Bouttavong v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)

Bouttavong v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)

Prior danger opinions under the former Immigration Act are irrelevant to danger-to-public determinations under IRPA s.113(d)(i) because such opinions are only admissible for their original statutory purpose and, given the passage of time and new facts, they do not create collateral consequences that prevent a...

Source-derived case information.

Citation
2005 FCA 341
Parties
Appellant: Mysay Bouttavong; Respondent: The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration
Court
Federal Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction
Canada
Judgment Date
18 October 2005
Procedural Posture
Appeal to Federal Court of Appeal / Decision on Certified Question and Mootness
Outcome
Appeal dismissed; certified question answered in the affirmative
Legal Topics
Public Danger Opinions, Mootness, Judicial Review, Pre Removal Risk Assessment, Inadmissibility for Serious Criminality
Source Language
en
Immigration Law Administrative Law Public Law Public Danger Opinions Mootness Judicial Review Pre Removal Risk Assessment Inadmissibility for Serious Criminality

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Parties

Mysay Bouttavong

Appellant

The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration

Respondent

Procedural Posture

Appeal to Federal Court of Appeal / Decision on Certified Question and Mootness

  1. 1 Whether danger opinions issued under the former Immigration Act are moot in light of IRPA provisions
  2. 2 Whether collateral consequences from prior danger opinions can influence IRPA s.113(d)(i) determinations
  3. 3 Whether the trial judge properly declined to exercise discretion to hear a moot judicial review

Ratio Decidendi

Prior danger opinions under the former Immigration Act are irrelevant to danger-to-public determinations under IRPA s.113(d)(i) because such opinions are only admissible for their original statutory purpose and, given the passage of time and new facts, they do not create collateral consequences that prevent a finding of mootness; accordingly the trial judge correctly found the judicial review moot and properly declined to hear it.

Court Disposition

Appeal dismissed; certified question answered in the affirmative

Orders

  • Appeal dismissed
  • Certified question answered in the affirmative