution or personal risk in Saudi Arabia. The Member noted that he had testified that as a Palestinian in Saudi Arabia he was not entitled to certain social services, but held this insufficient to establish that this treatment rose to the level of persecution. Rather, the RPD observed, Mr. XXXX testified that he had built a successful career while working in Saudi Arabia.37 [51] The RPD next found that Mr. XXXX did not lead evidence to show that he lost his employment sponsorship, forcing him to leave Saudi Arabia and be unable to return there, because of factors which amount to persecution, or that his inability to return to that country was itself persecutory. For those reasons, the RPD concluded that Mr. XXXX did not face a serious possibility of persecution or a risk to his life in Saudi Arabia, his country of former habitual residence.38 Saudi Arabia - analysis - RPD erred in finding Mr. XXXX did not establish a well-founded fear of persecution [52] In order to be found to be a Convention refugee, a stateless person who has only one CFHR must establish that by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution, he is outside that country and unable or, by reason of such fear, unwilling to return there. That is so even if they can no longer legally return. The IRB is, however, compelled to ask itself why the applicant is being denied entry to a country of former habitual residence because the reasons for the denial may, in certain circumstances, constitute an act of persecution.39 [53] In my opinion, Mr. XXXX, having established that he is a stateless Palestinian, who was initially subjected to non-persecutory discrimination in Saudi Arabia, but was then expelled from that country without having the right to seek refugee protection there, nor to enter any country where he did not have a well-founded fear of persecution, meets the test for refugee protection. [54] Citizenship somewhere is every person's basic right, for it is nothing less than the right to have rights.40 Without citizenship, individuals lack the mechanisms to access their rights. A central notion of refugee law is that those who fear persecution in their homeland and are unable to rely on their own government to protect their rights can call upon the international community to provide protection. Many refugees may possess formal citizenship, but that does not protect them. Ironically, they are de facto stateless while the threat of persecution continues. It is that very characteristic that makes them require surrogate protection, which treaty and customary international refugee law have evolved to provide.41 [55] But what about those who, like Mr. XXXX, are even worse off because they are really stateless? In a world of nation states, the de jure stateless lack "the right to have rights." A state may authorize a stateless person temporarily to remain, work, and study, as did Saudi Arabia, but if and when it chooses to withdraw that permission, as happened in this case, the stateless-in contrast to other noncitizen residents-have no other state to fall back on. Stateless persons who migrate to obtain work often find, as did Mr. XXXX, their residence permission tied to their employment authorization. If the job ends and they are ordered to leave, no other state (or in Mr. XXXX case, no other state where he lacks a well-founded fear of persecution) has an obligation to allow them to enter. In these circumstances, statelessness is "rightslessness".42 Indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada has noted that the requirement that a claimant be unable to avail themself of a state's protection originally related only to stateless persons, but was later extended to those refused protection by their state of nationality.43 [56] The UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (1979, reissued 2019) deals in only cursory fashion with the application of the refugee definition to stateless persons. To date, none of the UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection tackle it.44 [57] I agree with the RPD, and Counsel does not contest, that the indignities and restrictions of daily life as a person with temporary status within Saudi Arabia that Mr. XXXX described, as does the NDP, amount to discrimination that is less than persecution. I disagree, however, that when combined with his being a stateless person cast out of Saudi Arabia with no right to seek refugee protection there and no safe country to fall back on, all these factors together do not justify a well-founded fear of persecution, by reason of nationality (here non-nationality or lack of nationality, analogous to persecution for atheism being by reason of religion). [58] Some RAD decisions have held that as the laws and policies that led to a stateless Palestinian's exile from their CFHR are of general application, and equally applicable to all foreigners, there is thus not persecution.45 In Mr. XXXX case, I do not so hold, for two reasons. First, as recent events show, most governments and societies are coming to realize that laws and policies of general applicability, even when instituted without malign intent, can have systematically harmful effects on the fundamental rights of minorities. Applying these "general" laws and policies to a stateless Palestinian has dramatically worse effects than applying them to, say, a Canadian citizen working in Saudi Arabia. Effect, not just intent, are both relevant. [59] Second, while the courts46 and the altered layout of the refugee definition in IRPA,47 have closed off the argument that statelessness and inability to return alone qualify one for refugee protection, despite the earlier learned opinions of leading refugee law experts of their times that they do,48 there is no requirement that the required feared persecution be solely created and threatened by the CFHR. There must simply be a fear of persecution, by reason of which the claimant is outside the CFHR and which renders them unable to return there. That persecution may flow from the combined effects of laws, policies, acts and omissions of multiple states and intergovernmental organizations, not just Saudi Arabia. Just because part of the situation in which Mr. XXXX finds himself is caused by a Saudi immigration law of supposed general application does not mean that he does not have a well-founded fear of persecution. [60] The Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that everyone has the right to a nationality. Almost no one would choose to be stateless. There is no evidence that Mr. XXXX or his forebears so chose. Some combination of states or intergovernmental organizations deprived them of this basic right and have taken no steps to restore it. That was the first stage of what would develop, in his case, into persecution. [61] Saudi Arabia, which is not a signatory to the Refugee Convention,49 later forced Mr. XXXX out of the only country in which, subject to much discrimination, he had ever lived, and also denied him a right to return, without regard to his statelessness or whether he had a safe country to fall back on. When it did so, the collective international lifelong deprivation of his fundamental human right to a nationality crystallized into persecution. Here, denial of a right of return constituted an act of persecution. [62] The above is determinative of my conclusion on this point. The following are supplementary observations: 1954 Statelessness Convention [63] That refugee law as applied in Canada should extend protection to persons in Mr. XXXX combination of circumstances is reflected in its government's choices regarding statelessness treaties. There are two international conventions on statelessness: The 1954 Convention, which protects people like Mr. XXXX needing assistance because they are already stateless,50 and the 1961 Convention, aimed at avoiding the creation of new statelessness.51 Canada has signed and ratified the latter, but has never acceded to the former. Its government's primary explanation is: Canada believes that the Refugee Convention to a large extent duplicates the 1954 Statelessness Convention and thus there is no need to accede to both.52 [64] Thus, Canada directs stateless people like Mr. XXXX to seek protection here under the Refugee Convention. That being so, interpretation of the requirements for such protection should avoid, to the extent possible, rendering that instruction pointless. That is all the more so, given that Canada lacks formal statelessness determination procedure and a protected stateless person status that facilitates the naturalization procedure for stateless persons,53 and Canada's legal framework does not safeguard all the rights of stateless persons stipulated in the 1954 Convention.54 [65] For greater certainty, this point was not itself determinative of my decision, which would have been the same even without it. Refugee Convention Article 1D [66] There is another indirect international law factor why Canadian law should be interpreted and applied as far as possible, to the extent not clearly contradicted by its statutes, to grant Mr. XXXX refugee protection. This derives from Article 1D of the Refugee Convention. That treaty provision is not incorporated under Canadian law. It is thus not directly binding on the IRB. Yet, it is part of a treaty Canada ratified and thus undertook to the international community to fulfill. [67] The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized as a well-established principle of statutory interpretation that legislation will be presumed to conform to international law. The presumption of conformity is based on the rule of judicial policy that, as a matter of law, courts will strive to avoid constructions of domestic law pursuant to which the state would be in violation of its international obligations, unless the wording of the statute clearly compels that result. [68] The presumption has two aspects. First, Parliament is presumed to act in compliance with Canada's obligations as a signatory of international treaties and as a member of the international community. In deciding between possible interpretations, courts will avoid a construction that would place Canada in breach of those obligations. The second aspect is that Parliament is presumed to comply with the values and principles of customary and conventional international law. Those values and principles form part of the context in which statutes are enacted, and courts will therefore prefer a construction that reflects them. The presumption is rebuttable, however. Parliamentary sovereignty requires courts to give effect to a statute that demonstrates an unambiguous and unequivocal legislative intent to default on an international obligation.55 [69] Besides the general inclusion of stateless refugees, the 1951 Refugee Convention contains a specific protection measure for Palestinian refugees (as a consequence of various Arab-Israeli conflicts since 1948, millions of Palestinian refugees live in the Middle East and the majority of them are stateless). According to this specific provision (Article 1D), persons who received protection or assistance from a UN agency other than the UNHCR shall by that very fact be entitled to the "benefits of the Convention", if protection or assistance by the other UN agency has ceased "for any reason".56 [70] For decades, the only such "alternative" UN agency supporting refugees has been the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Consequently, Article 1D was meant to provide protection to those Palestinian refugees who received assistance from the UNRWA, but subsequently left its area of operation (e.g., by travelling outside Lebanon, Syria, the Gaza Strip or the West Bank) and therefore UNRWA assistance ceased. This provision has proved to be one of the most controversial ones in international refugee law for several decades. It has been-willingly or unwillingly-overlooked in many states' practices, and actors in the field have had extremely divergent (and sometimes even constantly changing) understanding about its proper application. Its use has so far remained marginal; most stateless Palestinians obtaining refugee status instead usually do so under Article 1A of the 1951 Refugee Convention (i.e., falling under the scope of the "general" refugee definition). [71] The 2012 El Kott judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union57 put an end (at least in the EU) to the two main debates about the meaning of Article 1D: 1) Some states repeatedly argued that the "benefits of the Convention" do not mean more than the mere possibility to apply for protection. The Court discarded this approach, noting that this possibility is anyway available to any third-country national or stateless person. The Court ruled that being entitled to the benefits of Article 1D means nothing less than an obligation for member states to recognize the person as a refugee (if no exclusion clauses apply). [72] The other main debate about Article 1D was centred on the term "for any reason". Historically, interpretations ranged from a very strict requirement (the reason for leaving the UNRWA area of operation must be a well-founded fear of persecution) to an all-inclusive approach (the mere fact of leaving the UNRWA area of operation results in an automatic entitlement to refugee status). The Court of Justice chose an interpretation lying somewhere between these two extremes, ruling that in order for this protection provision to be applicable, the cessation of UNRWA assistance must be beyond the asylum-seeker's control and independent of her/his will. In the Court's interpretation, this includes situations where the person's personal safety was at serious risk and it was impossible for the UNRWA to guarantee that her/his living conditions in that area would be proportionate with the Agency's mission. The Court rejected that purely voluntary migration from the UNRWA area of operation to the EU would trigger an automatic recognition of refugee status by member states, arguing that this would run counter to the objective of Article 1D. On the other hand, while the migratory move must be motivated by forcing elements (safety, living conditions), these are not required to reach the high threshold of a well-founded fear of persecution.58 [73] In Mr. XXXX case, the combination of the restrictions on his rights in Lebanon and his fear of persecution there by Hezbollah, combined with his apparent lack of right to enter Syria, the Gaza Strip or the West Bank, would have brought him within the ambit of Article 1D as interpreted by the CJEU. [74] Canada apparently decided not to apply Article 1D domestically because its government viewed its first sentence as an exclusion clause that could unfairly bar Palestinians registered with UNRWA but who had travelled to Canada from claiming refugee protection here.59 In doing so, it seems to have thrown out the baby with the bath water, given that, as more recently confirmed by the CJEU and the UNHCR, the second sentence operates in international convention law as a strong inclusion clause. [75] As noted, Article 1D is not incorporated in IRPA or other applicable Canadian legislation. There is thus no question of the IRB applying it directly. Article 1D, however, forms part of international conventional law to which Canada is a state party; thus, it is an international obligation. I do not see in IRPA section 96, or elsewhere in that statute, an unambiguous and unequivocal legislative intent to default on this international obligation. The point, then, is that the provisions of IRPA should be applied in a way that avoids a construction that would place Canada in breach of that obligation. A liberal interpretation of those provisions that would encompass persons like Mr. XXXX would avoid such a breach. For greater certainty, this point is not determinative of my favourable decision on his claim; I would have made the same decision without it. Ms. XXXX claim for protection against Jordan - RPD result correct [76] Ms. XXXX alleged a gender-based fear of persecution. She said she would not be able to live with her husband Mr. XXXX or their Canadian-born daughter in Jordan, her only country of nationality, because its law does not allow her to sponsor their immigration there. By contrast, she explained, a male Jordanian would be able to do so. 60. [77] Ms. XXXX wrote that Jordan never issues permission for Palestinians to immigrate to Jordan and remain there legally.61 RPD reasons (Jordan) [78] The RPD held that Ms. XXXX evidence on its face suggested only that she might be discriminated against in Jordan on the basis of her gender, but that there was insufficient corroborating evidence led to establish that this would rise to a level of persecution.62 Appellant's position (Jordan) [79] Counsel submits that: [80] The discrimination Ms. XXXX described can rise to the level of persecution, first because according to s. 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, one's right to found a family shall not be impaired by race, nationality or religion. Further,63 if a state exercises its rights to regulate foreign spousal entry into its territory in a manner that discriminates on grounds specified in IRPA section 96, such discrimination is a factor which needs to be considered in assessing whether a claimant has an objective fear of persecution.64 [81] The RPD member failed to analyze, as was incumbent on him, the traumatic effect that family separation would have.65 [82] Although the Federal Court has not generally recognized separation of family as a ground of persecution in and of itself, here the separation would be by reason of Ms. XXXX gender, which is certainly a basis for refugee protection under Canadian law.66 The 2017, observations by the UN's Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on Jordan's periodic report enumerate that country's discriminatory approach to spousal sponsorship and states that action needs to be taken to correct it.67 Analysis (Jordan) [83] A right to family life or unity is recognized in certain international human rights instruments, such as the UDHR and Article 8 of the European Charter of Human Rights. The RAD concluded in a 2018 decision,68 however, that: [61] Under both international and Canadian law, the principle of family unity alone cannot justify granting a person refugee status,69 and unfortunately, I am bound and limited by this law to consider claims individually and on their own merit on the basis of definitions set out in sections 96 and 97 of the Act. While the Act provides other mechanisms to address the objective of family unification in these circumstances, the reality is that a cloud of uncertainty persists for the family until these mechanisms are exhausted, which can be time consuming. One can only hope that Parliament may properly address these types of cases to ensure expedient processes are in place to keep families together and to promote expeditious integration into Canadian society. [84] That RAD decision, although describing concepts as generally applicable, nevertheless was concerned with a person alleging that Canadian refugee law would require Canada to grant refugee protection to a person whose spouse and child had been granted it, even absent a well-founded fear of persecution on the part of that person in their home country. It was not focused, as in Ms. XXXX case, on an allegation that she faced persecution because her own country of nationality would deny her family unity. In other words, it is not her potential separation from her husband or child by Canadian officials on which she bases her claim; rather it is such separation enforced by officials of her own country from which she claims protection. [85] In a 2015 decision, the RPD found that while the nationality laws of a claimant's country were discriminatory towards women, this did not amount to persecution, as family unity is not a concept recognized by Canadian refugee law. Relying on the decision of the Federal Court in Nakawunde v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 309 at paras 29-30, the RPD also concluded that forced separation of the claimant from her child would not constitute cruel and unusual treatment or punishment pursuant to IRPA section 97. Rather, the RPD held, the claimant's concerns were relevant to humanitarian and compassionate relief under section 25 of the IRPA. [86] In 2017, the Federal Court found that the RPD decision was consistent with the Court's jurisprudence.70 Ultimately, the Court held that while Canadian immigration laws may strive to facilitate family unity in certain circumstances such as those contemplated by section 25 of the IRPA [humanitarian grounds], Canadian refugee law does not recognize any fundamental right for refugee claimants to live together. Moreover, the Court added, the concept of family unity does not relieve a refugee claimant of the onus of demonstrating that they within the definition of "Convention refugee". [87] In the same decision, however, the Court stated, as Counsel indicates, that Canadian jurisprudence also provides that if a state exercises its generally valid right to control immigration and citizenship, but does so in a discriminatory manner which imposes limitations based on one of the enumerated grounds of persecution, such discrimination is a factor to be considered in assessing whether a claimant has an objective fear of persecution.71 [One of the "enumerated grounds of persecution" is membership in a particular social group, which in turn includes gender]. Here, the court echoed a 2006 judgment to the same effect. [88] Reconciling these findings of the Federal Court, my understanding is that a refugee claimant would not establish a risk of persecution in their country of nationality merely because it would not grant permission for their spouse or child to live there, but may establish such a risk, at least in part ("a factor"), if that country discriminates on a Convention ground, such as gender, in doing so. [89] Although issued in the context of claims of entitlement to live in an EU state under the ECHR's Article 8 right to family life, the European Court of Human Rights has found a number of factors to be taken into account in a human rights-based family reunification claim, among which: whether there are insurmountable obstacles in the way of the family living in the country of origin of one or more of them.72 I find that this is an apt criterion for assessing whether Jordanian gender discrimination in matters of immigration may result in an objective fear of persecution. [90] Ms. XXXX did not file any documents about the laws and practices of Jordan regarding its female citizens being able or unable to have their non-Jordanian husbands and children live in that country.73 In the NDP for Jordan, there are a number of documents showing that Jordanian women cannot pass Jordanian nationality on to their spouses or children, while Jordanian men can do so.74 Although discriminatory, that alone would not constitute persecution. In order that the factor of gender discrimination in immigration rise arguably to the level of persecution, the evidence would have to establish at least that Jordanian women would face insurmountable obstacles in law or in practice from having those family members admitted to Jordan to live there. [91] There is limited information touching on this question in the NDP and documents to which it refers. From those I have gleaned that: i. To live in Jordan, Palestinian non-nationals over the age of 16 require a residency permit subject to the approval of the General Intelligence Department.75 ii. Residence permits are issued valid for a year at a time, for the first ten years. They may then be issued for five years at a time.76 iii. As of 2015, there were 89,000 Jordanian women married to non-Jordanian men living in Jordan.77 Apparently, most of those men were Palestinian.78 iv. In September 2018, the Jordanian government revoked the requirement that Jordanian mothers married to foreigners live for five years in Jordan before their children would be entitled to public social, educational and medical benefits.79 There is no indication of a similar policy decision regarding non-Jordanian husbands. v. Adult Palestinian non-Jordanians cannot work in the public service, and have restricted social and property rights.80 vi. There is a limited range of professions legally open to non-Jordanians.81 [92] Mr. XXXX was in Jordan most of the time from XXXX 2017 to XXXX 2017.82 Ms. XXXX was living in Jordan throughout that time.83 The stamps in his travel document indicate that he left and re-entered Jordan several times during that period.84 There is no evidence then that he would be absolutely barred from its territory. [93] As to getting permission to stay there for an extended period: Mr. XXXX wrote in his BOC that between XXXX 2017 and XXXX 2017, he tried to obtain a resident visa in Jordan, but its officials would not issue one for a Palestinian, even though he is married to a Jordanian citizen.85 He was not questioned about this by the RPD. Nonetheless, he mentioned it in his BOC and Ms. XXXX based her claim on her husband's alleged inability to obtain a residency permit. This shows that both of them were alive to the relevance of this problem, and Mr. XXXX alleged fruitless attempts to overcome it, to her claim. That being so, there was no unfairness or error on the part of the RPD in not posing questions about it. The onus was on Ms. XXXX to provide evidence, through her or her husband's testimony, or through corroborating documents, to elaborate on this. She did not. [94] From the partial and indirect evidence, I conclude, on the balance of probabilities, that though Mr. XXXX and the Appellants' child would receive neither Jordanian citizenship nor permanent residence in the short run, it has not been established that there is a serious possibility that they would insurmountably be barred from entering Jordan with Ms. XXXX, nor of remaining there with some status that would allow them to sustain family life and to subsist. [95] In the result, I find that, despite the gender discrimination in Jordan's immigration law and practice, Ms. XXXX has not established a well-founded fear of persecution in her country of nationality. The RPD's result in rejecting her claim for protection was thus correct. [96] Should my positive decision in favour of Mr. XXXX become final, a practical solution to his family remaining together can be found in subsection 176 (1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 [IRP Regulations]. It provides that "[a]n applicant may include in their application to remain in Canada as a permanent resident any of their family members." Mr. XXXX would certainly include Ms. XXXX in such an application as a family member. She and her husband and their Canadian child thus would very likely not be separated merely because she was not granted refugee status and he was. In the event of such a forced separation, the mother would have recourse to the appropriate proceedings. DECISION [97] I dismiss the appeal of XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. The RPD was correct in finding that she is neither a Convention refugees nor a person in need of protection. [98] The appeal of XXXX XXXX is allowed. I substitute my own decision that he is a Convention refugee. (signed) Max Wolpert Max Wolpert August 3, 2020 Date MW/lp 1 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD reasons, at para 8. 2 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD reasons, at paras 12 and 13. 3 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD reasons, at paras 14 and 15. 4 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD reasons, at para 10. 5 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at pp. 17-20 (including exhibit). 6 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at pp. 21 and 22. 7 Subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. 8 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration v. Singh, 2016 FCA 96; Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Raza FC 385. 9 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, Appellants' Memorandum, at para 17. 10 Audio recording 1:04. 11 Audio recording, +/- minute 0:26. 12 Audio recording 1:04. 13 Audio recording 0:38. 14 Audio recording 0:28:30. 15 Audio recording 0:29. 16 Audio recording 1:07 to 1:08. 17 Audio recording 0:28 to 0:31. 18 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, Appellants' Memorandum, at paras 28, 30 and 32; The documentary evidence advises that the Lebanese General Directorate of General Security issues travel documents to Palestinian refugees in Lebanon who are registered with UNRWA, as well as the Lebanese refugee bureau, and who have a General Security authorization. 19 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, Appellants' Memorandum, at paras 29 and 30. 20 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, Appellants' Memorandum, at para 35. 21 Ibid. 22 Thabet v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1998 CanLII 9063 (FCA), [1998] 4 FC 21 23 Maarouf v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 1 F.C. 723 (T.D.) 24 Audio recording, 0:24. 25 Audio recording 1:05 to 1:06. 26 Audio recording 0:24. 27 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD record, BOC at p. 39, question 5 28 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, Affidavit of XXXX XXXX, at p. 17, paras 3 and 4. 29 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD record, Basis of Claim (BOC) of XXXX XXXX, narrative, at p. 38, para 7. 30 Al-Khateeb v. M.C.I., 2017 FC 31 31 Thabet v. M.C.I., 1998 CanLII 9063 (FCA), paragraph 28 32 Item 2.1, s.7(e). 33 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD record, at pp. 165 and 166. 34 Thabet v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1998 CanLII 9063 (FCA), [1998] 4 FC 21, at paragraph 30; Zaqout v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 779 (CanLII), paragraph 23. 35 e.g., National Documentation Package (NDP), Lebanon, 31 March 2020, tab 7.1: ?Hizballah. Country Reports on Terrorism 2018. United States. Department of State. October 2019, page 2; National Documentation Package, Lebanon, 31 March 2020, tab 7.9: ?Hezbollah. Stanford University. Mapping Militant Organizations. July 2019, page 9, para 4. 36 Audio recording 0:54 to 1:03. 37 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD reasons, at para 14. 38 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD reasons, at para 15. 39 Thabet v. M.C.I., 1998 CanLII 9063 (FCA), at para 32. 40 Earl Warren, former Chief Justice of the US Supreme Court. 41 Maryellen Fullerton, The Intersection of Statelessness and Refugee Protection in US Asylum Policy, Journal on Migration and Human Security, Volume: 2, issue: 3, page(s): 144-164, at p. 145. 42 Ibid. 43 Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 SCR 689, section headed 'Unable/Unwilling 44 H. Storey, International Journal of Refugee Law, Volume 32, Issue 1 March 2020, Pages 174-180, https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eeaa004. 45 e.g., X (Re), 2018 CanLII 141812 (CA IRB), paragraphs 19 and 23 46 Thabet v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 4 F.C. 21 (Can.); see also Revenko v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2000] E.W.C.A. Civ. 500 (U.K.), Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v. Savvin (2000), F.C.A. 478 (Austl.), Refugee Status Appeals Authority, Appeal No. 72635/01 (2002) (N.Z.), and R v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, Ex parte Adan, [1999] 1 A.C. 293 (H.L.). 47 Compare Refugee Convention Article 1A(2): owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it; with IRPA section 96: A Convention refugee is a person who, by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion, * (a) is outside each of their countries of nationality and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of each of those countries; or * (b) not having a country of nationality, is outside the country of their former habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to return to that country. 48 "A [stateless person] does not need to show a well-founded fear of being persecuted upon his eventual return ...[he] need only substantiate that he is unable to return to the country in question, in order to win recognition as a refugee." Atle Grahl-Madsen, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 261 (A.W. Sijthoff 1966); See also Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Report on Behalf of the Appellant, July 23, 2000, prepared for Revenko v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't United Kingdom: Court of Appeal (England and Wales), July 31, 2000, paragraphs 36-40; see also Heather Alexander and Jonathan Simon, "Unable to Return" in the 1951 Refugee Convention: Stateless Refugees and Climate Change. 26 FLA. J. INT'L L. 3 531-574 (2014); See also, confirming this but also contra, M. Foster and H. Lambert, International Refugee Law and the Protection of Stateless Persons, (2019, Oxford University Press), page 92. 49 https://www.unhcr.org/protection/basic/3b73b0d63/states-parties-1951-convention-its-1967-protocol.html 50 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, New York, 28 September 1954, in force 6 June 1960, 360 UNTS 117. 51 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, New York, 30 August 1961, in force 13 December 1975, 989 UNTS 175. 52 The secondary reasons given are: Canadian law contains all necessary safeguards to cover adequately the situation of stateless persons (for dissenting views, see: A. Brouwer, Statelessness in the Canadian Context, UNHCR, March 2012; Joint Submission to the Human Rights Council at the 30th Session of the Universal Periodic Review (Third Cycle, May 2018) by the Canadian Centre on Statelessness and the Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, 5 October 2017); and: Canada has concerns that ratification and subsequent inclusion in Canadian legislation of specific provisions governing the status of stateless persons would encourage stateless persons to come to Canada from other countries (the "pull-factor") and would encourage persons already in Canada to renounce their citizenship. 53 Canadian Centre on Statelessness, http://www.statelessness.ca/advocacy.html, accessed July 8, 2020. 54 Canadian Centre on Statelessness Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, Joint Submission to the Human Rights Council at the 30th Session of the Universal Periodic Review, May 2018, at para 17, http://www.statelessness.ca/uploads/3/1/9/0/31903945/isi_-_upr_submission_canada.pdf, accessed July 8, 2020. 55 R. v. Hape, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292, 2007 SCC 26, at paras 53 and 54. 56 Article 1D of the 1951 Convention provides: This Convention shall not apply to persons who are at present receiving from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees protection or assistance. When such protection or assistance has ceased for any reason, without the position of such persons being definitively settled in accordance with the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, these persons shall ipso facto be entitled to the benefits of this Convention. 57 Abed El Karem El Kott and Others (C-364/11, EU:C:2012:826). 58 For further support that Article 1D requires an interpretation at least as broad as that set out by the CJEU, see the UNHCR's 2012 Revised Statement on Article 1D of the 1951 Convention and its 2017 Call for comments on: Applicability of Article 1D of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees to Palestinian Refugees. 59 See e.g., El-Bahisi v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1994), 72 F.T.R. 117 (T.D.) in which the Federal Court concluded that Article 1D should be interpreted as an exclusion clause that applies only in the areas where UNRWA operates, and hence Palestinians in Canada are entitled to apply for refugee protection. 60 Audio recording 0:28 to 0:29 and 1:08. 61 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD record, at p. 11, question 2(c). 62 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD reasons, at para 10. 63 Citing MCI v. Hamdan et al, 2006 FC 290 at para 24. 64 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, Appellants' Memorandum, at paras 22-24. 65 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, Appellants' Memorandum, at para 25. 66 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, Appellants' Memorandum, at para 26. 67 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, Appellants' Memorandum, at para 27 ; National Documentation Package, Jordan, 31 March 2020, tab 5.3: ?Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Jordan. United Nations. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. 9 March 2017. CEDAW/C/JOR/CO/6. 68 X (Re), 2018 CanLII 133248 (CA IRB). 69 UNHCR Handbook, para 184; Akinfolajimi, v. M.C.I., 2018 FC 722, paragraphs 5, and 30-33; Dawlatly v. M.C.I., 1998 CanLII 7952 (Fed. Ct.); Casetellanos v. Canada (Solicitor General), 1994 CanLII 3546; Teluwo v. M.C.I., 2016 FC 1274, para 23. See also Nazari v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 561 at para 20. 70 Nazari v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 561 (CanLII), at para 21. 71 Ibid., at para 18. 72 Guide on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights - Right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence, updated 31 December 2019, at p. 76, para 345. 73 Her former counsel presented the RPD at its hearing with a number of country condition documents. Whether any of these dealt with this issue was not mentioned. The RPD did not accept them, but rather instructed counsel to pare them down to no more than 100 pages and file them after the hearing. Former counsel later wrote to the RPD advising that he would not be filing anything. 74 e.g., National Documentation Package, Jordan, 31 March 2020, tab 13.1: ?Jordan. DFAT Thematic Report: Palestinians in Jordan and Lebanon. Australia. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 2 March 2015, paragraph 3.38 75 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, NDP for Jordan (31 March 2020), tab 3.3: Palestinians and Jordanian citizenship. Middle East Monitor. Sawsan Ramahi. December 2015, p. 9. 76 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, NDP for Jordan (31 March 2020), tab 3.5: ?Availability of permanent residence for foreign investors and business owners, including rights for those individuals (2015-November 2016). Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 28 November 2016. JOR105694.E., Attachment: Law No. 24 of 1973 on Residence and Foreigners' Affairs, Chapter 3. 77 Jordan's sixth national periodic report to the CEDAW committee (2015), page 26. This is the report which led to National Documentation Package, Jordan, 31 March 2020, tab 5.3: ?Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Jordan. United Nations. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. 9 March 2017. CEDAW/C/JOR/CO/6, which counsel cites and that was also in the NDP version before the RPD. 78 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, NDP for Jordan (31 March 2020), tab 13.1: ?Jordan. DFAT Thematic Report: Palestinians in Jordan and Lebanon. Australia. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 2 March 2015, section 3. 79 RIR. JOR106168.EF, le 7 novembre 2018, p. 3. 80 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, NDP for Jordan (31 March 2020), tab 13.2: Rights and obligations of Palestinians living in Jordan without Jordanian citizenship, not including Palestinian refugees fleeing Syria since 2011, including employment, mobility and access to social services (2013-May 2014). Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 9 May 2014. JOR104860.E. 81 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, NDP for Jordan (31 March 2020), tab 14.1: Migration Profile: Jordan. European University Institute. Migration Policy Centre. Françoise De Bel-Air. November 2016. 82 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Schedule A, question 12, at p. 107. 83 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Schedule A, question 12, at p. 51. 84 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Travel document at pp. 111-113. 85 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 37, para 4. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB8-18893 TB8-18894 RAD.25.02 (January 2020) Disponible en français 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (January 2020) Disponible en français