N.P. v. I.V.

2013 BCSC 1323 N.P. v. I.V.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: N.P. v. I.V., 2013 BCSC 1323 Date: 20130725 Docket: E24057 Registry: New Westminster Between: N.P. Claimant And I.V. Respondent Before: The Honourable Mr. Justice N. Brown Reasons for Judgment Counsel for Claimant: M.A. Cook Counsel for Respondent: M.V. Weremchuk Place and Date of Hearing: New Westminster, B.C. March 7, 2013 Place and Date of Judgment: New Westminster, B.C. July 25, 2013 Table of Contents I. Overview.. 3 II. Previous orders. 4 III. Respondent's delay in bringing this application. 5 IV. Variation of child Support obligation and cancellation of arrears. 6 A. Has M. ever been a child of the marriage?. 7 B. Change in circumstances. 16 C. Imputed income. 18 V. Restraining or protection order. 22 A. Basis for restraining order 22 VI. Parenting arrangements. 29 VII. Costs. 34 I. Overview [1] The parties seek opposing orders. Ms. N.P. is the claimant. Mr. I.V., her former husband, is the respondent. [2] The parties married in 1997 and divorced on June 12, 2006, via desk order. [3] The divorce order mentions two children of the marriage. I., born January 23, 2004; and M., who is a child of the former marriage of the claimant, born June 29, 1992, making him 19 as of June 29, 2011. [4] The respondent's December 6, 2012 application seeks orders that: 1. the Director of Maintenance Enforcement hold in trust any money

received in respect of the order for the divorce granted June 12, 2006, until further order of court; 2. the June 12, 2006 order be varied retroactively as follows: a) child support be paid only for I.; b) the respondent's child support obligations be recalculated and based on the applicant's actual Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175 [Guidelines] income, instead of $48,000; 3. variation of para. 4 of the June 12, 2006 order to read: a) the respondent shall have reasonable and generous access to [I.] including the respondent's days off and/or every other weekend from Friday at 3 p.m. to Monday at 8 a.m., including statutory holidays, one half of all school holidays, including one month during the summer; 4. starting December 2012, the respondent to be at liberty to travel with the child within and outside Canada upon giving the claimant reasonable notice and travel details; 5. the claimant and respondent shall have joint guardianship of I.; 6. the claimant is to be restrained from removing I.'s residence from the Lower Mainland of British Columbia; and 7. costs. [5] In her January 11, 2013 application, the claimant applies for a restraining order in the terms set out in her notice of application. [6] The respondent says M. was never a child of the marriage. II. Previous orders [7] The June 12, 2006 order granted sole custody and guardianship to the claimant. It also

required the respondent to pay monthly child support of $725 for both children, who were described in the order as "children of the marriage", until neither were any longer a "child of the marriage" as defined by the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.) [DA]. Access was to be reasonable and generous, with at least 48 hours' notice of the time of the respondent's intended access. [8] On February 21, 2013, Justice Crawford ordered that by 4:00 p.m. on February 26, 2013, the respondent would provide a copy of his application for mortgage of the condominium he had bought in 2006, situated at 101 - 410 Carnarvon Street, New Westminster, B.C. He was also required to provide financial documents for his purchase of the condominium. The order granted the respondent Skype access on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays at 6:30 p.m. for no longer than 30 minutes, requiring him to connect with I. by 6:45 p.m. [9] During the present hearing, it soon became obvious the parties agreed on few facts. Although facts set out in the affidavits conflicted on so many issues, they did provide enough bases on which to make findings and orders. III. Respondent's delay in bringing this application [10] Although not clearly articulated this way, I understand the respondent seeks to excuse his delay in seeking an order to vary the child support order based on his failure to appreciate the significance

of the documents the claimant served on him in March 2006. The respondent says in his December 3, 2012 affidavit that he does not remember when he received the divorce order, and did not know he could challenge it. He states he was depressed at the time and says he nonetheless tried to keep up with the payments. The record of payments kept by the Family Maintenance Enforcement Program ("FMEP") suggests a somewhat haphazard effort to keep up with payments. [11] In para. 2 of his affidavit, the respondent describes a meeting with the claimant the evening of March 30, 2006, in a New Westminster café. He says that during their meeting, a man (the process server) approached and handed him an envelope, saying it was for him. According to the respondent, the process server put it on a seat next to him, they argued, and then the respondent left the envelope on the chair. [12] In her second affidavit, sworn January 10, 2013, the claimant says she specifically met with the respondent to serve documents for a court hearing. She recalled the process server had been attempting to serve the documents without success. She states that she explained to the respondent what he was being served with, but the respondent focused his attention on asking her to change her mind about a divorce and urging that they live together again. Whether the respondent left behind the envelope containing the

documents she could not say; but she does state that he definitely knew what it was. [13] The claimant argues the respondent was represented by counsel between February 1, 2006 and March 23, 2006. She points to correspondence between counsel up to that date. The respondent, however, says that he saw counsel on only one occasion and never returned. [14] Attached as Exhibit "B" to the claimant's affidavit is a letter dated June 26, 2006, written by the claimant's counsel, addressed to the respondent at 509 Carnarvon Street, New Westminster. The letter enclosed a copy of the June 12, 2006 order. I cannot find from the materials presented where that New Westminster address came from, but the respondent did not reprove its correctness. Sometime in July 2006 is likely the beginning of the period when the respondent could have applied to redress shortcomings in the June 12, 2006 order. [15] The claimant further deposes that the respondent mentioned to her sometime after 2007 that he had received several letters from FMEP and that due to his failure to pay child support, he had lost his driver's licence. As such, by then he would have been aware of the nature of his support obligations. [16] The respondent does not deny he received a copy of the order, but maintains he did not realize he could challenge it. He says his English was not good enough to deal with a court proceeding. Even

so, I note his resume touts English as one of his languages spoken. He could have written a letter and, after all, seven years have passed since granting of the order. [17] I find the June 12, 2006 order was duly served on the respondent. IV. Variation of child Support obligation and cancellation of arrears [18] The respondent says that the $48,000 annual income assigned to him in the June 2006 order is incorrect. He says he has not earned that much income since June 12, 2006, when the divorce and ancillary relief was granted. In 2008, he suffered a workplace accident and injured his right ankle. Between 2008 and 2011, he has been on Workers' Compensation Board ("WCB") disability. [19] When the claimant enrolled with FMEP on September 14, 2007, arrears already stood at $12,325. By December 2012, they were $14,237.87. The first direct payment made by the respondent was November 14, 2007. It appears the respondent was already in arrears by the time of the divorce order. As of March 5, 2013, arrears stood at $17,978.30. [20] The respondent also seeks a decrease of his monthly child support obligations on the grounds that M. is not and never has been a child of the marriage. A. Has M. ever been a child of the marriage? [21] In his December 3, 2012 second affidavit, the respondent says that when he met the claimant in 1996, she already had M., a child from a previous marriage. The

parties married a year later, in Latvia. [22] The parties' telling of the nature and extent of their cohabitation is unusual and somewhat unclear. The respondent submits the history of the parties' relationship establishes M. is not now, and never has been a child of the marriage. [23] The respondent initially suggested the parties never cohabited during the marriage. In 1997, they immigrated to Canada; they lived separately in Toronto, Ontario. They did not live together there. Within about one year, he says, the claimant moved to Vancouver to work. For the next five years, he remained in Toronto and drove a truck on long-distance routes. [24] In 2001, both agree that the claimant moved from Vancouver to Indiana, U.S.A., to work. She left M. in the care of her parents until she got settled. The respondent acknowledges going to Indiana in 2002 and "continuing to see" the claimant, but denies he worked there, except for cash jobs. I., the only child born of the marriage, was born in Indiana on January 23, 2004. [25] When I. was eight months old, the claimant left the respondent and returned to Vancouver. The respondent returned to Toronto. After mentioning some other moves and changes, he summarizes his position regarding his relationship with M. at para. 21 of his second affidavit: 21. [M.] and I have never lived in the same household. I did not stand in a place of a parent to

[M.] I did not live with him, provide for him, discipline him or spend any time with him. What contact I have with [M.] now, is not a positive experience. I often try to see my son in the morning when he is being taken to school. Sometimes it is [M.] who walks him to school. [M.] does not allow [I.] to speak to me, tells me to leave, calls me names, such as "stupid" in front of [I.], and is generally being disrespectful to me in front of [I.] [26] In her January 10, 2013 responding affidavit, the claimant deposes that M. lived with the parties in Indiana between June 2003 and August 2004. [27] Attached to her affidavit as Exhibit "C" is a statement from M.'s biological father, signed before an official administrator in Riga, Latvia. In it, the biological father states that he has surrendered his parental rights over his son M., that he would not take any further interest in M.'s life, and that he did not object to M. being adopted by another family. The claimant says that when the parties married, the respondent knew M.'s biological father had given up his parental rights. [28] The respondent was aware of the biological father and of the document he signed, but he dismisses it as a document prepared just for immigration purposes. [29] The claimant deposes that the respondent asked her to reconcile before the parties began to live together in Indiana between 2003 and 2004, which

appears to be the first time the parties had cohabitated since their marriage. [30] The claimant says she set conditions for reconciliation that the respondent had to agree to before she would agree to resume their relationship. One of the conditions was that the respondent would do his best to be a father to M. The claimant deposes that the respondent promised to do so. [31] Somewhat inconsistent with other statements about the nature of his work activities in Indiana, the respondent states he worked for cash in Indiana. I note that he was charged with a battery of his employer in November 2004; with respect to that offence, the claimant posted $2,500 bond. A document reflecting this transaction was marked as Exhibit "G". [32] The claimant deposes in her January 10, 2013 affidavit that the parties' relationship began gradually to deteriorate in Indiana. She says the respondent became increasingly aggressive and abusive towards her and M., particularly after the birth of I., in August 2004. For the protection of M. and her mother, who was living with them then, the claimant deposed that she sent M. and her mother to Vancouver. [33] The respondent's initial litigation position was that he had never lived in the same household with either M. or the claimant. He then resiled somewhat from that position and said he lived with the claimant in Indiana; but he maintained his denial

that he never lived with M., except for a couple of months, when both the maternal grandparents were visiting. [34] I note, however, that M.'s school records in Indiana list the respondent as a parent, and that the respondent claimed M. as a dependent in his 2003 and 2004 U.S. tax returns. These documents and some photographs exhibited by the claimant do not support the respondent's position. [35] The June 12, 2006 order, which I find was duly served on the respondent, refers to M. as a child of the marriage and required the respondent to pay child support of $725 monthly, until such time as each child was a no longer a child of the marriage, as defined by the DA. [36] Evidence of the nature and extent of the parties' cohabitations since their marriage in 1992 is somewhat unusual. For much of their marriage, the parties lived separate and apart. This obviously impacted the nature and extent of the respondent's parental involvement with M. What follows is a brief summary of the main details of the parties' cohabitation: a) After their marriage, in August 1997, the claimant was hospitalized for eight months. Her parents cared for M. while the respondent lived with his parents. The claimant states at para. 37 of her second affidavit that the respondent visited her once during this time. She says she planned to divorce, but that the respondent begged her to "forgive him and

promise[d] to change everything." b) In October 1998, the parties arrived in Toronto, where they decided to remain separate until their relationship improved. They continued, however, to see each other almost every day. It was a difficult time financially. The respondent provided the claimant with some financial support. c) In May 1999, the claimant received an employment offer from a pharmaceutical company in Vancouver, where she worked for a number of years. She moved to Vancouver with M. The respondent did not wish to move to Vancouver and remained in Toronto. d) The claimant says she did not see the respondent for several years thereafter. At para. 12 of his second affidavit, the respondent says he spoke with the claimant on the phone. He asserts that the claimant was living with another man in Vancouver and states that whenever he called the claimant, a man stated he was her husband and told the respondent not to call. The claimant says there was no contact between the parties during this period, but that in 2001, the respondent called her told her he was in Vancouver, and that he wanted to come to see her. She refused and asked for a divorce. e) At para. 41 of her second affidavit, the claimant says that in September 2002, she moved to Indianapolis to take advantage of an opportunity offered her by the pharmaceutical company she was working for in Vancouver. The company

sponsored her for permanent residency in the U.S. She said her parents agreed to care for M. while she settled in Indianapolis, and that M. would join her in a few months. f) The claimant says she met with the respondent in Toronto in November 2002, when they decided to try and reconcile their relationship. g) The parties cohabitated from November 2002 until the end of November 2004. The parties do not agree on the nature and extent of that cohabitation. Considering the evidence as a whole, I find they were living as a married couple. h) The claimant states the parties agreed mutually that M. would finish his school year in Vancouver and join them as a permanent resident in June 2002. i) The claimant deposes that at first, the relationship between the respondent and M. in Indiana was good. She says M. and the respondent spent a lot of time together swimming and playing hockey. The respondent denies ever having lived in the same household with M. j) The claimant alleges that the respondent became abusive, particularly after I. was born. When in August 2004 the respondent travelled to Florida for a few weeks looking for work, the claimant, sent M. and her mother to Vancouver for "their safety". She states that when the respondent returned from Florida in September 2004, she asked for a divorce, which the respondent refused. k) At para. 17 of his second affidavit, the respondent

says he was in Toronto looking for a place to live for him the claimant and I. and that when he returned to Indiana, the claimant, in his absence, had left for Vancouver. Speaking to why she left for Vancouver when the respondent was in Toronto, the claimant states at paras. 52-53 of her second affidavit: 52. I came to realization that the only way I could stop that was to leave him which meant quitting my job. I didn't see any future in our relationships after all what happened and was very scared to live with the respondent in the same city. 53. [W]hen the respondent went to Toronto to visit his family in November of 2004, I quit my job and left her Vancouver. I didn't tell the respondent about my plan. I did lead him to believe that I was going to move to Toronto with him as I was afraid that he would never let me go if I told him the truth. My life was a nightmare. [37] Section 2 of the DA defines a child of the marriage as follows: "child of the marriage" means a child of two spouses or former spouses who, at the material time, (a) is under the age of majority and who has not withdrawn from their charge, or (b) is the age of majority or over and under their charge but unable, by reason of illness, disability or other cause, to withdraw from their charge or to obtain the necessaries of life. [38] Section 2(2) of the DA states: (2) For the purposes of the definition "child

of the marriage" in subsection (1), a child of two spouses or former spouses includes (a) any child for whom they both stand in the place of parents; and (b) any child of whom one is the parent and for whom the other stands in the place of a parent. [39] Section 15.1 of the DA states: 15.1 (1) A court of competent jurisdiction may, on application by either or both spouses, make an order requiring a spouse to pay for the support of any or all children of the marriage. [40] The respondent relies on Chartier v. Chartier, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 242 [Chartier]. This is the only authority referred to by either counsel. [41] As summarized in the head note, Chartier holds: A person cannot unilaterally withdraw from a relationship in which he or she stands in the place of a parent. The court must look to the nature of the relationship to determine if a person in fact does stand in the place of a parent to a child. [42] At paras. 36-37, of Chartier, the Court stated: [36] The existence of the parental relationship under s. 2(2)(b) of the Divorce Act must however be determined as of the time the family functioned as a unit. See Julien D. Payne, Payne on Divorce (4th ed. 1996), at p.

148. If the "material time" was to be interpreted as in Hock, supra, it would be difficult to find a parental relationship in situations where the step-parent has little contact with the child between the separation and the divorce proceedings. This is inconsistent with the purpose of the Divorce Act. [37] The facts of the present case demonstrate why this interpretation is appropriate. Until Mr. Chartier's unilateral withdrawal from the relationship, Jessica saw the respondent as her father in every way. He was the only father she knew. To allow him to withdraw from that relationship, as long as he does it before the petition for divorce, is unacceptable. The breakdown of the parent/child relationship after separation is not a relevant factor in determining whether or not a person stands in the place of a parent for the purposes of the Divorce Act. Jessica was as much a part of the family unit as Jeena and should not be treated differently from her because the spouses separated. The "material time" factor does not affect the determination of the parental relationship. It simply applies to the age considerations that are a precondition to the determination of need. [Emphasis added.] [43] For sake of comparison, I note s. 147(4), of the Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c. 25 [FLA] provides that a child's stepparent does not have to provide support for the child unless the stepparent

contributed to the support of the child for at least one year and a proceeding for an order for support has been started within one year after the stepparent last contributed to the support of the child. Significantly, the triggering of obligations flowing from a stepparent to a child in the breakdown of a formalized marriage is not subject to the temporal requirements arising in a non-marriage relationship. The less restrictive triggering of obligations in a marriage relationship accords with the commensurate level of commitment, the policies and values reflected in the DA and contemporary Canadian society. [44] At para. 40 of Chartier, the Court noted that: [40] [N]ot every adult-child relationship will be determined to be one where the adult stands in the place of the parent. Every case must be determined on its own facts and it must be established from the evidence that the adult acted so as to stand in the place of a parent to the child. [45] At para. 39, the Court discussed some of the factors that determine the obligations of a person standing in place of a parent. In assessing the nature of the relationship between a person and the child the Court noted that the intention of the person is a relevant consideration. Intention need not be expressed formally and can be inferred from one's actions. Even expressed intentions may sometimes change. The Court emphasized that the

"actual fact of forming a new family is a key factor in drawing an inference that the step-parent treats the child as a member of his or her family". Other factors the Court enumerated include: · whether the child participates in the extended family in the same way as would a biological child; · whether the person provides financially for the child; · whether the person disciplines the child as a parent; · whether the person represents to the child, the family, the world, either explicitly or implicitly, that he or she is responsible as a parent of the child; · the nature or existence of the child's relationship with the absent biological parent. [46] It is important to note the Court affirmed at para. 39: [39] The manifestation of the intention of the step-parent cannot be qualified as to duration, or be otherwise made conditional or qualified, even if this intention is manifested expressly. Once it is shown that the child is to be considered, in fact, a "child of the marriage", the obligations of the step-parent towards him or her are the same as those relative to a child born of the marriage with regard to the application of the Divorce Act. [Emphasis added.] [47] Relevant considerations in the present case are as follows: The respondent was well aware of the presence of M. in the claimant's life before he married her. While the respondent objects that the biological

father's letter abjuring any interest in M. was written only for immigration purposes, in my view, that does not lessen the significance of the parties' having formed a new family, one that included M., whose biological father had effectively withdrawn from his life. As a condition of the claimant resuming a marital relationship with the respondent in Indiana in 2003, I find the respondent promised the claimant that he would try his best to be a father to M. Such a stipulation by the claimant consists with the nature of the parties' relationship to that time. The respondent has paid child support to two children, albeit in arrears, since 2006 and he took no steps to unsettle the June 12, 2006 order for 7 years. It appears the respondent was legally served with the divorce papers in March 2006; even if not, I find he had actual knowledge he was obligated to pay support for two children of the marriage. Had he wished to unsettle the characterization of his relationship with M. as a "child of the marriage", he ought to have given the claimant notice and applied long before now. In my view, the respondent's failure to provide notice for 7 years weakens his litigation position. [48] The Court in Chartier highlighted, at para. 22, Kerans J.A.'s rejection of Carignan v. Carignan (1989), 61 Man. R. (2d) 66 (C.A.) in Theriault v. Theriault (1994), 149 A.R. 210 (C.A.). Kerans J.A. noted

that once someone "has made an unconditional commitment to stand in the place of a parent" a court's jurisdiction pursuant to the DA is triggered and not lost by a subsequent disavowal of the child by the parent. Kerans J.A. also noted at p. 213 that "a refusal of medical care, or affection, or comfort, or any other need of a child" is akin to a refusal or avoidance of financial responsibility. [49] From that passage, I infer that a finding that a stepparent who has given a child no affection, no comfort, nor met some other of their needs since their first having assumed the office of a parent, cannot debar the Court from a determination that they are a person standing in the office of parent. In other words, the parent-child relationship need not be a model one. Otherwise, every person in such office who neglected their duties could rely on that very neglect to dodge the obligations flowing from standing in the place of a parent. As Kerans J.A. also pointed out at p. 213, "Financial responsibility is simply one of the many aspects of the office of parent." [50] The respondent's delay in bringing his application is a significant consideration. I cannot see that a purported weakness with English should be seen as an impediment to the respondent's applying earlier. He had at least conferred with counsel as at March 2006, to whom he logically could have turned if bothered by the

fact of his paying support for two children upon discovery that the divorce order obliged him to do so. He could have written a letter to the claimant setting out his position. The respondent was silent for too long. [51] I find that when the respondent married the claimant he assumed the place of a parent. It may appear difficult on first looking to see how the relationship between M. and the respondent could be characterized as one of a person standing in place of a parent when the respondent was so seldom physically present in M.'s life. He was absent from M's life, except when the parties lived as a family in Indiana, where I. was born; and, after which, the respondent became increasingly abusive towards both the claimant and M. Given such sparse evidence of cohabitation in the map of the marriage, it is obvious that long periods passed with minimal contact between the respondent and M. [52] Nevertheless, I find the respondent promised to do his best to be a father to M. before he resumed cohabitation with the claimant for two years ending in 2004. I accept the claimant's evidence that the respondent spent considerable time with M., swimming and playing hockey. I also find that over the period the parties lived in Indianapolis, the respondent became increasingly abusive, which in course led the claimant to give up her pharmaceutical job, which she valued, and choose to

return to Vancouver. [53] It is not clear why the parties stopped lived together as a family, except for the two-year period in Indiana. I find the most likely cause was the respondent's abusive behaviour towards the claimant. When the parties first immigrated to Canada, the respondent provided the claimant with financial support; and, to that extent, exercised the office of a parent towards M. He has also paid child support for M. as a child of the marriage pursuant to the divorce order without protest until this application. These payments, while in arrears to some degree, are some evidence of the respondent's acceptance of his obligations. Further still, the respondent's lack of protest of the court order suggests he recognized he owed parental duties to M. [54] As pointed out in Chartier, the respondent's pattern of contact with M. does not loosen him of all obligations to provide the financial support called for in the circumstances. The respondent had assumed some financial responsibility when he married the claimant, when they reconciled and also following the divorce order. [55] I find the respondent did stand in the place of a parent to M. The duration of his child support obligations is assessed later in these reasons. B. Change in circumstances [56] To obtain an order retroactively varying child support, the applicant must show a change in circumstances: s. 17(4) of

the DA. [57] In Dutrisac v. Ulm, 2000 BCCA 334 at para. 22, the Court of Appeal clarified the effect of Chartier: [22] In my view, Chartier has no effect on the issue dealt with in cases such as Sharratt and Beatty. In holding that a person who stands in the place of a parent cannot unilaterally terminate that status, the Supreme Court said nothing about the power of a court, under either the Divorce Act or provincial legislation, to grant a reduction of the amount of child support required to be paid by a stepparent. In my view, nothing in Chartier would preclude an order reducing the quantum of the obligation to zero if, in all the circumstances, that was found to be appropriate. [58] I view this passage as properly applying to a judge's discretion to consider retroactively varying child support; such discretion should not be confined to prospective support payments. [59] The questions of the quantum and duration of support a stepparent ought to that has continued to "'vex"' trial judges: per Kloegman J. in Babcock v. Meyrink, 2012 BCSC 1289 [Babcock], at para. 35. [60] As noted by Southin J.A. Beatty v. Beatty (1997), 33 B.C.L.R. (3d) 247 (C.A.) at para. 14:one of the troubling situations arises when a stepparent is expected to support a child who wants nothing to do them them: [14] The question of the extent to which someone who is not a parent either by blood or adoption

should continue to be held responsible, perhaps for years, for children who may have no interest in him or her at all and whose natural parent may have acquired a new spouse, is a troubling one which appears to be arising more frequently and is deserving of more than cursory attention. It is not a question to be answered by the "blunt instrument" approach. [61] In Babcock at para. 42, Kloegman J. noted some relevant factors applicable to this case when determining the proper amount of child support. These include length of the union and the lack of contact between the stepparent and the child - whether due to the failure of the children or the claimant, or both, to maintain contact. Also relevant is the standard of living the child enjoyed during the relationship with the stepparent and whether the biological parent pays any child support. [62] Considering the circumstances in this case, I find the respondent is obliged to pay child support for M. from the date of M.'s eighteenth birthday, on July 29, 2010. This finding is based mainly on the change in circumstances of the respondent's relationship, or lack thereof, with M. What contact there has been over the years has been negative: see para. 25 above. The claimant has not shown any interest in facilitating a relationship between M. and the respondent. The evidence does not reveal that M. had a continuing financial need or

that she could not support M. in recent years. [63] By July 29, 2010, the severed relationship between the respondent and M. had lasted long enough to characterize it as a material change in circumstances. C. Imputed income [64] The respondent's income, based on the unclear evidence provided has been: Year: Gross Income: Net Income: 2005 $45,649.40 $16,297.40 2006 $31,000.46 $16,676.96 2007 $14,868.87 $14,576.00 2008 $40,191.07 ($16,488.02 from WCB) 2009 $40,455.78 (including WCB) 2010 $44,248.80 ($40,293.80 from WCB; $4,850 from Graham Montessori Inc.) 2011 $41,080.12 (entirely from WCB) [65] As for the accuracy of the $48,000 figure for the respondent's annual income assumed in the divorce order, the respondent challenges its accuracy. He submits the WCB and his employer between them determined what his earnings were, and he had no say in setting the amount. In my view, however, that bespeaks an independent reliable figure, unless the employer was motivated to exaggerate the figure. I also note that disability benefits represented what the respondent would have received, net of taxes, based on his employment history. [66] When the figures for 2009 to 2011 are adjusted accordingly, the respondent's gross income falls within the range of $50,000 to $55,000. [67] The income between the years 2005 and 2008, which averages about $16,400, is unlikely to be truly representative of

the net financial benefit received by the respondent from his earnings during those periods. His earnings in 2009 are $40,455, which suggests the figure for the respondent's earnings in previous years must have been higher than the amount that the respondent calculated and declared for tax purposes. [68] In January 2012, the claimant's WCB disability benefits ceased. [69] As of March 5, 2013, the respondent had paid the claimant child support of $38,732. Arrears, inclusive of interest, were $17,978.30. [70] The respondent's annual FMEP payments are listed below: 2008 $7,714.93 2009 $9,570.00 2010 $8,541.92 2011 $10,898.31 2012 $1,241.82 [71] The respondent's form F8, filed December 6, 2012, states his income was $16,610 and his expenses $40,992. He lists unsecured debts totaling $97,000, which includes a debt he owed to his sister for a down payment on a condominium. For assets, he lists a condominium in New Westminster owned as at November 29, 2012. The mortgage held by the RBC is listed at $226,000. The market value listed on the freehold transfer is $240,000. The down payment is listed as $24,000, with the mortgage listed at $216,000, presumably after having taken into account a credit for a CMHC high ratio mortgage at $10,800. The monthly mortgage statement is listed at $1,371.20. [72] It is doubtful the bank would have approved a mortgage based on August 14, 2006 declared

earnings of $16,000. [73] Further, among the February 21, 2013 document-production orders made by Justice Crawford is one that requires the respondent to produce a copy of his application to the RBC for a mortgage on the condominium he purchased. His failure to do so does not stand in good stead the respondent's transparency, which, got an applicant seeking to cancel arrears, must leave no room for doubt. This calls for the drawing of the conclusion that the documents would not assist the respondent's case. [74] To reduce or cancel arrears, the applicant must satisfy the Court it would be grossly unfair not to do so: Semancik v. Saunders, 2011 BCCA 264. [75] Generally speaking, the Court will cancel arrears only where the payor is unable to pay them now and in the future. As mentioned, the applicant's supporting materials attempting to prove a change in financial circumstances should be clear and transparent. Naturally, these must include all financial documents previously ordered by a judge. [76] If the applicant has lost employment or been unable to find work, they must provide details of reasonable efforts made to find employment that would allow them to meet their support obligations. The Court gives priority to child support obligations. If an applicant says that illness or disability prevents them from earning sufficient income to meet their support obligation, they must

provide medical and other relevant evidence to prove it. [77] On the materials presented, I cannot find that the figure of $48,000 attributed to the respondent for the purposes of the June 12, 2006 order is incorrect. Allowing for gross-up of the WCB benefits, the amount of the respondent's benefits likely exceeds $48,000. [78] As for the respondent's earnings since WCB terminated benefits in January 2012, the respondent deposes that in the 12 months following, he earned $15,954.88. He points to two records of employment, the first, from Allied Systems (Canada) Company. This covers the period between March 26, 2012 and April 20, 2012. The other record of employment was issued by MCI McGill Carriers Ltd.; it covers the period between May 1, 2012 and July 10, 2012. In 2012, on an annualized pro-rata basis, this works out approximately $25,000. [79] The respondent deposes he has continued to look for work, but he provided no details of where he has applied or the responses received. He did mention in his December 3, 2012 affidavit that he hoped to earn some income from snow removal work, but he produced no medical evidence to suggest he is incapable of earning income in the trucking industry that matches his extensive experience in it. [80] If the respondent earned only $16,000 for all of 2012 and proved he had made every reasonable effort to find employment matching his extensive

experience in the trucking industry and reflecting any residual medical disability, an adjustment of his Guidelines income to about $25,000 for 2012 would be fair. This would be in accord with the principle that the change in circumstances should be material and sufficiently long lasting to justify a reduction for child support, thus placing his prorated annual income in the range of about $32,000. Absent such evidence, no adjustments can be justified. [81] Counsel for the respondent submits the respondent has paid $38,732.98 to date. She submits that the respondent should have paid only $18,984 for I.; and if for two children, $28,032. Counsel submits a fair order would be to cancel any arrears, including interest and penalties, accompanied by a further order that the claimant is not required to pay back any of the purported overpayment. [82] The respondent bears a heavy burden to obtain an order to reduce or cancel arrears of child support and judges should be slow to grant such orders: Wensel v. Rhodes, 2012 BCCA 245 at para. 12; see also Dubreuil v. Poloway, 2010 BCCA 297 where the Court of Appeal found it was an error to reduce or cancel arrears where the applicant failed to fully disclose his means such that payment would be "grossly unfair". [83] In summary, I make the following declarations and orders: · The respondent's Guidelines income remains at $48,000; · The

respondent stood in the place of parent for M. and is obligated for support payments up until M.'s eighteenth birthday on July 29, 2010; · Any arrears calculated based on support for two children instead of one child after July 29, 2010 are effectively cancelled. · The claimant is not obliged to repay any overpayments of child support. [84] The effect of this order is that respondent should see some reduction in his arrears. The respondent is obliged to continue to pay child support for I. and neither party owes any monies with respect to child support for M. V. Restraining or protection order [85] I find there likely has been a history of psychological and emotional abuse and harassment committed by the respondent. His conduct has involved the claimant and members of her extended family, and may have affected I. The continuance or recurrence of such harassment constitutes a reasonable risk that calls for imposition, on an interim basis, of a restraining order, pursuant to s. 183 and 184(1) of the FLA. It will remain in effect until further order of this Court. Provided that no further order has been made before two years from today's date, the restraining order will expire. This finding is without prejudice to subsequent hearings and findings on the need for a restraining order. A. Basis for restraining order [86] At para. 15 of her January 10, 2013 affidavit, the claimant

deposes that in 2006 the respondent, in I.'s presence, physically assaulted her sister. She states that several times the respondent has threatened, in I.'s presence, to "kill all of us". [87] On July 20, 2007, the respondent entered into a peace bond with certain conditions in addition to the usual condition to keep the peace and be of good behaviour. The peace bond was linked to assaults, one on the claimant, and one on the claimant's sister: Condition 2: You are not to attend any residence or place of employment known to you to be that of [the claimant]. You may only attend [the claimant]'s residence for pre-arranged access by consent for your children. Condition 3: You are not to have any contact with [the claimant] and [Ms. I.S., the claimant's sister] save and except you may have phone contact with [the claimant] at work for arranging access to children, the only contact you may have with [the claimant] is through a court order, counsel or mutually agreed upon third party. Access to [M.] is through a court order, access to [I.] is as [the claimant] permits. [88] As noted at para. 16 of the claimant's second affidavit, the respondent breached certain terms of the peace bond and on February 25, 2008, he was convicted of having breached the second condition of the peace bond on August 8, 2007. [89] Conditions 6 and 7 of the consequent probation order prohibited contact by

the respondent, directly, or indirectly, with the claimant or I., except in accordance with an order under the Family Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 128 (since repealed) or the DA. Condition 8 prohibited possession of weapons and Condition 9 required the respondent to participate in, and successfully complete, counselling as directed by his probation officer. [90] In para.17 of the claimant's second affidavit, she deposes that the respondent continued to breach the terms of the probation order. On June 10, 2008, he was convicted of having failed to comply with the conditions of the probation order between April 14, 2008 and May 7, 2008. The Court then imposed another probation order. [91] Conditions 10 and 11 of the new probation order prohibited the respondent from going within a two-block radius of any place known to the respondent to be the place of employment or a residence of the claimant, or of any residence, preschool or places of activity of I. [92] As noted at para. 18 of the claimant's affidavit, the respondent was detained at the North Surrey Pre-trial Centre pending his June 25, 2008 appearance in New Westminster. According to the June 10, 2008 probation order, he was sentenced to seven days in jail with time credited of 24 days. [93] The claimant deposes at para. 71 of her second affidavit that after the last probation order expired, "the respondent slowly got

back to his stalking routine again. I called the police several times, but they could not help me since I did not have any order to enforce and [they] recommended [that I] go back to Supreme Court and ask for a permanent restraining order." [94] In her second and third affidavits, sworn January 10, 2013 and February 19, 2009, respectively, the claimant sets out details of the respondent's harassment behavior. I will not summarize those here. But these, combined with the contents of the affidavits of Ms. I.S. (the claimant's sister) and Mr. N.Z.K., both sworn February 25, 2013, fortify the conclusion that a restraining order should be in place until further order of the Court. I find that this is in the best interests of I. and further justified by the need to minimize the risk of family violence involving the claimant and her family. [95] In her second affidavit, at paras. 73 to 75, the claimant deposes: 73. In [the] summer of 2012 the respondent started to follow me again. He has been following me to my clients on June 1, 2011, September 5, 2012, and October 1, 2012. He calls me constantly and has been sending me over 600 text messages a week in September and October of 2012.

74. The respondent was waiting for me in the park when I run in the morning, or would wait for me at the entrance of my building or [I.]'s school. He knew that I was seeing another man and it made him completely mad. Several times he tried to talk to me and asked me to get back together with him and told me that if I refused he would take me to court and he would spend all his money to get custody of our son. He asked me to stop FMEP, he said he would never pay me anything. He said he would beat up the man I date if he got a chance.

75. The respondent enters my building without [permission] several times. He tried to rent an apartment in my building in November of 2012. He basically spends every Friday night, Saturday and Sunday at the front door of my building. He said that he knows everything I do and he has his people in a building who are [watching all my steps.] [96] At para. 52 of her third affidavit, the claimant deposes that in October 2012, the respondent threatened her several times that he would sell his condo, use the money to take her to court, try to preclude her from seeing her children, and do everything he could to have her deported from Canada - if she did not leave her boyfriend, move back with him, and nullify the FMEP obligations. The claimant believes the respondent is obsessed with her. The respondent denies this. [97] At para. 76, of her second affidavit, the claimant attaches copies of photographs purportedly taken by her building security camera (Exhibit J). She says these show the respondent inside the lobby. The respondent grants that the first photo may depict him, but states that as the claimant had been depriving him of parenting time with I., he occasionally would come by to catch a glimpse of him. [98] The respondent denies, essentially, all the claimant's allegations of any threats to her, either with or without I. present. He specifically denies the claimant's assertion

that he had deliberately chosen to move near to where she lives. He claims it was actually the other way around, deposing that it was the claimant who had moved to within 150 metres of where he was living at the time. The claimant produced documents, however, which show she had been living at her current location for three months before the respondent moved into the area. [99] I considered the affidavit of Ms. I.S. She is the sister of the claimant. She addresses a number of matters raised by the respondent, but I will focus on her response to para. 26 of the respondent's February 15, 2013 affidavit, which deals with his conviction for assault of Ms. I.S. [100] The respondent admits he pleaded guilty to assaulting the claimant's sister. But he deposes she called him names in I.'s presence. He said he was shocked by what she was saying about him in I.'s presence. To protect I. from hearing what Ms. I.S. was allegedly saying, he deposes he covered her mouth. [101] As pointed out by the claimant, the peace bond and the subsequent probation orders related not just to an assault of the claimant's sister, but on the claimant as well, which the respondent did not specifically address. [102] The affiants have not been cross-examined on their affidavits. But considering the history of the respondent's involvement with courts on these matters and the collateral details contained in the

affidavits of the claimant and Ms. I.S., which anchor their assertions, I prefer the claimant's evidence regarding the respondent's threats and harassment where they conflict with those of the respondent. I give little or no weight to hearsay statements, such as Ms. I.S.'s mention in para. 4 of the observations of neighbours. I did consider the hearsay statement of Ms. I.S.'s about the respondent's uninvited presence at her son's graduation ceremony. [103] I will quote the last three paras. in Ms. I.S.'s February 25, 2013 affidavit: 22. The Respondent has made me feel extremely worried about my kids, so much so that we decided to move and change our phone number.

23. I called to police and asked to protect our family and I know that they talked to the Respondent several times.

24. Our family, my parents and the Claimant, lives in [continual] stress. We have to worry about our kids, and parents. All these affected our mother's health, so she could not leave the house for the last year. [104] Mr. N.Z.K. also swore his February 25, 2013 affidavit in response to the respondent's affidavit, sworn February 15, 2013. [105] Mr. N.Z.K. states he is a close friend of the claimant and says that he has known her since May 2010. At para. 3 of his affidavit, he states he witnessed the claimant receiving what he called enormous amounts of phone calls and text messages from the respondent. He spoke to the respondent a few times on the phone and began to recognize his voice and telephone number on the display. [106] At para. 4, he states that he visits the claimant every week and has seen the respondent several times in front of her building. He also saw him once inside the lobby of her building. As noted earlier, the respondent says he has sometimes come by the claimant's condominium hoping to catch a glimpse of I. [107] At para. 5 of his affidavit, Mr. N.Z.K. deposes that the respondent damaged his vehicle twice, once on October 27, 2012; and the second time, he says, on November 9, 2012, with damage estimates at over $1000. He provided the police file number as well. [108] He states that on November 24, 2012, the respondent approached him and the claimant outside

her apartment complex. He states the respondent followed them until he said he would call the police. He further states the respondent threatened to assault him should he get the chance. [109] The respondent denies he has harassed or stalked the claimant and her family. He says he has friends who live in the same building as the claimant and complains a restraining order of the kind the claimant seeks would unduly inhibit his movements and recreational activities. He says he jogs in the same park as the claimant. [110] Given the parties live in fairly close proximity, I am concerned the parties could come accidentally within a range that a restraining order would unduly inhibit the respondent's movements, exposing him to possible unnecessary charges of breaching conditions. I appreciate that parties engaged in high-conflict divorces can abuse restraining orders. [111] But I do not see an order that prohibits the respondent from entering the building where the claimant lives, except for purposes explicitly authorized by the Court, such as picking up I. for legal parenting access, as constituting an unreasonable restriction on the respondent. A statement of dates, times, and legal purposes to justify his presence in the lobby can be clearly stated and easily adhered to. [112] Considering the history of harassment and threats, not to mention breaches of previous probation orders,

the balance of convenience tends to the claimant and the need of the child to be shielded from marital conflict. If the respondent wishes to visit friends in the condominium the claimant lives in, he can telephone his friends in advance and make other arrangements to meet elsewhere. If he knows the claimant regularly jogs in a particular part, he can find another place to jog. This is in the respondent's own interests, as it will minimize the risk of false allegations. [113] The Court can amend terms if they are found too onerous, or if evidence demonstrates improved conduct and relations. The respondent must show he respects court orders. [114] I therefore order, largely in conformity with the last probation order, as follows: a) The respondent, Mr. I.V., shall have no contact, direct or indirect, with Ms. N.P., or with any of her "family". "Family" includes siblings, children of siblings, and parents. b) The respondent shall not enter into a radius of two blocks in any direction of any place known to him to be either the place of employment or residence of Ms. N.P. i. In exception to the foregoing restriction, the respondent may have such contact with the claimant, Ms. N.P., and in such ways, as the court has authorized, which will be only for the purposes of arranging parenting time between the claimant and I.; and for meeting for the purposes of parenting time with I. c)

The respondent shall have no contact with I., except in clear compliance with a court order that sets out specific terms for contact with him, pursuant to the DA or the FLA. Otherwise, unless specifically authorized by court order or terms for contract with I., the respondent shall not go within a two-block radius of any place known to him to be either the residence, preschool or any other place of activity of I. i. Exception to the foregoing restriction: the respondent may have such contact with the claimant, and may go within a two-block radius of any residence, preschool, or any other place of activity of I. for the purposes of parenting time, as authorized by order of the Court, or in writing by any parenting coordinator, or agreed to in writing, dated, signed by the parties and witnessed; or by their counsel. d) The respondent is to have no contact, direct or indirect, with Mr. N.Z.K. e) The respondent shall not have in his possession any weapon as defined by the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. VI. Parenting arrangements [115] The parties' affidavits stand diametrically opposed on almost all points of the evidentiary compass. I will confine my discussion of their evidence and positions to the essentials. [116] The respondent's basic position is that he wishes to maintain a relationship with I. and to see him on a regular basis. He says the claimant has been raising

roadblocks and making it difficult for him to see I. regularly. He states he has not seen him since his summer access visit in August 2012, but the claimant indicates visits took place as late as October 2012. [117] I understand Justice Blok stressed that the claimant was obliged to facilitate access and that I. must feel safe. In February, Justice Crawford ordered Skype access to continue until March 13, 2013. I do not know what the parenting arrangements are now. [118] The respondent says he consented to an order for supervised access at the last December 19, 2012 court appearance, not because he believed it was necessary, but because he wanted to remove any roadblocks to his seeing I. A friend of his, Mr. N., was willing to act as supervisor. The respondent states Mr. N. serves as a Russian interpreter in the courts. He withdrew his offer, however, after the claimant began to add increasing demands before she would agree to allow I. to see the respondent with Mr. N. present. These conditions were not mentioned in the court order; although it goes without saying the supervisor would be required to be a responsible person. The claimant insisted on meeting Mr. N., which is not an unreasonable request, but she also then demanded at least two letters of reference and a criminal record check. Counsel for the respondent points out that the Court did not impose such conditions and

that there is a financial and time penalty that comes with a criminal record check. Counsel argues that the claimant was attempting to delay and inhibit the respondent's parenting time. Apparently, the claimant was cautioned in correspondence that her actions would be brought to the Court's attention. [119] The respondent also complains that the claimant has blocked his emails and telephone calls, which he says makes it impossible for him to notify the claimant of his intended visits. I have already discussed the claimant's concerns about communication harassment. He also complains the claimant has refused to allow him to speak to I. before or after his swimming lessons and also complains she will not give him access to school records. He seeks an order for joint custody and guardianship pursuant to the DA to address such concerns. Those orders are not in I.'s best interests at this juncture. [120] The claimant says the respondent has been unable to build a healthy relationship with I. She says the respondent makes I. feel uncomfortable and scared in his presence. She denies the respondent's assertions that she has obstructed his attempts to see I., describing them as "outright false". She states that after several of the respondent's visits last summer, I. adamantly refused to see the respondent and told her he feared him. She states that if the respondent is truly interested

in patching up his relationship with I. visits ought to be supervised, at least at first. [121] The claimant denies that the respondent has ever showed interest in I.'s well-being and says he has never asked how I. is progressing in school or what I. enjoys doing. She states that I. has told her that the respondent questions him about her personal and intimate life and refers to her with coarse and disrespectful language. [122] She denies the respondent's allegation that she has attempted to obstruct his efforts to see I. She says at para. 29 of her second affidavit that, to the contrary, she and her father tried to "help the respondent build a healthy, sustainable relationship with [I.]" She points out that her father was a third party during the respondent's visits with I., but, she says, "[t]he respondent chose to keep arguing with [her] father instead of spending time with [I.]" Her father provided an affidavit confirming this. [123] She states at para. 31, that the respondent saw I. at least five days per week during September and October (presumably 2012); and that "[t]hereafter [I.] suddenly became scared of the respondent." She says she has explained to the respondent multiple times that I. refuses to go with him because he fears him. [124] With respect to scheduling parenting visits, she says she had been unable to set a time and day for a parenting visit because the

respondent has never asked her to schedule a meeting and failed to come when he said he would. She states he never gives notice as to when he would like to see I., but would just drop in as he liked, or not show up for months at a time. [125] Mr. M.P. is the claimant's father. He states he was present multiple times during I.'s visits with the respondent between 2005 and 2011. He states that initially, the respondent had asked him to be present as he was not confident looking after I. on his own. He states that during the meetings he noticed the respondent did not show initiative or desire to play with I. Instead, the respondent would begin the meetings by sidetracking him into a discussion about the respondent's child-support debt with the FMEP. He states the respondent asked him numerous times to sway the claimant to nullify the FMEP debt. [126] Mr. M.P. states that during the last few scheduled meetings, I. was reluctant see the respondent and, that during the last visitation, the child hid under the dinner table, clenching the table leg and crying. After that experience, Mr. M.P. refused to be present at any more meetings. [127] The respondent denies Mr. M.P.'s assertions. At para. 8 of his third affidavit, he states that every time he was allowed to see I. I. was happy to come with him. He alleges the claimant has been unduly restricting I.'s time with him. [128] I heard

concerns expressed about the disrespectful way the respondent speaks to I. about the claimant. Cursing and disrespectful language directed at another parent is harmful to a child's development and is unacceptable. I order the parties to refrain from making any disrespectful comments about the other parent to I. As this affects the emotional well-being and development of a child, proven infractions of this order will attract proportionate sanctions. [129] Any order for child support will be framed within the terms in the restraining order. The parties do not trust one another. There is virtually no common ground between the parties upon which to build the degree of trust essential to a healthy relationship between I. and the respondent. [130] The claimant's demands regarding Mr. N. were not dictated by the court order and in sum were unreasonable. A three-way meeting between the claimant and the respondent is reasonable, and asking for a brief resume was also a reasonable request. But the claimant had no legal basis to refuse parenting time until Mr. N. underwent a criminal record check. [131] The only guiding principle is the best interests of the child. I. must be shielded from the marital conflict, and any fears he might have need to be addressed before regular parenting access can resume. There is so little common ground between the parties that it is impossible to determine

if I.'s fears are wholly his own, generated by the respondent's behaviour, or by the influence of the claimant's fears. Considering the history of the respondent's conduct, however, no one could reasonably say the claimant's positions are groundless. [132] In my view, at this point professional intervention and supervision is required to ensure I. feels safe during visits. To that end, I. shall be interviewed by a psychologist qualified to obtain the views of a child, such as Dr. Michael Elterman, or other similarly qualified person, such as a family justice counsellor, for a period of six months. Counselling for I. should be arranged. If the parties cannot agree on one, the parenting coordinator or justice counsellor shall select one. The respondent shall attend counselling so that he can address I.'s concerns. [133] Parenting time should start with a weekly lunch or dinner with a parenting coordinator present for the first meetings. If this proves to be a positive experience, or at least encouraging, a responsible person, who need not be a professional, can supervise visits for a period recommended by the parenting coordinator or justice counsellor. [134] Given the poor communication between the parties, the parenting coordinator shall recommend a parenting time schedule and organize visits if necessary. The parenting time visit should include a visit of five days in July or

August, but the parenting coordinator shall determine whether I. is ready for extended overnight holiday visits. [135] The objective is a weekly access visit one weekend day every other weekend, and one evening weekday access visit, every second week. The respondent should have, on an interim basis, three parenting days over the Christmas holiday, beginning on December 26, 2013. This can be arranged by the parenting coordinator. [136] The schedule, to extend until the end of December, should be finalized by September 1, 2013. [137] The family justice counsellor or parenting coordinator shall prepare a brief report setting out the views of the child at the earliest possible date. [138] The parties shall cooperate with the parenting coordinator and follow their directions. If the parties decide to retain a parenting coordinator, the respondent shall contribute $1,500 to the retainer cost of the coordinator, drawing on proceeds remaining from the sale of his condominium if necessary, and the claimant shall contribute $750, with the total held in trust by the parenting coordinator to pay their fee. If a further retainer is required, the parties shall contribute in those same proportions. [139] As for communication, the respondent may email the claimant twice weekly on matters related to parenting arrangements for I. Otherwise, he shall not email or text the claimant or any member

of her family, except in case of emergency. The respondent may communicate with I. by Skype each Monday and Wednesday evening, for fifteen minutes, between 7:00 p.m. and 7:15 p.m. The respondent must be prompt and reliable. The claimant shall facilitate this. If these days and times interfere with one of I.'s regularly scheduled activities, the day and time shall be rescheduled to an available time. [140] The claimant shall mail photocopies of I.'s report cards to the respondent. [141] The respondent may attend one sporting activity that I. is engaged in each, as agreed by the parties, or as recommended by the parenting coordinator or family justice counsellor. He may speak with I. for up to 15 minutes if I. is willing to do so. [142] The claimant shall make reasonable efforts to facilitate parenting time visits. [143] If the respondent shows a pattern of arriving late or fails to show up on more than one occasion without serious reason, his parenting time may be suspended by the parenting coordinator or family justice counsellor. [144] After January 15, 2014, the parties are at liberty to apply for a review of parenting arrangements. I am not seized of that review. [145] The parties shall not question I. about the life of the other parent. VII. Costs [146] The claimant was largely successful. The respondent shall pay the claimant's costs, which I set in a lump sum for the hearing at $750 plus taxable disbursements. "N. Brown J."