Wong v. Christou

2025 BCSC 1212 Wong v. Christou IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: Wong v. Christou, 2025 BCSC 1212 Date: 20250627 Docket: S251493 Registry: Vancouver Between: Mark Siu Pong Wong Petitioner And Nicholas Christou Respondent Before: The Honourable Madam Justice W.A. Baker On judicial review from: A decision of the Residential Tenancy Branch dated April 9, 2024 (RTB File No. 910142932) Reasons for Judgment Counsel for the Petitioner: A. Ehteshami Counsel for Respondent: D. Shim Place and Date of Hearing: Vancouver, B.C. April 17, 2025 Place and Date of Judgment: Vancouver, B.C. June 27, 2025 INTRODUCTION [1] The petitioner, Mr. Wong, is a landlord who argues that he was not given notice of a hearing before the Residential Tenancy Branch ("RTB"), in which the arbitrator ordered him to pay $30,700 to his tenant, Mr. Christou. Mr. Wong applies for judicial review of the decision of Arbitrator Nelson of the RTB dated April 9, 2024, which was issued pursuant to the Residential Tenancy Act, S.B.C. 2002, c. 78 ("RTA"). In the alternative, Mr. Wong seeks to set aside the review decision of Arbitrator Smit, of the RTB dated February 18, 2025. Mr. Wong seeks an order remitting the dispute back to the RTB for a hearing de novo. [2] In the decision under review, the RTB ordered Mr. Wong to pay the respondent, Mr. Christou, $30,700 on the basis Mr. Wong did not move into the rental unit within a reasonable time, and failed to stay in the rental unit for at least six months. [3] Mr. Wong's objection to the decision is that he was not given notice of the hearing, or an opportunity to be heard. He says the decision is patently unreasonable for two reasons. First, he says the arbitrator had clear evidence that he was not served, and proceeded with the hearing anyways. Second, he says the RTB decision has provided insufficient reasons to explain why it found Mr. Wong was deemed to be served. Background [4] Mr. Wong owns a condominium located at 701 - 933 Seymour Street, in Vancouver, which he rented to Mr. Christou. [5] Mr. Wong and Mr. Christou were parties to a tenancy agreement which began on March 1, 2022. On May 24, 2023, Mr. Wong's agent served a two month notice to end tenancy for landlord's use on Mr. Christou, terminating the tenancy effective August 1, 2023. [6] On February 6, 2024, Mr. Christou filed a notice of dispute proceeding against Mr. Wong. [7] Mr. Christou purported to serve Mr. Wong with the notice of dispute proceeding at 323 W. 24th Street, North Vancouver. [8] The hearing before Arbitrator Nelson took place on April 9, 2024, and lasted just over 30 minutes. Mr. Wong submits that he did not receive the notice of dispute proceeding, or notice of the hearing. ISSUES ON REVIEW [9] This petition raises the following issues: a) Are the affidavits of Mr. Wong and Mr. Christou filed in this petition admissible in relation to any issues in this petition? b) Should Mr. Wong be permitted to bring this application for judicial review outside the deadlines permitted under the Administrative Tribunals Act, S.B.C. 2004, c. 45 (the "ATA")? c) What is the appropriate decision under review? d) What is the appropriate standard of review? e) Was the decision of the arbitrator patently unreasonable? f) Did the arbitrator breach Mr. Wong's right to procedural fairness? Are the affidavits of Mr. Wong and Mr. Christou filed in this petition admissible in relation to any issues in this petition? [10] Both Mr. Wong and Mr. Christou filed affidavits in support of this petition. Neither party made an application to admit fresh evidence. On an application for judicial review, the general rule is that the record is limited to the evidence that was before the adjudicator whose decision is under review. [11] This was addressed in Johal v. Damiano, 2021 BCCA 197 at para. 40: [40] On appeal, the Johals again seek to rely on the affidavits they filed in support of their judicial review application. However, as those affidavits were not before Arbitrator Martin, Mr. Damiano's objection to them is well taken. Apposite is the following from Justice MacKenzie's judgment in Albu v. The University of British Columbia, 2015 BCCA 41, 69 B.C.L.R. (5th) 222: [36] On judicial review, the reviewing court generally does not admit evidence that is not part of the record: SELI Canada Inc. v. Construction and Specialized Workers' Union, Local 1611, 2011 BCCA 353 at para. 80. This Court clearly explained in [Actton Transport Ltd. v. British Columbia (Employment Standards), 2010 BCCA 272] at para. 23 that the reviewing court usurps the role of the tribunal where it receives new evidence that was not before the tribunal and conducts a de novo hearing rather than reviewing the tribunal's decision based on the record that was before the tribunal. Such an approach is not appropriate on judicial review or on an appeal from a judicial review decision. [Emphasis added.] See also: Air Canada v. British Columbia (Workers' Compensation Appeal Tribunal), 2018 BCCA 387 at paras. 32-44, 15 B.C.L.R. (6th) 238. [12] As a result, I will not rely on the affidavits of either party in determining the issues raised in the judicial review. [13] However, there is a preliminary question, for which the affidavit of Mr. Wong is admissible. I find that the affidavit of Mr. Wong is admissible on the issue of delay in bringing this petition. I accept his affidavit to the extent it provides an explanation for his delay in commencing the petition. Should Mr. Wong be permitted to bring this application for judicial review outside the deadlines permitted under the Administrative Tribunals Act? [14] Pursuant to s. 57(1) of the ATA, an application for judicial review must be filed within 60 days of the decision. This deadline may be extended if the court is satisfied that there are serious grounds for relief, there is a reasonable expectation for the delay, and no substantial prejudice or hardship will result to a person affected by the delay: s. 57(2). Serious grounds for relief [15] I am satisfied that Mr. Wong has established serious grounds for relief. The application for dispute resolution was served at an old address for Mr. Wong, and there was no evidence that Mr. Wong had actual notice of the hearing. I am satisfied that Mr. Wong has raised a serious issue for determination on this point. I am also satisfied that his secondary basis, namely the adequacy of the reasons for decision, ought properly to be determined in the same application Reasonable expectation for the delay [16] In January 2025, Mr. Wong began communicating with a mortgage lender when seeking to obtain a new mortgage. At that point, for the first time, he learned of the RTB decision and the monetary award of $30,700 against him. Prior to that, Mr. Wong says he had no notice of the decision, or the notice of dispute before the RTB. [17] There is no evidence that Mr. Christou advised Mr. Wong of the decision at any time, or took any steps to enforce the judgment. Mr. Wong says he did not receive the original notice of dispute, and when he learned of the decision he took immediate steps to launch this review. [18] I am satisfied that Mr. Wong has presented a reasonable explanation for the delay. No substantial prejudice or hardship [19] Mr. Christou has taken no steps to enforce the decision since it was rendered, and has demonstrated no hardship if this matter proceeds to a hearing. He filed the dispute six months after he moved out of the unit, and took no steps to enforce the judgment between April 2024 and January 2025. [20] I am satisfied that Mr. Christou has not established any prejudice or hardship, if this judicial review was to proceed. Conclusion on delay [21] I am satisfied that Mr. Wong has met the test articulated in s. 57(2) of the ATA, and I extend the deadline for filing the application for judicial review to permit this matter to be heard on its merits. What is the appropriate decision under review? [22] While Mr. Wong seeks to set aside both the decision of Arbitrator Nelson and the decision of Arbitrator Smit, in argument he focussed on the decision of Arbitrator Nelson as the prooper decision to be reviewed. [23] Mr. Wong submits that the review procedure under the RTA did not allow for a full reconsideration of the original decision. [24] Under s. 79(2) of the RTA, a decision may be reviewed only in certain circumstances. The circumstances relevant to the case before me are: (2) A decision or an order of the director may be reviewed only on one or more of the following grounds: (a) a party was unable to attend the original hearing or part of the original hearing because of circumstances that could not be anticipated and were beyond the party's control; (b) a party has new and relevant evidence that was not available at the time of the original hearing and that materially affects the decision; (d) in the original dispute resolution proceeding, the director did not determine an issue that the director was required to determine; (e) in the original dispute resolution proceeding, the director determined an issue that the director did not have jurisdiction to determine. [25] Mr. Wong provided detailed written submissions in support of his review application. These submissions referenced the evidence that was before Arbitrator Nelson, including the transcript of the hearing. No new evidence was submitted to Arbitrator Smit. [26] Arbitrator Smit considered each of the four circumstances raised by Mr. Wong, as set out above. [27] Arbitrator Smit made the following findings: a) Mr. Wong provided no evidence to rebut the deemed receipt of service, found by Arbitrator Nelson, such as evidence that he was living at a different address on the date of service; b) Mr. Wong submitted no new evidence on the application for review, and identified no new evidence which would have an impact on the decision; c) The issue of service was determined by Arbitrator Nelson; and d) Arbitrator Nelson did have the jurisdiction to proceed in the absence of a party, pursuant to the Rules of Procedure. [28] Arbitrator Smit dismissed Mr. Wong's application for review. Did the Review process provide for a substantive review of the merits of Mr. Wong's claim? [29] In Yellow Cab Company Ltd. v. Passenger Transportation Board, 2014 BCCA 329, the court of appeal addressed the availability of a judicial review of an initial decision, when the statutory regime included a statutory review of the initial decision. The court held: [38] I do not read Auyeung as standing for the broad proposition that whenever a statute provides a tribunal with power to reconsider its decisions, the courts will refuse to entertain judicial review of the tribunal's initial decisions. Auyeung is more nuanced. In applying it, a court must consider the scope of the reconsideration power and whether an attempt has been made to invoke it. Where a party has attempted to invoke the reconsideration power, the court must also consider whether the tribunal - either in undertaking reconsideration or in deciding that it will not do so - has made a determination that the allegation of error lacks foundation. I will discuss the various possible scenarios and the considerations that apply to them. [39] There is a general principle that a party must exhaust statutory administrative review procedures before bringing a judicial review application: Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Matsqui Indian Band, 1995 CanLII 145 (SCC), [1995] 1 S.C.R. 3; Harelkin v. University of Regina, 1979 CanLII 18 (SCC), [1979] 2 S.C.R. 561. For that reason, where an alleged error comes within a tribunal's statutory power of reconsideration, a court may refuse to entertain judicial review if the party has not made an attempt to take advantage of the reconsideration provision. Of course, where the power of reconsideration is not wide enough to encompass the alleged error, reconsideration cannot be considered an adequate alternative remedy to judicial review, and the existence of the limited power of reconsideration will not be an impediment to judicial review. [40] Where a party has taken advantage of a tribunal's reconsideration power, and the tribunal has undertaken the reconsideration, it is the reconsideration decision that represents the final decision of the tribunal. In such a situation, it is only the reconsideration decision that may be judicially reviewed, since it is the final decision of the tribunal. [41] A final common scenario arises where a tribunal has jurisdiction to reconsider a decision, but that power is discretionary. This situation arises where leave is required for reconsideration. A denial of leave will usually represent a considered decision by the tribunal that the allegation of error lacks substance or is so inconsequential as to be vexatious. [44] Where a denial of leave does not constitute a determination that the request for reconsideration lacks merit, it is my view that the initial administrative decision, and not the denial of leave, will be the appropriate target for judicial review. To hold otherwise would be to allow a tribunal, through procedural machinations, to oust the inherent, constitutionally-protected supervisory jurisdiction of the superior courts. In Jozipovic v. British Columbia (Workers' Compensation Board), 2012 BCCA 174, this Court emphasized that a tribunal cannot, by blocking access to administrative review of a decision, bar the courts from passing on the merits of judicial review. [30] In the case before me, Mr. Wong advances two grounds in his application to review the initial decision. Mr. Wong argues Arbitrator Nelson's decision in finding that he was properly served is patently unreasonable, and he argues the patently unreasonable decision resulted in a hearing that was procedurally unfair. [31] I am not satisfied that Arbitrator Smit had the jurisdiction to determine the issues raised in this petition. While Arbitrator Smit did consider the question of whether the party was unable to attend because of circumstances that could not be anticipated and were beyond the party's control, that narrow question and Arbitrator Smit's focus on the fact that Mr. Wong provided no new evidence on the review hearing, do not provide an adequate alternative remedy to judicial review. [32] The position of Mr. Wong on this judicial review is that, based on the facts before Arbitrator Nelson, his decision was patently unreasonable and the hearing was procedurally unfair. These are not questions which Arbitrator Smit was capable of addressing under the limited review powers found in the RTA. [33] As such, I find that the decision of Arbitrator Nelson is the appropriate decision under review in this judicial review. What is the appropriate standard of review? [34] The appropriate standard of review of an arbitrator's decision under the RTA has been determined many times by this court, and is grounded in ss. 5.1 and 84.1 of the RTA and s. 58 of the ATA. [35] Questions of fact, law and discretion are only open to review if such decisions are patently unreasonable: Yee v Montie, 2016 BCCA 256 at para. 19. In Yee, the court of appeal described when a decision is patently unreasonable: [21] The ATA does not define patent unreasonableness as the term applies to questions of fact or law. In Manz v. Sundher, 2009 BCCA 92 at para. 39, Saunders J.A. adopted the meaning of the phrase in relation to factual matters from Speckling v. British Columbia (Workers' Compensation Board), 2005 BCCA 80: [37] As the chambers judge noted, a decision is not patently unreasonable because the evidence is insufficient. It is not for the court on judicial review, or for this Court on appeal, to second guess the conclusions drawn from the evidence considered by the Appeal Division and substitute different findings of fact or inferences drawn from those facts. A court on review or appeal cannot reweigh the evidence. Only if there is no evidence to support the findings, or the decision is "openly, clearly, evidently unreasonable", can it be said to be patently unreasonable. That is not the case here. [36] In the case before me, the petitioner alleges the reasons of Arbitrator Nelson are insufficient, resulting in a patently unreasonable decision. Adequacy of reasons has been considered in the test of patent unreasonableness. In Kong v. Lee, 2021 BCSC 606, the court stated: [63] The standard of patent unreasonableness also applies to the consideration of the adequacy of reasons. A court conducting a judicial review must consider both the outcome and the reasons provided for it: Vavilov at para. 83; Air Canada v. British Columbia (Workers' Compensation Appeal Tribunal), 2018 BCCA 387 at para. 74. The latter inquiry is an assessment of the "justification, transparency and intelligibility" of the decision-making process: Ashurwin Holdings Ltd. v. British Columbia, 2012 BCSC 1408 at paras. 18-21; Pacific Newspaper Group Inc. v. Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, Local 2000, 2014 BCCA 496 at para. 41, citing Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at para. 47. [64] The Supreme Court of Canada recently reiterated the importance of adequate reasons in Vavilov. It is the duty of a reviewing court, whether applying the reasonableness or the patent unreasonableness standard, to determine whether the reasons meaningfully consider the central issue in the case and the concerns raised by the parties: Guevara v. Louie, 2020 BCSC 380 at para. 48. In the specific context of a judicial review of an RTB decision applying the patent unreasonableness standard, Justice Davies in Laverdure v. First United Church Social Housing Society, 2014 BCSC 2232, summarized the requirements for adequate reasons: 35 What I take from my review of all of the authorities to which I was referred is that for the reasons of a Dispute Resolution Officer [now arbitrator] to be adequate, they must: 1) Set out the legal test to be met by the party advancing its claim; 2) Set out the adjudicator's findings of fact and the principal evidence upon which those findings were made; and 3) Apply those findings of fact to the test to be met in reaching a conclusion that will allow the parties and others (including a reviewing court) to understand how and why the adjudicator reached that decision. 36 That need for the reasons given to be understandable is the key to determining their adequacy. 37 In short, for reasons to be adequate, they need not necessarily address every issue raised by the parties nor all of the evidence adduced, but on the central issue or issues that underlie the conclusion reached there must be sufficient clarity of fact finding and application of those facts to the test to be met to allow the parties and a court to know why the decision was reached and whether it was within a range of acceptable outcomes. [65] Under the RTA regime, the overriding test for adequacy of reasons is "whether a reviewing court is able to understand how and why the decision was made": Ganitano v. Yeung, 2016 BCSC 2227 at para. 24. [37] Questions of procedural fairness, however, must be decided having regard to whether, in all of the circumstances, the tribunal acted fairly. Many cases have considered what level of procedural fairness is to be applied in RTB hearings, and have concluded that such hearings require the adjudicator to observe a high degree of procedural fairness, following the analysis in Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 ["Baker"] at paras. 25-28. In Ndachena v. Nguyen, 2018 BCSC 1468, the court held: [55] It is settled law that a decision reached through an unfair process cannot stand. In Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 1999 CanLII 699 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, the Court summarized the considerations going into determining the nature and extent of a duty of fairness in particular circumstances. [56] The duty of procedural fairness is flexible and variable and depends on an appreciation of the context of the particular statute and the rights affected. The purpose of the participatory rights contained within it is to ensure that administrative decisions are made using a fair and open procedure, appropriate to the decision being made and its statutory, institutional and social context, with an opportunity for those affected to put forward their views and evidence fully and have them considered by the decision-maker. [57] Several factors are relevant to determining the content of the duty of fairness: (1) the nature of the decision being made and process followed in making it; (2) the nature of the statutory scheme and the terms of the statute pursuant to which the body operates; (3) the importance of the decision to the individual or individuals affected; (4) the legitimate expectations of the person challenging the decision; (5) the choices of procedure made by the agency itself. This list is not exhaustive. [58] I am satisfied that the petitioners were entitled to a high level of procedural fairness in the Dispute Resolution Applications. The issues before the Arbitrator were adversarial with serious financial consequences to the petitioners. The statutory scheme under the RTA vests the RTB with the same powers in residential tenancy disputes to grant monetary judgments as the provincial court has in other matters. [38] I agree that a high degree of procedural fairness was required before the RTB. The financial penalty against landlords for improper eviction is very high, and should not be granted without providing a landlord a high degree of procedural fairness. [39] Considerations on a review for procedural fairness do not engage the substance of the outcome of the hearing before the tribunal. [40] Mr. Wong asserts a breach of procedural fairness in Arbitrator Nelson's decision to proceed with the hearing in his absence. The standard of review on this issue is fairness in all the circumstances. Was the decision of the arbitrator patently unreasonable? The evidence before the arbitrator [41] On May 24, 2023, Mr. Wong, through his agent Mr. William Fok, sent Mr. Christou a "Notice to End Tenancy For Landlord's Use of Property", requiring Mr. Christou to move out of the rental unit by July 31, 2023. The address for the landlord (Mr. Wong) on the notice was 323 W. 24th Street, North Vancouver, BC, V7M 2C7. The address of the rental unit was 701 - 933 Seymour Street, Vancouver, BC, V6B 6L6. [42] On February 6, 2024, Mr. Christou filed a notice of dispute proceeding against Mr. Wong. On his notice of dispute proceeding, Mr. Christou stated Mr. Wong's address for service of documents was 323 W. 24th Street, North Vancouver, BC, V7M 2C7. [43] There was no response from Mr. Wong in the RTB file prior to the hearing commencing. [44] On April 9, 2024, the hearing before Arbitrator Nelson began. There were no witnesses other than Mr. Christou. [45] Arbitrator Nelson asked Mr. Christou how he served Mr. Wong, and Mr. Christou responded that he served Mr. Wong by registered mail at 323 W. 24th Street, North Vancouver, BC, V7M 2C7. Arbitrator Nelson referred to a photograph of a stamped letter on a postal scale, showing registered mail tracking number. There is no reference in the transcript to evidence of the letter actually being successfully delivered to the address. [46] Arbitrator Nelson then confirmed with Mr. Christou that the notice to end tenancy stated that Mr. Wong would be moving into 701 - 933 Seymour Street, Vancouver, BC. Mr. Christou confirmed that the only address he served Mr. Wong at was the 323 W. 24th Street, North Vancouver address. [47] Mr. Christou was questioned by Arbitrator Nelson about his decision to serve Mr. Wong at the North Vancouver address, when the notice clearly stated Mr. Wong would be moving into the Seymour Street unit. [48] Mr. Christou gave hearsay testimony about what he heard when he was in the unit at the time of move out. He stated he overheard Mr. Wong talking to someone about how he intended to manage the unit as an AirBnb. [49] Arbitrator Nelson then asked Mr. Christou if he had "any other tangible reason to believe [Mr. Wong] was still living there or that he can - in some way confirm that he - that address was still a valid address for service?" Mr. Christou replied: Yes. So I so - William, Chun Wai - basically I was on the phone with him, and I said, hey, I would like to - I have basically mail to send to Mark. I didn't tell him what it was. Can I send it to this address? And he says yes. He said yes, so - but I said when I sent it -- [50] Arbitrator Nelson then confirmed that the letter was sent to the North Vancouver address, and asked Mr. Christou to affirm that the William he referred to was the landlord's agent. Mr. Christou stated William was the landlord's agent, and stated he spoke to William two weeks before he sent the letter. [51] William, who is purported to be Mr. Wong's agent, was not a witness on the hearing, and there was nothing in writing to confirm the statements attributed to him by Mr. Christou. The only text message Mr. Christou provided in evidence was from William on May 24, 2023 where he told Mr. Christou that the "Landlord decided to take the unit back and move in himself". [52] Arbitrator Nelson stated: Because the landlord has not appeared, I need to be very certain that you have served him at an address where he could be expected to get it, so that's why I'm asking so many questions here. Do you have any other evidence that you were able to use that address? [53] Mr. Christou replied that he had no other evidence. The decision [54] The relevant parts of the decision of Arbitrator Nelson are the following: Service of Notice of Dispute Resolution Proceeding (Proceeding Package) I find that Landlord M.S.P.W. is deemed served with the Proceeding Package, in accordance with section 90 of the Act, on February 12, 2024, by registered mail in accordance with section 89(1) of the Act, the fifth day after the registered mailing. The Tenant provided a copy of the Canada Post Customer Receipt containing the tracking number to confirm this service. Service of Evidence Based on the submissions before me, I find that the Tenant's evidence was served to the Landlord in accordance with section 88 of the Act. No evidence was received by the Residential Tenancy Branch from the Landlord. Analysis [55] Arbitrator Nelson states that service was effected pursuant to s. 89(1) and 90 of the RTA. Arbitrator Nelson does not specify which subsection of s. 89(1) is relied upon. Section 89(1) states: 89 (1) An application for dispute resolution or a decision of the director to proceed with a review under Division 2 of Part 5, when required to be given to one party by another, must be given in one of the following ways: (a) by leaving a copy with the person; (b) if the person is a landlord, by leaving a copy with an agent of the landlord; (c) by sending a copy by registered mail to the address at which the person resides or, if the person is a landlord, to the address at which the person carries on business as a landlord; (d) if the person is a tenant, by sending a copy by registered mail to a forwarding address provided by the tenant; (e) [Repealed 2023-47-98.] (f) by any other means of service provided for in the regulations. [56] The decision states that service was effected by Mr. Chrstou sending the notice by registered mail. It is not clear if the arbitrator was relying on s. 89(1)(b), service on an agent (which does not permit service by mail), or s. 89(1)(c) (service by mail), or some other section. If the arbitrator was relying on s. 89(1)(b), some evidence that William was in fact the agent of the landlord in February 2024 would be required, and some evidence that the notice was left with the agent (as opposed to mailed to the agent) would be required. If the arbitrator was relying on s. 89(1)(c), some evidence that Mr. Wong lived at the North Vancouver address, or carried on business at the North Vancouver address, would be required. The specific legal basis for the arbitrator's decision is not set out in the decision. [57] The issue as to where Mr. Wong resided in February 2024 was raised before Arbitrator Nelson, who asked Mr. Christou why he would assume the address on W. 24th Street, North Vancouver, was the address where Mr. Wong was residing, given Mr. Wong's notice to end tenancy stated he was moving into the Seymour Street apartment. Mr. Christou recounted hearsay evidence of a conversation he overheard on the day he moved out of the unit, suggesting that Mr. Wong intended to rent out the apartment on AirB&B. [58] Mr. Christou also told the arbitrator that a person named William would accept service. However, this evidence was not corroborated. There was no evidence before the arbitrator that Mr. Wong was residing at or carrying out business as a landlord at the North Vancouver address in February 2024, as would be required under s. 89(1)(c). [59] The documentary evidence before the arbitrator was that Mr. Wong advised Mr. Christou that he would be moving into the Seymour Street apartment. The arbitrator appears to have rejected the evidence of residency set out on the face of the notice to end tenancy, but it is not clear why the arbitrator did so. The evidence before the arbitrator raised many questions regarding appropriate service, none of which were considered on the face of the decision. [60] For the decision of Arbitrator Nelson to be adequate, Arbitrator Nelson needed to set out which subsection of s. 89(1) was relied on, what evidence was accepted or rejected, what findings of fact were made, and how those findings of fact supported a conclusion that service was completed in compliance with s. 89(1) of the Act. Instead, the decision of Arbitrator Nelson sets out a bald conclusion, but I am not able to understand how and why the decision was made. [61] As a result of Arbitrator Nelson's failure to set out how and why the decision was made, and failure to address what evidence the arbitrator accepted at the hearing, I find the decision is patently unreasonable. Did the arbitrator breach Mr. Wong's right to procedural fairness? [62] I am satisfied that Mr. Wong was entitled to a high level of procedural fairness before the arbitrator. The issues before the arbitrator were adversarial with serious financial consequences for Mr. Wong. [63] Arbitrator Nelson clearly understood the importance of ensuring that Mr. Wong had notice of the hearing. He stated to Mr. Christou "I need to be very certain that you have served him at an address where he could be expected to get it." [64] Arbitrators under the RTA must make their decisions using a fair and open procedure, appropriate to the decision being made. They must ensure those affected have an opportunity to put forward their views and evidence fully and have them considered by the decision-maker. [65] In the face of the need to be certain that Mr. Wong had an opportunity to be heard before rendering a decision resulting in a judgment against him of more than $30,000, Arbitrator Nelson could have adjourned the hearing and required Mr. Christou to serve Mr. Wong at the Seymour Street address, or provide some positive proof of actual service. There was no urgency in proceeding with the hearing. Mr. Christou had been out of the apartment for six months by the time he filed the dispute notice. [66] I find that Mr. Wong's right to procedural fairness in the hearing of this dispute was breached. Disposition [67] The petition for judicial review is allowed. I remit the dispute to the RTB for a hearing de novo. [68] I award ordinary costs to the petitioner, Mr. Wong. "W.A. Baker J."