R. v. N.H.

R. v. N.H. Collection Decisions of the Court of Appeal Date 2021-09-17 Neutral citation 2021 ONCA 636 Docket numbers C63612 Judges Simmons, Janet M.; Watt, David; Roberts, Lois B. Subject Criminal Decision Content WARNING The President of the panel hearing this appeal directs that the following should be attached to the file: An order restricting publication in this proceeding under ss. 486.4(1), (2), (2.1), (2.2), (3) or (4) or 486.6(1) or (2) of the Criminal Code shall continue. These sections of the Criminal Code provide: 486.4(1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of (a) any of the following offences; (i) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 159, 160, 162, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1, 172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 210, 211, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 280, 281, 286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 or 347, or (ii) any offence under this Act, as it read at any time before the day on which this subparagraph comes into force, if the conduct alleged involves a violation of the complainant’s sexual integrity and that conduct would be an offence referred to in subparagraph (i) if it occurred on or after that day; or (iii) REPEALED: S.C. 2014, c. 25, s. 22(2), effective December 6, 2014 (Act, s. 49). (b) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in paragraph (a). (2) In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice shall (a) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the victim of the right to make an application for the order; and (b) on application made by the victim, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order. (2.1) Subject to subsection (2.2), in proceedings in respect of an offence other than an offence referred to in subsection (1), if the victim is under the age of 18 years, the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way. (2.2) In proceedings in respect of an offence other than an offence referred to in subsection (1), if the victim is under the age of 18 years, the presiding judge or justice shall (a) as soon as feasible, inform the victim of their right to make an application for the order; and (b) on application of the victim or the prosecutor, make the order. (3) In proceedings in respect of an offence under section 163.1, a judge or justice shall make an order directing that any information that could identify a witness who is under the age of eighteen years, or any person who is the subject of a representation, written material or a recording that constitutes child pornography within the meaning of that section, shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way. (4) An order made under this section does not apply in respect of the disclosure of information in the course of the administration of justice when it is not the purpose of the disclosure to make the information known in the community. 2005, c. 32, s. 15; 2005, c. 43, s. 8(3)(b); 2010, c. 3, s. 5; 2012, c. 1, s. 29; 2014, c. 25, ss. 22,48; 2015, c. 13, s. 18. 486.6(1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), (2) or (3) or 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction. (2) For greater certainty, an order referred to in subsection (1) applies to prohibit, in relation to proceedings taken against any person who fails to comply with the order, the publication in any document or the broadcasting or transmission in any way of information that could identify a victim, witness or justice system participant whose identity is protected by the order. 2005, c. 32, s. 15. COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO CITATION: R. v. N.H., 2021 ONCA 636 DATE: 20210917 DOCKET: C63612 Simmons, Watt and Roberts JJ.A. BETWEEN Her Majesty the Queen Respondent and N.H. Appellant Margaret Bojanowska, for the appellant Philippe Cowle, for the respondent Heard: September 29, 2020 by video conference On appeal from the convictions entered on September 23, 2016 by Justice Beth A. Allen of the Superior Court of Justice, sitting with a jury and from the sentence imposed on April 21, 2017. ADDENDUM Introduction [1] On November 4, 2020, we released our reasons in this matter to the parties only. Because our reasons contained references to evidence the appellant applied to adduce at trial under s. 276 of the Criminal Code and to the trial judge’s decision dismissing that application, we requested submissions from the parties concerning publication of our reasons. Among other things, we asked whether the publication ban contained in s. 278.95[1] of the Criminal Code applies to our reasons and if it does, whether we could make an order permitting publication of our reasons “as-is”, i.e., unredacted, in the same form in which they were distributed to the parties. [2] The Crown responded to our request and informed us that appellant’s counsel agreed with its response. In essence, the Crown submitted that the s. 278.95 publication ban applies to our reasons but that this court has, and in this case we should invoke, inherent jurisdiction to make an order permitting publication of our reasons as is. [3] Prior to this panel determining the issue, two other panels of this court requested submissions concerning publication of their reasons in other appeals involving the same or similar publication bans. In at least one of those matters, the Crown submitted this court has jurisdiction under s. 278.95(1)(d)(ii) of the Criminal Code to make an order permitting publication of unredacted reasons subject to the s. 278.95 publication ban. Given that submission, we requested further submissions concerning the jurisdiction issue. [4] Counsel have now clarified that the Crown’s position is that this court has inherent jurisdiction to make an order permitting publication of our reasons as is and should exercise that discretion based on the same factors that would guide a trial judge or a justice under s. 278.95(1)(c) or (d)(ii) of the Criminal Code. [5] For the reasons that follow, we accept the Crown’s position and order that our reasons in this matter may be published in the form released to the parties on November 4, 2020, subject to the s. 486.4 publication ban imposed at trial. The Section 278.95 Criminal Code Publication Bans and Related Provisions [6] Section 278.93 of the Criminal Code sets out the procedure for an accused to apply for a hearing to determine the admissibility at trial of evidence of other sexual activity on the part of the complainant not the subject of the charge before the court. Section 278.93(4) specifies that the presiding judge or justice may decide to hold an admissibility hearing.[2] Section 278.94 prescribes various procedural rules relating to any hearing that is ordered, including a requirement that the presiding judge or justice give reasons for the admissibility determination: s. 278.94(4).[3] [7] Section 278.95 prohibits publication of: the contents of a s. 278.93 application; the evidence or representations made on a s. 278.93 application or at a s. 278.94 hearing; and of the decision(s) concerning same, but subject to certain exceptions concerning the decision(s) made as set out in ss. 278.95(1)(c) and (d): 278.95 (1) A person shall not publish in any document, or broadcast or transmit in any way, any of the following: (a) the contents of an application made under subsection 278.93; (b) any evidence taken, the information given and the representations made at an application under section 278.93 or at a hearing under section 278.94; (c) the decision of a judge or justice under subsection 278.93(4), unless the judge or justice, after taking into account the complainant’s right of privacy and the interests of justice, orders that the decision may be published, broadcast or transmitted; and (d) the determination made and the reasons provided under subsection 278.94 (4) unless; (i) that determination is that evidence is admissible, or (ii) the judge or justice, after taking into account the complainant’s right of privacy and the interests of justice, orders that the determination and reasons may be published, broadcast or transmitted. [Emphasis added.] The Crown’s Position [8] In essence, the Crown submits: · the s. 278.95 publication ban applies to our reasons; · the authority to make an order permitting publication under ss. 278.95(1)(c) and/or (d)(ii) is restricted to the judge who made the decision under s. 278.93 or 278.94 as the case may be; and · this court has, and in this case should invoke its inherent jurisdiction to make an order permitting publication of its reasons in the same form in which they were distributed to the parties. (i) The s. 278.95 publication ban applies to our reasons [9] In brief, the Crown submits that the s. 278.95 publication ban applies to our reasons and that neither of the exceptions to the application of the ban set out in ss. 278.95(1)(c) and (d) apply. That is: i) the evidence sought to be adduced in the court below was not admitted; and ii) the judge in the court below did not make an order permitting publication, broadcast or transmission of her decision. In fact, there was no discussion in the court below concerning whether the ban should apply. [10] The Crown is not aware of any provisions that would limit or restrict the duration or operation of the ban but submits s. 278.95 should not be interpreted to impose such limits or restrictions, as a restrictive interpretation would defeat its purpose. The purpose of s. 278.95 can be gleaned by analogy to similar publication bans and by reference to the statutory context. In Canadian Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 122, at pp. 129-32, the Supreme Court of Canada discussed the purpose of s. 486.4 publication bans, which protect the identity of complainants in prosecutions for sexual offences. Broadly speaking, the Court recognized that the purpose of the publication ban was to foster complaints from victims of sexual assault by protecting them from the trauma of wide-spread publication, which could result in embarrassment and humiliation. [11] The Crown notes that those same important objectives underlie the statutory framework surrounding applications to lead evidence of extrinsic sexual activity. In ss. 276(3)(b),(f), and (g), Parliament expressly lays out the objectives of encouraging reporting and protecting the dignity and privacy of complainants as factors that the court must consider in determining whether the evidence of extrinsic sexual is admissible. As highlighted in Canadian Newspapers, at pp. 131-33, legislation aimed at protecting a complainant’s privacy rights must be robust, as temporary protection is effectively no protection at all. [12] Finally, the Crown submits that the existence of a s. 486.4 publication ban does not affect whether the s. 278.95 ban applies. The scope of the bans and the protected interests under them are different. Whether a s. 486.4 ban is in place, a complainant may, or may not, wish the details of the evidence presented on a s. 276 application to remain private. (ii) Subsections 278.95(1)(c) and (d)(ii) do not provide this court with authority to permit publication of our reasons [13] The Crown submits that the authority to make an order pursuant to ss. 278.95(1)(c) or (d)(ii) is restricted to the judge who made the decision under ss. 278.93 or 278.94. Subsections 278.95(1)(c) and (1)(d) both refer to “the judge or justice” (as opposed to “a judge or justice”), suggesting that the authority is granted specifically to the judge who made the decision. The French text supports this interpretation, referring to “le juge ou le juge de paix”. Read on its face, no language in s. 278.95 purports to create any power exercisable by a reviewing court. (iii) This court has, and should invoke in this case its inherent jurisdiction to make an order permitting publication of its reasons as-is [14] The Crown acknowledges that it may be possible for this court to access the trial court’s power to make an order under s. 278.95 through s. 13(2) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 (the “CJA”),[4] or to find jurisdiction to make an order permitting publication through the combined operation of s. 683(3) of the Criminal Code and s. 134 of the CJA.[5] [6] However, the Crown submits both of those options present challenges. In any event, the Crown submits this court has inherent jurisdiction to make an order permitting publication of its reasons as is. As will be discussed further below, the Crown relies on several cases holding that a court has inherent jurisdiction to control its own records in support of that proposition. Further, taking account of the statutory factors that would guide trial judges making the same decision under ss. 278.95(c) or (d), the Crown submits this court should make an order permitting publication of its reasons in this case for four reasons: · the complainant is comfortable with this court’s decision being published as is; · the complainant’s privacy remains protected through the s. 486.4 publication ban, which will remain in place; · on the particular facts of this case, the privacy rights at issue are already lessened, because the evidence at issue on the s. 276 application came out at trial despite the trial judge’s ruling; and · the development of the jurisprudence surrounding s. 276 applications and evidence of extrinsic sexual activity will benefit from the publication of this court’s decision as is. Discussion (1) This court has inherent jurisdiction to permit publication of its reasons as is [15] Assuming that we cannot authorize publication, broadcast or transmission of our reasons under ss. 278.95(1)(c) or (d)(ii) of the Criminal Code, we are satisfied that, in any event, we have inherent jurisdiction to do so. [16] In support of its position that this court has inherent jurisdiction to order that its judgment be published unedited and effectively override the s. 276.3 publication ban, the Crown initially relied on this court’s decisions in Re Joudrie (1997), 100 O.A.C. 25 and R. v. A.B. (1997), 33 O.R. (3d) 321 in which this court lifted publication bans imposed at trial under ss. 486(3) and (4) of the Criminal Code. Although this court did not discuss its jurisdiction in those cases, the Crown submitted that, by implication, it relied on its inherent jurisdiction to control its own records. [17] In our view, those cases appear to be premised on a court’s inherent jurisdiction to vary or revoke an order made at trial where the circumstances that were present at the time the order was made have materially changed. The Crown has subsequently clarified[7] that it relies on a general line of cases establishing a court’s authority to control its own records. [18] Those cases are: R. v. Garofoli, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1421, at p. 1457; Vickery v. Nova Scotia Supreme Court (Prothonotary), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 671, at pp. 681-83; R. v. Bernardo, [1995] O.J. No. 1472 (Gen. Div.), at paras. 13, 112-28, leave to appeal refused, [1995] S.C.C.A. No. 250, further appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, (1998) 122 C.C.C. (3d) 475 (Ont. C.A.); and R. v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., 2010 ONCA 726, 102 O.R. (3d) 673. [19] None of the above-noted cases dealt with a reviewing court’s power to lift a statutory publication ban. However, they all dealt with public access to court records and affirmed the supervisory power a court holds over access to its records. Further, Vickery relied on A.G. (Nova Scotia) v. MacIntyre, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 175, in which the Supreme Court clearly stated, at p. 189, “Undoubtedly every court has a supervisory and protecting power over its own records.” [20] The records at issue in the cases upon which the Crown relied include exhibits at a criminal trial or preliminary inquiry (transcripts of an alleged confession after an accused was acquitted: Vickery; explicit recordings of violent crime: Bernardo; preliminary inquiry exhibits: CBC; search warrants and the information to obtain based on which they were issued: MacIntyre; and affidavits, upon which the police relied to obtain wiretaps: Garofoli). [21] Here, the court record at issue is this court’s reasons for decision, which include reference to the reasons of the court below – the object of a s. 278.95 statutory publication ban. However, if this court has supervisory and protective powers over externally filed court records, it must follow that it has at least the same or greater powers over its own reasons. [22] Moreover, given that s. 278.95 is silent on the powers of a reviewing court, whatever inherent jurisdiction this court possesses necessarily survives, as it has not been displaced by clear and precise statutory language: Canada (Attorney General) v. Fontaine, 2017 SCC 47, [2017] 2 S.C.R. 205, at para. 33; R. v. Adams, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 707, at para. 28. [23] Undoubtedly, the tests enunciated in the early cases for restricting public access to court records have been superseded by the Dagenais/Mentuck test: see Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835; R. v. Mentuck, 2001 SCC 76, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442. However, what is at issue in this case is not restricting public access. Rather, the issue is whether statutorily restricted public access to this court’s reasons should be expanded. [24] Accepting that this court has inherent jurisdiction over its own records, we conclude that it can exercise its discretion concerning publication, based on the same factors that the court below is entitled to permit publication of its reasons. It makes sense that this court’s discretion should be exercised in a manner that accords with the framework of the statutory publication ban. [25] We also accept the Crown’s submission that this court’s discretion extends to permitting publication of any portion of the reasons of the court below that refer to the content of the underlying application and the evidence and representations made in relation to it or at a hearing. That is consistent with a purposive interpretation of s. 278.95(1). To hold otherwise would make the discretion to permit publication conferred in that section, and by extension this court’s inherent jurisdiction to do so, meaningless. (2) This court should permit publication of its reasons as is in this case [26] In this case, there was no discussion in the court below concerning whether the mandatory s. 278.95 publication ban should be lifted under s. 278.95(1)(c). The mandatory ban therefore applied by statute. The question of what, if any, deference is owed to the court below does not arise. [27] On appeal, the Crown asks that this court exercise its discretion to publish its reasons. It notes that the complainant is comfortable with that result and the complainant’s identity will in any event be protected by the s. 486.4 publication ban, which will remain in place. Equally important, the development of the jurisprudence surrounding s. 276 applications and evidence of extrinsic sexual activity will benefit from the publication of this court’s decision as is. [28] We accept the Crown’s submissions as supporting the order it seeks. They take proper account of both the complainant’s privacy right and the interests of justice, the relevant factors under s. 278.95(1)(c) of the Criminal Code. Disposition [29] Based on the foregoing reasons, we order that, despite the s. 278.95 publication ban, our reasons in this matter may be published in the form released to the parties on November 4, 2020, subject to the s. 486.4 publication ban imposed at trial. “Janet Simmons J.A.” “David Watt J.A.” “L.B. Roberts J.A.” Appendix “A” English Version Evidence of complainant’s sexual activity 276 (1) In proceedings in respect of an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1 or 155, subsection 160(2) or (3) or section 170, 171, 172, 173, 271, 272 or 273, evidence that the complainant has engaged in sexual activity, whether with the accused or with any other person, is not admissible to support an inference that, by reason of the sexual nature of that activity, the complainant (a) is more likely to have consented to the sexual activity that forms the subject-matter of the charge; or (b) is less worthy of belief. Conditions for admissibility (2) In proceedings in respect of an offence referred to in subsection (1), evidence shall not be adduced by or on behalf of the accused that the complainant has engaged in sexual activity other than the sexual activity that forms the subject-matter of the charge, whether with the accused or with any other person, unless the judge, provincial court judge or justice determines, in accordance with the procedures set out in sections 278.93 and 278.94, that the evidence (a) is not being adduced for the purpose of supporting an inference described in subsection (1); (b) is relevant to an issue at trial; and (c) is of specific instances of sexual activity; and (d) has significant probative value that is not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice. Factors that judge must consider (3) In determining whether evidence is admissible under subsection (2), the judge, provincial court judge or justice shall take into account (a) the interests of justice, including the right of the accused to make a full answer and defence; (b) society’s interest in encouraging the reporting of sexual assault offences; (c) whether there is a reasonable prospect that the evidence will assist in arriving at a just determination in the case; (d) the need to remove from the fact-finding process any discriminatory belief or bias; (e) the risk that the evidence may unduly arouse sentiments of prejudice, sympathy or hostility in the jury; (f) the potential prejudice to the complainant’s personal dignity and right of privacy; (g) the right of the complainant and of every individual to personal security and to the full protection and benefit of the law; and (h) any other factor that the judge, provincial court judge or justice considers relevant. Interpretation (4) For the purpose of this section, sexual activity includes any communication made for a sexual purpose or whose content is of a sexual nature. … Application for hearing — sections 276 and 278.92 278.93 (1) Application may be made to the judge, provincial court judge or justice by or on behalf of the accused for a hearing under section 278.94 to determine whether evidence is admissible under subsection 276(2) or 278.92(2). Form and content of application (2) An application referred to in subsection (1) must be made in writing, setting out detailed particulars of the evidence that the accused seeks to adduce and the relevance of that evidence to an issue at trial, and a copy of the application must be given to the prosecutor and to the clerk of the court. Jury and public excluded (3) The judge, provincial court judge or justice shall consider the application with the jury and the public excluded. Judge may decide to hold hearing (4) If the judge, provincial court judge or justice is satisfied that the application was made in accordance with subsection (2), that a copy of the application was given to the prosecutor and to the clerk of the court at least seven days previously, or any shorter interval that the judge, provincial court judge or justice may allow in the interests of justice and that the evidence sought to be adduced is capable of being admissible under subsection 276(2), the judge, provincial court judge or justice shall grant the application and hold a hearing under section 278.94 to determine whether the evidence is admissible under subsection 276(2) or 278.92(2). Hearing — jury and public excluded 278.94 (1) The jury and the public shall be excluded from a hearing to determine whether evidence is admissible under subsection 276(2) or 278.92(2). Complainant not compellable (2) The complainant is not a compellable witness at the hearing but may appear and make submissions. Right to counsel (3) The judge shall, as soon as feasible, inform the complainant who participates in the hearing of their right to be represented by counsel. Judge’s determination and reasons (4) At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge, provincial court judge or justice shall determine whether the evidence, or any part of it, is admissible under subsection 276(2) or 278.92(2) and shall provide reasons for that determination, and (a) if not all of the evidence is to be admitted, the reasons must state the part of the evidence that is to be admitted; (b) the reasons must state the factors referred to in subsection 276(3) or 278.92(3) that affected the determination; and (c) if all or any part of the evidence is to be admitted, the reasons must state the manner in which that evidence is expected to be relevant to an issue at trial. Record of reasons (5) The reasons provided under subsection (4) shall be entered in the record of the proceedings or, if the proceedings are not recorded, shall be provided in writing. Publication prohibited 278.95 (1) A person shall not publish in any document, or broadcast or transmit in any way, any of the following: (a) the contents of an application made under subsection 278.93; (b) any evidence taken, the information given and the representations made at an application under section 278.93 or at a hearing under section 278.94; (c) the decision of a judge or justice under subsection 278.93(4), unless the judge or justice, after taking into account the complainant’s right of privacy and the interests of justice, orders that the decision may be published, broadcast or transmitted; and (d) the determination made and the reasons provided under subsection 278.94(4), unless (i) that determination is that evidence is admissible, or (ii) the judge or justice, after taking into account the complainant’s right of privacy and the interests of justice, orders that the determination and reasons may be published, broadcast or transmitted. Offence (2) Every person who contravenes subsection (1) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction. … Order restricting publication — sexual offences 486.4 (1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of (a) any of the following offences: (i) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 160, 162, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1, 172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 280, 281, 286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 or 347, or (ii) any offence under this Act, as it read from time to time before the day on which this subparagraph comes into force, if the conduct alleged would be an offence referred to in subparagraph (i) if it occurred on or after that day; or (b) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in paragraph (a). Mandatory order on application (2) In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice shall (a) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the victim of the right to make an application for the order; and (b) on application made by the victim, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order. Victim under 18 — other offences (2.1) Subject to subsection (2.2), in proceedings in respect of an offence other than an offence referred to in subsection (1), if the victim is under the age of 18 years, the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way. Mandatory order on application (2.2) In proceedings in respect of an offence other than an offence referred to in subsection (1), if the victim is under the age of 18 years, the presiding judge or justice shall (a) as soon as feasible, inform the victim of their right to make an application for the order; and (b) on application of the victim or the prosecutor, make the order. Child pornography (3) In proceedings in respect of an offence under section 163.1, a judge or justice shall make an order directing that any information that could identify a witness who is under the age of eighteen years, or any person who is the subject of a representation, written material or a recording that constitutes child pornography within the meaning of that section, shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way. Limitation (4) An order made under this section does not apply in respect of the disclosure of information in the course of the administration of justice when it is not the purpose of the disclosure to make the information known in the community. Version française Preuve concernant le comportement sexuel du plaignant 276 (1) Dans les poursuites pour une infraction prévue aux articles 151, 152, 153, 153.1 ou 155, aux paragraphes 160(2) ou (3) ou aux articles 170, 171, 172, 173, 271, 272 ou 273, la preuve de ce que le plaignant a eu une activité sexuelle avec l’accusé ou un tiers est inadmissible pour permettre de déduire du caractère sexuel de cette activité qu’il est : a) soit plus susceptible d’avoir consenti à l’activité à l’origine de l’accusation; b) soit moins digne de foi. Conditions de l’admissibilité (2) Dans les poursuites visées au paragraphe (1), l’accusé ou son représentant ne peut présenter de preuve de ce que le plaignant a eu une activité sexuelle autre que celle à l’origine de l’accusation sauf si le juge, le juge de la cour provinciale ou le juge de paix décide, conformément aux articles 278.93 et 278.94, à la fois: a) que cette preuve n’est pas présentée afin de permettre les déductions visées au paragraphe (1); b) que cette preuve est en rapport avec un élément de la cause; c) que cette preuve porte sur des cas particuliers d’activité sexuelle; d) que le risque d’effet préjudiciable à la bonne administration de la justice de cette preuve ne l’emporte pas sensiblement sur sa valeur probante. Facteurs à considérer (3) Pour décider si la preuve est admissible au titre du paragraphe (2), le juge, le juge de la cour provinciale ou le juge de paix prend en considération: a) l’intérêt de la justice, y compris le droit de l’accusé à une défense pleine et entière; b) l’intérêt de la société à encourager la dénonciation des agressions sexuelles; c) la possibilité, dans de bonnes conditions, de parvenir, grâce à elle, à une décision juste; d) le besoin d’écarter de la procédure de recherche des faits toute opinion ou préjugé discriminatoire; e) le risque de susciter abusivement, chez le jury, des préjugés, de la sympathie ou de l’hostilité; f) le risque d’atteinte à la dignité du plaignant et à son droit à la vie privée; g) le droit du plaignant et de chacun à la sécurité de leur personne, ainsi qu’à la plénitude de la protection et du bénéfice de la loi; h) tout autre facteur qu’il estime applicable en l’espèce. Précision (4) Il est entendu que, pour l’application du présent article, activité sexuelle s’entend notamment de toute communication à des fins d’ordre sexuel ou dont le contenu est de nature sexuelle. … Demande d’audience : articles 276 et 278.92 278.93 (1) L’accusé ou son représentant peut demander au juge, au juge de la cour provinciale ou au juge de paix de tenir une audience conformément à l’article 278.94 en vue de décider si la preuve est admissible au titre des paragraphes 276(2) ou 278.92(2). Forme et contenu (2) La demande d’audience est formulée par écrit et énonce toutes précisions utiles au sujet de la preuve en cause et le rapport de celle-ci avec un élément de la cause; une copie en est expédiée au poursuivant et au greffier du tribunal. Exclusion du jury et du public (3) Le jury et le public sont exclus de l’audition de la demande. Audience (4) Une fois convaincu que la demande a été établie conformément au paragraphe (2), qu’une copie en a été expédiée au poursuivant et au greffier du tribunal au moins sept jours auparavant, ou dans le délai inférieur autorisé par lui dans l’intérêt de la justice, et qu’il y a des possibilités que la preuve en cause soit admissible, le juge, le juge de la cour provinciale ou le juge de paix accorde la demande et tient une audience pour décider de l’admissibilité de la preuve au titre des paragraphes 276(2) ou 278.92(2). Audience — exclusion du jury et du public 278.94 (1) Le jury et le public sont exclus de l’audience tenue pour décider de l’admissibilité de la preuve au titre des paragraphes 276(2) ou 278.92(2). Non-contraignabilité (2) Le plaignant peut comparaître et présenter ses arguments à l’audience, mais ne peut être contraint à témoigner. Droit à un avocat (3) Le juge est tenu d’aviser dans les meilleurs délais le plaignant qui participe à l’audience de son droit d’être représenté par un avocat. Motifs (4) Le juge, le juge de la cour provinciale ou le juge de paix rend une décision, qu’il est tenu de motiver, à la suite de l’audience sur l’admissibilité de tout ou partie de la preuve au titre des paragraphes 276(2) ou 278.92(2), en précisant les points suivants: a) les éléments de la preuve retenus; b) ceux des facteurs mentionnés aux paragraphes 276(3) ou 278.92(3) ayant fondé sa décision; c) la façon dont tout ou partie de la preuve à admettre est en rapport avec un élément de la cause. Forme (5) Les motifs de la décision sont à porter dans le procès-verbal des débats ou, à défaut, donnés par écrit. Publication interdite 278.95 (1) Il est interdit de publier ou de diffuser de quelque façon que ce soit le contenu de la demande présentée en vertu de l’article 278.93 et tout ce qui a été dit ou déposé à l’occasion de cette demande ou aux audiences mentionnées à l’article 278.94. L’interdiction vise aussi, d’une part, la décision rendue sur la demande d’audience au titre du paragraphe 278.93(4) et, d’autre part, la décision et les motifs mentionnés au paragraphe 278.94(4), sauf, dans ce dernier cas, si la preuve est déclarée admissible ou, dans les deux cas, si le juge ou le juge de paix rend une ordonnance autorisant la publication ou la diffusion après avoir pris en considération le droit du plaignant à la vie privée et l’intérêt de la justice. Infraction (2) Quiconque contrevient au paragraphe (1) commet une infraction punissable sur déclaration de culpabilité par procédure sommaire. … Ordonnance limitant la publication — infractions d’ordre sexuel 486.4 (1) Sous réserve du paragraphe (2), le juge ou le juge de paix qui préside peut rendre une ordonnance interdisant de publier ou de diffuser de quelque façon que ce soit tout renseignement qui permettrait d’établir l’identité de la victime ou d’un témoin dans les procédures relatives à: a) l’une des infractions suivantes: (i) une infraction prévue aux articles 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 160, 162, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1, 172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 280, 281, 286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 ou 347, (ii) une infraction prévue par la présente loi, dans toute version antérieure à la date d’entrée en vigueur du présent sous-alinéa, dans le cas où l’acte reproché constituerait une infraction visée au sous-alinéa (i) s’il était commis à cette date ou par la suite; b) deux infractions ou plus dans le cadre de la même procédure, dont l’une est une infraction visée à l’alinéa a). Obligations du juge (2) Dans les procédures relatives à des infractions visées aux alinéas (1)a) ou b), le juge ou le juge de paix qui préside est tenu: a) d’aviser dès que possible les témoins âgés de moins de dix-huit ans et la victime de leur droit de demander l’ordonnance; b) de rendre l’ordonnance, si le poursuivant, la victime ou l’un de ces témoins lui en fait la demande. Victime de moins de dix-huit ans — autres infractions (2.1) Sous réserve du paragraphe (2.2), le juge ou le juge de paix qui préside peut rendre une ordonnance interdisant de publier ou de diffuser de quelque façon que ce soit tout renseignement qui permettrait d’établir l’identité de la victime âgée de moins de dix-huit ans dans les procédures relatives à toute infraction autre que celles visées au paragraphe (1). Obligations du juge (2.2) Dans les procédures relatives à toute infraction autre que celles visées au paragraphe (1), le juge ou le juge de paix qui préside est tenu, si la victime est âgée de moins de dix-huit ans: a) d’aviser dans les meilleurs délais la victime de son droit de demander l’ordonnance; b) de rendre l’ordonnance, si le poursuivant ou la victime lui en fait la demande. Pornographie juvénile (3) Dans les procédures relatives à une infraction visée à l’article 163.1, le juge ou le juge de paix rend une ordonnance interdisant de publier ou de diffuser de quelque façon que ce soit tout renseignement qui permettrait d’établir l’identité d’un témoin âgé de moins de dix-huit ans ou d’une personne faisant l’objet d’une représentation, d’un écrit ou d’un enregistrement qui constitue de la pornographie juvénile au sens de cet article. Restriction (4) Les ordonnances rendues en vertu du présent article ne s’appliquent pas à la communication de renseignements dans le cours de l’administration de la justice si la communication ne vise pas à renseigner la collectivité. [1] Many of the Criminal Code provisions referred to in this Addendum have been renumbered since the trial. For convenience, we will refer to the current section numbers. [2] Sections 278.93 and 278.94 also apply to applications and hearings regarding the admissibility of records in the accused’s possession that relate to a complainant, which are presumptively inadmissible under s. 278.92. [3] All Criminal Code provisions referred to in this Addendum are set out in full, in both French and English, in Appendix “A”. [4] Section 13(2) of the CJA states: “A judge of the Court of Appeal is, by virtue of his or her office, a judge of the Superior Court of Justice and has all the jurisdiction, power and authority of a judge of the Superior Court of Justice.” [5] Section 683(3) of the Criminal Code states: A court of appeal may exercise, in relation to proceedings in the court, any powers not mentioned in subsection (1) that may be exercised by the court on appeals in civil matters, and may issue any process that is necessary to enforce the orders or sentences of the court, but no costs shall be allowed to the appellant or respondent on the hearing and determination of an appeal or on any proceedings preliminary or incidental thereto. Section 134(1) of the CJA states: Unless otherwise provided, a court to which an appeal is taken may, (a) make any order or decision that ought to or could have been made by the court or tribunal appealed from; (b) order a new trial; (c) make any other order or decision that is considered just. [6] The Crown notes there is precedent for this court to impose a publication ban pursuant to s. 134(1) of the CJA: R. v. G.M., [2000] O.J. No. 5007, at para. 4. (Presumably, this was done in conjunction with s. 683(3) of the Criminal Code.) Further, the Crown notes that a Superior Court judge has inherent jurisdiction to vary or lift publication bans pursuant to s. 486.4 after the trial judge has become functus officio (R. v. Ireland (2005), 203 C.C.C. (3d) 443 (Ont. S.C.J.)). As noted, under s. 13(2) of the CJA, judges of this court have the jurisdiction, power and authority of judges of the Superior Court of Justice. [7] In our second request for submissions referred to above, we asked if this court’s inherent jurisdiction to make an order permitting unredacted publication of its reasons was confined to situations where there had been a material change in circumstances. We asked this question because in Re Joudrie and R. v. A.B., the complainants asked on appeal that publication bans imposed at trial be lifted and the Crown supported their requests. In lifting the publication bans, this court had regard to principles set out in R. v. Adams, [1955] 4 S.C.R. 707. In Adams, the Supreme Court of Canada held, at para. 30, that, as a general rule, any order relating to the conduct of a trial can be varied or revoked if the circumstances that were present at the time the order was made have materially changed. To be material, the change must relate to a matter that justified the order in the first place.