Campitelli v. Ajax (Town)

Campitelli v. Ajax (Town) Collection Decisions of the Court of Appeal Date 2000-07-11 Docket numbers C33370 Judges Carthy, James Joseph; Austin, Allan McNiece; Moldaver, Michael James Subject Civil Decision Content DATE: 20000711 DOCKET: C33370 COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO RE: NINO CAMPITELLI (Plaintiff (Appellant)) and THE CORPORATION OF THE TOWN OF AJAX, RUNNYMEDE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LIMITED AND RUNNYMEDE SOMERSET LTD. (Defendants (Respondents)) BEFORE: CARTHY, AUSTIN AND MOLDAVER JJ.A. COUNSEL: Jeffrey E. Streisfield For the appellant N. Cameron Murkar For the respondent Corporation of the Town of Ajax Raymond M. Slattery For the respondent Runnymede Development Corporation and Runnymede Somerset Ltd. HEARD: June 12, 2000 On appeal from the order of Somers J. dated December 8, 1999. ENDORSEMENT [1] We agree with the conclusion reached by the motions judge that summary judgment should issue to the extent indicated in his reasons. The plaintiff raises a myriad of issues spawned by his concern that the municipality and his neighbour are acting male fides. However, he presents no real evidence to give reality to his suspicions. [2] While we substantially agree with the reasons of Somers J., we must add our comments concerning two issues that he did not refer to. [3] A road allowance ran between the properties of the plaintiff and Runnymede, and thence south to the shore of Lake Ontario. Instead of passing one by-law to close the road, the Town passed five by-laws, each applying to a segment of the entire allowance and one of which applied to the land between the plaintiff’s property and that of Runnymede. [4] The appellant argues that this was a ruse to avoid the approval of the Ministry of the closing of a road leading to a lake as required by s.297(3) of the Municipal Act (since repealed). The purpose of this section was, no doubt, to secure access points to lakes and waterways and we see no detriment to that purpose in treating the closing opposite the plaintiff’s property as not being contemplated by s.297(3). There is an east- west access road south of the plaintiff’s property and the Minister’s approval, when it was required, can properly be considered as required for closings between that road and the lake. In any event, were we to hold otherwise, it would only require the Town to pass a new by-law and would not justify a trial. [5] A legitimate purpose for segregating the closing by-law adjacent to the Runnymede property may relate to the second subject of these reasons. The Town sold the westerly half of the former road allowance abutting Runnymede’s property to Runnymede and also granted a perpetual easement for “grading purposes” over the easterly portion. The closing by-law identified the north and south limits of that segment and thus permitted it to be easily dealt with apart from the portions to the south. The plaintiff submits that the permanent easement is, in effect, a sale of the eastern segment and, pursuant to s.215(2) of the Municipal Act must be offered to him as the abutting owner. We disagree. The municipality is entitled to treat this property as its own, in this case as a bike path subject to a grading easement, and the plaintiff’s rights do not arise until there is a determination by the municipality to effect a true sale. [6] For these reasons the appeal is dismissed with costs. “J.J. Carthy J.A.” “Austin J.A.” “M. Moldaver J.A.”